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The research and analysis regarding compelled commercial speech utilized the
theoretical perspectives of: 1) "hegemony" as theorized by Antonio Gramsci and 2)
"countervailing power" as outlined by political economist, John Kenneth Galbraith.
Gramsci maintained that hegemony occurs when a dominant class or alliance of classes
or social groups assert a unifying world view and successfully gain political and
economic control over subordinate society through consent rather than direct force.
Galbraith's theory of countervailing power asserts that modern capitalistic society breeds
centers of industrial concentration that become monopolies or oligopolies. He views this
as a positive formula for growth if the monopolistic power systems induce countervailing
institutions that wield sufficient power to prevent potential abuse and exploitation by the
dominant groups.
This dual theoretical perspective offered the means to analyze the agricultural
climate and players involved in the compelled commercial speech conflict by examining
which entities or individuals have the economic power, which parties are vulnerable to
abuse or exploitation, which ones are induced to build centers of countervailing power
and what will be needed for success as a countervailing institution.
The goal of this study was to obtain evidence and to perform an economic,
political and legal analysis that would show the relationship between the law on
compelled commercial speech and the underlying interests of key entities seeking to
maximize their positions. Further, this analysis sought to identify the consequences,
including the role of speech and communications in the industrial, economic and political
environment, occasioned by different legal resolutions on compelled commercial speech.
Research methods included analysis of primary documents such as case law,
briefs, transcripts, Congressional testimony, published federal and state agency materials,
and statements by commodity promotion boards and commissions; review of generic
advertising; analysis of secondary evidence on checkoffs in print or electronic format;
and telephone interviews with individuals knowledgeable about the checkoff programs or
involved in the legal challenges. Two investigative frames were used as tools to collect
and analyze evidence, along with traditional legal analysis and a critical approach to all
evidentiary materials. Gramsci's ideas on hegemony and Galbraith's theory of
countervailing power provided a framework for interpreting the evidence
This study showed a climate ripe for hegemonic change in the agricultural
industry driven by economic and political changes that are creating a profound "season of
discontent" much broader than the First Amendment free speech issue. Parallel winds of
change in First Amendment doctrine have coincided to elevate this particular issue as a
platform for the challengers. Resolution of the government speech defense issue and the
First Amendment issue regarding the appropriate level of protection for compelled
commercial speech will have ripples on economic, political and social institutions that are
affected by the way in which commercial speech may be compelled and regulated.
vi

ABSTRACT
A major battle in First Amendment free speech rights is raging over the
constitutionality of mandatory commodity assessments for generic product advertising
(called "commodity checkoffs"). Such advertising features slogans such as "Got Milk?"
"The Other White Meat" and "Beef, It's What's for Dinner." More than $750 tpillion per
year is collected in commodity checkoffs on the basis of stand-alone legislation or
marketing orders that have their genesis in legislation dating back to 1937. This income
directly supports generic advertising, administrative salaries, research and educational
activities and indirectly supports other functions. The rationale for commodity checkoffs
is to maintain and expand the market for commodities.
The First Amendment challengers claim that forced payment of such fees to fund
commercial speech with which they disagree is a violation of their free speech rights.
The courts have addressed these arguments in a line of cases, including the 2001
Supreme Court case, United States v. United Foods. In United Foods, the Court struck
down mushroom checkoffs by applying a First Amendment doctrine regarding freedom
from compelled speech or compelled association, as first established in the union dues
case, Abood v. Detroit Board of Education. In doing so, it avoided applying the
commercial speech doctrine set forth in the Central Hudson test, a standard followed by
lower courts in deciding earlier checkoff cases.
United Foods triggered a spate of hotly contested cases involving challenges to
commodity checkoffs, with the USDA and dominant leadership in the agricultural
industry vigorously defending the checkoff programs on the grounds that the generic
advertising constitutes "government speech." The decisions indicate a judicial trend
toward recognizing the First Amendment rights of the challengers by holding commodity
checkoffs unconstitutional unless they are part of a complex regulatory scheme. The
lower courts are divided in regard to the "government speech" defense, and the issue has
yet to be addressed by the U.S. Supreme Court.

The legal conflict constitutes only one layer of a broader political, economic and
social picture. The research revealed that the agricultural industry is experiencing
dramatic shifts from competitive industry models to industry structures characterized by
concentration, vertical integration, and powerful control by meat packers, dairy and meat
processors and other entities higher in the "food chain." A network of close relationships
among the USDA, trade associations and giant agribusiness organizations suggests the
possibility of a deeply imbedded hegemony thriving off checkoff fee wealth.
The central thesis of this dissertation is that the line of compelled commercial
speech cases represents a fundamental hegemonic conflict within the agricultural industry
in which the challengers are using the courts and the First Amendment as a mechanism to
break the current hegemony of commodity checkoffs and establish countervailing power.
If successful, the resulting changes will impact both the hegemony of the agricultural
industry and the development of First Amendment doctrine.
V
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CHAPTER l
INTRODUCTION
Constitutional challenges to the laws and regulations promulgated by
governmental institutions (or institutions of "the State") never arise in a vacuum in the
United States. A targeted law or regulation is always associated with its own lineage of
direct and indirect enforcement by legal, economic, cultural and political institutions that
interact to produce a dominant approach. Every constitutional challenge is launched
within the context of a complex social and political environment populated by players
with contradictory private and public agendas. The challengers seek to change the
dominant approach and shift the balance of power by asserting an argument grounded in
constitutional theory.
A powerful example of a challenge representing a struggle of epic proportion can
be found in the civil rights movement of the 1960s. In that conflict, the vested interests
and historic actions of government, society and African American citizens and others
who believed in equal justice under law (individually and collectively) were involved in
the legal battle for equal rights as interpreted under the Constitution of the United States
and its Amendments.
While the civil rights conflict today is not evidenced as openly in strident clashes
between individuals and State authority, people of color, gays and other minorities still
advance constitutional challenges to seek the equality that will allow them to achieve
economic, political and cultural goals. Studying the court cases and the legal issues
affords only a partial understanding of any conflict since such an approach does not
illuminate the nature of the social and political forces that surrounded these legal

1

developments in the past and continue to provide context for the legal conflicts today. A
fuller understanding can be gained only by a careful analysis of the players involved in
the battle for power, the interests at stake, the platforms or principles being espoused and
the underlying values that may not be openly expressed.
In a parallel fashion, notable struggles have occurred during the second half of the
Twentieth Century and early years of the Twenty-first Century in the realm of First
Amendment rights. The First Amendment of the Constitution of the United States of
America says: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press,
or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances." 1 As might be expected in a republic such as the United States,
protection of political speech has been a primary and critical focal point of First
Amendment jurisprudence. But standards of protection for other types of speech have
also generated First Amendment doctrine, including a body of case law and legal
rationale regarding Amendment protection for: 1 ) commercial speech, and 2) speakers
seeking protection from compelled speech and compelled association.
In a 1942 case, Valentine v. Christensen,2 the Supreme Court of the United States
denied protected status to commercial speech. The court held against the plaintiff who
challenged a New York city ordinance preventing citizens from distributing commercial
leaflets. In the opinion of the court, the city was entitled to regulate commercial use of
the streets. The Christensen case and a later case denying protection to door-to-door

1 U.S. Const., amend. I.
v. Christensen, 3 16 U.S. 52 (1942).

2
_ Valentine

salesmen, Breard v. Alexandria, 3 established the doctrine that commercial speech
warranted no First Amendment protection. However, the Court's failure to provide a
well-reasoned rationale and a definition of commercial speech made this doctrine the
target of critical commentators. 4
Legal scholars got a first glimpse of change in the commercial speech doctrine in
a 1 964 libel case, New York Times v. Sullivan. 5 This landmark case was of seminal
importance in libel law development, establishing that public officials must show actual
malice in order to prevail in a claim for libel. However, the Supreme Court's opinion in
Sullivan also recognized limited First Amendment protection for "editorial advertise

ments." The case arose when the New York Times ran an advertisement in 1960 on
behalf of black clergymen seeking to combat a wave of terror taking place in the South in
police actions directed toward nonviolent demonstrators in various cities, including
Montgomery, Alabama. Sullivan, a city commissioner in Alabama who was not
identified in the ad, successfully convinced an Alabama state court that he was damaged
in the amount of $500,000 as a result of minor inaccuracies in the ad that he claimed had
harmed his reputation. Under state defamation law, the paper was liable for defamation
and could not defend based on truth because of such factual inaccuracies.
Justice William J. Brennan's opinion provided a new federal rule that First
Amendment protection will be afforded to criticism leveled against government or public
officials unless they show that that the alleged defamatory speech was made with actual
malice, i.e., "with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was
3

Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (195 1).
4 Daniel F. Farber, The First Amendment (New York: The Foundation Press, 1998), 150.
5New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).

false or not." 6 The ruling made clear that falsity and defamatory nature of the speech
aimed at public officials, without more, would not prohibit First Amendment protection.
Equally clear was the fact that the publication of speech in an "editorial advertisement"
did not prevent such speech from receiving First Amendment protection, since the ad
"communicated information, expressed opinion, recited grievances, protested claimed
abuses and sought financial support on behalf of a movement whose existence and
objectives are matters of the highest public interest and concern."7
The Supreme Court made another significant move toward First Amendment
protection for commercial speech in Bigelow v. Virginia. 8 A university newspaper in the
state of Virginia, a state where abortion was illegal, published an advertisement for
abortion services in New York, a state that permitted legal abortion. The Court
overturned the newspaper' s conviction for violating a Virginia statute prohibiting
publications that encouraged abortion. Holding that the statute was unconstitutional, the
Court observed that the ad included information of interest to many readers who should
not be denied access to such speech simply because the information appeared in
commercial advertising.
In 1976, the Supreme Court provided an unequivocal message that its First
Amendment doctrine on commercial speech was changing in Virginia State Board of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. 9 The opinion fashioned a new
doctrine that governs this area of First Amendment law today despite strong criticism by
its detractors over the years. In holding a ban on advertising of drugs by pharmacists
6

Ibid. at 280.
Ibid. at 266.
8
Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
9
Va. State Board of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
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unconstitutional, the Court outlined its position that the free flow of commercial
information serves the interests of the individual consumer and the public interest in
making decisions that are well informed in the aggregate. While the decision clarified
that the free speech language in the First Amendment affords a degree of protection to
commercial speech or advertising, it did not define the level of protection.
The Court addressed that open question four years later by establishing an
intermediate level of protection for commercial speech in Central Hudson Gas & Electric
Corp. v. Public Service Commission ofNew York. 1 0 The standard the Supreme Court

outlined in this case provides that truthful, non-misleading commercial speech that is not
illegal will receive First Amendment protection if the government proves that it has a
substantial interest that warrants the restriction, that the speech restriction directly
advances the government's interest, and that the restriction on speech is no more
extensive than necessary This standard has served as a legal foundation for challenges
by a wide range of professional groups and industries seeking to avoid government
regulation of their advertising. Among such groups are private liquor and tobacco
companies, 1 1 members of the legal profession seeking to advertise their services without
government restriction, 12 and pharmacists seeking to advertise their services in
compounding specified drugs. 1 3 Each legal conflict represents an effort by challengers to
utilize the First Amendment to attack regulations by the State and to trigger shifts in
political, economic and social power. Acquiring more market power is typically the
10
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overriding goal. The commercial speech doctrine has become a mechanism to facilitate
this quest.
A threshold question in every case is whether the speech at issue is commercial
speech entitled to an intermediate level of First Amendment protection or political speech
that is afforded the highest level of protection under a strict scrutiny standard. This issue
was squarely before the U.S. Supreme Court in Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 1 4 a case that invited
the high court to consider whether a new definition of commercial speech was warranted.
This case arose when a private individual sued Nike under a California statue that
allowed him to seek to enforce California unfair competition and false advertising law on
behalf of California citizens as a "private attorney general." 15 He claimed that Nike's
communications to the public during the 1990s about working conditions in its overseas
factories were false and misleading. The issue at the heart of the case is whether Nike's
speech qualifies as political speech that furthers open debate on global labor practices or
whether it constitutes commercial messages about Nike's business activities and sales of
its shoes. In an environment saturated with commercial messages, the lines between
commercial and political speech have blurred, compounding the thorny issue of how to
define commercial speech. The California Supreme Court held that the Nike statements
constituted commercial speech and were subject to state false advertising laws. Nike
sought review of this decision by the United States Supreme Court.
The U.S. Supreme Court heard arguments on April 23, 2003, but then dismissed
the case on June 26, 2003, in a per curiam decision (opinion of the court without an
identified author) on the grounds that the writ of certiorari was "improvidently
See Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 27 Cal. 4th 939 (2002).
15 Ibid.
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granted." 16 In his concurring opinion, Justice John Paul Stevens Goined by Justice Ruth
Bader Ginsburg and Justice David Souter in part) listed three reasons why the case
warranted dismissal: 1) the California Supreme Court never entered final judgment, 2)
both parties lacked standing to claim federal jurisdiction, and 3) the U.S. Supreme Court
should avoid addressing novel constitutional questions prematurely. 17 Justice Stephen
Breyer Goined by Justice Sandra Day O' Connor) wrote a dissent opinion finding no
reason for the Supreme Court to delay hearing the case. Justice Anthony Kennedy
dissented without opinion.
If the Supreme Court would choose to overrule its decision in Central Hudson
and afford commercial speech the same level of protection as private speech or define
commercial speech strictly as "speech that does no more than propose a commercial
transaction," 1 8 then the issue raised in Nike, Inc. v. Kasky would disappear.19 Many
thought that the Supreme Court would use the Nike case as an opportunity to take a fresh
look at the commercial speech doctrine, but it was clear that procedural issues could
provide the Court with grounds to dispense with the case on procedural grounds if it
wished to avoid reaching the merits. 20 The Court's dismissal of the case indicated that it
16
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is not eager to tackle the difficult issue of whether the intermediate level of protection for
commercial speech under the Central Hudson test should be replaced with the higher
level of protection afforded to political and ideological speech.
Freedom of speech is a right expressly enumerated in the Bill of Rights while
freedom of association is an implied right. (Although it can be argued that the "right of
the people peaceably to assemble" is an express enumeration of the freedom of
association, many scholars feel that they can be distinguished.) A compelled association
claim is frequently joined with a compelled free speech claim, and courts often find
themselves analyzing the two claims together.
The 1977 benchmark case of Abood v. Detroit Board of Education 21 was
instrumental in developing the First Amendment principle that free speech rights under
the Constitution encompass the right to be free from compelled speech and from
compelled association. The Supreme Court had to decide whether "agency shop"
arrangements were constitutional in school systems where employees were represented
by unions. These arrangements required all union and non-union members to pay the
same amount to the union as a condition for employment. The payment by union
members was identified as union dues while the same amount paid by non-union
members was characterized as a "service fee" for the activities taken by the union to
represent them as their agent.
In Abood, a teachers union (the Detroit Federation of Teachers) and the Detroit
Board of Education entered into a collective bargaining agreement that included shop
agency terms. Teachers challenging the arrangements contended that they opposed
21

See Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
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collective bargaining by public employees and objected to the use of their fees for
ideological and political causes with which they disagreed. They based their legal
challenge on a claim that the compulsory service charges violated their First and
Fourteenth Amendment rights.
In reaching its decision in Abood, the U.S. Supreme Court relied on two of its
earlier union shop agreement cases as precedent, Railway Employes' Dept. v. Hanson,22
decided in 1956, and the 196 1 case of Machinists v. Street. 23 The Court in Hanson
upheld the constitutionality of union-shop contracts that required all employees to
financially support a union that legally represented them as an agent in collective
bargaining. Union members were required to pay dues and non-union members had to
pay "service fees."
The constitutionality of the union shop agreement was an issue five years later in
the Street case, but dissatisfied non-union employees in that case added the claim that the
service fees they paid to the union were being used for political speech in violation of
their First Amendment rights. The U.S. Supreme Court acknowledged that there were
constitutional issues "of the utmost gravity," but sidestepped them with its statutory
interpretation that the relevant federal statute (the Railway Labor Act)24 prohibited a
union from spending money that had been exacted for collective bargaining purposes on
political activities.25 The Supreme Court is entitled and, indeed, bound to exercise such
judicial discretion to refrain from deciding a case on constitutional grounds if there is
another means available through careful interpretation of a statute. Because Machinist v.
22
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Street avoided a decision on constitutional grounds, First Amendment issues remained

unresolved. The Abood case brought them to the forefront sixteen years later.
In Abood, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the agency shop arrangements as
"constitutionally justified by the legislative assessment of the important contribution of
the union shop to the system of labor relations established by Congress"26 but
conditioned its decision by holding that the use of the service fees for purposes other than
collective bargaining, contract administration and grievance adjustments would be
unconstitutional. The Court stated: "Our decisions establish with unmistakable clarity
that the freedom of an individual to associate for the purpose of advancing beliefs and
ideas is protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments."27 It expanded this principle
by stating:
The fact that the appellants are compelled to make, rather than prohibited from
making, contributions for political purposes works no less an infringement of their
constitutional rights. For at the heart of the First Amendment is the notion than an
individual should be free to believe as he will, and that in a free society one's
beliefs should be shaped by his mind and his conscience rather than coerced by
the State.28
This decision stands for the principle that while a union may compel payment of
fees, it must use the fees only for limited purposes which may not include ideological and
political activities. The Abood case has served as the general starting point for courts to
analyze compelled speech and compelled association cases.
At the time Abood was decided in 1977, the U.S. Supreme Court had already
taken a position in the 1974 case of Miami Herald Publishing v. Tomillo against
compelling newspapers to print certain speech. In Tomillo, the Court struck down a
26
Abood
27

at 222.
Ibid. at 233.
28
Ibid. at 234-235.
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Florida statute requiring newspapers to provide a "right of reply" to political candidates.
The statute required that political candidates be given equal space to reply to newspaper
attacks on their official record or personal character. The Supreme Court held that the
guarantee of a free press protects a newspaper editor or publisher from being compelled
to print a reply. While the Abood and Tomillo decisions both address issues of
compelled speech, Tomillo focused on the right of the press to be free from government
compelled political or ideological speech and Abood addressed the right of non-union
employees to be free from political or ideological speech. The Abood Court did not cite
Tomillo or otherwise join these two consistent threads of First Amendment doctrine,

choosing instead to expand on its Hanson and Street decisions that were narrowly
focused on agency shop issues.
Abood served as a signal that the courts would scrutinize government's efforts to

force individuals to speak or to be publicly associated with a message. A series of
significant cases reinforced this position. Wooley v. Maynard, 29 also decided in 1977,
involved a married couple living in New Hampshire that objected to the words "Live Free
or Die" on their license plates and covered that portion of the plates. The Court
analogized this case to an earlier case, West Virginia State Board of Education v.
Bamette, 30 in which it held that a compulsory flag salute implicated freedom of speech.

In his majority opinion in Wooley, Chief Justice Warren E. Burger held that an individual
does not have to use his private property as a "mobile billboard" and does not have to "be
an instrument for fostering public adherence to an ideological point of view he finds

29

30
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unacceptable."3 1 He reinforced the key concept that First Amendment freedoms include
"both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all."32
In Pacific Gas & Electric v. Public Utility Commission,33 the Supreme Court in
1 986 sustained a public utilities claim that its First Amendment rights were violated by
the requirement that it include written speech of a private advocacy group in the
envelopes in which it mailed its bills.
An example of a case focused primarily on freedom of association is Roberts v.
United States Jaycees, 34 decided in 1984. This case arose when the Minnesota

Department of Human Rights issued an order to the Jaycees compelling them to admit
women into their local chapters. The Jaycees took umbrage and refused to comply.
Although the Supreme Court upheld the order on the grounds that the constitutional
rights of the Jaycees were not sufficiently violated, the opinion by Justice William H.
Brennan established several important points of doctrine for future compelled association
cases. He recognized that freedom of association was "constitutionally protected" and
that "freedom of association . . . plainly presupposes a freedom not to associate."35 Most
importantly, although the Court declined to perform a First Amendment analysis of the
state's order, it clearly indicated that the appropriate standard would be strict scrutiny:
"Infringements on that right [of association] may be justified by
regulations adopted to serve compelling state interests, unrelated to the
suppression of ideas, that cannot be achieved through means significantly less
restrictive of associational freedoms." 36

31
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Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's concurring opinion provided an example of
judicial tension and inconsistency that has occurred when the facts of a compelled speech
case include elements of commercial speech. She held that the case should have been
analyzed under the commercial speech doctrine since the Jaycees were involved in
commercial activity. In her view, the commercial nature of the Jaycees foreclosed them
from claiming First Amendment protection in controlling their membership. Under her
analysis, freedom of commercial association should only be afforded minimal
constitutional protection.37
Other cases that have advanced the body of law addressing freedom from
compelled speech and freedom from compelled association include: Ellis v. Brotherhood
of Railway, Airline & Steamship Clerks38 (holding that compelled union dues may be

used for nonpolitical social activities); Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson39 (requiring
unions to set up and maintain escrow accounts and systems for reimbursement to ensure
that no disputed fees are used for political purposes while a resolution procedure is
pending); Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Association4-0 (holding based on Abood and Hudson
cases that fees used for lobbying activities are not sufficiently connected to collective
bargaining to compel employees to comply); Keller v. State Bar41 (holding based on
Abood analogy that mandatory bar dues cannot be used by state bar associations for

"activities having political or ideological coloration"42 and that use of mandatory dues
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must be " 'germane' to the purpose for which compelled speech was justified"43) ; and
Board ofRegents of the University of Wisconsin System v. Southworth44 (holding that as

long as mandatory student fees are distributed in a viewpoint-neutral manner to groups
with various political, ideological and expressive positions, the compelled funding does
not violate students' First Amendment rights). In Southworth, the Supreme Court sought
to apply the Abood case to the compelled-expression issues in the university setting, but
had to modify it by substituting the "viewpoint-neutral" standard in place of the
"gennaneness" standard.
Beginning in the late 1 980s, factions within the agricultural industry have
launched constitutional challenges against programs that impose mandatory assessments
on commodity producers (referred to as "commodity checkoffs") for purposes of generic
advertising of the commodities. Those opposed to the programs disagree with a
regulatory scheme that forces commodity producers to contribute payments toward
advertising that does not represent their preferred positions. They assert that commodity
checkoffs create an unconstitutional restriction on the free speech rights of commodity
producers by compelling them to fund generic advertising that they feel does not provide
them with benefits or undercuts their own marketing efforts or delivers messages contrary
to their ideological and political beliefs. This is the crux of the compelled commercial
speech legal challenge. However, those opposing and those defending checkoff
programs in legal actions have vacillated between using First Amendment arguments
based on the commercial speech doctrine or based on the doctrines governing freedom
from compelled speech and compelled association to support their claims.
43
44
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The collision of First Amendment doctrines in a compelled commercial speech
case can first be seen in United States v. Frame, 45 a 1989 case involving a challenge to
mandatory beef checkoffs under the Beef Promotion and Research Act of 1985. The beef
producer advanced a First Amendment argument based on compelled association. In an
opinion written by Circuit Judge Anthony J. Scirica, a panel of three judges on the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals accepted this argument under the Abood precedent and applied a
strict scrutiny standard in accordance with the Roberts case. Nevertheless, the opinion
found that the government's interests were sufficient to withstand the First Amendment
challenge.
The dissenting judge in the Frame case, Circuit Judge Dolores K. Sloviter,
correctly observed: "Because...there is no precedent for the kind of compelled
commercial speech at issue here, it is difficult to find the right framework for analysis."46
She asserted that a standard of First Amendment review less stringent than the test
applied by the majority was warranted because the case involved commercial speech.
Judge Sloviter concluded that, under this intermediate standard, the commodity checkoffs
were unconstitutional, noting that the government's interests in beef ads were not
sufficiently substantial to allow the infringement of producer's First Amendment right to
be free from compelled speech. 47
In the controversial case of Glickman v. Wileman, 48 the U.S. Supreme Court chose
to ignore the claims of First Amendment speech violations by characterizing the checkoff
programs as mere economic regulatory programs that did not implicate the First
45 United States v. Frame, 885 F. 2d 1 1 19 (3d Cir. 1989),cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1094 ( 1990).
Ibid. at 1 146.
47
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Amendment. The majority opinion held that if free speech rights had been raised,
however, the correct test would have been an Abood/Keller analysis. In his dissent,
Justice David Souter argued that the compelled funding for generic advertising did,
indeed, raise First Amendment free speech issues and that the correct test to apply was
the Central Hudson test. Justice Souter concluded that the marketing orders imposing
mandatory assessments for commercial speech did not pass muster under the Central
Hudson test and should be held unconstitutional. Many scholars and courts joined Justice

Souter in disagreeing with the majority opinion in Glickman. An example of critical
commentary is found in a 2002 law review article in which the authors state:
The U.S. Supreme Court decision in Wileman Bros. is troubling: it sidestepped
the opportunity to append First Amendment protections against compelled speech
and compelled financing of speech to commercial speech, and by lumping
advertising into the broader arena of economic regulation, it appeared to have
established a precedent curtailing those protections to political and ideological
speech, and permitting the government to surreptitiously communicate its
message through the pocketbooks of private enterprises.49
Disagreement with the Glickman case prompted the California State Supreme
Court to resort to state activism in concluding that compelled funding of generic
advertising implicated the rights of fruit growers under the free speech clause of the
California State Constitution. In Gerawan Farming, Inc. v. Lyons,50 a checkoff case
involving fruit growers, the California Supreme Court objected strongly to the U.S.
Supreme Court's failure to recognize First Amendment rights under the United States
Constitution and its conclusion in Glickman that the programs were solely economic
49
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regulatory schemes. The California high court held that the free speech clause of its state
constitution was broader than the First Amendment and protected the commercial speech
rights of the commodity producers. Since free speech issues at issue, it overturned the
lower court decision granting a motion for judgment on the pleadings and remanded the
case to the appellate court with instructions for the lower court to decide: 1) the level of
protection afforded commercial speech by the California State Constitution, and 2) what
test should be used. The appellate court in 2001 held that an intermediate level
"balancing test," should apply and struck down the California State Plum Checkoff and
Promotion Program as unconstitutional. 5 1
In other cases in which the courts have recognized First Amendment speech
rights, there has been tension between whether the commercial nature of the generic
advertising should require an intermediate standard of scrutiny under commercial speech
doctrine or whether the forced funding and forced association should trigger a strict
scrutiny analysis under the doctrines of compelled speech and compelled association.
While the Supreme Court has developed separate First Amendment doctrine relevant to
both commercial speech and compelled speech, it has not developed a roadmap to follow
when the doctrines converge in a single case.
In a 2001 decision addressing commodity checkoffs, United States, v. United
Foods, Inc., 52 the U.S. Supreme Court struck down a mushroom checkoff program by

using a two-point analysis to determine whether the commercial speech involved was
protected against compulsory commodity fees. First, it determined that the regulation
involved did not fall within the comprehensive regulatory scheme defined by the court in
51 Gerawan Farming, Inc. v. Lyons, No. F031 142 (5 th Appellate Dist., State of Cal., 2001).
United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405 (2001).
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the Glickman case. Second, relying upon the doctrine regarding freedom from compelled
speech and compelled association, the court determined the degree to which the
compelled checkoff program was germane to the core purpose of the regulatory program.
It dismissed the issue of whether to apply the intermediate commercial speech standard
by noting that the government did not rely upon Central Hudson in its appeal. 53
Some commentators felt that the U.S. Supreme Court erred in not performing a
Central Hudson analysis in United Foods. The perceived seriousness of the failure to

apply the Central Hudson test is pointed out by Schoen, Hogan and Falchek:
The absence of the heightened Central Hudson analysis in United Foods
may permit courts to review government regulations restricting or compelling
commercial speech without any regard to the nature of the governmental interest
underlying the regulation, the coherence of the regulatory scheme, the efficacy of
the regulation in achieving its stated purpose, or the consideration of whether less
intrusive means might accomplish the policy's objective . . . . Commercial speech
protections, it seems, might be better served by the heightened Central Hudson
analysis than by the obfuscating United Foods analysis. 54
As noted in the example of the civil rights cases, the legal conflict and its
complexities constitute only one layer of the broader political and economic issues. The
commodity checkoff programs operate within a dense framework of regulations, power
and industry conditions in which major participants include: 1) federal or state
legislators who adopt enabling legislation and subsequently enact implementing
legislation that creates councils or Commissions, 2) federal and state departments of
agriculture that promulgate regulations, 3) secretaries of the departments of agriculture
who appoint members of implementing boards, 4) boards, commissions and councils that
manage the checkoff programs and determine how monies are used, 5) industry trade
53 Ibid. at 415.
54 Schoen, Hogan and Falcheck, 5 12.
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associations, 6) commodity producers supporting checkoffs, 7) commodity producers
against checkoffs, 8) agribusiness corporations, 9) key players in the production chain,
i.e., processors and retailers, 10) external activist groups such as environmental protec
tion groups, 11) ad agencies and consulting firms, 12) the media, and 13) the courts.
The interwoven roles of all of these entities support a condition of hegemony or
consensual acceptance of power. This occurs when a social group exercises political and
moral direction in society and other groups support this leading group with "a relatively
wide political consensus" of its policy goals.55 Antonio Gramsci, the Italian Marxist and
social and political theorist, is recognized for his contributions in developing the concept
of hegemony. 56 The following description of Gramsci' s concept of hegemony is
outlined by Benedetto Fontana in his book, Hegemony and Power:
Hegemony is defined by Gramsci as intellectual and moral
leadership . . . whose principal constituting elements are consent and persuasion. A
social group or class can be said to assume a hegemonic role to the extent that it
articulates and proliferates throughout society cultural and ideological belief
systems whose teachings are accepted as universally valid by the general
population. Ideology, culture, philosophy, and their 'organizers'-the
intellectuals-are thus intrinsic to the notion of hegemony.57
An alliance between social groups creates a consensus, which "makes the power
of the dominant group appear both natural and legitimate."58 Hegemony may undergo

55 Enrico Augelli and Craig N. Murphy, "Gramsci and International Relations: A General Perspective and
Example From Recent US Policy Toward the Third World," in Gram.sci, Historical Materialism and
International Relations, ed., Stephen Gill (Cambridge: University of Cambridge, 1993), 130.
56 Antonio Gramsci developed his theory of hegemony in The Prison Notebooks, which he painstakingly
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Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, eds. and trans., Q. Hoare and G. Nowell Smith (London:
Lawrence & Wishart, 1971).
57
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58 James Watson and Anne Hill, Dictionary ofMedia & Communication Studies, 5 th ed., s.v. "hegemony."
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change, renegotiation or actual displacement by counter-hegemony if the dominant group
is unable to accommodate new ideologies introduced by subordinates. 59
Gramsci asserted that hegemony occurs when an existing political system is
maintained through the consensual support of civil society and its many institutions rather
than through means of domination. Intellectual and moral leadership are integral to
maintaining a powerful state of hegemony since society at large must identify underlying
principles and causes worthy of their support. Minority groups can build alternative
counter-hegemony within society, but such efforts must also be supported by a
combination of intellectual, ideological and moral leadership that generates the consensus
necessary for the power base of a new hegemony.
Gramsci theorized that a strong hegemony with interlocking relations between
dominant groups in government and civii society will not require tactics founded on force
or coercion to maintain the status quo. On the other hand, a weak or vulnerable
hegemony will be more likely to use domination strategies. Hegemony thus raises the
specter of an iron fist concealed within a velvet glove of rhetoric and moral authority. In
the context of this study, the velvet glove of rhetoric and moral authority is evident in the
public justifications for the checkoff programs while the iron fist can be glimpsed in the
USDA's "government speech" argument.
The genesis for these ideas is found in Gramsci' s fundamental premise that a
matrix of social, intellectual, political and ideological forces coalesce at a given time in
history to form a "historic bloc." The historic bloc exercises civil, cultural and political
leadership. Gramsci incorporated Marx's ideas on base and superstructure to explain that
59 Ibid.
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the relations of production or the social means for creating value and culture through
human labor (the base) f orm a foundation on which an institutional and civil framework
is constituted.60 Referred to as "superstructure," this is a fluid domain where civil, social,
political, legal and intellectual elements interact, state institutions assert authority,
conflicting ideologies emerge and coercion is directly or indirectly applied.
The "historic bloc" of the Twenty-First Century has been described as ".. .one of
capitalist democracy, characterized by private ownership of the means of production and
wage labor, and ideologically organized by a discourse of parliamentary and electoral
politics. "6 1
In the hegemonic conflict over mandatory commodity assessments, the
challengers have employed the courts and First Amendment arguments against compelled
commercial speech as their mechanism of choice in attempting to break the current
hegemony in the agricultural industry or at least achieve meaningful change. The
agricultural industry (especially the pork and cattle sectors) is experiencing dramatic
shifts from more competitive industry models to industry structures characterized by
concentration, vertical integration, powerful control by meat packers, processors and
other entities higher in the "food chain."62 The commodity producers are experiencing
all-time low profits while at the same time they are paying mandatory fees for generic
advertising to promote their products in ways in which many do not approve. Numerous
publications, testimony, activist materials and other resources have provided a picture of
60 See Douglas Raber, "Librarians as Organic Intellectuals: A Gramscian Approach to Blind Spots and
Tunnel Vision," The Library Quarterly 73, no. 1 (January 2003): 33-53, 35.
61 Ibid., 35, citing Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, eds. and trans., Q. Hoare and G.
Nowell Smith (New York: International Publishers, 1971).
62
See Daniel I. Padberg and Charles Hall, ''The Economic Rationale for Marketing Orders," San Joaquin
Agricultural Law Review 5 (1995): 73-87.
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a network of close relationships among the United States Department of Agriculture, the
large trade associations and the giant concentrated agribusiness organizations. 63 This
suggests the possibility of a deeply embedded hegemony that is thriving on the checkoff
fee wealth.
Efforts by commodity producers to pursue more autonomy and independent
practices have been squelched by the dominant groups, including deliberate inactivity on
the part of the USDA by declining to follow referendum practices for voting on the
continuation of beef checkoffs. The intense resistance to change by the government and
industry factions in favor of commodity checkoffs, strongly suggests that the interests of
the State and the dominant industry groups supporting checkoffs are closely aligned.
The State can assume the role of neutral referee by taking independent action
based on what is best for the public interest and by avoiding alliances with the dominant
hegemony or the minority challengers in the agricultural industry. In keeping with this
approach, the legislature and regulatory agencies (such as the USDA) could follow
rational policies beneficial to the industry, the environment and consumer interests,
although possibly in opposition to all particular regulated interests. The "referee
approach" is characterized by a balancing of a plurality of interests (e.g., private versus
private and public versus private). Consumer advocacy groups often promote this role of
the State in order to further their interests in protecting the public and the environment.
Such groups have posed serious questions regarding the government's interest in
independently protecting the public interest of taxpayers and consumers in the field of
·63 See, e.g., William Heffernan, "Report to the National Farmers Union: Consolidation in the Food and
Agriculture System," National Farmers Union (February 5, 1999), available from
http://www.nfu.org/images/heffeman_l999.pdf; Internet; accessed 2 May 2003.
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agriculture after the recent passage of the latest farm bill, The Farm Security and Rural
Investment Act of 2002. 64
This legislation was seen by many as a quintessential example of political agendas
unleashed during an election year. Many argue that the result represents missed
opportunities for the government to change course in its agricultural policies by adopting
more environmentally conscious laws that curtail large federal farm subsidies, especially
limiting those subsidies that benefit the agribusiness behemoths and exacerbate
consolidation. 65 The new support programs also reverse many of the reforms initiated
under the 1996 Freedom to Farm Act66 and increase subsidies by an additional $82 billion
over the next ten years. 67 In short, this legislation suggests that, rather than a referee, the
State is joined in hegemonic relationships with dominant interests in agriculture, and this
has become one more example of a regulatory authority captured by the regulated.
Another conceptual approach that illuminates the economic aspects of the
commodities checkoff power struggle is John Kenneth Galbraith's concept of
countervailing power outlined in his American Capitalism: The Concept of

64

Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-171, §§ 1001-10910 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C).
65
See Richard E. Cohen and Corine Hegland, "Farm Bill Winners and Losers," National Journal 34, no. 19
(May 1 1, 2002): 1 389-1390; and "How Conservation Measures Up in the Farm Security and Rural
Investment Act of 2002," Soil and Water Conservation Society (June 20 2002); available from
http://www.swcs.org/t_media_background.htm; Internet; accessed 1 8 November 2002. For a contrary
view, see Thomas M. Franklin and Caitlin A. Burke, ''The 2002 Farm Bill: A Conservation Victory,"
Wildlife Society Bulletin 30, no. 2 (Summer 2002): 600-601 . Comments on agricultural policy issues
related to the farm bill, including the threats agricultural consolidation pose with regard to environment and
the existing system of food production, can be found in Chuck Hassebrook, ''For American Farms, a
Harvest of Change," New York Times, 20 April 2002, A16.
66 Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104- 127, 1 10 Stat. 888 (codified
as amended at 7 U.S.C. 7201).
67Barbara Rippel, "Farm Bill Undermines Open Trade - and Consumer Welfare, Consumer's Research
Magazine 85, no. 6 (June 2002), 34-35.
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Countervailing Power. 68 Although Galbraith's approach was developed outside the neo

Marxist tradition, it nevertheless remains highly consistent with Gramsci's hegemony
framework. Galbraith argued:
". . . [P]rivate economic power is held in check by the countervailing power of
those who are subject to it. The first begets the second. The long trend toward
concentration of industrial enterprise in the hands of relatively few firms has
brought into existence not only strong sellers, as economists have supposed, but
also strong buyers as they have failed to see."69
Galbraith believed that when a seller gains a monopoly (or several firms develop
an oligopoly), an incentive develops for the seller's suppliers and those to whom it sells
to "develop the power with which they cari defend themselves against exploitation."70
He provided the following clarification of how this concept differs from the traditional ·
notion of competition within a capitalist economy:
Competition which, at least since the time of Adam Smith, has been
viewed as the autonomous regulator of economic activity and as the only
available regulatory mechanism apart from the state, has, in fact, been superseded.
Not entirely, to be sure. There are still important markets where the power of the
firm as (say) a seller is checked or circumscribed by those who provide a similar
or a substitute power or service. This in the broadest sense that can be
meaningful, is the meaning of competition . . .. The active constraint is provided by
the competitor who offers, or threatens to offer, a better bargain. By contrast, in
the typical modem market of few sellers, the active restraint is provided not by
competitors but from the other side of the market by strong buyers.71
In a nutshell, Galbraith asserted " . . . power on one side of a market creates both
the need for, and the prospect of reward to, the exercise of countervailing power from the
other side."72 However, a certain amount of organization and minimum opportunity must

68 John Kenneth Galbraith, American Capitalism: The Concept of Countervailing Power (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1952).
69
Ibid., 1 18.
70
Ibid., 1 19.
7
1 Ibid.
72 Ibid., 120.
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exist for countervailing power to operate. Given the difficulties inherent in developing
countervailing power, subordinates seeking change have often turned to the government
and the courts for assistance. If countervailing power is valued as a necessary regulatory
function, then it is incumbent upon these State institutions to "give it freedom to develop
and to determine how it may best do so. The government also faces the question of
where and how it will affirmatively support the development of countervailing power."73
It may choose to support countervailing power with an affirmative role or block it with a
negative role.
Statement of Thesis
The Supreme Court and other lower federal and state courts have been active in
adjudicating compelled commercial speech cases involving First Amendment challenges
to mandatory commodity assessments or checkoffs.74 A number of these have been filed
since the United Foods decision in 2001 as anti-checkoff groups determined that the
holding in that case offered them renewed hope for success in legal forums. The
challenges launched by the subordinate groups have been contested hotly in key cases,
with appeals in 2003 before five different federal appellate courts and one state appellate
court.75 (Only days before subrrtjssion of this dissertation, the Eighth Circuit Court of
73
74

Ibid., 143.
See listing of cases at Appendix B.
75 See Livestock Marketing Association v. USDA, 207 F. Supp. 2d 992 (D. S. Dakota, 2002) and Livestock
Marketing Association v. USDA, Nos. 02-2769 and 02-2832, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 13630 (8 th Cir. 2003)
(decided July 8, 2003); Jean Charter and Steve Charter v. USDA, 230 F. Supp. 2d 1 121 (D. Montana
2002) (on appeal before the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals); Michigan Pork Producers v. Campaign for
Family Farms, 229 F. Supp. 2d 772 (W.D. Mich. 2002), as corrected on October 3 1 , 2002; (on appeal
before the 6th Circuit Court of Appeals, the tribunal that held mushroom checkoffs were unconstitutional
in the United Foods case, affirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court in United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533
U.S. 405 (2001); Delano Farms v. Ca. Table Grape Commission, No. 00-16778 (9th Cir. 2003) (the 9th
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a dismissal by finding First Amendment issues were raised so case has
returned to trial court); Joseph and Brenda Cochran v. Ann Veneman, No. 4:CV-0 1-0529, 2003 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 4361 , (Middle Dist. Penn. 2003) (on appeal before the 3n1 Circuit Court of Appeals); State of Fla.,
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Appeals rendered an opinion in the Livestock Marketing Association case holding the
federal beef checkoff program unconstitutional.)76
The central thesis of this paper is directly related to such litigation, past and
present. The thesis is stated as follows:
The line of compelled commercial speech cases challenging commodity
checkoffs on First Amendment grounds represents a fundamental hegemonic
conflict within the agricultural industry in which the challengers are using
the courts and the First Amendment in an attempt to break the current
hegemony of commodity checkoffs and establish countervailing power.

The thesis is based on the assumption that decisions of the courts on constitutional
issues are signifiers of underlying political, social and economic contests that have
moved to the courts as the parties strategically sought to use the judicial system in their
struggles. It is also based on a second theoretical assumption that political struggles over
constitutional issues arise from a condition of hegemony characterized by a dominant
group exercising hegemony to maintain control and minority challengers seeking to build
counter-hegemony to change the balance of power. The assumptions noted above would
support similar studies of cases dealing with other constitutional issues arising from
political contests in which the participants have recognized the courts as a viable terrain
for battle.
If the challengers in the checkoff cases are successful, the resulting changes
would significantly affect both the hegemony of the agricultural industry (and the related
commercial and governmental groups that are within its hegemonic sphere) and the

Dept. of Citrus v. Graves Brothers Company, Tampa Juice Services, et al. , No. 2DO03-2276, iix1 Dist. Ct.
of Appeal, Florida (on appeal before Florida state appellate court); and Pelts & Skins, LL C. v. Jenkins, Jr.,

No. 02-384-A (Middle Dist. La. 2003) (on appeal before the 5th Circuit Court of Appeals).
See Livestock Marketing Association v. USDA, Nos. 02-2769 and 02-2832, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS
13630 (8 th Cir. 2003).
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development of First Amendment doctrine related to compelled commercial speech.
Changes in the hegemony of the agricultural industry could change the relative balance of
commercial and political power among the commodity producers, processors and
dominant trade associations.
The defenders of the existing commodity checkoffs are supported staunchly by
the USDA. In fact, the USDA has become an industry apologist. Therefore, both sides
in the conflict are utilizing powerful institutions of the State, pitting the Courts and First
Amendment doctrine against the USDA.
Overview of Study

This study relies upon an historical approach to gather evidence to perform a
combined political and legal analysis. The interests at stake for each of the participating
entities are investigated in order to provide a context for understanding why factions
within the agricultural industry are using the compelled commercial speech argument as
leverage to acquire countervailing power or challenge hegemony. This includes a study
of the economic and political interests and the inducements and deterrents experienced by
all entities involved in the current checkoff programs. As a foundation for political
analysis, this study identifies major changes in the agricultural industry that are
influencing the positions of key participants in the programs. Background is provided for
legal analysis by reviewing changes and trends that have occurred in the Supreme Court's
interpretation of First Amendment doctrines related to protection of commercial speech
and freedom from compelled speech and compelled association.
The diagram identified as Figure 1 shows changes that a preliminary analysis has
disclosed may be at work in influencing the hegemony in agricultural commodity

27

�

- �-

:\GRICL'LTURAL lNDLSTRY
Hegemony
in Agricultural
Commodity Checkoffs

- -

�-

CHAI\GE AGENTS
Globalization of Agricultural Markets
Public Health and Environment
Concerns/Biotechnology
Vertical Integration In Industry Sectors

Ill(

Contract Agriculture
Concentration of Ownership
(Final Stage of Industrialization}
Crisis of Competitiveness In Agriculture
Market Due to Obsolete Organizational
and Ownership Structures

• AMAA of l 937
• Federal and state checkoff
programs
• Close industry and
government network
• $750 million in che-ckoff

Tension Between Out-Dated Paradigm
and Other Post-Industrial Business Models
--

-

-

1 ST A\1END�IEKT DOCTR li\ES

-

- -

CHANGE .-\ GEI\TS

�---- Changes in Technology
--•
-•
•
�--- Changes in Commercial Culture
---•
IIIIE
E---- Trend Toward Stricter Supreme Court
Doctrine Re:
Interpretation of First Amendment
Commercial Speech
Doctrine for Commercial Speech
• Central Hudson test applied
■
-----Justice
Thomas Position Supporting Strict
since 1 980
Scrutiny for Commercial Speech
• Commercial speech afforded
--.:
IIIE--- Supreme Court Discomfort with Central
intermediate protection
• Fed/state advertising
Hudson Test
regulations in place
-•�--- Trend Toward Government De-regulation

--------- Government's Expanded Use of
Speech and Use of New Forms of
Doctrine Re: Freedom from
Speech
Compelled Association and
.,___11.
15- Judicial Trend Toward Expanding
Compelled Speech
Abood Analysis to New Areas
• Abood case used for analysis since 1977. (Union
(Challenges to Mandatory Bar
can use dissenter's fees only for purposes germane to
compelled association, i.e., collective bargaining.)
Dues, Mandatory Student Fees,
• Roberts case introduced strict scrutinv standard for
etc.)
cases involving compelled associatio� in 1984.
• Judicial preference: in analyzing compelled
Supreme Court Application of
◄
commercial speech cases under First Amendment
framework of compelled speech and asSO<:iation
versus commercial speech doctrine.

Figure 1

Abood Analysis in U.S. v.
United Foods (2001 )

Changes Creating Climate for Hegemonic Challenge
28

checkoffs and the two areas of First Amendment doctrine relevant to the commodity
checkoff litigation. These respective changes have created a climate for the hegemonic
challenge that is the focus of this study. (However, it is expected that further research
may indicate that not all of the elements of change identified are equally important in
creating a climate for hegemonic challenge.)
As shown by the diagram identified as Figure 2, changes have spawned key issues
in each sphere. The diagram illustrates how the overlapping of developments in the
agricultural industry and First Amendment law has generated a zone of conflict. The
following core issue emerging from the zone of conflict will impact both the commercial
sphere and the legal sphere: "Should mandatory assessments on commodities used for
generic advertising be deemed a violation of First Amendment rights?" Additional
critical issues found within the zone of conflict include: which First Amendment
doctrine should be applied to compelled commercial speech cases, whether Glickman v.
Wileman was correct in concluding that no First Amendment rights are implicated if the

court finds "collectivization" within a "broader regulatory scheme" and whether the
"government speech defense" asserted by defenders of the checkoff program should
immunize the checkoff programs from First Amendment scrutiny.
In the realm of private politics, this study analyzes the power dynamics within
five segments of the agricultural commodities industry by investigating how the major
industry associations representing the producers of each commodity are constituted and
who attempts to speak on behalf of each commodity to the press, to government agencies,
to Congress, to and through external entities such as ad agencies, and to the public
(especially with regard to any claims regarding how the associations are representing the
29
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public good). The research also identities the characteristics of the members comprising
the respective factions, and the contradictory positions that are held within each
commodity group. Gramsci' s concept of hegemony is used in examining the hegemonic
matrix of people and institutions supporting the mandatory commodity assessment
programs and the nature of the counter-hegemony advanced by the challengers.
Additionally, Galbraith's theory of countervailing power is applied to study whether
subordinate factions are seeking to generate countervailing power to defend themselves
against economic exploitation.
In exploring the public politics of compelled commercial speech, a critical
theoretical perspective (utilizing assumptions found in Gramsci's hegemony concept) is
used to examine the evolution and rationale for the mandatory commodity checkoff
programs, which had their genesis in two pieces of legislation77 that were central to the
New Deal policies of the 1930s.78 The negative manner in which the government (the
USDA in particular) has responded to the various political and legal actions of the
Agricultural Adjustment Act of May 12,1933, ch. 25, 48 Stat. 3 1 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§
601-605, 607-623 ( 1994)) and Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of June 3, 1937, Pub. L. No. 1 37, 50
Stat. 246 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.).
78See Olan D. Forker and Ronald W. Ward, Commodity Advertising: The Economics and Measurement of
Generic Programs (New York. : Lexington Books, 1993) (noting the role of the federal government in the
marketing of products since the 1930s); Daniel Bensing, ''The Promulgation and Implementation of Federal
Marketing Orders Regulating Fruit and Vegetable Crops Under the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act
of 1937," San Joaquin Agricultural Law Review 5, no. 1 (1995): 3-47, 5 (identifying the Agricultural
Marketing Act of 1937 (AMAA) as a "direct statutory descendent of President Roosevelt's Agricultural
Adjustment Act (AAA), a centerpiece of the New Deal's first 100 days"); Brian C. Leighton, ''The
Socialization of Agricultural Advertising: What Perestroika Didn't Do The First Amendment Will," San
Joaquin Agricultural Law Review 5, no. 1 ( 1995): 49-65, 49 (referencing the AMAA as a "'short term fix'
to pull farmers out of the Depression,"); Laura Jackson, "Commercial Speech: The Constitution-It's
What's For Dinner. United States v. United Foods, Inc., 121 S. Ct. 2334 (2001)," Wyoming Law Review 2
(2002): 617-640, 620 (noting that the AMAA was enacted as part of the New Deal to advance "orderly
marketing conditions and fair prices," quoting Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 521 U.S. 457
(1997)); and Jon Lauck, "After Deregulation: Constructing Agricultural Policy in the Age of 'Freedom to
Farm,"' Drake Journal ofAgricultural Law 5 (Spring 2002): 3-54, 4 and n. 1 (asserting that the sweeping
government agricultural programs of the 1930s were prompted by "economic misery in rural America" and
continued into the l 990s long after public support for New Deal economic policies had waned).
77
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challengers who have sought to establish countervailing power against the dominant
commodity producers, trade organizations and government players is of keen interest in
analyzing the underlying framework of political, economic and social forces that are
clashing in the public arena of the compelled commercial speech cases. It can be linked
to Gramsci' s idea of hegemony and suggests that the scope of this study include a
critique of the role of the government in the current agricultural hegemony of the
commodity checkoff programs.
The legal component of this study includes a review of how the Central Hudson
test and/or the Abood analysis has been applied to compelled commercial speech cases
decided by the Supreme Court and lower courts to determine, among other things,
whether a doctrinal test has been applied consistently to such cases and to assess whether
the Supreme Court has adopted a standard approach with any predictive value for future
cases on compelled commercial speech. This review of the checkoff cases involving the
commercial speech doctrine and freedom from compelled speech and compelled
association will evaluate how the courts have handled the convergence of the First
Amendment doctrine with the Central Hudson commercial speech analysis. Attached as
Appendix B is a comprehensive annotated list of compelled commercial speech cases.
Appendix C sets forth a list of criteria for analyzing compelled commercial speech cases.
This study seeks to identify the legal consequences (regarding First Amendment
doctrine on compelled commercial speech as well as the broader commercial speech
doctrine) and the political consequences (probable shifts in political or economic power)
that are likely to occur with respect to alternative actions that may be taken by the
Supreme Court with regard to compelled commercial speech. The Supreme Court is
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uniquely poised in these cases to become either a "catalyst" or a "brake" in recognizing
broader protection for commercial speech or extending the scope of protection against
compelled speech or compelled association, thereby providing legitimacy to the counter
hegemony movement that is occurring in the agricultural industry.
Objectives
This study has the following objectives:
1) To examine the historical evolution and legislative rationale of the mandatory
commodity checkoff programs for the five industries that are currently involved
in First Amendment compelled commercial speech conflicts (fruit growers,
mushroom growers, beef industry, pork industry and dairy industry);
2) To identify through collection and analysis of evidence the economic and political
interests of the following key participants in five commodity checkoff programs:
a) federal and state legislators;
b) federal and state departments of agriculture that promulgate regulations
(USDA and comparable state agencies);
c) secretaries of the departments of agriculture who appoint members of
implementing boards;
d) boards, commissions and councils that manage the checkoff programs and
determine how monies are used;
e) industry trade associations;
t) commodity producers in favor of checkoffs;
g) commodity producers against commodity checkoffs ("the challengers");
h) agribusiness corporations;
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i) other key players in the production chain such as processors and retailers;
j) external activist groups such as environmental protection groups;
k) ad agencies and consulting firms;
1) the media, and
k) the Supreme Courts and lower courts.
3) To identify and clarify current agricultural industry trends and/or broader conflicts
that are exerting an influence on the positions of the key participants in the
hegemonic struggle regarding compelled commercial speech;
4) To analyze, identify, and clarify, within the theoretical perspectives of hegemony
and countervailing power, the relationships among the key participants in the
commodity checkoff programs (see list of participants set forth in objective two),
especially with regard to which entities exert control and dominance;
5) To explore in general terms the history and use by the U.S. Supreme Court of the
First Amendment doctrine for protection of commercial speech as set forth in the
Central Hudson test and the First Amendment standards for freedom from

compelled speech and from compelled association based on the Abood case;
6) To examine critically the scholarly literature and federal and state cases related to
the application of First Amendment doctrines to the area of compelled
commercial speech to detennine, among other things, whether a standard
approach has been developed and consistently applied over time and to judge
whether such approach has any predictive value;
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7) To critically examine the scholarly literature and federal and state cases relating to
the "government speech principle" to determine its viability as a defense against
the compelled commercial speech challenge;
8) To explore whether there is a hegemonic relationship between the decisions of the
federal judiciary on compelled commercial speech and the economic and political
interests of the dominant groups involved in the commodity checkoff programs;
and
9) To assess the legal and political consequences of the various legal outcomes on
compelled commercial speech issues, with attention to how the public interest will
be served by such outcomes.
Analysis of the evidence will be guided by the following research questions:
RQ 1: Do the existing policy goals of the respective external entities (including
the USDA and powerful trade organizations) remain in direct conflict with First
Amendment speech rights f or compelled commercial speech?
RQ 2: Have the Supreme Court and other federal courts failed to recognize the
First Amendment constitutional right not to participate in compelled commercial
speech by privileging the economic and political interests of the dominant parties
in the agricultural hegemony?
RQ 3: Do government's efforts to use "government speech" as a justification for
mandatory commodity assessments create a heightened risk that the government
may displace or monopolize private speech or interfere with the gatekeeping
function of private speakers?
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The final objective set forth above notes that this research will seek to obtain
evidence to assess the legal and political consequences of the potential legal resolutions
on the compelled commercial speech issue. In resolving the legal conflict, the Supreme
Court could find that mandatory assessments are:
1) constitutional when they are part of a broader regulatory scheme (such as the
regulatory framework governing the fruit growers in Glickman v. Wileman), 79 but
unconstitutional when they are imposed as stand-alone orders like those assessed
against the mushroom growers in United States v. United Foods, 80 or
2) unconstitutional and a violation of First Amendment rights regardless of the
regulatory scheme in which they reside, because they do not pass scrutiny under
First Amendment analysis (either through application of the Central Hudson test
or an analysis based on Abood principles);
3) constitutional regulations not protected by the First Amendment; or
4) constitutional under a "government speech" exception to the First Amendment.
The consequences will be evaluated in terms of the potential for creating change
in the agricultural industry hegemony, the impact of such decisions on the dual legal
doctrines involved (the doctrine regarding First Amendment protection for commercial
speech and the doctrine of government speech) and, finally, with respect to the way in
which the public interest will be served.
A Tempest Brewing: Political, Economic and Legal Significance ofthe Problem
A web of private and public organizations performing a myriad of roles currently
drives the system of collecting, managing, coordinating and spending an immense stream
79
80

See Glickman, 521 U.S. 457 (1997).
See United Foods, 533 U.S. 405 (2001).
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of money generated by commodities checkoffs. Estimates put the annual dollar figure at
$750 million. 81 The mandatory assessments provide the basis for a dominant hegemonic
culture that derives influence, credibility and ongoing employment from the commodity
checkoff schemes. Discontinuing or modifying the continuous flow of checkoff money
that supports these activities will have political implications regarding who can wield
influence and power as well as economic implications for those who financially benefit
from the income. The threat to such hegemony can be observed by evaluating the
relentless and extensive efforts of the government and the groups supporting the
checkoffs to fight the challengers. Success in the courts will lead to shifts in who
exercises power in the commodity production chain and the way in which the minority
group is able to independently conduct its business and achieve a greater market share.
On a broader scale, this hegemonic conflict can be viewed as a stepping-stone in
addressing the "crisis in competitiveness" that arguably exists because of a lack of
competitiveness in agricultural markets. The challengers in the compelled commercial
speech cases are seeking the ability to promote their products and compete as individual
producers rather than as part of an industry bloc lacking any internal level of competition.
John Ikerd, professor emeritus at the University of Missouri Department of Agricultural
Economics, referred to the current industry model as an obsolete organizational
paradigm. 82 The description Ikerd offered is highly reminiscent of Gramsci's concept of
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Jackson, 617.
John Ikerd, "Alternative Organizational Structures: Implications for Competitiveness of Markets," in A
Food and Agriculture Policy for the 21 st Century, 78, Michael C. Stumo, ed.; compilation of papers
presented at the Organization for Competitive Markets Food Policy Retreat on April 29 - May 1, 2000;
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hegemony. Ikerd observed the following about the lack of competitiveness in the
agricultural industry:
Under current conditions, no one is capable of wresting control of
agricultural markets from corporate agribusiness - not even the top managers of
agribusiness firms themselves. Stockholders demand profits and growth, not just
over the long run, but quarter after quarter . . . 83
According to Ikerd, political institutions and institutions of the State have become major
contributors to the problem. He declared:
Government can't stop the corporations, because politicians too have
come under their power. Politicians are strongly influenced, if not controlled, by
the agribusiness corporations through their large contributions to political
campaigns. Agricultural constituencies are influenced, if not controlled, by the
general farm organizations and commodity groups. These groups are far more
concerned with maintaining production and profits for agriculture as an industry
than in maintaining competitive markets or viable family farms and rural
communities. The USDA and the rest of the government bureaucracy has an
organizational structure much like industry that responds far more to agribusiness
interests than to the needs of family farmer. Consequently, government either
supports or at least offers no meaningful resistance to corporate consolidation and
ultimate corporate control of agricultural markets. Thus, American agricultural
[sic] is dominated by an obsolete organizational structure that is essentially out of
control.
The crisis of competitiveness in agricultural markets will not pass unless
or until the current industrial organizational structure is replaced with an
alternative self-regenerating, post-industrial organizational paradigm. 84
Ikerd' s description of a troubled industry is highly revealing, because it identifies
a number of effects of the hegemony that exist in the agricultural industry. While others
may not fully support Ikerd' s ultimate conclusion that American agriculture is dominated
by an "obsolete organizational structure that is essentially out of control," there is ample
evidence that American agriculture is dominated by a hegemonic structure that does not

Ibid.
84 Ibid.
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encourage or tolerate competition by minority factions. Fred Stokes, president of the
Organization for Competitive Markets contended in 2000:
"While farmers are driven from their lands, food processors and retailers
use their market power to depress commodity prices and expand their
margins . . . .Family farms are giving way to mega farms under control of giant
corporations. Open and competitive markets are being replaced by 'supply
chains' and production contracts. More and more we depend on foreign sources
for our food needs."85
The commodity checkoff challenges represent a small-scale effort to change this
model (or break the hegemony) and, as such, may be significant in demonstrating
incremental movement toward a different paradigm with broad implications for the
agricultural industry.
On the other hand, those supporting the checkoffs have argued that generic
advertising is critical for increasing domestic sales as well as ensuring that commodity
producers are able to compete in a global market. 86 They contend that commodity
checkoffs used for research and development are a key factor in allowing all commodity
growers to benefit from new technical advancements. 87 Commodity checkoff defenders
have argued that the elimination of commodity checkoffs will seriously jeopardize the
ability of industries to speak with one voice in promoting and marketing commodity

Thomas F. Stokes, forward to A Food and Agriculture Policy for the 21 st Century, ed. Michael C. Stumo;
compilation of papers presented at the Organization for Competitive Markets Food Policy Retreat on April
29 - May 1, 2000; available from http://www.competitivemarkets.com/library/academic/2lstcentury;
Internet; accessed 1 November 2002.
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products, particularly in foreign markets, and will greatly restrict technological
innovation that can be realized through collective funding of progressive research. 88
The amount of checkoff fees dedicated to research varies by industry. The use of
checkoff fees for research raises another area of free speech concerns for the challengers,
who frequently object on philosophical and legal grounds to the focus and goals of the
research. For example, beef producers may object to use of their mandatory fees for
research on irradiated beef procedures and growth hormones. Similarly, fruit growers
may object to the use of their fees for research to develop genetically altered fruits or
fruits to meet the requirements of a foreign market.
The research addresses how potentially different legal frameworks for compelled
commercial speech may influence the exchange of ideas and the economic and political
environment in which the entities identified in this research participate. In the
commercial free speech arena, the future ability of commercial entities in the United
States to exchange ideas freely via advertising of their own design and choosing is at
stake. This could have a broad impact on communication strategies of industry and
government By looking at potential outcomes of the compelled speech issues, this
dissertation identifies characteristics of the role of free speech and unrestricted
communication in the industrial, economic and political structure of the United States.
If the courts hold mandatory assessments to be unconstitutional in pending and
future cases under the approach provided in United Foods, such decisions could mean
that, in all but the most highly regulated industries, commercial speakers would enjoy
First Amendment rights similar to those afforded to political and cultural speakers. The
88
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line between standards governing commercial speech and standards for political speech
may become increasingly blurred, creating a communications environment in which the
audience would be unable to distinguish among different types of speech and to evaluate
the motives and interests of the speaker. (This highlights the need to consider how the
public interest is best served in addressing the compelled commercial speech issue.)
The opposite action by the Supreme Court in holding that mandatory assessments
are not protected by the First Amendment could lead to further compulsory assessments
to pay for generic industry speech regardless of the level of controversy or support for
such commercial messages in the industry. Troubling conflicts may continue to brew
within commodity industries that are not unified and are dominated by trade associations
that disregard a minority faction of the industry (or eventually even fail to represent the
majority faction). If the mandatory assessments continue to be deemed constitutional
within a highly regulated framework such as that in the Glickman case, then the
groundwork is laid for increased governmental regulatory schemes for commodities.
Why would this result prevail over the alternative of abolishing the checkoffs? In the
words of U.S. Supreme Court Justice John Paul Stevens, this approach would avert "the
danger that a federal statute would turn into a toothless scarecrow. "89
Expected Contributions to Research

Existing research on compelled commercial speech reflects an emphas-is on
studying developments using a traditional legal analysis. This generates an
understanding of the end result of the legal battle, but does not provide knowledge
regarding the underlying political, economic and social factors that are prompting
89 U.S. Supreme Court Justice John Paul Stevens, ''The Shakespeare Canon of Statutory Construction," The
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 140 (1992): 1373- 1387, 1387.
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challengers to resort to court action. No researcher has yet performed a "holistic"
analysis on compelled commercial speech. 90 It is the goal of this research to perform an
integrated political, legal and economic analysis of compelled commercial speech in five
commodity areas: the beef, pork, dairy, mushroom and tree fruit industries.
This research is also expected to make a contribution to political theory by
extending Antonio Gramsci's theoretical conceptualization of an historic bloc that
exercises hegemony in capitalist societies to the socio-economic domain of agricultural
commodity production.
The broad applicability of the research method utilized in this dissertation is
expected to give rise to a third area of scholarly contribution. The study will use a highly
structured approach to examine underlying political, economic and social conflicts that
are signified by a line of legal cases involving constitutional challenges. This method,
referred to as the "Gramscian/Galbraith legal context analysis," can be applied to gain
insight into other major constitutional conflicts that represent complex political interests
and issues between a dominant hegemony responding to challenges from groups and
individuals with unequal power.
Limitations of the Study

The United States Department of Agriculture is involved in the operations and
oversight of fourteen generic agricultural commodity programs that require fees for
promotion of commodities to increase consumer markets. These include: honey,
90 Olan D. Forker and Ronald W. Ward provided a thorough overview of advertising for agricultural
commodities in their 1993 book, Commodity Advertising: The Economics and Measurement of Generic
Programs. However, they devoted only two paragraphs to the constitutionality of commodity promotion
programs (an indication that the First Amendment compelled commercial speech issue had not yet emerged
as a predominate area of conflict.) See Olan D. Forker and Ronald W. Ward, Commodity Advertising: the
Economics and Measurement a/Generic Programs (N.Y.: Lexington Books, 1993), 256-257.
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mushrooms, popcorn, watermelons, potatoes, beef, pork, soybeans, dairy, fluid milk,
cotton, eggs, peanuts and blueberries. 91 The compelled commercial speech litigation
initially involved challenges to commodity checkoff programs for tree fruit, mushrooms,
beef, pork, dairy products and almonds. Since the United Foods case in 2001, other
commodity checkoff programs have also been challenged, including programs for grapes,
alligators and citrus fruit.
The research and analysis in this study will focus on five representative
industries-tree fruits, mushrooms, beef, pork and dairy. However, certain aspects of
the study may apply to all commodity producers. In addition, the legal analyses required
by this study will be based on the full line of compelled commercial speech cases.

9 1 See listing of national checkoff programs and website for each commodity board or council at "Straight
Answers to the Most Frequently Asked Questions About National Checkoff Programs," Cattlemen's Beef
Board (2002); available from http://www.beefboard.com/dsp/dsp_locationContent.cfm?locationID=l062;
Internet; accessed 15 June 2003.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW OF THEORY AND AGRICULTURAL THEMES
This literature review will address the following areas of importance in this
dissertation's study of how competing interests in the agricultural industry overlap with
the development of First Amendment doctrine and create a zone.of conflict related to
commodity checkoffs and compelled commercial speech:
1) a dual theoretical framework for viewing the operations of the State and other
principal actors in this conflict by applying Gramscian hegemonic theory and
Galbraith countervailing power analysis;
2) counter-hegemony in the agricultural industry;
3) the history and rationale for mandatory assessment programs,
4) major players involved in the checkoff programs;
5) areas of change influencing the agricultural industry;
6) two First Amendment standards of review;
7) the compelled commercial speech cases;
8) the government speech doctrine (major legal defense being proffered by those
supporting the commodity checkoffs); and
9) the representations inherent in First Amendment compelled commercial speech
cases.
The areas outlined above represent component parts of the overall scope and
thrust of this dissertation research and are, therefore, considered pertinent to this literature
review.
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Theoretical Perspective
The research and analysis regarding compelled commercial speech are analyzed
within the theoretical perspectives of hegemony and countervailing power. Both of these
concepts offer a means to interpret and understand the action being taken by individuals
or groups in a subordinate position who have organized their resources to challenge the
dominant private and public groups via First Amendment litigation. However, the two
concepts of hegemony and countervailing power owe their origins to contrasting social
theories of the State.
Antonio Gramsci developed his ideas on hegemony as an extension of his Marxist
political orientation while John Kenneth Galbraith's countervailing power argument is
aligned with the Neo-Pluralist view of the State. Hegemony, as envisioned by Gramsci,
is a condition that includes both political and social dimensions. Countervailing power,
on the other hand, has explanatory value in the compelled speech analysis primarily as an
economic theory.
The use of the compelled commercial speech argument by the minority group to
challenge the dominant scheme of commodity checkoffs can, therefore, be understood on
a broader scale by considering it within the framework of Marxism (the underlying
framework for Gramsci's theory) as well as within the neo-pluralist State theory (related
to Galbraith's concept of countervailing power). The brief overviews of the Marxist and
neo-pluralist theories of the State set forth below will provide a basic foundation for
understanding the key theoretical concepts of hegemony and countervailing power that
are employed in this study.
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This portion of the literature review addressing the theoretical framework will be
presented in five sections consisting of: 1) a general introduction to the concept of "the
State," 2) a background on the Marxist theory of the State, 3) a summary of Gramsci' s
hegemonic paradigm, 4) a background on Neo-pluralist theory of the State, and 5) an
overview of Galbraith's concept of countervailing power.
Concept of ''the State." A definition of the state that has been widely respected
by scholars is offered by Max Weber, a sociologist who produced a body of work in the
late nineteenth century and early twentieth century. He defined the state as: "a human
community that successfully claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical
violence within a given territory."92 Contemporary author John Hoffman restated the
Weber formula as follows: "The state is an institution claiming to exercise a monopoly
of legitimate force within a particular territory."93 The four interrelated elements of
monopoly, territory, legitimacy and force formed the foundation for an understanding of
the state based on Weber's political sociology. The attribute of force emerged, however,
as a primary focus in this definition, balanced by its counterpart, legitimacy.
Weber argued that force is a central criteria for the existence of a state, even
though he qualifies this by stating: " . . . of course, force is not the normal or the only
means of the state . . . . "94 Methods such as persuasion, promised rewards, appeal to duty
are alternatives, but they co-exist with the state's potential and actual exercise of force.
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Weber presented legitimacy as the concept underpinning force. A state must
achieve a monopoly of legitimate force in order to function as a state. Individuals living
within the territory of the state confer a degree of legitimacy on the use of coercion and
force by simply complying with the legal norms or obeying the rules, whether through
respect, fear or apathy. In contrast, the modern liberal view of legitimacy is normative in
its assertion that "free and equal individuals must consent to the laws they obey.
Legitimacy excludes the use of force."95 (The word "liberal" is used here in the context
of classical liberal theory that recognizes autonomous citizens have the capacity to
rationally decide how to ensure freedom for all members of their society and to choose
the acceptable limits that will be imposed on their individual freedom by endorsing
political institutions and their rules.) Assuming at least a minimum level of consent,
Andrew Haywood described legitimacy as "the quality which transforms naked power
into rightful authority; it confers upon an order or command an authoritative or binding
character, ensuring that it is obeyed out of duty rather than because of fear."96
As a generalization, it appears that all contemporary theories of the state in
current Western political systems (e.g., pluralism, neo-pluralism, the New Right, elite
theory, Marxism, and neo-Marxism) assume the existence of a "system of rules whereby
mutual expectations are established between people. "97 As noted, Max Weber was
willing to accept the legitimacy of a state when its citizens acknowledge the command of
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those in authority and believe that the laws of the state must be obeyed. 98 On the other
hand, Dave Beetham argued that power is legitimate only if three conditions are present:
"First, power must be exercised according to established rules, whether embodied
in formal legal codes or informal conventions. Secondly, these rules must be
justified in terms of the shared beliefs of the government and the governed.
Thirdly, legitimaci must be demonstrated by the expression of consent on the part
of the governed."
All states engage in the "legitimization process" when they undertake activities
that are designed to legitimize power. This can occur by following principles of popular
consent or, in a more controversial way, by attempting to manufacture legitimacy by
manipulating the ideas and symbols delivered to the public. (This may be viewed as
ideological hegemony.) 1 00 A "legitimization crisis" occurs when a political system loses
the confidence and voluntary consent of its citizens and becomes vulnerable to a change
in regime. 1 01
In a modem liberal state, legislative power determines what the rules will be and
the sorts of rights allocated, the executive power oversees administration and compliance
with the rules, and the judicial power adjudicates cases of dispute and passes judgment. 1 02
This understanding of a state does not presuppose a certain political system; the powers
can be manifested differently (i.e., powers can be separated or combined in function) in
states with liberal democratic, sovereign or authoritarian political systems.
The state may be seen as both an apparatus of rules and an agent. It performs as
an agent when individuals engage in actions on behalf of the state and their identities
98
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become an abstraction, so that the state itself does the acting . The image of the state is
passive when it is understood as merely an apparatus of rules, but active and self
directing when it is interpreted as an agent. 1 03
During the 1980s, social scientists, political scientists and historians were
particularly focused on studying the modem state and its characteristics. They agreed
that the following characteristics were inherent in the government of a modem state:
1) The state is a recognizable separate institution or set of institutions, so
differentiated from the rest of its society as to create identifiable public and
private spheres.
2) The state is sovereign, or the supreme power, within its territory, and by
definition the ultimate authority for all law, i.e. binding rules supported by
coercive sanctions. Public law is made by state officials and backed by a
formal monopoly of force.
3) The state's sovereignty extends to all individuals within a given territory, and
applies equally, even to those in formal positions of government or rule
making. Thus sovereignty is distinct from the personnel who at any given
time occupy a particular role within the state.
4) The modem state's personnel are mostly recruited and trained for
management in a bureaucratic manner.
5) The state has the capacity to extract monetary revenue (taxation) to finance its
activities from its subject population. 1 04
The Marxist Theory of the State. Karl Marx believed that the capitalistic

economy invariably produces systematic inequality and massive restrictions on real
freedom. The State reinforces social order in the interest of dominant social groups, the
primary one being the capitalist class. John A. Hall and G. John Ikenberry summarized
the focus of Marxist theory as follows:
What mattered more than the universal right to vote was the inequality established
between those who owned the means of production and those who, without such
means, were forced to labor for them. . . The state is not at any time a neutral force,
representing the general interest. On the contrary, the state embodies the interests
103 Ibid., 3.
104 Patrick Dunleavy and Brendan O'Leary, Theories of the State: The Politics of Liberal Democracy
(London: MacMillan Education, 1987), 2.
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of the dominant class; the rules that it produces corresponding! y serve the
interests of some rather than all of the people. 105
Marx argued that the working class (or the class of proletariat wage-laborers) will
be in a position to realize its interests only if it successfully mounts a revolution against
those who control the means of production (the elite ruling class or the bourgeoisie).
Marx saw these two classes as the essential components of capitalism. He stated: ''The
essential condition for the existence and for the sway of the bourgeois class is the
formation and augmentation of capital; the condition for capital is wage labor." 1 06 A
crisis can create the stimulus for class-based political action by yielding a classconsciousness.
Marx' s understanding of capitalism is captured by the authors of The Dictionary
of Social Sciences (who endorse Marxism) in the following definition:
A system that separates workers from any true property
rights . . . . Capitalism transforms the social means of subsistence (i.e., work) into
capital on the one hand and the immediate producers into wage laborers on the
other hand. Most of the time, capitalism is defined as the private ownership of the
means of production, but that definition does not encompass the great harm done
to humanity by the system. By claiming all (or most) of the means to produce
culture as private property, a small class of owners preempts material culture for
their own comfort while denying the vast majority the means to subsistence as
well as the means to produce ideological culture when they are not working." 1 07
According to Marx, the system of capitalism has inherent flaws that will
eventually cause it to disintegrate. Marx referred to them as the "weapons" that the
bourgeoisie have created that will create a crisis in capitalism and a climate for a social
105
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revolution. 1 08 The proletariat will recognize common class interests and be able to make
the sacrifices necessary for revolution. The wage-laborer will ultimately be able to
demonstrate a capability for "democratic control of a modem economy." 1 �
Marx emphasized the concept of exploitation in his assertion that the wage
laborer is exploited by the bourgeoisie due to the inferior bargaining power of the
proletariat. This theme is prevalent in his use of words such as "oppression,"
"subjugation," "force" and "slavery" to characterize the wage-laborer. 1 10 The
relationship of inequality will be remedied when, as a result of the proletarian movement
of the "immense majority," 1 1 1 the worker' s control of production replaces capitalism and
"all the springs of cooperative wealth flow more abundantly." 1 12
To Marx, the bourgeoisie, the ruling class under capitalism has "conquered for
itself, in the modem representative State, exclusive political sway. The executive of the
modem State is but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole
bourgeoisie." 1 1 3 In his discussion of Marx's legacy, Richard Miller summarized Marx's
central claims as follows:
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1 . Government actions serve the long-term interests of the bourgeoisie as a
whole, even if those interests conflict with those of the rest of society. 1 14
2. This bias in interests served is sustained by mechanisms that are part of the
social context of political choice, sufficient mechanisms which will exist, in one
form or other, so long as capitalism endures . . . Marx ascribes the pattern of choice
on the part of successful elected officials to underlying relations of economic
power rather than bribery or conspiracy. 1 15
3. If a social movement threatens to end the bias toward bourgeois interests, the
old connection between class and government will be defended through violence
which mobilizes residual bourgeois political resources, violence which can only
be defeated by organized counter-violence, rooted, in part, in non-electoral
activity. 1 1 6
A primary theme of the Marxist view of the capitalist State is that the State will
always be biased toward the interests of the bourgeoisie.
Antonio Gramsci's Concept of Hegemony. Antonio Gramsci introduced the

idea of hegemony as an alternative to the strict Marxist approach which he felt over
emphasized the economic sphere and class analysis. Gramsci took the position that Marx
was mistaken in concluding that a change simply in the ownership of production would
result in a truly democratic and free society because power was also exercised in political
arenas and civil society. 1 1 7 Gramsci offered the concept of hegemony as a more complete
explanation of the way in which power is exercised.
Hegemony occurs when a dominant class or alliance of classes or other social
groups asserts a unifying world view and successfully gains political and economic
control over subordinate society by using active consent (knowingly or not) rather than
direct force. Law, religion, art, sciences, politics, the media, private industry and
1 14
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government all become relevant forces in bolstering the world view of the dominant class
and its approach to human and social relationships. 1 18 However, elements of dissension
in this social structure create the need for negotiation and compromise, or, in the
alternative, the need to use coercion. Leadership must develop consent at the
intellectual, moral and philosophical level in order to create and maintain hegemony.
Gramsci asserted that "there can, and indeed must, be hegemonic activity even before the
rise to power, and that one should not count only on the material force which power gives
in order to exercise an effective leadership." 1 19
Challenges to the legitimacy of the dominant hegemony create the potential for
change in the dominant ideology, relationships, economics and political institutions.
Harper Dictionary of Modem Thought asserted

The

that "the struggle for hegemony is seen

as a primary and even decisive factor in radical change, including change in the economic
base itself." 120
Gramsci's interpretation of hegemony recognized that three areas of a social
structure form the basis for hegemony: the economic (modes of material production), the
state (state-supported bureaucracies, agencies, legal institutions and apparatus for
coercion, such as the police and armed forces) and civil society (other private institutions
existing within society in the areas of religion, culture, etc.). 121 The line that separates
the state and civil society is not boldly defined and may change or be re-negotiated.
Gramsci recognized that certain historical periods are characterized by unstable
1 18
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equilibrium between the classes, leading to close associations and specific alignments of
state and civil society. 1 22 These have been identified as "historic blocs." 123 Bob Jessop
interpreted this key concept in Gramsci' s paradigm as follows: "the weight of various
particular interests is continually re-negotiated in the 'unstable equilibrium of
. ' that underpms
. hegemony. ,,124
comproffilse

Gramsci emphasized the role of "organic intellectuals." As used by Gramsci, this
term encompassed intellectual thinkers within the dominant group who may be
bureaucrats, politicians, academics, corporate specialists, trade industry researchers, etc.
These are the individuals involved in "directing the ideas and aspirations of the class to
which they organically belong." 125 In order to create environments favorable to their
ideology, the organizers of society or elite leaders within a social group seeking
dominance facilitate and maintain a circle of organic intellectuals whose purpose is to
provide the social group with "homogeneity and an awareness of its own function not
only in the economic but also in the social and political fields." 1 26 This occurs when
"[T]he capitalist entrepreneur creates alongside himself the industrial technician, the
122
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specialist in political economy, the organizers of a new culture, of a new legal system,
,,
etc_ 1 21
Bob Jessop has credited Gramsci with introducing a major theoretical break
within Marxist theory by focusing on the intellectual and moral aspects of the State
machinery. Instead of viewing the state as a strictly coercive apparatus, Gramsci focused
on the "relative weight of coercion, fraud-conuption, and active consent." 128 This
theoretical shift allowed Gramsci to examine a wider gamut of economic, ideological,
political and social factors that influence how political hegemony is supported or
undermined by the dominant and subordinate groups. According to Jessop, Gramsci's
approach also "implies a concern with the hegemonic apparatuses of state power and the
role of intellectuals in organizing the hegemony of the dominant class and forming a
'historic bloc' .. . " 1 29 The state can, therefore, serve as a battleground for hegemonic and
counter-hegemonic social forces.
Those in disagreement with existing hegemony must find methods by which to
respond. Gramsci maintained that the hegemonic paradigm must include a search for
transformation (or counter-hegemony) and not be limited simply to anti-hegemony.130
He developed the idea of a "war of position" to describe the process by which a
subordinate group (the proletariat) tries to build hegemony in civil society before
engaging in an effort to capture state power from the bourgeoisie.1 3 1 It is a concept that
refers to the strategic activities of opposing forces in a capitalist society-the dominant
1 21
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group is engaged in a war of position to maintain its hegemony in an environment where
challenges are always taking place. The subordinate group engages in a war of position
to organize its organic intellectuals and other allies aligned with it into a more powerful
bloc and also to challenge the hegemony of the dominant group, preferably in more than
one terrain at a time (i.e., through State agencies or judicial systems, the media, lobbying
efforts, the educational system, and so forth.) If a subordinate group desires change, it
must engage in a hegemonic struggle.
Gramsci's work on hegemony was expanded by several theorists in the neo
Gramscian school in the 1970s and 1980s, Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe." 1 32
Mouffe argued that Gramsci initiated a break with the strict model of "economism" (the
base-superstructure model) and the class reductionist view (the belief that class endows
economic, political and ideological pre-determination). Her description of Gramsci's
ideas on social relations are found in the following:
1) Gramsci adopted a concept of political forces as "' inter-class' . . . collective wills in
and through ideological struggle," 1 33 refusing to recognize them as class subjects.
2) He rejected the assumption that different classes exhibit class ideologies, opting
instead for "a pluralistic universe of ideological elements" that can be selectively
articulated and synthesized into new ideologies. Hegemony, in Gramsci's view,
was not adequately explained by a "paradigmatic class ideology" imposed by a
dominant class on other classes. Instead, hegemony involved "the articulation of
132 See generally Jessop 191-2 10. Jessop draws liberally on the individual and collaborative writings of
Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe in outlining the "discourse-theoretical" approach. For original source
information, see Ernesto Laclau, Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory (London: New Left Books,
1977); Ernesto Laclau, ''Togliatti and Politics," Politics and Power 2 (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul,
1980); Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, "Socialist Strategy-Where Next?" Marxism Today (January
1981).
133Jessop, 193.
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elements from different ideological discourses around a specific hegemonic
principle to create a relatively unified but syncratic ideological system." 134
3) Gramsci recognized a category of 'national-popular' ideological elements having
no class connotations that gave rise to the "par excellence of ideological class
struggle," 135 a situation that arose when:
" . . . two fundamental classes compete to articulate these elements into their own
class discourse so that it becomes a 'popular religion' or organic expression of the
national interest with the active consent of the people. The agents of this
ideological struggle are the intellectuals and it is mediated through an ensemble of
hegemonic apparatuses." 136
Mouffe and Laclau developed these ideas one step further by introducing a
"general theory of the discursive constitution of hegemony. 137 In their "discourse
theoretical' approach, they emphasize that discourse is synonymous with social relations
which leads them to conclude that the Marxist metaphor of base and superstructure as it
is used to define social relations must be modified to reflect that both elements are
discursive in nature. (Under the Marxist model, the base was seen as "extra-discursive"
and the superstructure was discursive.) The national-popular ideological elements
identified in point three above become as important to the formation of social relations
and political hegemony as the class struggles.
Jessop referred to "discursive ensembles" and "ideological ensembles" as
important aspects of the formation of political hegemony in a framework not dictated by
the class paradigm. He offered this description: ''The struggle for hegemony is re
interpreted in terms of intervention to articulate different discursive elements into more or
1 34 Ibid.
135 Ibid.
1 36 Ibid., 193.
1 3.7 Ibid., 195.
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less discrete ideological ensembles." Jessop argued that this can occur because
discursive elements 'have common nuclei of meaning which are not fully determinate in
denotation and can be connotatively linked to other elements or produce the specific
.
.
. ensembles. ,, 1 3s
meanmgs they revea1 m d'ffi
1 erent discurs1ve
Gramsi's ideas, along with the interpretations of Jessop and the Neo-Gramicians,
Mouffe and Laclau, provided this study with a point of reference for understanding the
way in which hegemony operates in the realm of agricultural commodity production. A
theoretical assumption underlying this study is that the socio-economic relations existing
within agricultural commodity production that give rise to the dominant checkoff
hegemony and, on another level, that give rise to an industrial agriculture hegemony, are
eminently suitable for interpretation under the same principles that Gramsci formulated
for examining and explaining political hegemony.
The Neo-Pluralist Theory of the State. A review of the neo-pluralist theory of
the state must begin with a brief consideration of its predecessor, the pluralist theory. A
basic tenet of the pluralist theory is that it recognizes the existence of group:; as
meaningful participants in the political process. Early in the Twentieth Century, political
scientists such as Albert Bentley identified pluralism as the most accurate description of
an American political system that included many active interest groups and pressure
groups. 1 39 The pluralist view assumes that actions of the State occur through a process
of deliberative democracy that incorporates the following assertion:
While I may take my preferences as a sufficient reason for advancing a proposal,
deliberation under conditions of pluralism requires that I find reasons that make
1 38
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the proposal acceptable to others who cannot be expected to regard my
preferences as sufficient reasons for agreeing.1 40
Robert Dahl's early works in the 1960s and 1 970s presented his view of the
pluralist theory. He pictured the state as a "neutral mediator of conflict" that operated as
an intermediary between "multiple centers of power." It acted in the best interest of all in
the midst of constant negotiations among different centers of power. , He asserted that the
diverse competing strategies will ensure over time that no interest group or faction will
systematically win and coercion will be "reduced to a minimum." 1 4 1 This theory is
inconsistent with Gramsci's hegemony paradigm, which recognizes that the state at times
may not be neutral when it becomes a location of conflict for hegemonic forces. The
state may align itself with one of the competing groups or various state institutions may
engage in hegemonic conflict between themselves (e.g., the courts versus the executive).
Murray Knuttila, professor of sociology and social studies at the University of
Regina in Saskatchewan, Canada, summarized the pluralist view by declaring that " ...the
state is not an institution capable of eliminating conflict but rather the arena of legitimate
political conflict." 1 42 This idea cuts across the theoretical schools of thought, fitting also
within the theories of both Gramsci and Dahl.
In the late 1950s and early 1960s, pluralist political science theorists embraced the
image of "stable democracies" functioning by means of interaction and negotiation
among power centers. However, political and social unrest during the 1960s and the
subsequent expansion of corporate power and commercialism into everyday life
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highlighted the interconnections between the economic power centers and the political
choices available to U.S. citizens. Conventional pluralists found their assumption about
the autonomous nature of politics being questioned by the New Right, the elite theorists
and Marxists. In response, the neo-pluralist theorists emerged. These were a group of
liberal thinkers, many of whom were formerly instrumental in developing the orthodox
pluralist theory. Authors in the group that began questioning the harmony of democracy
in a pluralist state included: Charles Lindblom, Robert Dahl, Albert Hirschman, and John
Kenneth Galbraith. 1 43
In his Politics and Markets, Lindblom focused on the weaknesses in the pluralist
paradigm, with special attention to the relationship between the market and government.
The power of business resources are recognized by government officials who anticipate
and prepare policies to expressly address commercial profitability issues. 1 44 Lindblom
concluded that modem liberal democracies afford business a privileged position and, in a
perceptive final chapter of his book stated:
In short, in any private enterprise system, a large category of major decisions is
turned over to businessmen, both small and larger. They are taken off the agenda
of government. Businessmen thus become a kind of public official and exercise
what, on a broad view of their role, are public functions. 1 45
Robert Dahl, a former collaborator with Lindblom, also noted the defects in the
conventional pluralist theory Representative political mechanisms were insufficient to
guide policy-makers in the complex issues facing the modem state so a new model of the
"professionalized state" was needed to meet the technological and social changes. While

143
Dunleavy and
1 44
Ibid., 294.
145

O'Leary, 27 1.

Charles Lindblom, Politics and Markets (New York: Basic Books, 1977), 172. Also see discussion of
Lindblorn's work in Knuttila, infra, n. 63, 70.

60

neo-pluralists accept an extended apparatus for collective decision-making as a realistic
way to effectuate decision-making, they still retain conventional pluralist values, such as
participation by diverse groups and accountability of political representatives to satisfy
the wishes of ordinary citizens.
Neo-pluralist theorists are united in their conclusion that modern social, economic
and political policies cannot be premised on models that are grossly outdated, such as a
model of economics that is premised on the centrality of markets and consumer
preferences, but fails to acknowledge the reality that the economic priorities further the
objectives of large corporations rather than the individual or collective choices of
citizens. In their overview of theories of state, the authors Patrick Dunleavy and Brendan
O'Leary, summarized the following common characteristics of neo-pluralism:
The major problems of liberal democracies concern the possibility that some
power centres (especially large corporations) may be able to persuade citizens
what they should want. Most neo-pluralists also acknowledge that the
development of an advanced industrial state is not directly controlled by citizens,
and recognize the existence of a good deal of sub-technocratic government. But
however much they assert a need for reform (which varies between different
authors), they all see the existing political and social systems of Western
democracy as the best attainable form of social organization. Power in society is
fragmented between economic and political authority systems, but in such a way
as to preserve a very substantial capability for reforming the undeniable social
problems, economic strains and political dilemmas which must inevitably
remain. 146
The first sentence of this quotation suggests the importance of the role of
· commercial communication and the tools of persuasion (including commercial speech) in
the allocation of power between corporations, government and citizens. John Kenneth
Galbraith took this idea one step farther, arguing that the dominance of large corporations
in economic markets requires that the government accommodate their interests first and
1 46
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foremost by providing stability in the regulation of the business environment that will
allow the corporations to capitalize on long-term investments. 1 47 Any substantial market
sector not dominated by large corporations will have a nominal impact on the market and
the shaping of economic policy.
Peter Self argued that a shift has occurred in political thought regarding the role of
the State from the benevolent to the malevolent State. He illustrated this by referring to
changes in theories of pluralism from a benign view to a distinctly malevolent approach:
Theories of pluralism, developed initially in and about the American environment,
started out with an optimistic view of the consequences of the rise of organized
groups for democratic stability and balance, veered towards a stress upon the
capture of government by powerful private interests, and contributed finally (in
Europe particularly) towards a concept of 'corporate pluralism' in which
integrated private and public interests dominate government to the exclusion of
other groups. 1 48
John Kenneth Galbraith's Concept of Countervailing Power. In his book,
American Capitalism, the Canadian-born political economist, John Kenneth Galbraith,

advanced his theory that modem capitalistic society breeds centers of industrial
concentration that become monopolies or oligopolies. He believed that this is a positive
formula for growth, if the monopolistic power systems induced countervailing
institutions that wield sufficient power to prevent potential abuse and exploitation by the
monopolistic group. Galbraith offered examples of how "countervailing power" can arise
with large retailing groups balancing the power of large manufacturers, trade unions
balancing the power of large employers, supplier and consumer organizations balancing
the power of dominant sellers and government regulation balancing the power of private
1 47
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monopolies and oligopolies. Although giant firms have replaced small firms to the point
where the competitive model is no longer applicable, Galbraith concluded that this is not
a problem provided that centers of countervailing power emerge to protect consumers and
smaller players. A system of economic checks and balances is more likely to occur
when competing centers of monopolistic and oligopolistic power interact with
countervailing institutions. 1 49
This theoretical perspective offers the means to expand this study's analysis of the
agricultural climate and players that are involved in the compelled commercial speech
conflict by examining which entities (most likely monopolistic or oligopolistic) or
individuals have economic power, which parties are currently vulnerable to abuse or
exploitation, which ones are currently induced to build centers of countervailing power
and what will be needed to be successful as a countervailing institution.
Summary. This dissertation uses a dual theoretical framework for viewing the

operations of the State and other principal actors in this conflict: Gramscian hegemonic
theory + Galbraith countervailing power analysis. All evidence will be analyzed within
the Gramsci hegemonic framework and the Galbraith countervailing power analysis will
be selectively applied when appropriate to evidence dealing more directly with economic
aspects of the struggle over commodity checkoffs and compelled commercial speech.
The theories will not be combined or modified; all original assumptions and assertions
for each theory will be retained in the analysis.

149

See generally Galbraith, American Capitalism, 1 19 -1 31.

63

Power Blocs and Hegemony in Agriculture

Gramsci recognized that close associations and alignments between state and civil
society create "historic blocs" comprised of bourgeoisie and organic intellectuals from
various parts of civil society and the state engaged in discourse and activities necessary to
build and maintain hegemony. The historic bloc is integral in organizing entire social
formations. While the bourgeoisie was the initial class around which a ruling historic
bloc organized, later Gramsci theorists understood Gramsci' s ideas to mean that such
blocs are not as closely bound to class organization. Instead, power blocs can articulate
discursive elements containing nuclei of meaning to produce ideological ensembles that
form the central foundation for the hegemonic activities of the power bloc.
This dissertation advances the notion that organic intellectuals within the
agricultural industry have aligned themselves around agribusiness. In its exercise of
hegemony, agribusiness has created certain nuclei of meaning that have formed widely
accepted ideological ensembles. The nuclei of meaning are linked to the industrial
agriculture model and to the programs for mandatory assessments on commodities.
The power blocs involved are the "industrial agriculture bloc" and separate
"commodity industry blocs" for each of the five commodities covered by this study.
While interrelated to some measure, they are formulated on different nuclei of meaning
and represent different ideological ensembles. The power blocs also are subject to
different historical conditions that have been instrumental in developing the social
relations necessary to achieve hegemony. A challenge to the hegemony in one of these
power blocs and resulting reform or renegotiation of power may influence the other, but
they each remain autonomous.
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The industrial agriculture bloc exercises hegemony and power over the entire
agricultural industry based on its need to reinforce and maintain the industrial agriculture
model, a key ideological element in its discursive ensemble. The central organizers for
this bloc are the large concentrated and highly integrated agricultural business
organizations. Allied with them are other groups and organic intellectuals from within
civil society and the state, including the USDA.
The concentration and vertical integration that has occurred in the agricultural
industry in the last decade has combined with biotechnology developments to create a
climate for a few powerful groups to exercise hegemony by owning, controlling or
partnering with companies that provide each necessary function in the food chain. Of
particular importance is ownership of intellectual property rights in genetically
engineered organisms (seeds, crops, livestock DNA, etc.).
Dr. William Heffernan of the University of Missouri Department of Rural
Sociology has identified "food chain clusters" or vertically integrated food systems that
cross internati�nal boundaries. 150 The industrial agriculture bloc will take on a new
character as these food chain clusters become the primary organizers for the agricultural
industry in the future. In a report he prepared for the National Farmer's Union,
Heffernan touches on how the decision making process will become more complex and
more important. There will be a hegemonic dialogue within each food cluster chain and
between the clusters of firms. Other participants in the industrial agriculture model will
need to negotiate their place in the industry by allying themselves with the food chain
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clusters. The organic intellectuals in academia, the USDA, trade associations, etc. will
have to do the same.
Will it be possible to build an effective counter-hegemony to attack the industrial
agriculture bloc with these powerful food chain clusters? That remains to be seen.
However, from the literature and activities of several of the major coalitions aligned with
the agricultural counter-hegemony (Organization for Competitive Markets and National
Campaign for Sustainable Agriculture), it appears that there are leaders in the counter
hegemony who are astute about the reorganizing taking place in the industrial agriculture
bloc. The strategies and resources will need to be well-coordinated and sophisticated to
be effective in dealing with the emerging industrial agriculture power bloc.
A commodity industry bloc exists for each of the five commodities covered by
this dissertation: beef, pork, mushrooms, tree fruit and dairy products. In each case, the
commodity industry bloc has a history of relations between different segments of the
industry and external forces combined with an "ideological ensemble" that have worked
together to generate the consensus of the commodity industry itself (albeit sometimes by
coercive means), and has achieved public consensus through discourse or by default
through public apathy or lack of public awareness. The central organizers for each
commodity industry bloc differ as well as the agents they use to exercise hegemony.
However, in each commodity industry, the US�A has aligned itself with the dominant
power bloc.
While operating in an autonomous manner, the industrial agriculture bloc and the
respective commodity industry blocs are linked to Gramsci's historic bloc, the primary
bloc that organizes capitalist society and accommodates the masses through
66

parliamentary democracy. Some of the same agents align themselves with the dominant
forces in each bloc (such as various arms of the state apparatus) and some of the
discursive and ideological elements are present in each power bloc, but they are still
relatively separate in terms of the way they exercise hegemony and influence society. As
shown by the model in Figure 3, this phenomenon of power blocs operating within a
capitalist state can be conceptualized as a cascading set of power blocs, each formed
around a central organizer, each articulating discursive meaning, each assimilating its
own ideological ensemble, and each making concessions and negotiating with
challengers to maintain and strengthen its hegemony.
One power bloc may experience radical change without imposing change on other
power blocs, but often they observe and assimilate new economic, political and social
elements that appear successful for other blocs. For example, the complete vertical
integration of the poultry industry has set the stage for other commodity industry blocs to
consider how vertical integration can be incorporated into their hegemonic strategies.
Certainly, the power bloc that adopted the ideological ensemble for the industrial
agriculture model was cognizant of the hugely successful use of similar business models
over which that bloc exercises hegemony leads to the conclusion that a discrete "checkoff
hegemony" can be recognized for each industry. It contributes significantly to the overall
hegemony wielded by each power bloc. The legal termination of the commodity
checkoff program in an industry would force the commodity industry bloc to re-formulate
its ideological ensemble and re-negotiate relations within the industry to re-establish
hegemonic control forfeited through loss of the checkoff programs. Other consequences
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outside of agriculture would result as well. This study will analyze the consequences of
different legal outcomes on First Amendment doctrine and public interest as well as on
agriculture.
As noted earlier in this dissertation, the struggle for hegemony is intrinsically
related to the fact that discursive elements "have common nuclei of meaning which are
not fully determinate in denotation and can be connotatively linked to other elements or
produce the specific meanings they reveal in different discursive elements." 151 This idea
is instructive in examining the counter-hegemony that has arisen to challenge the
checkoff hegemony in each commodity industry. Programs for mandatory commodity
assessments in each industry were adopted based on certain understandings of the
meanings and justifications for such programs, how they would function within the
industry structure and how they fit with dominant ideology.
This consensus became strained as both the dominant power bloc and critical
segments of the industry developed different meanings for the checkoff programs which
were connotatively and literally linked to other elements. An agent of the dominant
hegemony, the USDA, even developed its own discursive ensemble around the idea that
the generic advertising generated by the checkoff programs is "government speech. "
This position was not only sharply opposed by those challenging the checkoff hegemony,
but was also at odds with the ideological ensemble of the commodity industry bloc. The
commodity industry bloc has grudgingly made a concession to the USDA on this point, a
move that has imposed a new thread in the ideological ensemble of the dominant bloc
and a source of ongoing tension within that bloc.
151
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An assumption is made in this dissertation that the industrial agriculture bloc has
organized the commodity production system in much the same manner as the bourgeoisie
has organized capitalist society under the historic bloc. The evidence indicated that
agribusiness has captured the key government agency (the USDA), a major portion of
the media, the land grant educational institutions and the major trade associations. There
are minority fractions within media, academia and the farming community that are
building their own alternative trade association and coalitions f or lobbying and legal
purposes. The idea ensembles they develop and the strategies they use (such as the First
Amendment challenges to the commodity checkoffs) will allow them to engage in a war
of position. Each of these groups will be analyzed in detail in chapter seven which
presents the investigative frame.
Failed Counter-Hegemony Serves as Legal Catalyst
As noted earlier, the central thesis underlying this research is that the legal
developments concerning the constitutionality of compelled commercial speech signify a
fundamental hegemonic conflict within the agricultural industry. The challengers,
individuals and groups who object to mandatory payment of commodity fees, are now
using the Courts as a means to achieve change. However, there is evidence that the
challengers initially sought to achieve change by using routine mechanisms within the
current hegemony, namely, the referendum procedure.
This occurred in the pork industry when the pork producers followed procedures
set forth in 7 U.S.C. § 48 12(b)(l)(A) for voting on whether the pork checkoffs should
continue. The Campaign for Family Farms took the lead in May 1999 by submitting
petitions to the USDA with signatures of at least fifteen per cent of the hog producers as
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required. After completing a verification review, the USDA concluded that the petitions
did not represent fifteen percent of the hog producers. However, this conclusion was
viewed with suspicion, especially when the USDA admitted that the "verification process
was vulnerable to criticism." 152
Recognizing the problems and seeking to preserve the legitimacy of the USDA's
role, then Secretary of Agriculture Dan Glickman (a Democrat) decided to conduct a
"fairness" referendum in 2000 to allow the pork producers to vote on whether to
terminate the checkoff program. The results showed 15,95 1 votes against the program
and 14,396 votes in favor of the program. Accordingly, Secretary Glickman announced
that the pork checkoff program would be terminated. In immediate response, the
Michigan Pork Producers Association (MPPA) filed suit to challenge the counting of the
votes and the "voluntary" referendum and obtained a Temporary Restraining Order to
prevent termination of the program while the action for a preliminary injunction was
pending.
At this key juncture, a new Secretary of Agriculture, Ann Veneman (a
Republican), took office. Despite the votes indicating that more than half of the industry
was against the checkoffs, she decided to discount the referendum and continue the pork
checkoff program. In an effort to conclude the matter, she entered into an agreement with
the MPPA to transfer responsibility for managing the checkoff funds from the National
Pork Producers Council to the National Pork Board, a panel of individuals appointed by
the Secretary. This prompted the Campaign for Family Farms to cross-claim challenging
the settlement and to add a new claim that the pork checkoffs violated the pork
152 Michigan Pork Producers v. Campaign for Family Farms, 174 F. Supp. 2d 637, 639 (2001), citing
Glickman Memorandum of February 25, 2000.
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producers' First Amendment rights in commercial speech.1 53 In a surprising move, U.S.
District Court Judge Richard Enslen ruled on November 1, 2002, that the pork checkoffs
were unconstitutional and that collection of all mandatory checkoff fees must cease on
November 24, 2002. 154 The USDA and other defendants successfully persuaded the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals to allow the checkoff payments to continue while the
lawsuit was pending. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals heard oral arguments in this
case on March 14, 2003.
In a parallel development, the Livestock Marketing Association (LMA) submitted
petitions to the USDA on November 12, 1999, to drive a referendum for a vote on
whether beef checkoffs should continue. The Secretary of Agriculture provided no
response. In light of her failure to validate the petitions and schedule a referendum, the
LMA and other plaintiffs filed a declaratory judgment action. They sought: 1) a ruling
that the Secretary's action (or inaction) was unconstitutional and violative of their due
process and equal protection rights; 2) an injunction prohibiting further collections of
checkoffs; 3) an injunction regarding the required actions on the referendum, and 4) an
order requiring the Cattlemen's Beef Board to cease using checkoff fees to publicize anti
referendum messages in its producer communications. (Such inappropriate use of
checkoff fees demonstrated a strong hegemony controlling the cattle industry.) The
plaintiffs then amended their complaint, adding a claim that beef checkoffs violated their
First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and freedom of association.
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The LMA was successful in obtaining a court order in 2001 to enjoin the use of
checkoff fees by the Cattlemen's Beef Board for communications designed to block or
discourage a beef checkoff referendum or to influence government action or policy with
regard to keeping the beef checkoff and the beef board or to influence beef producers on
these subjects. 155 The USDA's failure to participate in the referendum process also led to
another district court victory. On June 21, 2002, District Court Judge Charles B.
Kommann held that beef checkoffs were unconstitutional as a violation of the First
Amendment rights of the plaintiffs and ordered that collection of all beef checkoffs
cease.1 56 The USDA and the other defendants prevailed, however, in their vigorous effort
to have the order lifted so that the checkoff program could continue while the litigation
was pending. Their appeal with the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals seeking a reversal of
the district court decision met with unfavorable results on July 8, 2003, when the
appellate court upheld Judge Kommann's finding that the beef checkoff programs were
unconstitutional. 157
These two scenarios demonstrate how the challengers' original strategy for
counter-hegemony was unsuccessful due to the powerful hegemony in place. The
minority group simply did not have the market power or political capital to overcome the
tactics of the USDA and the groups aligned with it. However, the favorable Supreme
Court decision in United States v. United Foods was an unexpected boon that
1 55 Livestock Marketing Association v. USDA, 132 F. Supp. 2d 817, 832 (2001). The district court also
enjoined the Cattlemen's Beef Board from using descriptive words such as "fair," "accountable,"
"effective" and "it's working" to refer to the beef checkoff program. It expressly recognized that checkoff
funds should be used solely "to promote and fund research to promote the consumption of beef' and to
'�romote and advertise beef products and the consumption of beef." Ibid.
1 6 Livestock Marketing Association v. USDA, 207 F. Supp. 2d 992, 1007 (D. S. Dakota 2002).
157 Livestock Marketing Association v. USDA, Nos. 02-2769 and 02-2832, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 13630
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dramatically shifted power. From a strictly economic standpoint, the challengers'
success in their free speech legal claims was seen as being likely to cause a disruption in
the flow of millions of dollars in checkoff revenues in the pork and beef industries.
The government is fighting to maintain the legitimacy of the current hegemonic
framework. The USDA' s handling of this situation and a similar referendum vote in the
beef industry suggests that the USDA is situated squarely within the historic bloc of
political and social institutions that form the hegemony. However, the outcomes of the
recent legal battles in favor of the challenger indicate that the USDA's dominant position
may need to be re-negotiated, a process that Gramsci predicted will occur when the
relationship between the State and civil society become unstable. Re-negotiation could
also be prompted by unstable relationships between classes or between competing
interests within civil society.
History and Rationale for Mandatory Assessment Programs and Major Players
Commodity marketing programs are regulated by federal and state governments
through a variety of institutional mechanisms. 1 58 The federal government employs: 1)
stand-alone statutory programs or 2) "marketing orders" as authorized under the
Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937 (AMAA). 159 The stand-alone programs
arise when Congress passes an Act providing for the advertising, joint promotion, and
education of a commodity, and the relevant industry affirms the legislation with a super
majority vote. 1 60
1 58
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The AMAA vests significant authority in the Secretary of the USDA to adopt
regulations for commodities (or marketing orders) in the Code of Federal Regulations. 1 6 1
The scope of such marketing orders covers joint promotion, advertising, marketing
research, production research, designation of unfair trade practices, and minimum pricing
and supply controls. 1 62 In deference to the expertise and preferences of a particular
industry, the statute also requires a vote of approval by two-thirds of the relevant
producers or by those producers who market at least two thirds of the output of the
relevant commodity. 1 63 (It is clear that the second condition would privilege the interests
of the large producers.) Federal marketing orders may be imposed on both domestic and
foreign producers of beef sold in the United States. The free speech controversy arises
out of further provisions in the AMAA that permit a commodity program to collect
mandatory fees from all producers in an industry to be used for funding of its authorized
activities, including generic advertising and promotion of the industry's key commodity.
State agricultural commodities programs are created through the enactment of
state legislation that authorizes the secretary of a state department of agriculture to adopt
marketing orders to regulate an industry. Other statutory vehicles for commodity
regulations are state councils and state commissions. Both are created by stand-alone
legislation and can be modified only through further legislation. State councils are
generally viewed as providing certainty and reducing the vulnerability of producers to a
scenario where one small faction in an industry imposes its agenda on the entire industry.
For this reason, state councils have become the preferred vehicle in states where
161
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industries with competing interests seek to address complex issues, often related to
technology or environmental issues. 164
The Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937 (AMAA) was a reenactment
of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933. 165 It was a strategic move by Congress to
clarify that all sections of the 1933 Act that had not been amended in 1935 remained in
effect. 166 The overwhelming rationale for this legislation was the need to respond to
agricultural marketing conditions created by the Depression.
Today the rationale for commodity promotion programs is primarily based on the
argument that commodity producers will realize greater benefits through collective
action, especially in regard to competing on an international market. Secretary of
Agriculture Ann M. Veneman, in 20002 endorsed commodity checkoffs by stating:
''The U.S. Department of Agriculture regards such programs, when properly
administered, as effective tools for market enhancement." 167 Likewise, the U.S . Congress
expressed its resounding support for generic commodity promotion programs in statutory
findings it codified in 1996:
It is in the national public interest and vital to the welfare of the
agricultural economy of the United States to maintain and expand existing
markets and develop new markets and uses for agricultural commodities through
industry-funded, Government-supervised, generic commodity promotion
programs established under commodity promotion laws. 168
The statute specifies that the congressional intent "has always been to maintain
and expand markets for the agricultural commodity covered by the law, rather than to
164
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maintain or expand the share of those markets held by any individual producer or
processor." 169 Finally, the Congressional findings recognize the value of the generic
commodity programs to small producers "who often lack the resources or market power
to advertise on their own and who are otherwise often unable to benefit from the
economies of scale available in promotion and advertising." 1 70
It is noteworthy that Congress issued these laudatory statements about the
commodity checkoff programs after the Ninth Circuit had delivered the second of two
opinions striking down checkoffs as unconstitutional. 171 This raised a general sense of
alarm by the industrial agriculture bloc, resulting in pressure on legislators to clarify the
benefits of the programs in a way that would help strengthen the government's case in the
next checkoff lawsuit.
California fruit growers supporting mandatory assessments have stated their
rationale for the checkoff programs as follows:
Though created under the auspices of various federal and state statutory
schemes, these programs serve the same general purpose-building, maintaining
and expanding markets for key agricultural products. The need for collective
action in these markets has long been recognized by both state and federal
legislatures. In today's global economy and world market, commodity
promotional programs help to promote, position, and organize an industry so that
it can compete in the international marketplace. It enables producers/handlers to
join together and reach markets otherwise out of reach to all but the biggest
players in an industry.172
An extension of this rationale can be seen in an effort in California to organize
support for an "Ag Alliance." In the course of this initiative, industry representatives
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argued that commodity producers can no longer act on behalf of individual interests since
the public now views agriculture collectively and not as industry segments. 173
Government and Multiple-Industry Players. The USDA is the key

governmental agency that oversees the fourteen federal commodity checkoff programs.
It derives its authority from the Agriculture Marketing Act of 1937. It has been a named
defendant in all challenges to federal commodity checkoffs and receives its legal support
from the U.S. Department of Justice.
A number of legal and activist groups have supported the challengers and
represented their interests in Court and in the public arena. These include groups such as
the Farmers' Legal Action Group (FLAG), a non-profit law center founded in 1986 and
based in St. Paul Minnesota. 174 This legal group is dedicated to providing legal services
to help sustain and preserve the family farm system of agriculture and provide social and
economic justice to American farmers. The Center for Individual Freedom (CFIF) is a
non-profit First Amendment rights group based in Alexandria, Virginia, that is active as a
plaintiff in several checkoff challenges. The CFIF has provided financial support for
various challenges to mandatory advertising, assisted in legal actions, filed amicus curie
("friend of the court") briefs, joined as plaintiffs in two cases challenging beef and dairy
checkoffs, and generally supported the position of the checkoff challengers in their First
Amendment battles over commodity checkoff programs. The CFIF receives funding
from the contributions of individuals, foundations and corporations.
1 73
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Another family farm group that has challenged the pork checkoffs and corporate
concentration and vertical integration is the Campaign for Family Farms and the
Environment (Campaign for Family Farms or CFF). This group was the plaintiff in the
major legal action against pork checkoffs, Michigan Pork Producers v. Campaign for
Family Farms. It has been represented by the Farmers' Legal Action Group in that case.
The CFF is a coalition of member organizations, including: the Missouri Rural Crisis
Center, Iowa Citizens for Community Improvement, Illinois Stewardship Alliance and
Land Stewardship Project (Minnesota). 1 75
The Organization for Competitive Markets (OCM) is a recognized national group
that describes itself as dedicated to furthering the interests of independent farmers,
ranchers and rural communities. Its activities include facilitating discourse among
academic and economic experts. It also receives donations from member organizations,
foundations and individuals.
Fruit Growers Industry. Federal regulation of the fruit growing industry has
occurred through the actions of the secretary of the USDA in promulgating regulations in
the Code of Federal Regulations in the form of "marketing orders." The authority for
creating and enforcing such regulations, including mandatory commodity assessments, is
established in the Agricultural Agreement Act of 1937. The marketing orders subject
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fruit growers to extensive federal regulation that includes measures regulating supplies
and prices along with the checkoff requirements. 1 76
California, the state with the largest group of fruit growers, has a state act, the
California Marketing Act of 1937, that is the counterpart to the federal act. It grants
authority to the secretary of the California Department of Food and Agriculture to
implement commodity checkoff regulations. Other commodity-specific acts control
various individual fruit growers. However, all of these acts are subject to scrutiny after
the landmark case of Gerawan v. Lyons, decided by the California Supreme Court in
2000. The Court held that the freedom of speech provisions of the California
Constitution are broader than the First Amendment rights under the U.S. Constitution.
Therefore, the mandatory commodity assessments against plum growers at issue under
the California Plum Marketing Program were unconstitutional. 1 77
Several industry groups represent the interests of growers of fresh produce on a
national or regional basis, however, most of the fruit growing associations are state
based. The Western Growers Association supports growers of fresh produce in California
and Arizona with legislative and trade programs that benefit its members collectively.
The United Fresh Fruit & Vegetable Association and the Fresh Produce Association of
the Americas are recognized national trade groups. Strong trade associations can be
found in a number of states, including such groups as the California Growers
Association, Florida Citrus Mutual, Texas Fruit Growers Association, Michigan
Agricultural Cooperative and many others. The research for this study did not identify
176 See Brief for the Respondent on Writ of Certiorari to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
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specific groups that are aligned for or against commodity checkoffs, although individual
fruit producers have been active in challenging fruit checkoffs. 1 78
Mushroom Growers Industry. Mandatory assessments on mushroom growers
were previously imposed by the Mushroom Promotion, Research and Consumer
Information Act of 1990. 179 This statute focused narrowly on the goal of maintaining and
expanding markets for mushrooms rather than on supply management or stabilizing
markets. The Act established the Mushroom Council to administer the mushroom
checkoff program. In 2001, the Supreme Court held this Act unconstitutional in United
States v. United Foods, Inc. 1 80

The American Mushroom Institute is the primary mushroom trade association. It
has supported commodity checkoff programs and filed an amicus brief in the United
States v. United Foods case supporting the government's position.

Beef Industry. The checkoff legislation for the beef industry is the Beef
Promotion Research Act and Order, enacted in 1986. 1 8 1 The beef checkoff program
requires cattle producers to pay a one dollar fee for each head of cattle sold, which results
in revenues of more than $80 million annually. 1 82 These mandatory assessments are the
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source of funding for the "Beef. It' s what's for dinner" generic advertising.
Congress created the beef checkoff program as the governing legislation to
promote beef as a commodity. The Cattlemen' s Beef Board (CBB) is the organization
that directs the flow of the beef checkoff money. The U.S . Secretary of Agriculture
appoints its members, who represent the three steps in beef production-the beef
producers, the cow-calf operators, and the feedlot operators. The National Cattlemen' s
Beef Association (NCBA) is the largest recipient of checkoff funds and provides services
to the CBB that support the objectives of the beef checkoff programs. Many beef
producers expressed dissatisfaction upon the forming of the NCBA because the meat
packing industry was allowed representation in policy-making. The packers have
interests at odds with beef ranchers and feeders who fear and mistrust the economic
power of the packers. 1 83
Among the challengers to beef checkoffs are two organizations, the Livestock
Marketing Association (LMA) and the Westem Organization of Resource Councils
(WORC). The livestock markets (primary members of the LMA) must collect the
checkoff fee of $ 1 .00 per head for every animal that is sold in their rings without any
reimbursement for this service. The WORC is an association of six grassroots
organizations from six western states. Its membership includes ranchers, farmers, small
businessmen, and others who have strong environmental interests.

1 83 See "Concentration in the Meat Packing Industry Minority Report," USDA Advisory Committee on
Agricultural Concentration (June 7, 1996); available from
http://www.web-span.com/~pga/library/report.html; Internet; accessed 12 November 2002. An example of
one way that the packers exert power is through the use of "captive supply" or contract agriculture, which
can occur through packer-owned cattle, formula cattle, futures cattle, and custom-fed cattle. These
methods, accounting for twenty to thirty percent of the cattle produced, remove control from the producers
and affect the prices obtained from independent feeders. Ibid.
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Pork Industry. The Pork Promotion, Research and Consumer Information Act1 84
has historically governed the commodity checkoff program for hog producers. Enacted
in 1985, this act required hog producers to pay 40 cents for each $100 in hog sales and
specified that revenues from such checkoffs be spent solely on generic advertising, such
as the "Pork, the Other White Meat" promotional campaign. Annual revenue from pork
checkoffs has totaled $57 million dollars. 1 85 However, on October 25, 2002, a federal
district court judge in Grand Rapids, Michigan, held that the pork checkoff program
violates the free speech rights of hog farmers. In an opinion that expressed his overall
disdain for the mandatory commodity assessments, Judge Richard A. Enslen declared:
''The government has been made tyrannical by forcing men and women to pay for
messages they detest. Such a system is at the bottom unconstitutional and rotten." 1 86
The National Pork Board (NPB) administers the pork checkoff program and is
instrumental in collecting checkoffs and channeling the revenues. In addition to the
promotion of pork, it uses checkoff fees for research related to technology and swine
health, consumer information projects and production improvement. The National Pork
Producers Council (NPPC), one of the nation's largest livestock commodity
organizations, is a recipient of the checkoff fees. It is affiliated with parallel state
commodity associations that also receive checkoff fees, such as Michigan Pork
Producers, California Pork Producers, Kentucky Pork Producers, Indiana Pork Producers,
New York Pork Producers, and Ohio Pork Producers.

Pork Promotion, Research and Consumer Information Act of 1985, 7 U.S.C. §§ 4801 et seq. (1985).
Becker, CRS-1.
1 86
Michigan Pork Producers (2002) at 791 .
83
184

1 85

A nonprofit organization discussed earlier, the Campaign for Family Farms,
represents family farm hog producers, the challengers in the current litigation against
pork checkoff programs.
Dairy Industry. Fluid milk producers began paying checkoffs with the

enactment of the Dairy Production Stabilization Act of 1 983. 1 87 In May 2002, this Act
was amended to impose checkoffs on imported dairy products as well as milk produced
in the United States. Annual revenues from dairy checkoffs today exceed $250 million.
The Dairy Production Stabilization Act of 1983 gave authority to the National
Dairy Promotion and Research Board (NDB) to collect mandatory assessments, to
evaluate proposals for projects to promote the use of fluid milk and dairy products and
carry out research and education projects. The administrative activities of this board
were transferred in 1995 to Dairy Management, Inc. (DMI) a private non-profit
corporation formed by merging the NDB and the United Dairy Industry Association.
Today more than 80,000 dairy producers belong to the DMI. It has become a
management organization, overseeing the activities of the American Dairy Association,
the National Dairy Council and the U.S. Dairy Export Council. 1 88
The DMI has aggressively pursued programs to increase demand for U.S.
produced dairy products, including the widely promoted "Got Milk?" campaign. It has
most recently used its checkoff money as a means to induce one of the twenty-four small
California towns it has targeted to change its name to "Got Milk?"as a publicity gimmick
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to celebrate the tenth anniversary of the Got Milk campaign and to help the dairy industry
combat decreasing milk sales. 189
Influence of Changi,ng Economic, Political and Cultural Conditions
on the Agricultural Industry
The struggle between competing interests in the commercial and legal spheres has
created a highly charged "zone ofconflict" with regard to compelled commercial speech
(see Figure 2) The clash cannot be simply attributed to First Amendment zealots or
opportunistic freeloading commodity producers. More complex developments in both
the agricultural and legal arenas have primed the social and political environment for the
current conflagration. This section will address major influences on the agricultural
industry.
Agricultural economist specialist John Crespi maintained that the generic
advertising battle is the product of a "long, evolutionary process of economics,
legislation, and litigation." 190 Several events in the 1930s laid the foundation for
mandatory assessments, including enactment of the Agricultural Marketing Agreement
Act of 1937

191

and a Supreme Court opinion in 1939 in United States v. Rock Royal

CO-OP, lnc. 192 upholding the constitutionality of the 1937 Act in the face of Fifth

Amendment, Tenth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment challenges. Another
landmark piece of legislation was introduced in 1954 when Congress amended the 1937
189
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Act to authorize the Secretary of Agriculture to implement programs for generic
advertising and promotion for commodities in furtherance of the goals of the Act. 193 A
primary objective of the marketing orders promulgated under this legislation was to
stimulate demand for farm products, thereby propping up prices for farm commodities
and reducing the need for the government to purchase excess production. 194
It is noteworthy that almost fifty years passed without challenges to the
constitutionality of the 1 937 Act. One possible interpretation of this phenomenon is that
the agricultural industry had a high level of acceptance of the legitimacy of the Supreme
Court decision in Rock Royal. The judicial hiatus ended in 1 985 when a cattle producer
and auctioneer initiated the case of United States v. Frame, 195 challenging an amendment
to the Beef Promotion and Research Act of 1 976 196 that imposed mandatory assessments
for generic advertising. Since 1985, there has been a steady stream of litigation
challenging the mandatory promotional checkoffs. (See Appendix B listing compelled
commercial speech cases.) The agricultural industry has undergone many changes, and
the renewed interest in litigation can be seen as one manifestation of the changes.
Several areas of influence are imposing profound changes on the agricultural
industry as shown in Figure 1 . Reflecting general trends in other areas of business, these
key areas include: 1) globalization of agricultural markets (with attendant implications
for all links in the chain of producing, promoting and selling goods in a competitive
world marketplace); 2) public health and environmental concerns that lead to a tension
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between advancements in technology and the organic commodities producers, 3) vertical
integration in industry sectors; 4) contract agriculture; 5) increased concentration of
ownership in larger firms that run agricultural operations; and 6) crisis of
competitiveness in agriculture market because of obsolete organizational and ownership
structures and tensions with other post-industrial business models. 197 Each of these areas
will be briefly addressed below.
Globalization. The term "agribusiness" has become common nomenclature for a
commercial or industrial enterprise that manages agricultural operations such as
production, processing, storage and distribution of farm commodities in accordance with
profit-generating standards and criteria. A major focus of agribusiness is to source raw
materials as cheaply as possible and then reformulate them in some manner that can be
marketed to the consumer at the highest price the market will bear. This allows the
agribusiness concern an edge in productivity, yields, and costs. Opening up new
international markets has been a catalyst for "global agribusiness" and have introduced a
new era of multinational food conglomerates engaged in import/export trade and
transborder business strategies.
Food producers seeking to compete against the multinational behemoths are
concerned with their ability to advertise and distinguish their products from the heavily
advertised brands of these giant companies. Mandatory commodity checkoffs can be
seen as a hindrance when they limit the pool of resources available to create recognition

197 See generally "A Food and Agriculture Policy for the 2 1 st Century," Compilation of papers presented at
the Organization for Competitive Markets Food Policy Retreat on April 29 - May 1, 2000, ed., Michael C.
Stumo, available from http://www.competitivemarkets.com/library/academic/2 1 stcentury; Internet;
accessed 1 November 2002.
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and a distinct image for a specialty or niche product. An argument also has been made
that marketing orders with standards for the handling and quality of commodities are less
necessary today, since the large domestic and foreign conglomerates in each major
commodity groups have their own established criteria and systems that are often superior
to those mandated by the marketing orders. Since they also are involved in their own
research and public promotion efforts, the checkoff fees are not needed to bolster their
advertising programs . 198
On the other hand, the opposing side has strongly argued that the competitive
nature of the global food commodity market begs for a collective response by organized
commodity groups. The players in the global environment are now selling "food
products" rather than "food commodities" and this difference is critical. 199 Food
commodities can be sold without organized and aggressive marketing and maintain a
sense of continuity in time, without major introduction of change. Food products need
proactive marketing to create visibility and promote images that attract consumers to
more than just the attributes of the commodity itself, i.e., that lifestyle and behavior can
be transformed by choosing a particular food product. Professors David Padberg and
Charles Hall outlined the need for a "functional commodity brain trust" to perform the
serious role of identifying values and attitudes of the consumer and managing the public
image of the food product in the same manner that aggressively branded products are
managed in a national and global food market. 200
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Health and Environmental Concerns/Organic Agriculture. The U.S. Food

and Drug Administration's approval of a genetically altered organism for commercial
sale on May 1 8, 1994, ushered in a new era of genetically engineered crops that are
resistant to pests and disease. 201 They are touted as capable of repelling pests, resisting
herbicides, and competing with weeds for water and nutrients.202 The agricultural
industry welcomed the opportunity to increase production and grow crops with less need
for pesticides. However, there is a dark side to these genetically engineered crops, also
called "transgenic crops" (or "Frankenfood" by the purists). There is a tradeoff between
resistance and resilience. As the plants are modified, they become more resistant to
weeds and herbs. They will have less sturdy stems, less vigorous deep roots and less
ability to compete with weeds. Another disadvantage for farmers growing transgenic
crops is that they must plant some fields with traditional plants to serve as "refuges" for
nonresistant pests (to maintain a nonresistant pest population). The refuges have
extremely low yields because the pests "swarm" in from genetically protected fields. 203
The transgenic crops can increase productivity, but there are disadvantages as noted
above. Not all farmers are enthusiastic about the new transgenic crops, resulting in
further division in the agricultural community.
Another developing area of agriculture is organic agriculture. This is the process
of growing grains, fruits and vegetables without using synthetic pesticides. Organic
farmers view farming as a way of sustaining an ecosystem rather than a factory for
201
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producing food. 204 The goal is "ecologically sustainable agriculture'' that will restore the
soil and improve the efficiency of nutrient cycling in the soil. 205 Grounds for difference
exist within the agriculture industry since many organic farmers run small operations so
their interests may not be aligned with the large farming operations. There are also
ideological differences since the organic farmers' goals are often heavily focused on
environmental concerns with profit a secondary objective.
It is clear, however, that organic farming has moved from a fringe agricultural
initiative to a new food sector. In 1997, organic food was cited as a "$3.5 billion
business growing at an average rate of 20 percent annually." 206
Vertical Integration and Contract Agriculture. Vertical integration occurs

when "integrating firms have acquired or build operations in position of their former
buyers or sellers. The result is a network of subsidiaries conducting business rather than
independent firms buying and selling to each other." 207 Often the network includes a
mix of wholly owned operations and other independent entities working for the
conglomerate under contracts.
By the end of the Twenty-first Century, the entire poultry industry had been
vertically integrated, and vertical integration had made large inroads in the pork
industry.208 The vertical structure raises issues similar to the ones outlined in the section
below on concentration of ownership. A major outcome of vertical integration is the loss
of autonomy. The owner will control all farming decisions, and the farmer essentially
204
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becomes a paid laborer. Another serious concern is the unfair bargaining position of the
contract farmer or the farmer/employee. With the exception of Iowa and Nebraska,
vertical integration practices were virtually unregulated in the 1990s. 209 But the most
serious concerns are the environmental risks that accompany the large production
facilities owned and controlled by the packers. Four states have experienced large-scale
pollution incidents related to large hog confinement units and the number is expected to
grow. Although some technology is available to address the odor problems, the
conglomerate owners allege that the cost is too great. It can be argued that the social
costs for the large integrated hog operations are being unfairly borne by others so that the
integrated firms can profitably compete. 210
Concentration of Ownership. Early in the Twenty-first Century, the
agricultural industry experienced a period of increased concentration and mergers. In
fact, in the summer of 1999, Senator Paul Wellstone, a Democrat from Minnesota,
became so alarmed at the frenetic pace of the mergers in the agricultural community that
he proposed a freeze on all agribusiness mergers for eighteen months. 21 1 Twenty-seven
of his fellow senators voted for this proposal, demonstrating that the concern was
recognized by members of Congress.212
Several years earlier, Secretary of Agriculture Dan Glickman had formed a USDA
Advisory Committee on Agricultural Concentration to investigate the concentration in the
agricultural industry and make recommendations in February 1996. After hearing
209
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testimony from more than seventy individuals representing all sectors of the agricultural
process, representative trade associations, environmental groups, and others, the
committee provided its report four months later in two sections, the main committee
report and a minority report (referenced herein as the "Majority Report" and the
"Minority Report).2 1 3 Both acknowledged that the growing level of concentration within
the agricultural industry was accompanied by a strong level of mistrust by the producers
toward the agribusiness conglomerates. The Minority Report forcefully pointed out that
the larger concentrated firms are able to maintain profit margins within the profit cycle,
while the smaller producers "become primary shock absorbers for fluctuations in the
commodity cycle."214
The Majority Report identified the following negative characteristics of the
current agricultural environment in its findings: 1) producers felt an intense sense of
powerlessness as they felt coerced into doing business with concentrated firms, especially
in the cattle industry, where the producers compared record losses with the sizable profits
posted by those in higher levels of the industry chain, 2) the devastating effect of
depressed producer prices on everyone in the cattle industry; 3) evidence of severe
mistrust in the procurement system with the most flagrant example being the cattle
producers' mistrust of the meatpackers and their ability to use concentration to depress
prices (some witnesses were afraid to testify for fear of reprisal by the packers}, 4) the
potential for price manipulation and other detrimental effects on ranchers and farmers due
to formula pricing, captive supplies, and vertical integration.215
21 3
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Several critical paragraphs in the Minority Report directly support the thesis of
this paper that the compelled commercial speech cases represent a hegemonic conflict
within the agricultural industry:
Checkoff-Financed Producer Organizations
Extensive dissatisfaction was voiced by beef producers over the formation of the
National Cattlemen's Beef Association because of packer representation in the
organization's policy formation. Allowing representation of an industry segment
with interests that may be contrary to the interest of the producer, was viewed as
an unfair use of mandatory nonrefundable beef checkoff funds. In effect, the
splintered cow-calf and feedlot operations were helping support the concentrated
interests of the packing segment.
The activities of the various checkoff programs tend to be focused on large-scale
production, reflecting, no doubt, the wishes of the largest contributors. This
further contributes to concentration at the production level. Those who object to
commodity group activities or the resulting concentration have little chance to
show their dissatisfaction since the checkoffs are not refundable.
Findings
The use of commodity checkoff funds to finance research and promotion of the
interests of the largest market participants accelerates the rate of concentration in
the industries from which the funds are withheld. The use of nonrefundable
checkoff funds to support an organization that is viewed by contributors as not
accountable to its members is improper. Those who disagree with a promotion
organization's membership and policies should not be compelled to support it.
Recommendation: All checkoff fees should be made refundable. 216
The observations and findings of the six members of Congress who signed the
Minority Report emphasized the alliances generated by the close relationship of the
activities of the National Cattlemen's Beef Association and the business interests of the
concentrated packers.217 These relationships demonstrate how private enterprise is able
to utilize a trade association to further its agenda. The two become hegemonic partners,
both benefiting from the beef checkoff hegemony to the extreme disadvantage of the
216
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cattle producers. In fact, in its conclusion, the Minority Report forcefully stated its belief
that the current concentration in the livestock industry needs to be addressed by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Congress. However, the actions of the Secretary of
Agriculture and the USDA in the last several years with respect to the beef checkoff issue
suggest that this agency has joined in the hegemonic alliance with the packers and the
National Cattlemen's Beef Association.
In the Minority Report's sobering summary, the participating committee members
expressed their grave concerns in two concluding paragraphs:
The importance of the issues addressed by the committee cannot be overstated.
All consumers and all producers will feel ill effects if market power grows
without accompanying accountability. Some concentration of agriculture is,
indeed, inevitable as farmers retire or otherwise voluntarily leave the farm, and as
technology provides increasing economies of scale. However, as briefly
described above, there are several anticompetitive forces at work in the livestock
industry that are artificially accelerating the rate of concentration.
Once concentration occurs, it is almost impossible to reverse. We have thus
concentrated our recommendations on preventative measures in hopes of allowing
"progress" but preserving competition. Such a strategy is not only in the interest
of independent market participants, but is vital for the long-term protection of the
American consumer. Without immediate and strong action by the Secretary, and
where necessary, by the Congress, the interests of artificial concentration will
prevail. We stand ready, individually and as a group, to lend our help in this vital
task. 2 1 s
A telling note at the end of the Minority Report stated that the biggest question left
unanswered was whether the "big three beef packers" should be broken up since they
control almost 80 percent of the fed cattle slaughter along with shares of other markets
such as the cow/bull and pork.
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Author Jon Lauck used the phrase "corporate feudalism" to describe an
agricultural environment dominated by concentration. 2 1 9 The antithesis is a model of
economic independence, a position sought by the challengers in the checkoff cases.
Lauck pointed out the support that exists for the corporate feudalism model, particularly
by economists who feel that the large processors offer producers an opportunity to reduce
risk and save their farms. 220
Crisis of Competition in Agriculture Markets. The agricultural community
has faced various levels of economic crisis during the last century arising from
agricultural market failure. It has not responded to market gluts like other industries are
forced to respond, i.e., by reducing production in order to achieve a more sustainable
level of supply. Rather, farmers have maintained the same level of production or
increased production in order to compensate for lower prices, which pushes prices even
lower. This has been the perennial "farm problem" that American industry and
government have not been able to solve. A related problem arises because the failure of a
farm does not lead to a reduction in the number of producing facilities. Instead, a new
owner acquires the farming interests and the aggregate size of all American farming
resources remains static.
A third factor in this dysfunctional economic model is a high level of government
regulation of agricultural markets as the government has sought to ameliorate the severe
losses and overproduction through price controls, farm subsidy programs, and the
purchase of farm commodity surplus.

2 19
220
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CHAPTER 3
LITERATURE REVIEW OF LEGAL THEMES
First Amendment Standards of Review
Turning to the legal sphere, two different First Amendment standards for
protection of speech governed communications in the United States in 2003. A
demanding "strict scrutiny" standard for "pure speech" or political speech coexisted with
a less stringent intermediate scrutiny standard for commercial speech (referred to as the
Central Hudson test) outlined in Central Hudson Gas & Electric v. Public Service
Commission. 221

In 1994, the Supreme Court determined in Roberts v. United States Jaycees that
the strict scrutiny standard is the appropriate standard for cases narrowly focused on
freedom from compelled association.222 Under this standard, the government can justify
its regulation by showing that it has " . . .compelling state interests unrelated to the
suppression of ideas" in the matter underlying the regulation and that these interests
"cannot be achieved through means significantly less restrictive."223
The Abood case, decided in 1977, and the line of cases following its analysis for
determining cases with mixed issues of freedom from compelled speech and compelled
association apply a standard of protection for speech that can be characterized as
intermediate. In these cases, government-compelled speech will pass First Amendment
scrutiny based on a showing that the government has an "important" interest in a
collective or associational activity and that the compelled speech is germane to achieving
221 See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
222
See Roberts , 485 U.S. 609 (1984).
223

Ibid. at 623.
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that legitimate regulatory purpose. The U.S. Supreme Court established this standard in
the following language of Abood:
To be required to help finance the union as a collective-bargaining agent might
well be thought, therefore, to interfere in some way with an employee's freedom
to associate for the advancement of ideas, or to refrain from doing so, as he sees
fit. But the judgment clearly made in Hanson and Street [prior union shop cases]
is that such interference as exists is constitutionally justified by the legislative
assessment of the important contribution of the union shop to the system of labor
relations established by Congress. [emphasis added] 224
This standard was followed in the United States v. United Foods case in 200 1 . The
Supreme Court stated : ''The features of the marketing scheme found important in
Glickman are not present in the case now before us." [emphasis added] 225
A description of the level of scrutiny required for an Abood /Keller analysis is
provided by the dissenting judge in the Gerawan v. Lyons case, decided by the state
appellate court for the Fifth Appellate District upon remand. 226 The majority opinion in
this case held that the appropriate level of scrutiny for the checkoff programs under the
free speech clause of the California State Constitution was an intermediate level
balancing test based on "whether the asserted governmental interests are sufficiently
substantial to outweigh the free speech rights of dissenting plum growers. "227 Dissenting
Judge Herbert I. Levy argued that the Abood/Keller germaneness test should be the
appropriate standard. In clarifying the Abood/Keller standard, Judge Levy stated:
Although generally referred to as the 'germaneness test,' it [the Abood/Keller test]
encompasses more than a determination of whether the speech is relevant to the
goals of the association. Rather, when a member of a compelled association
objects to being burdened with particular expenditures, 'the guiding standard must
be whether the challenged expenditures are necessarily or reasonably incurred' for
224 Abood at 222.
225 United Foods at 2339.
226 Gerawan v. Lyons, No. F03 1 142 (5 th App. Dist., State of Cal. 2001).
227
Ibid. at 6.
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the purpose of furthering those goals. (citing Keller v. State Bar of California,
496 U.S. at 14) Requiring more than a rational relationship and less than a
na"owly tailored service of a compelling s'tate interest, this test essentially
constitutes an intermediate level of scrutiny. Moreover, this analysis is not
specific to a particular type of speech. Compelled contributions to commercial
speech, as well as political or ideological speech are subject to this test. (citing
United States v. United Foods, 121 S.Ct. at 2339). (Levy, ff.dissenting)
[emphasis added] 228
In its July 8, 2003 opinion holding the beef checkoff unconstitutional, the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals discussed the Keller and Abood analysis before applying the
Central Hudson test. It stated: "In compelled speech cases, the Supreme Court has

traditionally applied a balancing-of-interests test to determine whether or not the
challenged governmental action is justified."229 The court cited language by Justice
Stevens in his concurring opinion in United Foods that recognized compelled funding of
speech as a subset of compelled speech cases called a "compelled subsidy."230
The intermediate standard for protection of commercial speech set forth in
Central Hudson requires that the government demonstrate a substantial interest in the

subject matter of the regulation. The Supreme Court held that regulation of speech
impacting economic transactions does not violate the First Amendment if:
1) it concerns lawful activity and is not misleading;
2) the government interest is substantial;
3) the regulation advances the governmental interest asserted (i.e. whether there
is a reasonable fit between a commercial speech regulation and achievement
of a legitimate policy goal); and
4) the regulation is no more extensive than necessary.231
In a subsequent case, 44 Liquorman v. Rhode Island,232 the Supreme Court
228

Ibid. at 13-14.
Livestock Marketing Association v. USDA, Nos. 02-2769 and 02-2832 at 16, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS
13630 (8th Cir. 2003).
230
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231
Central Hudson at 566.
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justices were sharply divided over the level of protection to afford truthful commercial
speech. The court invalidated a Rhode Island law that forbid the advertising of alcohol at
any location other than within liquor store premises. Writing for a plurality of the
justices, Justice Stevens expressed the view that special care was warranted in reviewing
regulations that impose restrictions on truthful, nonmisleading commercial messages:
. . . when a State entirely prohibits the dissemination of truthful, nonmisleading
commercial messages for reasons unrelated to the preservation of a fair
bargaining process, there is far less reason to depart from the rigorous review that
the First Amendment generally demands. 233
Legal scholars have concluded that this language suggests that a heightened
degree of intermediate scrutiny be applied to commercial speech cases involving
regulatory schemes designed to restrict the public from receiving truthful information.
Seven of the justices agreed that the regulation on advertising failed the Central Hudson
test, but four of the justices seemed uneasy about applying the test. In this case and later
cases, Justice Clarence Thomas argued that the Court should apply a strict scrutiny
standard to evaluate the constitutionality of commercial speech.
The question raised by the 44 Liquonna,rt case is "whether the government should
be able to suppress truthful advertising in the interest of consumer protection, or whether,
as some Justices have insisted, truthful advertising should receive exactly the same
constitutional protection as other speech."234
The Compelled Commercial Speech Cases

The Supreme Court decided a case in 1939, United States v. Rock Royal CO-OP,
232
See 44 Liquormart,
233
Ibid. at 501.
234

Inc. v. Rhode Island, 5 17 U.S. 484 (1996).

Farber, 159. Professor Farber argued that the "core values" underlying the First Amendment that are
relevant for other categories of traditionally protected speech are not present to the same extent for
commercial speech.
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Inc., 235 that was a precursor to the checkoff challenge cases that emerged in the late
1980s. The government initiated the case to collect mandatory fees from several milk
processors as authorized under the 1937 Agricultural Marketing Act and a subsequent
milk order. The processors used a three-pronged defense, claiming: 1) their due process
rights under the Fifth Amendment were violated, 2) the federal government was
prohibited by the Tenth Amendment from fixing the price of milk prior to its entry in
interstate commerce, and 3) that the authority given to the Secretary of Agriculture
violated their property rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Secretary's
authority encompassed activities such as determining market areas, implementing market
orders based only on the consent of the producers and authorizing bloc voting by farming
cooperatives. These arguments testing the constitutionality of the milk order garnered the
support of the district court, but were ultimately rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court.
Fifty years passed before the next constitutional test of mandatory commodity
fees occured in 1989 in the case of United States v. Frame. 236 This time the focus was on
the compelled payment by cattle producers and importers of one dollar per head for use
in a national beef promotional campaign. The challengers sought a ruling by the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals that the Beef Promotion and Research Act was unconstitutional
because it exceeded the limits of Congressional authority granted by the Constitution, or
violated the free speech and association clauses of the First Amendment or violated the
takings clause or equal protection guarantee of the due process clause of the Fifth
Amendment. The appellate court held the act was constitutional under the Central
Hudson test. However, it expressly rejected the government speech argument in its
235
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decision, stating: " . . . the underlying rationale of the right to be free from compelled
speech or association leads us to conclude that the compelled expressive activities
mandated by the Beef Promotion Act are not properly characterized as 'government
speech.

, ,,231
In its first ruling on compelled commercial speech, the U.S. Supreme Court in

Glickman v. Wileman Brothers & Elliott, Inc. 238 delivered a 5-4 decision in 1997,

rejecting a First Amendment challenge to the constitutionality of a series of agricultural
marketing orders imposed by the federal government requiring fruit growers in central
California to pay assessments for product advertising. The Court held that the agricultural
orders in Glickman (issued by the Secretary of Agriculture of the United States) did not
prohibit or compel speech in a manner that raised any First Amendment concerns. Such
federal regulations were, therefore, constitutional because they were part of a collective
regulatory program and ancillary to a comprehensive scheme restricting marketing
autonomy. The Court stated that such federal regulations stabilize commodity markets
by collectivizing agricultural supplies. It observed that the mandatory assessments on
fruit growers in the Glickman case had the character of economic assessments rather than
speech restrictions because they were employed as an integral component of other
controls on commodity supplies. In performing this analysis, the Court expressly rejected
the Central Hudson analysis (which had been carefully applied by the appellate court)
and dismissed the First Amendment free speech claims of the fruit growers. In an
oftband statement, the Court noted:

237 Ibid. at 1 132.
238
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"Although respondents have continued in this Court to argue about their
disagreement with particular messages, those arguments, while perhaps calling
into question the administration of �ortions of the program, have no bearing on
the validity of the entire program." 39
As mentioned in chapter one of this dissertation, the California compelled speech
case of Gerawan Farming Inc. v. Lyons,

240

decided in 2000, expressed the discontent of

the California judiciary with the Supreme Court's decision in Glickman. The case arose
when a fruit grower, Gerawan Farming, Inc., was required to pay more than $80,000 per
year to comply with the California Plum Marketing Program. More than 55% of these
funds were used for generic advertising on behalf of all plum growers. This advertising
reflected viewpoints Gerawan strongly opposed. Gerawan claimed these mandatory
assessments used for generic advertising constituted a violation of its commercial free
speech rights under: 1) the First Amendment, which states "Congress shall make no
law . .. abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press," and 2) the California
Constitution, Article I, Section 2, Subdivision (a) which provides "Every person may
freely speak, write and publish his or her sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for
the abuse of this right. A law may not restrain or abridge liberty of speech or press."
The fruit grower filed an action against the California Secretary of Food and Agriculture
and others seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.
Relying upon the U.S. Supreme Court's 1997 determination in Glickman v.
Wileman that compelled commercial speech does not raise a First Amendment issue, the

California Supreme Court (in a 4-3 decision) reluctantly concluded that there was no
violation of Gerawan's commercial free speech rights under the First Amendment.
239 Ibid. at 467-468.
240 See Gerawan, 24 Ca. 4th 468 (2000).
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However, the majority defiantly asserted that the Glickman decision was faulty and
delivered a scathing criticism of the U.S. Supreme Court's opinion in that case. The
California Supreme Court found that the conclusion of the Glickman court that the First
Amendment's right to freedom of speech does not protect commercial speech against
compelled funding to be "simply untenable" with respect to Article I of the California
Constitution.241 It held that the California Plum Marketing Program implicated
Gerawan' s right to freedom of speech under the free speech clause of the California
Constitution by compelling funding of generic advertising. (This was not a finding that
Gerawan' s rights were violated. Rather, the decision recognized that Gerawan had
sufficient facts to argue that its rights under the California Constitution may have been
violated.) The California Supreme Court then sent the case back to the appellate court to
determine the appropriate standard for evaluating whether the plum checkoff program
was unconstitutional and to decide whether Gerawan' s commercial speech rights were
violated. 242
The California Supreme Court was fully entitled under its state constitution to
accord greater free speech protection to commercial speech than the U.S. Supreme Court.
The critical language in this case was nevertheless an open challenge to the U.S. Supreme

241 Ibid. at 5 14.
242 See Gerawan Farming, Inc. v. Lyons, No. F031 142 (5th App. Dist., State of Cal. 2001); available from
http://www.cfac.org/Attachments/Gerawan_Farming_v_Lyons.html; Internet; accessed 5 July 2003.
The Fifth Appellate District Court of Appeal of the State of California issued an opinion on December 17,
2001, that Gerawan's commercial free speech rights under Article I of the California Constitution were
violated. It applied an intermediate scrutiny balancing test. Ibid. at 6. Since the fruit growers were
empowered by vote to reject a marketing order program, the court held that, even if the government has a
substantial interest, in this case it does not matter. It stated:
The governmental interest in the present form of the program is tenuous and is based on findings of
necessity that are wholly illusory, for a simple reason: under the current statute, the government is
forbidden to enact a remedial program no matter how severe an economic crisis arises in the plum
industry unless a majority ofgrowers wants the program. [emphasis in original] Ibid. at 7.
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Court to reconsider its ruling in Glickman v. Wileman should an appropriate case or
controversy reach the court.
The next compelled commercial speech case came before the U.S. Supreme Court
in the summer of 2001, seven months after Gerawan. The decision in United States v.
United Foods, Inc. revealed a Supreme Court making a decided effort to retrench from its

position in Glickman. The issue was whether mandatory assessments imposed by the
Mushroom Promotion, Research, and Consumer Information Act of 1 990 on members of
the mushroom industry for industry advertisements violated the First Amendment. The
Court struck down the government regulation compelling mushroom growers to submit
mandatory assessments because the primary intent of the regulation was to solicit funds
for advertising rather than to implement a full regulatory scheme as evidenced by the
regulations at issue in Glickman.
The United Foods case showed incremental movement toward broader protection
against compelled commercial speech. However, it also showed a Supreme Court unable
to provide clear guidance on how to incorporate the two First Amendment doctrines
impacting compelled commercial speech - the commercial speech doctrine and the
doctrine governing freedom from compelled speech and association.
Many industry groups and their promotion boards who benefit from mandatory
fees for generic advertising embedded in federal and state regulatory programs expressed
concern that the United Foods decision would spawn multiple lawsuits that would rock
the status quo. The groups most concerned filed amicus curie briefs with the Supreme
Court on behalf of the USDA and the government in United Foods, namely: American
Mushroom Institute, the American Soybean Association, the National Milk Producers
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Federation, the Milk Industry Foundation, the United Egg Producers, the United Egg
Association and National Cattlemen's Beef Association.
Independent cattle producers in the cattle industry watched the outcome of the
United Foods case with a vested interest since a favorable Supreme Court ruling on

mandatory fees (also referred to as "commodity checkoffs") would offer new hope for
two pending lawsuits challenging the constitutionality of beef checkoff fees imposed on
cattle producers under the Beef Promotion Research Act and Order. The beef checkoff
program requires cattle producers to pay a one-dollar fee for each head of cattle sold.
Enacted in 1986, the legislation channels a huge stream of money (over two million
dollars a week by some estimates)243 to the National Cattlemen's Beef Association
(NCBA), a private organization that represents only three percent of the U.S. cattle
industry. A Congressional Research Service Report updated on July 11, 2002, reported
that annual beef assessments are 86 million dollars (a figure less than the two million
dollars per week). It was reported in 2002 that the NCBA used the checkoffs to fund
almost 90 percent of its activities, including the promotion of many platforms opposed by
cattle producers. 244 Some members of the beef industry (primarily the independent cattle
producers) strongly object to paying the mandatory fees.
In a show of protest, cattle producers in the year 2000 submitted petitions with
more than 146,000 signatures (well over the minimum 108,000 signatures required) to the
USDA demanding a referendum vote on continuing the mandatory fees. The USDA
243

Bill Mackay, Jr., a lead intervener in the case, has used this figure in various media interviews. See,
e.g., "Judge Allows Ranchers to Intervene in "Beef Checkoff Lawsuit," Northern Plains Resource Council

1I 4 (December 21, 2001); available from http://www.nprcmt.org/media/2001/PR-AG-Checkoff-Intervenor
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soundly rebuffed their demand on January 17, 2001, by disqualifying more than half of
the signatures and announcing that no referendum would take place. In response, the
Western Organization of Resource Councils (WORC) and the Livestock Marketing
Association (LMA) filed a lawsuit in Federal District Court in South Dakota seeking to
force the USDA to hold a referendum. Defendants included the USDA, the Cattlemen's
Beef Promotion and Research Board (the group that administers the program) and the
Nebraska Cattleman, Inc., a group supporting beef checkoffs. This case, described earlier
in Chapter 2 of this dissertation, has been a success story for the anti-checkoff groups.
Following the United Foods decision, the District Judge Charles B. Kornmann
requested that the USDA clarify its position regarding the beef checkoffs. In response,
the USDA asserted that such checkoffs are constitutional and indicated that it would
defend such mandatory fees. 245 In a bold move on June 21, 2002, the Judge Kornmann
ruled that the checkoffs and the Beef Promotion Research Act are unconstitutional and
unenforceable and rejected the defendants' government speech arguments.246 This
decision was upheld by the 8th Circuit Court of Appeals on July 8, 2003.
In 2002, independent dairy farmers also made a bid also to challenge mandatory
fee-based promotion programs as violations of First Amendment free speech rights in
reliance on the Supreme Court's decision in United Foods. A Pennsylvania dairy
farming family, the Cochrans, together with the Center for Individual Freedom, filed a
suit in U.S. District Court in Scranton, Pennsylvania on April 2, 2002, to protest dairy
245 ACA Journal, ''Checkoff Challenges Get Complicated " (November 2001); available from
http://www.chicattle.org/journ/November/chi_checkoff.htm; Internet, accessed 28 April 28, 2002.
246 See Livestock Marketing Association v. United States, 207 F. Supp. 2d 992 (D. S. Dakota 2002). Also
see "History of LMA' s Campaign to Obtain a Producer Referendum on the Beef Checkoff," Livestock
Marketing Association (July 16, 2002) available from http://www.Imaweb.com/Imapress.html; Internet,
accessed 1 August 2002).
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checkoffs that pay for speech they do not support, including the popular "Got Milk"
campaign. 247 The dairy checkoff program brought in over $250,000 million in 2001
based on an assessment of approximately two cents per gallon.248 On March 24, 2003,
District Judge John E. Jones, III granted summary judgment to the government
defendants. 249 He performed an analysis under the United Foods and Glickman cases and
concluded that the level of regulatory intervention in the dairy industry required a finding
that the dairy checkoffs were constitutional. The checkoff challengers contend that their
position as independent milk producers who do not belong to a milk cooperative
distinguishes them from much of the industry and the courts should evaluate their case
accordingly. They have filed an appeal with the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.
The United Foods decision holding mandatory assessments for generic
advertising in the mushroom industry unconstitutional under a finely drawn set of
conditions created uncertainty for other agricultural programs that also impose mandatory
assessments. The compelled speech cases on the court dockets in 2003 forced courts to
immediately begin interpreting United Foods to determine how the distinctions made in
that case impact commodities checkoffs in the other eleven industries that require them
pursuant to federally controlled programs. The United Foods ruling has also had an
impact in 2003 on state programs that assess mandatory generic advertising fees as seen
247
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by the decision of a Circuit Court in Florida striking down a mandatory state citrus
checkoffs. 250
The compelled commercial speech cases arising from beef checkoffs appear to be
good candidates for a possible hearing by the Supreme Court in 2004 to determine the
validity of the government' s claim that commodity checkoffs constitute an extension of
government speech and are, therefore, constitutional. This argument assumed that
government speech is immune from First Amendment scrutiny, a position that has been
vigorously refuted by the First Amendment challengers in two pending cases in federal
courts in Montana and South Dakota. Compelled payments for generic advertising, the
challengers argued, are part of programs that are industry-funded, self-directed and
producer-driven, contrary to the claim by the Department of Justice that such programs
are a function of the government. Moreover, they asserted that the government' s position
fails even if the mandatory assessments are deemed to be government speech, since the
courts must apply the same First Amendment scrutiny to a forced subsidy of speech
whether the speech is by an industry promotion board or the government. The district
court in Montana accepted the government speech argument while the district court in
South Dakota rejected it (a decision upheld by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals). 25 1
This raises the potential for conflicting decisions by the respective appellate courts of the
Eighth and Ninth Circuits.
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In 2003, the Sixth Circuit considered the constitutionality of the pork checkoffs in
Michigan Pork Producers v. Campaign for Family Farms, a case argued on March 14,
2003. Other Federal and state courts have rendered decisions at a furious pace in the
early months of 2003 on the constitutionality of four other agricultural commodities:
grapes, apples, citrus and alligators.
In Delano Farms Company, et al. v. California Table Grape Commission,252 the
challengers, who produce and sell branded table grapes, objected to compelled payments
for generic advertising of grapes that undermined their branded advertising. The Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals found that the fact situation hued closely to the United Foods
case and that First Amendment rights of the grape growers were, therefore, at issue.
Accordingly, the appellate court reversed the district court's decision granting dismissal
of the grape growers'constitutionality claim. The case is now before the district court
again awaiting trial.
In the case of In Re Washington Apple Advertising Commission,253 decided on
March 14, 2003, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington granted a
preliminary injunction to apple producers who challenged the Washington state apple
checkoff program. The court expressly rejected the government speech argument. The
Commission, responsible for prompting this legal action as a means of confirming the
constitutionality of its mandatory assessment program, closed down its offices after the
ruling.

252
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On March 31, 2003, a citrus checkoff (called a "box tax") was held
unconstitutional in a consolidated case before the Florida Tenth Judicial Circuit Court. 254
The Circuit Court held that the generic advertising did not constitute government speech
despite the fact that the State of Florida ran the promotional program. It struck down the
box tax based on an analysis based on the United Foods and Glickman cases. The
Department of Citrus for the State of Florida has filed an appeal .
Lastly, the District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana struck down
alligator checkoffs compelling alligator farmers to fund generic promotional programs
that did not recognize type, quality or brand of alligator products. In its analysis, the
court distinguished the alligator checkoff program from the marketing orders in the
Glickman case. It rejected the government speech argument because of the "close nexus

between the alligator producers and the message funded."255 Judge John V. Parker closed
his opinion granting summary judgment to the alligator growers with the following
statements:
The undersigned admits to a certain degree of difficulty in maintaining an
appropriately straight judicial face while attempting to apply the Supreme Court
precepts that explain the simple language of the First Amendment to the alligator
advertising program at issue here.
When important constitutional issues must be resolved by a determination
of whether an alligator is more like a mushroom than a peach, then in the words
of Justice Thomas: 'Surely we have lost our way.' (citing Glickman, 521 U.S. at
506 (Thomas J., dissenting)). 256
The Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries has filed an appeal with the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.
254

State of Fla., Dept. of Citrus v. Graves Brothers Company, Tampa Juice Services, et al. , No. 2DO032276, 2nd Dist. Ct. of App., Florida.
255
Pelts & Skins, LLC. v. James Jenkins, Jr., Secretary of the Louisiana Department of Wildlife and
Fisheries,No. 02-384-A, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7014, 21-22 (Middle Dist. Louisiana 2003).
256
Ibid. at 34.

110

The "Government Speech" Counter-Argument
In the pending compelled commercial speech cases, the United States government
has advanced the argument that its mandatory assessments constitute "government
speech" that is not subject to First Amendment challenge or scrutiny. 257 The challengers
have countered by arguing that the industry trade associations and commodity boards
administer the commodity assessment programs; therefore, the speech involved in the
generic advertising cannot fall within the realm of government speech. Even if the
speech is deemed "government speech," the challengers argue that it would fail to pass
First Amendment scrutiny under either the current Supreme Court standard for First
Amendment protection of commercial speech (i.e., the Central Hudson standard)258 or
under the standard for protection from compelled speech or compelled association
(established in Abood and later cases). 25 9
What is government speech? In laying the groundwork for his analysis of
government participation in communication networks, Professor Mark Yudof provided
this comprehensive description of government expression that falls within the parameter
of government speech:
Government speech here will include organized (local, state, and federal)
governments' efforts to communicate symbols, ideas, information, perceptions,
and values to the citizenry. Overlapping this public rhetoric, and difficult to
disentangle from it, are the private utterances of government officials. Also
troubling is the problem of distinguishing propaganda or indoctrination from
information or education. The modes and types of government discourse include
time-honored methods as well as those provided by modem technology: direct
257
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access to the broadcast media, mass distribution of documents, speeches and other
activities of political leaders reported in the private media, the gathering and
dissemination of statistics and research results, advertising, preparation and
dissemination of official reports, activities of government public-relations offices,
dissemination of official records of governmentiroceedings, press conferences,
public schooling, military training, and so on."2
The courts in an increasing number of cases involving the government speech
doctrine are fleshing out a working legal definition of "government speech." The concept
of government speech is based on an assumption that there is a need for a democratic
government to inform its citizens about its business in order to accomplish its
Constitutional purposes, including actions taken under its power to regulate. The
Supreme Court has established the broad principle that the government generally may
expend funds through "speech and other expression to advocate and defend its own
policies."26 1 It has further held that when the government speaks through its officials or
through the expenditure of public funds, it has the broad power to determine what
message and viewpoint it will convey. 262 A government can occupy many roles when it
"speaks" as it relays government speech that explains, persuades and justifies policies
and preferences. If the government is purposefully acting as a speaker with an identified
message which is reasonably understood by those receiving it to be a government
message, then such action should fit within the concept of government speech.
On the other hand, if the agents purportedly representing the government have not
been hired or formally recognized as acting on behalf of the government, there is no
government speech. Moreover, if the government's expression of an idea is obscured
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behind the veil of other actors or the decision to distribute an idea is accompanied by an
effort to override the market's distribution system for the expression of ideas (e.g.,
traditional advertising channels or press releases by private industry), then government
speech is suspect. Citizens can resort to collective political action to reject an
unacceptable government idea only if they know the government is speaking. 263
The "government speech" argument has been asserted as a defensive strategy by
government in pending legal actions involving compelled commercial speech. In
addition, industry trade associations and others who have aligned themselves with the
government in these actions have directly and indirectly supported the concept. As an
example, in March of 2002, fifteen agricultural trade associations were thwarted in their
efforts to gain statutory recognition for "government speech" for commodity checkoffs
when Congress failed to respond to their request to expand the 2002 Farm Bill to include
language declaring that all checkoff-related advertising qualifies as government
speech. 264
The USDA's position that government speech is protected is based on the
principle that the government has a right to be a contributor to the marketplace of ideas.
Therefore, the traditional interpretation of the First Amendment as a restraint on
government is loosened to allow the government to exercise a voice. This is a practical
as well as a doctrinal principle, since the government must often have the capacity to act
as a speaker to express its policy preferences and to conduct business. However, as
263
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Professor Yudof noted, ''The advancement of policy objectives through communications
activities and the provision of information almost invariably advances the interests of
those in power."265 The inherent ris� is that the government has the resources to become
a powerful voice that can be used to muffle or silence other voices as well as legitimately
express its views on policy. 266
In the compelled commercial speech cases, the government has asserted that it has
assumed the role of speaker in the mandatory commodity assessment cases due to the
level of oversight that it exercises. It has relied upon the case of Lebron v. National R.R.
Passenger Corp., 261 decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1995, to support its position.
The case arose when Amtrak denied Michael Lebron the right to display an
advertisement on a billboard at the main entrance to Amtrak's Pennsylvania Station in
New York City. He sued claiming that his First Amendment and Fifth Amendment rights
had been violated. Lebron argued that Amtrak, as a government-created corporation,
should be deemed a government entity for purposes of First Amendment rights. The U.S.
Supreme Court agreed with Lebron, stating that when "the Government creates a
corporation by special law, for the furtherance of governmental objectives, and retains for
itself permanent authority to appoint a majority of the directors of that corporation, the
corporation is part of the Government for purposes of the First Amendment. "268 The
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Court reached this conclusion by determining that the government had created Amtrak to
further its objectives and retained control over its operations. 269
The government has relied on Lebron to argue that the checkoff commissions and
boards are government actors and the generic advertising they produce is government
speech. It has advanced a three-point argument that such governing groups are created
by Congressional acts to achieve government objects, the Secretary of Agriculture
exercises control in appointing and removing board members, and the USDA exercises
control over the messages in the checkoff-funded generic advertising. 270 In response, the
anti-checkoff challengers have pointed out: 1) Amtrak was subsidized with public funds
in 1995 and still receives public funds today, and 2) the Lebron case was concerned with
whether Amtrak was a government entity for purposes of addressing a restraint of speech
claim, whereas the checkoff cases deal with claims that First Amendment rights have
been violated by compelled support for objectionable speech. They argued that Lebron
cannot serve as precedent since that case did not address "whether Amtrak would be
considered government if Amtrak had tried to claim Mr. Lebron's speech as its own, or
had compelled Mr. Lebron to pay for a message he despise."27 1
The government's claim of extensive oversight has been disputed by the
challengers in light of the many years that the program has been characterized and
operated as a "self-directed" industry program. The trade groups and the USDA are
aligned within the dominant hegemony, but their interests appear to be at odds in the
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event that the government speech defense is fully accepted by the courts. If the argument
is recognized, centralized government control over the commodity programs would
appear to reduce the autonomous decision-making regarding commercial messages that is
currently enjoyed by the industry boards and associations.
Government speech has come under increasing scrutiny as an abridgment of the
rights of others under the First Amendment. Scholars have concluded that the
government crosses the line in abridging such rights in several ways. A 1998 law review
article succinctly summarized this as follows:
When government expression seriously inhibits competing speech,
monopolizes the opportunity for exchange of ideas, or deceives the audience as to
its truth or its origins, government's expression functions effectively as a
regulation of other, usually private, speech, and is thus subject to the fullest
panoply of First Amendment limitations.272
The evidence obtained in connection with this paper is expected to show that the
current challenges to government speech are related to the government's expanded use of
speech and its adoption of new forms of speech. In addition, the courts are recognizing
new types of First Amendment claims, which creates a climate for testing doctrine. With
respect to the hegemonic struggle over compelled commercial speech, the doctrine of
government speech may represent a blatant effort to exercise industry control.
What Do the Compelled Commercial Speech Cases Represent?

The first section of this literature review presented a theoretical perspective of
Gramsci's hegemony and Galbraith's concept of countervailing power. Subsequent
sections provided details that build a cultural, political, economic and social context for
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examining the thesis of this dissertation. The diagram identified as Figure 4 illustrates the
various ways in which the compelled commercial speech cases represent opportunities,
conflicts, threats, judicial actions or failure to act, trends and other meanings in the three
spheres of importance that intersect to form the zone of conflict.
With regard to First Amendment doctrine regarding commercial speech, the line
of cases can be viewed as representing a consistent effort by certain individuals or groups
to reduce or eliminate advertising regulations, Supreme Court inconsistency and struggle
to interpret First Amendment doctrine regarding commercial speech (characterized by
uncertainty and missed opportunities to clarify existing standards or develop new
standards for protection of commercial speech), a slow trend toward expanding the
protection for commercial speech, and a judicial balancing of free speech values with
commercial nature of speech and the need for regulation.
Viewed from the perspective of First Amendment doctrine regarding freedom
from compelled speech and compelled association, the cases represent an effort to stop
mandatory payment of fees that are used for speech considered objectionable or for
activities that force unwanted affiliation. They also represent an expansion of the
principles found in the union dues cases and other cases to a new subject of conflict
(compelled commercial speech) and a balancing of free speech values against the need
for collective dues and fees.
In the agricultural sphere, the cases represent first and foremost the extreme
dissatisfaction of individuals and groups with commodity system programs. Such parties
are using the courts to vent their frustration and seek judicial results consistent with their
positions. These cases represent a conflict of interest between dominant and minority
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First mendment
Doctrine Re: Freedom
From Compelled Speech and
Compelled Association
First Amendment compelled
commercial speech cases represent:
I . Effort to stop mandatory payment of fees that
are used for speech and/or affiliation considered
objectionable
2. Expansion of union dues cases and subsequent
student fee cases by analogy to new subject of
conflict
3. Balancing offree speech values vs. need for
collective dues and fees

Hegemony in Agricultura
Commodity Checkoff System

First Amendment Doctrine
Re: Commercial Speech

First Amendment compelled commercial
speech cases represent:
I . Extreme dissatisfaction o f individuaV
groups with commodity checkoffs
2. Conflict of interests
3. Effort to fight vertical integration and
concentration in agriculture
4. For the challengers· Only way to be
heard and make impact
For the dominant heaemony·
Annoyance and financial drain

First Amendment compelled
commercial speech cases represent:
I . Effort to reduce or eliminate advertising
regulations
Supreme Court inconsistency and struggle
to interpret Fitst Amendment doctrine re:
commercial speech
A. Court UOCOl1linty
B. Missed opportunities rodarify existinJ
.-andards or ffYefop new standard�
Slow trend toward c.xpanding First
Amendment commercial speech doctrine
Balancing free speech \'alUCS VS.
commercial nature of speech and
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In the "zone of conflict," the First Amendment compelled
com mercial speech cases represent:

1.

2.

Hegemonic struggle between competing interests in agricultural and legal spheres.
A. Challen&ers: Cases represent realistic chance of success with new resources
and favorable case law. Success is equated with protecting free speech rights
and creating a barrier for increased vertical integration and concentration in
the agricultural industry.
B. Dominate Hegemony: Cases represent threat to power and status quo.
C. Other Activist Participants: Cases represent opportunity to expand First
Amendment rights.
Judicial and doctrinal tension regarding what standards to apply in analyzing the
constitutionality of check off programs.

Figure 4

Representations Inherent in First Amendment Compelled
Commercial Speech Cases
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groups. More specifically, they represent an effort by the challengers to fight vertical
integration and concentration in agriculture. The challengers perceive legal mechanisms
the only way to be heard or to have an impact. Historically, the dominant hegemony was
annoyed by the inconvenience and cost incurred by responding to the persistent
challengers. Their response has changed as the courts have incorporated changes in First
Amendment doctrine more favorable to the challengers and the zone of conflict has
created a serious legal challenge for the dominant parties in the agricultural hegemony.
In the zone of conflict, the stakes have become high and the battle fierce, primarily
because the challengers are now brandishing new decisions in their favor and are
receiving some help from activist and trade groups. The First Amendment compelled
speech cases in this zone represent a genuine counter-hegemony for the challengers with
a strong potential for success. In addition to more favorable case law, the challengers
appear to have intellectual and moral leadership, components identified by Gramsci as
necessary for realizing success as a counter-hegemony. On the other hand, these cases
signify a threat to the dominant hegemony, now facing the possibility of curtailment of
funds and, as a result, less power to act. Other legal and activist organizations and
entities may view the cases as opportunities to expand First Amendment rights in
commercial speech or possibly to serve as one link in a larger strategical effort to protect
free speech rights of U.S. citizens.
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CHAPTER 4
METHODOLOGY
Theoretical Perspectives as Organizing Generalizations for Research
The theoretical perspectives of hegemony and countervailing power (as
supplemented by an overall understanding of the state theories of Marxism and Neo
Pluralism) informed the process of gathering evidence and analysis required in this study.
These theories facilitated an overall organization of evidence into four major subsets:
1) information that explains the dominant hegemony of commodity checkoffs in
the agricultural industry (including history, justifications, legislation and its
proponents, interests of State institutions and industry monopolies or oligopolies,
public and private policy agendas, etc.);
2) information that clarifies the position of the minority challengers in seeking
counter-hegemony or countervailing power to prevent exploitation (history of
their efforts, characteristics of the challengers, nature of their platform, economic
and political goals they are seeking to achieve, exploitation they are seeking to
prevent, etc.);
3) key externalities that affect the first two subsets, such as changes in the
agricultural industry (vertical integration in industry sectors, increasing
concentration in ownership, globalization of agricultural markets, etc.) and
changes in First Amendment doctrine; and
4) evidence that explores the existing case law on commercial speech and
compelled speech and compelled association (consistency in applying standards
and predictive value of the cases); and
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5) evidence that pertains to legal and political consequences of various judicial
outcomes (including implications for the public interest, the agricultural industry
and the freedom of commercial expression).
The analysis phase focused on identifying the relationships and the cooperation
and/or conflicts within each individual subset and between the subsets. The investigative
frame shown in the chart at Figure 4 was used as a tool in facilitating such analysis. The
approach outlined in this chart guides the researcher in analyzing the relationships
between key evidence within each of the four subsets outlined above, specifically seeking
to discover links between the hegemonic conflicts related to political and economic
differences and the legal manifestation of the interests at stake in the courts.

Research Methods
One method used in this study is a traditional legal analysis of federal cases
relating to compelled commercial speech and government speech. However, the
researcher breaks away from the conventional approach of studying the subject strictly
through legal analysis of judicial opinions by seeking to collect data that will afford a
richer analysis of the political and economic interests driving the participants in the legal
process and defining their communication strategies in the short-term and in the future.
The initial phase of this study is exploratory. It requires the researcher to follow
an historiographical approach for gathering data and assimilating evidence from primary
sources. The beginning period for collection of evidence is the date on which the
interests of the key entities can first be publicly identified (rather than the date on which
the first legal action arose). Obtaining evidence related to the social, political and
economic contexts surrounding each entity's early and ongoing involvement in the
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compelled commercial speech debate is a research goal. This includes evidence on
policies and events that have formed the basis for specific legal claims. Telephone
interviews serve as a viable primary source of evidence for understanding the conditions
of the current hegemonic agricultural environment and the respective interests driving the
current compelled speech litigation.
The following research methods were employed in carrying out this study:
1) Analysis of primary legislative documents
a) Legislation and annotations (used to identify political parties and elected
officials in opposition or support of beef checkoffs)
b) Transcripts of hearings, committee activities
c) Public comments
d) Proposed bills (identify political party and elected officials in support)
2) Analysis of primary legal and judicial documents
a) U.S. Supreme Court cases and lower Federal Court cases
b) State Supreme Court cases and lower state court cases
c) Briefs submitted by parties to the cases
d) Amicus curie briefs by other interested parties
3) Analysis of primary federal and state agency documents:
a) Regulatory rulings of United States Department of Agriculture
b) Regulatory rulings of State Agencies
c) Published public comments
d) Reports by agency task forces or committees
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4) Analysis of Reports of Agricultural Commodity Promotion Boards and
Commissions
5) Review of generic advertising
6) Review of Secondary Print and Electronic Information and Evidence on
Checkoffs

a) Law review articles
b) Periodical and newspaper articles (Successful Farming)
c) Books on mandatory assessments
d) Newsletters/electronic articles published by trade associations
e) Newsletters/electronic articles published by activist groups (Free
speech rights groups and environmental groups)
f) Websites/publications of federal and state agencies
g) Websites/publications of associations supporting checkoffs or the
dominant hegemony
h) Websites/publications of associations challenging checkoffs or the
minority against the dominant hegemony
7) Interviews

The study sought to gather evidence from a representative group of individuals
belonging to the categories listed below:
a) Commodity producers who are named parties in compelled speech
lawsuits
b) Non-litigant commodity producers supporting checkoffs
c) Non-litigant commodity producers opposed to checkoffs
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d) Attorneys representing parties in compelled speech lawsuits
e) Attorneys and representatives of legal organizations and activist groups
t) Agricultural agency officials and representatives
g) Recognized agribusiness experts (academic and industry specialists)
Sample interview questions are attached as Appendix D.
8) Review of Literature on Theoretical Ideas Included in D issertation
a) Books
b) Print and electronic articles
Mode ofAnalysis
Court decisions on commercial speech and communications are a visible
representation of the political and economic interests of other entities. The thrust of this
study was to obtain evidence and perform a descriptive analysis that would: 1) show the
relationship between the law on compelled commercial speech and the underlying critical
interests of other key entities seeking to maximize their positions (Phase I analysis); and
2) identify the consequences, including the role of speech and communications in the
industrial, economic and political environments, occasioned by different legal resolutions
on compelled commercial speech (Phase II analysis). Gramsci's ideas on hegemony and
Galbraith's theory of countervailing power were used to create a fundamental framework
for interpreting the evidence.
Phase I Analysis. Table 1 shows an "investigative frame" that was used as a
guide in conducting the Phase I analysis. The information inserted in the chart was based
on preliminary research and included for illustrative purposes. The final content of the
investigative frame was determined during the analysis process.
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Table 1

Investigative Frame for Analysis of Connections Between Key
Economic and Political Interests and Decisions of the Federal
Courts Regarding Compelled Commercial Speech
-

History

Entities
- ---

1

Interests at
Stake

--

Federal and
State
Agencies
Political
Parties and
Elected
Officials

--

Principle Level
-

- - -

I

Mandatory fees for 1 Checkoffs are
compelled
constitutional.
Industry alliances
commercial speech is
not a free speech
and support
Satisfied with
Pattern of
issue (involves only
Glickman v.
Bureaucratic
actions taken in
economic regulation). Wileman (1997)
past
structure and jobs
which upheld the
Generic advertising
checkoffs as
funded by checkoff
economic
Individuals and , Government
1 regulation within a ,
groups playing
control
money is
1
I
major roles
"government speech" comprehensive
not subject to First
Interest in Stable
regulatory scheme.
commodities
i Amendment scrutiny.
market
Supreme Court in
Economic regulation Glickman said
Interest in
is needed to protect
there was no First
public from defective Amendment issue.
expanding market
for commodities
products/unstable
I
1 commodities market. Dissatisfied with
i
Legislative
granting
authority

Dollars

I

I
I

Industry
Trade
Organizations
Agricultural
Commodity
I Boards
i

!

Checkoffs are needed
to create consumer
demand for
commodities and to
support education
and research.

I Not a First

Dollars

Manner in
which trade
organizations
and boards have
functioned in the
past

Government
alliances and
support

Organizational
structure and jobs
Actions
demonstrating
effectiveness or Organizational
' control
weakness
I

I

Legal
Level

Interest in stable
commodities
market
Interest in
expanding market
for commodities
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Amendment issue

Support claim that
generic advertising is
"government speech"
Aggressive lobbying
is viable option to get
Congressional
recognition of
checkoffs as
"government speech"
Checkoffs are needed
to create consumer
demand for
commodities and to
support education
and research

U.S. v. United
Foods (2001) in

which the Supreme
Court struck down
the mushroom
checkoffs.

Checkoffs are
constitutional
Government
speech is immune
from First
Amendment
scrutiny
Satisfied with

Glickman decision

Aligned with the

I government in
these cases

Dissatisfied with
the United Foods
case striking down
mushroom
checkoffs

1

Table 1

(Continued)

-

-

History

Entities

Record of
cooperation and
conflicts with
other producers
within the
industry

Commodity
1 Producers for
Mandatory
Assessments
(Defending
Hegemony)

-

Interests at
Stake
Dollars to
communicate
collective
messages
Alliances with
major purchasers
· of commodities

Principle Level
-

Not a Frrst
Amendment issue
. Support "government
speech" argument

Interest in stable
commodities
market

Aggressive lobbying
is viable option to get
Congressional
recognition of
checkoffs as
"government speech"

Interest in
expanding sales of
commodities

Checkoffs are needed
for promotion,
education, research

History of how
Dollars to
the minority
: communicate
groups
independent
developed
messages
awareness of the
issues
Interest in product
differentiation
Past efforts by
minority groups Interest in
to achieve
participating in a
countercommodities
1 market free from
hegemony
compelled speech
Nature of
regulation
support by
activist groups
Interest in making
unique
contributions and
sales in the
commodities
market

; Commodity
Producers
Against
Mandatory
Assessments
(Opposing
Hegemony)
Activist
Groups

· (Seeking free
speech and
other goals)

I

Legal
Level
Satisfied with
Glickman decision
in favor of
checkoffs
, Aligned with the
government in
these cases

Commodity
producers should not
be compelled to fund
commercial speech
with which they
disagree.
I
Checkoff programs
are self-directed with
government
oversight, so generic
advertising is not
government speech.

Dissatisfied with
the United Foods
case striking down
the mushroom
checkoffs
I

Commodity
checkoffs are
unconstitutional
violations of the
First Amendment. I
Even if generic ads
are government
speech, the
checkoff programs
do not pass First
Amendment
scrutiny.

Industry trade
United Foods case
organizations and
provides legal
agricultural
grounds for
commodity
1 challenges by
promotion boards are members of the
using checkoff
fruit, mushroom,
moneys in ways
beef, pork and
' milk industries.
1 detrimental to the
. Interest in fighting interest of those
the industrial
commodity producers United Foods case
agriculture model
paying the fees.
recognizes First
of agriculture
Am. right not to be
I
compelled to fund
objectionable
speech, unless
government shows
a detailed
reeulatorv scheme.
I
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Table 1

(Continued)
-

Entities

History

Interests at
Stake

Principle Level

--

State and
Federal
Judiciaries

-

In prior cases, the
Glickman v.
Supreme Court
Wileman held
indicated it was
there was no need
uncomfortable with
to apply First
the current standard
Amendment
for protection of
1 scrutiny to the
commercial speech
1) commercial
Constitutional
checkoff programs
so it had an incentive since they were
norms
speech,
, to avoid applying the economic
2) freedom from Institutional
commercial speech
regulations.
doctrine if another
compelled
obligations
speech and
approach was
Programs were
available.
Cost to
association,
constitutional
governmental
because they were
interests
The Supreme Court
3) government
part of a broader
defers to legislative , regulatory scheme.
speech, and
1
branch if the Court
Judicial
manageability
and
can apply a narrow
Court specifically
4) compelled
1
enforceability
construction to a
commercial
sidestepped a
statutory issue to
speech.
commercial speech
Substantive justice avoid constitutional
analysis.
conflict.
Democratic
. U.S. Supreme
acceptability given Strong criticism of
Court moved away
reasonable
the Glickman
from the Glickman
disagreement
decision prompted
position in U.S. v.
careful reassessment
United Foods by
of First Amendment
applying a First
Amendment
I doctrine in United
analysis and
Foods.
holding mushroom
California State
checkoffs
Supreme Court
unconstitutional.
disagreed with the
Glickman case and
The Court
distinguished
recognized
United Foods from
I commodity checkoffs
Glickman because
as violation of free
speech rights under
the mushroom
checkoff program
the California
was created in
Constitution.
stand-alone
. legislation.

Development of
doctrines and
· principles in
cases dealing
with:

Implementation of
the First
Amendment of the
Constitution of the
United States

Legal
Level

!
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Phase II Analysis. What are the consequences of legal decisions regarding
compelled commercial speech? This phase of the analysis focused on the future role of
speech and communications in the industrial, economic and political environments under
four different legal resolutions:
1) Mandatory commodity assessments are held constitutional when they
are part of a broader regulatory scheme;
2) Mandatory commodity assessments are held unconstitutional and a
violation of the First Amendment regardless of the regulatory scheme
in which they reside;
3) Mandatory commodity assessments are constitutional regulations not
protected by the First Amendment; and
4) Mandatory commodity assessments are constitutional as they are
within the "government speech" exception to the First Amendment.
Traditional legal analysis was used (see list of criteria for analyzing compelled
commercial speech cases attached as Appendix C) along with a critical review of relevant
evidentiary materials listed earlier in this methodology section. In addition, a legal
investigative frame was used as a structured means to identify and analyze key elements
of the cases and legal proceedings that form the body of law related to First Amendment
challenges of the checkoff programs. The five areas covered by the legal investigative
frame included: 1) the cases, the parties and the courts that have rendered decisions on
checkoffs; 2) the history of factual and legal developments underlying each case; 3) the
interests at stake for the presiding federal or state judges and the legal institutions in
which they serve; 4) the opinions and legal doctrines or principles on which such
opinions are based; and 5) the status of each case and its relevance with regard to the line
of cases on compelled commercial speech. A summary of the legal investigative frame is
provided in chapter eight of this dissertation. In addition, an annotated list of the cases
included in the investigative frame is provided in Appendix B.
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Conclusion

This study was expected to show a climate ripe for hegemonic change in the
agricultural industry driven by economic and political changes that are creating a
profound "season of discontent" much broader than the compelled commercial speech
issue. Parallel winds of change in the development of First Amendment doctrine have
coincided with changes in the agricultural industry to elevate this particular issue as a
platform for the challengers. First Amendment rights is their cause, but agricultural
autonomy may be their quest. The resolution of the First Amendment issue regarding the
appropriate level of protection for compelled commercial speech is expected to cause
ripples affecting economic, political and social institutions that are impacted by the way
in which commercial speech may be regulated. Strategies for communication by private
business will undergo change, and relationships and foundations for authority between
government agencies and private institutions will be impacted. The public will need to
assess its assumptions about the commercial messages that it receives and their
legi�imacy.
Change in agricultural hegemony and the First Amendment doctrine are expected
to be a key theme of this study. In writing his thoughts about Justice Holmes in 193 1,
Harold Laski characterized the esteemed jurist's approach to change as follows:
The conservative believes that change is erroneous and undesirable; the radical
insists that it is necessary and urgent. Mr. Justice Holmes simply urges that since
change is inevitable, we must frovide for its coming and see to it that the game is
played in terms of the rules. 27

273 Harold J. Laski, "Mr. Justice Holmes," ed., Felix Frankfurter, in Mr. Justice Holmes (New York:
Coward-McCann, 193 1), quoted in Roberta Kevelson, The Law as a System of Signs (New York: Plenum
Press, 1988), 203.
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A critical question in the compelled commercial speech conflict is "Whose
rules?" Has the hegemony created by the commodity checkoffs and other agricultural
developments created an environment where rules of dominance prevail over traditional
rules for processing minority dissents and respecting the autonomy of market
participants? Is the issue of compelled commercial speech simply a representation of the
hegemonic battle to establish new rules? This dissertation used critical research to
examine these questions in investigating the central thesis of this paper, i.e., that the
challengers are using the Courts and the First Amendment as a mechanism to break the
current hegemony of commodity checkoffs and establish countervailing power.
In view of the checkoff cases before the courts in 2003 in the Third, Fifth, Sixth,
Eighth and Ninth Circuits, it is certain that the U.S. Supreme Court will have the
opportunity to address the constitutional dilemma of how to apply First Amendment
doctrine to compelled commercial speech sometime in 2003 or 2004. The evidence,
analysis and conclusions of this dissertation has added to the current literature by
providing a holistic analysis of the political, social and economic elements underlying the
compelled commercial speech cases and advancing some implications for Supreme Court
decision-making on the compelled commercial speech issue.
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CHAPTER S
THE EVIDENCE
The research method for this dissertation required the identification and study of
primary legislative, legal and judicial documents, published cases, official reports of
administrative boards and commissions, generic advertising, and secondary evidence in
print and electronic format. In addition, in-depth interviews with participants
knowledgeable and involved in commodity checkoff programs were conducted. The goal
was to solicit the understandings and opinions of participants regarding: the impact of
these programs; the agricultural industry environment; the political, economic, and legal
interests of the individuals and entities involved in the legal conflicts; the relationships of
power and control that determine the way in which commodity checkoffs are allocated
and used; and key arguments and positions involved in the legal conflicts.
Individuals representing divergent views and opposing philosophies generously
gave their time and shared their observations and insights in telephone interviews that
helped piece together the puzzle of the legal conflicts over commodity checkoff
programs. Those who provided interviews on an attribution basis include:
1) John Bunting - Dairy farmer in Delaware County, New York,. writer for The
Milkweed, a dairy newspaper produced in print and on-line from Wisconsin;274

2) Mike Callicrate - Beef producer in St. Francis, Kansas, plaintiff in three legal
actions (one involving checkoffs and two involving antitrust actions against meat
packing companies);275
274

John Bunting, telephone interview by Retha J. Martin, 2 May 2003, transcript on file with author [hereinafter
"Bunting interview"].
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3) Jeanne Charter - Cattle producer in Shepherd, Montana (plaintiff in legal action
currently pending before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, Steven and Jeanne
Charter v. USDA); 216

4) Joseph and Brenda Cochran - Dairy farmers in Scranton, Pennsylvania (plaintiffs
in legal action currently pending before the Third Circuit Court of Appeals,
Joseph and Brenda Cochran v. USDA); 277

5) Enrique E. Figueroa, Ph.D. - Director, Roberto Hernandez Center at University
of Wisconsin, Milwaukee, Wisconsin; former Administrator of the United States
Agricultural Marketing Service; 278
6) Renee Giachino, J.D - General Counsel for Center for Individual Freedom,
Alexandria, VA (an activist organization promoting individual rights, also a
plaintiff in a beef checkoff case and a dairy checkoff case); 279
7) Daniel Glickman - Former Secretary of U.S. Department of Agriculture, Director,
Harvard University Institute of Politics, Cambridge, Massachusetts; 280
8) Erik Jaffe, J.D. - Constitutional lawyer in Washington, D.C., law clerk for
Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas at the time Glickman v. Wileman was
decided, legal counsel for plaintiffs in beef checkoff case, Steven and Jeanne

275

Mike Callicrate, telephone interview by Retha J. Martin, 20 March 2003, transcript on file with author
[hereinafter "Calli crate interview"] .
276
Jeanne Charter, telephone interview by Retha J. Martin, 20 February 2003, transcript on file with author
[hereinafter "Charter interview"].
m Joseph and Brenda Cochran, telephone interview by Retha J. Martin, 3 May 2003, transcript on file with
author [hereinafter "Cochran interview"] .
278
Enrique Figueroa, telephone interview by Retha J. Martin, 2 March 2003, transcript on file with author
[hereinafter "Figueroa interview"].
279
Renee Giachino, telephone interview by Retha J. Martin, 12 February 2003, transcript on file with author
[hereinafter "Giachino interview"] .
280
Daniel Glickman, telephone interview by Retha J. Martin, 25 March 2003, transcript on file with author
[hereinafter "Glickman interview"].
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Charter v. USDA (currently pending before the Ninth Circuit Court of
81

Appeals) ;2

9) Harry Kaiser, Ph.D. - Director, Cornell Commodity Promotion Research
Program, Professor, Department of Applied Economics and Management, Cornell
University, Ithaca, New York; 282
10) Kathleen Merrigan, Ph.D.- Director, Agriculture, Food and Environment
Program, Gerald J. and Dorothy R. Friedman School of Nutrition Science and
Policy at Tufts University, Medford, Massachusetts; former Administrator of the
United States Agricultural Marketing Service (replacing Enrique Figueroa);283
1 1) David Moeller, J.D. - Counsel for Farmers' Legal Action Group Incorporated, St.
Paul, Minnesota (a coalition of groups representing the interests of family farmers
8

and independent livestock producers);2 4
12) Doug O'Brien, J.D. - Agriculture Legislative Assistant for Senator Tom Harkin,
Washington, D.C.; former legal specialist with USDA Packer and Stockyards
Administration, former associate legal counsel for Organization for Competitive
Markets, clerked for Iowa Supreme Court Justice (Note: Senator Harkin is the
ranking Democratic member of Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition and
Forestry, U.S. Senate, Democrat, Iowa); 285

281

Erik Jaffe, telephone interview by Retha J. Martin, 4 April 2003, transcript on file with author [hereinafter
"Jaffe interview"] .
. 282 Harry M. Kaiser, telephone interview by Retha J. Martin, 28 May 2003, transcript on file with author
[hereinafter "Kaiser interview"].
283
Kathleen Merrigan, telephone interview by Retha J. Martin, 27 March 2003, transcript on file with author
[hereinafter "Merrigan interview"].
284
David Moeller, telephone interview by Retha J. Martin, 21 March 2003, transcript on file with author
[hereinafter "Moeller interview"].
285
Doug O'Brien, telephone interview by Retha J. Martin, 3 1 March 2003, transcript on file with author
[hereinafter "O'Brien interview"] .
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13) Barry Richard, J.D. - Constitutional lawyer, Tallahassee, Forida, counsel for
defendants, Florida Department of Citrus in citrus checkoff cases (represented
President George W. Bush in the 2000 presidential election litigation); 286
14) Terry Stokes - Chief Operating Officer, National Cattlemen's Beef Association,
Denver, Colorado (the group that provides checkoff services under contract with
the Cattlemen's Beef Board);287
15) Steven Vetter - Editor, Western Livestock Journal, a national livestock weekly
newspaper; Denver, Colorado; 288 and
16) Ronald Ward, Ph.D. - Professor of econometrics and agricultural market
structures at University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida (advisor to Cattlemen's
Beef Research and Promotion Board, National Dairy Board, Mushroom
Promotion Board, California Almond Board and others). 289
Several informative interviews were also provided anonymously by individuals
who asked to be identified as:
► a representative of the National Cattlemen's Beef Board;
► an executive of the Livestock Marketing Association (plaintiff in a beef
checkoff lawsuit currently pending before the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals, Livestock Marketing Association v. USDA);
► a pork producer and member of the Pork Board;
286

Barry Richard, telephone interview by Retha J. Martin, 26 March 2003, transcript on file with author
[hereinafter "Richard interview"].
287 Terry Stokes, telephone interviews by Retha J. Martin, 17 March 2003 and 19 March 2003, transcripts on file
with author [hereinafter "Stokes interview one" and "Stokes interview two"] .
288
Steven Vetter, telephone interview by Retha J. Martin, 28 March 2003, transcript on file with author
[hereinafter "Vetter interview"] .
289
Ronald Ward, telephone interview by Retha J. Martin, 18 February 2003, transcript on file with author
[hereinafter "Ward interview"].
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► a legislative assistant for a Senator serving as a member of the Committee
on Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry, U.S. Senate;
► a legislative assistant for a Congressman serving as a member of the
House Agricultural Committee, U.S. House of Representatives.
In addition, several others provided information strictly for background purposes
on an anonymous basis.
The theoretical perspectives of hegemony and countervailing power provided the
necessary framework to gather evidence for this study. These theories guided the
collection of evidence in four categories: 1) information that explains the dominant
hegemony of commodity checkoffs in the agricultural industry, 2) information that
clarifies the position of the minority challengers in seeking counter-hegemony or
countervailing power to prevent exploitation; 3) key externalities that affect the first two
subsets, such as changes in the agricultural industry and changes in First Amendment
doctrine; 4) evidence that explores the existing case law on commercial speech and
compelled speech and compelled association; and 5) evidence that relates to the legal and
political consequences of various outcomes and the impact on the public interest, the
agricultural industry and freedom of commercial expression.
Evidence That Brings Understanding to Both Sides

The respective views of the opposing forces in the checkoff litigation are
illuminated in number of source documents that give attention in varying degrees to both
sides. Chief among these are transcripts of oral arguments and legal opinions of the
courts. A sampling of such materials utilized in this study include:
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► Transcript of oral arguments on cross summary judgment motions in Jeanne. and
Steve Charter v. United States Department ofAgriculture (oral arguments

occurred on April 16, 2002, in the United States District Court for the District of
Montana, Billings Division);290
► Transcript of oral arguments before the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in
Livestock Marketing Association v. United States Department ofAgriculture on

March 10, 2003, in St. Paul, Minnesota;29 1
► Transcript of oral arguments before the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in
Michigan Pork Producers v. Campaign for Family Farms v. United States
Department ofAgriculture (oral arguments on March 14, 2003, in Cincinnati,

Ohio);292
► Decision and Order of Dismissal on December 9, 1997, in In Re: United Foods,
Inc., Administrative Law Court, United States Department of Agriculture; 293

► Fruit Checkoffs - Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment, Consolidated Cases of Tampa Juice Services, Inc., et al. v. State of
Florida, Department of Citrus, Graves Brothers Company, et al. v. State of
Florida, Department of Citrus, and Oak Hammock Groves, Ltd., et al., v. State of
Florida, Department of Citrus, issued March 3 1 , 2003. 294
290

Oral Arguments on Cross Summary Judgment Motions, Jeanne and Steve Charter v. United States
Department ofAgriculture (Dist. Montana 2002) (Cause No. CV 00-198-BLG-RFC), argued 16 April 2002.
291
Oral Arguments on Appeal, Livestock Marketing Association v. United States Department ofAgriculture (8th

Cir. 2003) (Appeal Nos. 02-2796 and 02-2843), argued 10 March 2003.
Oral Arguments on Appeal, Michigan Pork Producers, et al. v. Campaign for Family Farms, et al. v. Ann
Veneman (6th Cir. 2003) (Appeal Nos. 02-2337 and 02-2338), argued 14 March 2003.
293
Decision and Order of Dismissal, In Re: United Foods, Inc. (USDA Administrative Law Court, 1997)
(MPRCIA No. 96-0001), issued 9 Dec. 1997.
294 Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Tampa Juice Services, Inc. et al. v.
State of Florida, Department of Citrus ( 10th Cir., Polk County, Fla., 2003) (Case Nos. GC-G-00-3488, GC
G-00-37 18, GC-G-01-0286, GC-G-01-0375, and GC-G-01-0694); Graves Brothers Company v. State of
292
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► Judicial decisions in compelled commercial speech cases listed in Appendix B;
Various reports from the United States General Accounting Office provided
information that was useful in analyzing both the dominant hegemony and the
challenging position. The following reports were useful in the analysis:
► "Pork Promotion Program: Petition Validation Process Needs to be
Strengthened," United States General Accounting Office Report to Congressional
Requesters, September 2000 (GAO/RCED-00-274);295
► "Economic Models of Cattle Prices: How USDA Can Act to Improve Models to
Explain Cattle Prices," United States General Accounting Office Report to the
Honorable Tom Daschle, U.S. Senate, March 2002;296
► "Packers and Stockyards Programs: Investigations of Competitive Practices Need
Improvements," United States General Accounting Office Publication of
Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Administrative Oversight and the Courts,
Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, September 25, 2000;297

Florida, Department of Citrus (Case No. GC-G-02-46-4686) and Oak Hammock Groves, Ltd., et al. v.
State of Florida, Department of Citrus (Case No. GC-G-03-028 1), order issued 3 1 March 2003.
295
United States General Accounting Office, "Pork Promotion Program: Petition Validation Process Needs to be
Strengthened," Report to Congressional Requesters, GAO/RCED-00-274 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, September
2000).
296
United States General Accounting Office, "Economic Models of Cattle Prices: How USDA Can Act to
Improve Models to Explain Cattle Prices," Report to the Honorable Tom Daschle, U.S. Senate, GAO-02-246
(Washington, D.C.: GPO, March 2002).
297
United States General Accounting Office, "Packers and Stockyards Programs: Investigations of Competitive
Practices Need Improvements," Publication of Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Administrative Oversight
and the Courts, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, GAO/T-RCED-00299 (Washington, D.C.: GPO,
September 25, 2000).
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► "Cattle Prices: Questions and Answers," by Geoffrey S. Becker, Congressional
Research Service, Environment and Natural Resources Policy Division, Report
for Congress, November 14, 1996;298
► "Federal Farm Promotion ('Check-off) Programs," by Geoffrey S. Becker,
Congressional Research Service, Resources, Science and Industry Division
Report for Congress, July 1 1 , 2002; 299
► "Merger and Antitrust Issues in Agriculture: Statutes and Agencies," by Jerry
Heykoop, Agricultural Policy Analyst, Congressional Research Service,
Resources, Science and Industry Division, Report for Congress, May 21, 2002; 300
► "Consolidation in U.S. Meatpacking," by James M. MacDonald, Michael E.
Onlinger, Kenneth E. Nelson, and Charles R. Handy, Economic Research Service
(ERS), USDA, Food and Rural Economics Division, February 2000; 301
► "A Time to Act," report by USDA National Commission on Small Farms, January
1998;302 and
► "Concentration in the Meat Packing Industry," Majority and Minority Reports by
the USDA Advisory Committee on Agricultural Concentration, June 7, 1996. 303
298

Geoffrey S. Becker, "Cattle Prices: Questions and Answers," Congressional Research Service, Environment
and Natural Resources Policy Division, Report for Congress, 96-1 15 ENR (Wa. D.C.: GPO, November 19,
1996).
299
Geoffrey S. Becker, "Federal Farm Promotion ('Check-off) Programs," Congressional Research Service,
Resources Science and Industry Division, Report for Congress, 93-353 ENR (Wa. D.C.: GPO, July 1 1, 2002).
300
Jerry Heykoop, "Merger and Antitrust Issues in Agriculture: Statutes and Agencies," Congressional Research
Service, Resources, Science and Industry Division, Report for Congress, RS20562 (Wa. D.C.: GPO, May 21,
2002).
301
James M. MacDonald, Michael E. Onlinger, Kenneth E. Nelson, and Charles R. Handy, "Consolidation in
U.S. Meatpacking," Economic Research Service, USDA, Food and Rural Economics Division, Agricultural
Economics Report, ERSAER 785 (Wa. D.C.: GPO, February 2000).
30
2 United States Department of Agriculture National Commission on Small Farms, "A Time to Act," Special
Report, MP- 1545 (Wa. D.C.: GPO, January 1998).
303 United States Department of Agriculture Advisory Committee on Agricultural Concentration, "Concentration
in the Meat Packing Industry, Majority and Minority Reports" (Wa. D.C.: GPO, June 7, 1996); available in part
from http://www.web-span.com/~pga/library/report.html; Internet; accessed 12 November 2002.
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Evidence That Identifies and Explains the Dominant Hegemony
Several key sources of evidence provided understanding of the dominant
hegemony in terms of the interests at stake, the principles, and the legal arguments. The
following individuals provided interviews that were instructive in this regard: Terry
Stokes, Dr. Ronald Ward, Barry Richard, Dr. Enrique Figueroa, Dr. Kathleen Merrigan,
Dr. Harry Kaiser, Secretary Daniel Glickman, Doug O'Brien, a staffer for a Congressman
on the House Agricultural Committee, a pork producer and member of the Pork Board,
and a representative of the Cattlemen's Beef Board. Advertising samples and other
materials provided by National Cattlemen's Beef Association were also helpful.
Legal documents filed in various checkoff lawsuits by the United States
Department of Agriculture, the state and federal commodity associations and individual
producers documented the publicly stated positions of these groups and outlined their
legal arguments. Such documents consisted of briefs, memorandums in support of
motions for preliminary injunction or summary judgment and transcripts of testimony,
depositions, and oral arguments. Examples of items used for analysis included:
► Beef Checkoffs - Declaration of Barry Carpenter in Support of Defendant's
Motion for Summary Judgment, executed February 14, 2002; filed by the United
States Department of Agriculture in Jeanne and Steve Charter v. United States
Department ofAgriculture in the United States District Court for the District of

Montana, Billings Di vision; 304

304

Declaration of Barry Carpenter in Support of Defendant' s Motion for Summary Judgment, Jeanne and Steve
Charter v. United States Department of Agriculture (Dist. Montana) (No. CV 00- 198-BLG-RFC), executed 14

February 2002.
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► Beef Checkoffs - Briefs for cross summary judgment motions, filed February 15,
2002, in Jeanne and Steve Charter v. United States Department ofAgriculture in
the United States District Court for the District of Montana, Billings Division,

305

► Beef Checkoffs - Briefs for appellate review, filed in September and October
2002, in Livestock Marketing Association v. United States Department of
Agriculture in the United States Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals; 306

► Beef and Pork Checkoffs - Reports and literature published by the Cattlemen's
Beef Board and the Pork Board;
► Pork Checkoffs - Briefs for appellate review, filed in February 2003, in Michigan
Pork Producers v. Campaign for Family Farms in the United States Sixth Circuit

Court of Appeals,307
► Pork Checkoffs - Deposition of Barry Carpenter, Deputy Administrator of the
Livestock and Seed Program in the Agriculture Marketing Service, on May 13-14,
2002, in Michigan Pork Producers Association Inc, et al. v. Campaign for Family
Farms, et al. v. Ann Veneman, USDA, et al. in the U.S. District Court, Western

District of Michigan, Southern Division; 308
► Pork Checkoffs - Deposition of Hugh Dorminy, President of the National Pork
Board, May 10, 2002, in Michigan Pork Producers Association Inc, et al. v.

305

Briefs for Cross Summary Judgment Motions, Jeanne and Steve Charter v. United States Department of
riculture
(Dist. Montana 2002) (No. CV 00-198-BLG-RFC), filed 15 February 2002.
�
Briefs for Appellate Review, Livestock Marketing Association v. United States Department ofAgriculture (8th
Cir. 2002) (Appeal Nos. 02-2769 and 02-2832, filed September and October 2002.
m Briefs for Appellate Review, Michigan Pork Producers, et al. v. Campaign/or Family Farms, et al. v. Ann
Veneman (6th Cir. 2003) (Appeal Nos. 02-2337 and 02-2338) filed February 2003.
308
Deposition of Barry Carpenter, Michigan Pork Producers, et al. v. Campaign for Family Farms, et al. v. Ann
Veneman (W. Dist. Mich. 2002) (No. 1:01-CV-34), taken 13-14 May 2002.
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Campaign for Family Farms, et al. v. Ann Veneman, USDA, et al. in the U.S.

District Court, Western District of Michigan, Southern Division; 309
► Dairy Checkoffs - Published statements and online articles by Richard T. Rossier,
attorney representing American Dairy Council;
► Dairy Checkoffs - Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Summary
Judgment, filed June 5, 2002, in Joseph and Brenda Cochran v. Veneman, United
States District Court, Middle District of Pennsylvania; 3 10
► Mushroom Checkoffs - Testimony of Wade Whitfield, President and CEO of the
Mushroom Institute, on August 15-16, 1995, in In Re: Donald B. Mills, Inc. ;
Administrative Law Hearing, United States Department of Agriculture, 3 1 1
► Mushroom Checkoffs - Reply Brief for the Petitioner, United States Department
of Agriculture, filed in April 2001, in the appeal before the U.S. Supreme Court in
United States v. United Foods; 312

► Fruit Checkoffs - Hearing testimony of Dan Gerawan, President of Gerawan
Fanning, Inc. on July 29, 1999 before the Subcommittee on Commercial and
Administrative Law, Committee of the Judiciary, U.S. House of
Representatives ;3 1 3

Deposition of Hugh Dorminy, Michigan Pork Producers, et al. v. Campaign for Family Farms, et al. v. Ann
Veneman, (W. Dist. Mich. 2002) ( No. 1 :01-CV-34), filed 10 May 2002.
310
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, Joseph and Brenda Cochran v.
Veneman, (Middle Dist. Penn. 2002) (Case No. 4:CV-01 -0529), filed 5 June 2002.
30'J

311

U.S. Department of Agriculture, Administrative Law Hearing, before Judge S. Bernstein, San Francisco,
CA, In Re: Donald B. Mills, Inc., MPRCIA No. 95- 1 , Testimony of John Haltrom, 15-16 August 1995.
312
Reply Brief for Petitioner, United States v. United Foods, Inc. (U.S. Supreme Court 2000) (No. 00 276), filed
April 2001.
31
U.S. Congress, House, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law,
Testimony of Dan Gersawan, 106th Congress, 1st sess., 29 July 1999.
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► Fruit Checkoffs - Briefs urging support for the checkoff program submitted by
the USDA, the Tree Fruit Agreement and other parties filing amicus curie for the
Supreme Court review in Glickman v. Wileman; and
► Fruit Checkoffs - Complaints filed by plaintiffs, Graves Brothers Company, et al.
and Barron Collier Company, Ltd. in the Florida citrus checkoff challenges. 3 14
Web sites maintained by the trade associations and primary groups involved in
administration of the checkoff programs provided information and opinions of outlined
the public positions of these groups. The following were included among the websites
that provided evidence: Cattlemen's Beef Board, 31 5 the National Pork Board,3 16 the
National Milk Producers Federation,3 17 the Mushroom lnstitute3 1 8 and others. (See list
included in bibliography.)
Evidence That Clarifies the Position of the Anti-Checkoff Challengers
During evidence gathering, it became apparent that analyzing what the legal
conflict over commodity checkoffs collectively represents would not be productive, since
the structure of each commodity industry was different and the characteristics of the
challengers in various legal actions appeared disparate. It was, therefore, especially
important to gather evidence that would clarify the positions of the anti-checkoff
challengers in each of the respective industries.

314 Complaint, Graves Brothers, et al. v. State of Florida, Department of Citrus (2nd Judicial Circuit, Leon
County, Fla., 2002) (No. 02 CA 2207), filed September 2002; and Complaint Barron Collier Company,
Ltd. v. State of Florida, Department of Citrus (10th Judicial Circuit, Polk County, Fla., 2003) (Case No. 532003 CA-00028 1), filed January 2003.
315
See website for Cattlemen's Beef Board at http://www.beefboard.org.
316
See website for the National Pork Board at http://www.porkboard.org.
317
See website for the National Milk Producers Federation at http://www.nmpf.org.
318
See website for the Mushroom Institute at http://www.americanmushroom.org.
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The challengers' point of view in the beef industry was articulated by Jeanne
Charter in her interview and numerous published materials. Mike Callicrate also
provided an additional perspective of a cattle producer and feedlot operator fighting a
dominant hegemony on several fronts, including the checkoff challenges and other
antitrust legal actions. An executive of the Livestock Marketing Association ("LMA")
provided additional observations and information on the beef checkoff cases, especially
regarding LMA's involvement in the referendum process.
In her interview, attorney Renee Giachino provided background and articulated
the positions of the anti-checkoff challengers in the beef, pork and dairy industries.
David Moeller' s interview focused more on the pork industry and the views of pork
checkoff challengers that are affiliated with his client, Campaign for Family Farms, a
coalition of farm and rural groups opposed to the corporate takeover of the hog industry
and supportive of family farming.
John Bunting, (dairy farmer and writer for an agricultural newsletter, The
Milkweed,) and Joseph and Brenda Cochran (plaintiffs in a dairy checkoff lawsuit)

provided information and background on what the constitutional challenge to mandatory
dairy a�sessments represented for dairy farmers. A particularly poignant glimpse of the
position of the anti-checkoff challenger, Brenda Cochran, can be found in her on-line
letters published under "Dispatches From Dairyland: A new voice from the raw edge of
dairy disaster''319 on the website for The New Farm. The letters describe the economic

319

See Brenda Cochran, "Dispatches from Dairyland," The New Farm (November 18, 2002); available from
http://www.newfarm.org/depts/dairyland_dispatches/print/1 1 1802.shtml; Internet; accessed 4 April 2003; and
Brenda Cochran , "Dispatches from Dairyland," The New Farm (November 26, 2002); available from
http://www.newfarm.org/depts/dairyland_dispatches/1 12602.shtml; Internet; accessed 16 March 2003.
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experiences of the dairy farmer today that have prompted she and her husband to engage
in legal action.
The challengers point of view in the mushroom challenge was obtained primarily
through documents filed in connection with the United Foods case and a related
predecessor administrative law case (In Re: Donald B. Mills, Inc.), for which the record
was submitted with other lower court records for the U.S. Supreme Court review in the
United Foods case. Documents that provided useful evidence included:

► Testimony of John Haltom, President of Pictsweet Mushroom Farms, on August
17, 1995, in In Re: Donald B. Mills, Inc. ; Administrative Law Hearing ,
USDA; 320 and
► Affidavit of Donald Dressler, Executive Vice President of United Foods, filed on
July 9, 1998, in United Foods v. United States Department ofAgriculture, Case
Nos. 96-1252 and 98-1082 in the United States District Court for the Western
District of Tennessee. 321
Web sites of groups opposing checkoffs furnished information that was highly
useful in gleaning an understanding of their underlying interests. Among these were the
following: R-CALF, 322 Livestock Marketing Association,323 Center for Individual
Freedom324 and Erik Jaffo' s legal services website. 325

320

U.S. Department of Agriculture, Administrative Law Hearing, before Judge S. Bernstein, San Francisco,
Cal., In Re: Donald B. Mills, Inc., MPRCIA No. 95- 1, Testimony of John Haltrom, 17 August 1995.
321
Affidavit of Donald Dressler, United Foods v. USDA (W. Dist. Tenn.) (Nos. 96- 1252 and 98- 1082),
filed 9 July 1998.
322
See website for R-CALF, available from http://www.rcalf.com.
323
See website for Livestock Marketing Association; available from http://www.Imaweb.com.
32
4 See website for Center for Individual Freedom; available from http://cfif.org.
325
See website for Law Offices of Erik Jaffe; available from http://www.esjpc.com.
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Evulence Relative to Key Externalities
A wide scope of legal materials, testimony in Congressional hearings, scholarly
articles and popular press materials were used to gain an understanding of the major
political, economic and social influences acting upon the agricultural industry and
contributing in some way to the checkoff conflict. Materials relating to U.S. agricultural
policy, concentration, vertical integration, and commodity promotion and marketing were
useful. Several key books traced with clarity, thoughtfulness and some urgency, the
historical changes occurring in agriculture during the past few decades, including: Hard
Tomatoes, Hard Times by Jim Hightower (1973), The Corporate Reapers: The Book of
Agribusiness by A.V. Krebs (1992), and Fatal Harvest: The Tragedy of Industrial
Agriculture, edited by Andrew Kimbrell. The individuals interviewed for this research

were highly knowledgeable and, in addition to their individual contributions, provided a
wealth of information on authors, academic scholars, industry and media representatives,
government contacts and books and articles to use as resources.
Evulence That Provules Backgroundfor Case Law and Judicial Activity
Three areas of doctrine were pertinent to the research required to meet the
objectives outlined in this dissertation. The first two related to doctrinal approaches for
evaluating compelled commercial speech rights under the First Amendment, i.e., the
commercial speech doctrine and the doctrine on freedom from compelled speech and
association. The third area of importance was government speech, a concept that has
been recognized in dicta as a principle having merit, but not yet molded by the Supreme
Court into a clear doctrine.
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The research required that each of these threads of law be explored in the context
of the cases addressing compelled commercial speech. In addition, the researcher was
required to scrutinize the judicial interests at stake and possible hegemonic relationships
between the compelled speech decisions and the interests of the dominant groups in the
checkoff hegemony (and the larger agricultural hegemony.) Based on these
requirements, the evidence could be roughly grouped into:
1) case law and scholarly literature (law review articles, treatises, etc.) providing
historical understanding of the three doctrinal areas;
2) case law, briefs and memoranda in past and pending cases, scholarly literature,
interviews and publications focusing on judicial applications of these First
Amendment doctrines and the government speech principle to the cases involving
constitutional challenges of mandatory commodity fees; and
3) a collection of evidence providing social, political and economic context for the
court decisions, including such things as:
► public statements revealing background on the stated and unstated goals of the
groups exercising hegemony;
► evidence of underlying facts that were at odds with the reported opinions;
► important developments related to key externalities (for example, the class
action suit brought by cattle producers under the Packer & Stockyards Act to
challenge the USDA failure to protect producers against the anticompetive
business practices);
► previous voting patterns of the U.S. Supreme Court justices on the issues in
question;
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► political and social environment for the time period of each case, including the
year 2003 as the compelled commercial speech cases wind their way through
the courts,
► agency activities in enforcing or failing to enforce rules,
► trends in economic policy, and
► other influences that might impact the decision-making of the federal and
district courts and the U.S. Supreme Court.
The cases shown at Appendix B serve as a basic foundation for this analysis.
Evidence Pertaining to Consequences of Legal Outcomes

Objective nine required that the researcher gather evidence to analyze the legal
and political consequences of different alternatives that the U.S. Supreme Court could
choose in its next ruling on the constitutionality of the mandatory commodity
assessments. The Supreme Court may hold that the checkoffs are: 1) constitutional
when part of a broader regulatory scheme, but unconstitutional when they arise in stand
alone legislation; 2) unconstitutional as a violation of First Amendment rights because
they do not pass any First Amendment analysis; 3) constitutional regulations not
protected by the First Amendment; or 4) constitutional under a First Amendment
exception to the First Amendment.
The interviews conducted in this study provided insight into the way each of the
participants expected different outcomes to affect their own vested interests and the
current environment. The researcher reviewed the consequences of each of the cases
decided thus far to gather information on what similar or different consequences might

147

occur in future cases. A number of law review articles were helpful in identifying
potential legal consequences.
The framework for this dissertation required the researcher to examine the
consequences of the legal outcomes for agriculture, First Amendment doctrine and the
public interest. A basic assumption was made that any of the possible outcomes would
reflect elements of the Gramscian theory of hegemony, as the judicial decision making
yielded advantages and disadvantages to those engaged in the war of position in the
judicial arena.
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CHAPTER 6
INDUSTRY CONDITIONS
A constitutional lawyer interviewed as part of this research, Erik S. Jaffe, was
asked what is at stake for the parties in the cases dealing with challenges to mandatory
commodity assessments. He replied, "Money. Well, both money and principle. Some
people, like my clients, are doing this out of principle, and, in fact, likely contrary to their
economic interests."326 When asked whether there were other things going on in
agriculture related to this conflict, he replied, "Of course there are. On the substance, it's
about many things."327
Like a magnet, the cases have drawn in participants with a range of interests to
advance and protect. One way to gauge the scope of interested parties is to examine the
seven amici curiae briefs filed in Glickman v. Wileman, the 1997 Supreme Court case
addressing the First Amendment challenge to tree fruit checkoffs. These "friends of the
court" briefs were filed by groups as disparate as the AFL-CIO and the American
Association of Advertising Agencies. 328
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By mining the evidence beyond the "money and principle" level, other
substantive areas began to emerge as factors for prompting such a large number of
plaintiffs to launch legal challenges at this time and so many interested parties to file
briefs of amici curiae. Among these were shifting industry structures, branding and
product differentiation strategies, threats to status quo that could arise through a change
in First Amendment doctrine, and threats to the current balance of power and influence.
According to David Moeller, an attorney for the Farmer's Legal Action Group,
Inc., in St. Paul, Minnesota, the source of the conflict is related to the interests being
represented:
I think, from the farmer's perspective, the conflict basically comes from whose
interest at heart they [industry commodity groups] are representing. Are they
representing family farmers who are trying to make a living on the land or are
they representing the industrial model of agriculture, which includes not only
factory farms, the short hand term, but also processors and other parts of the chain
that don't have. the family farmer's interest at heart?329
Secretary Daniel Glickman, Secretary of Agriculture from March 1995 to January
2001 , characterized the checkoff challenges as follows:
I think that it's true that most of these checkoff programs and the monies
that are spent are viewed as kind of tools or pawns of the established interests
within that community. So there's a lot of internal politics within the commodity
communities between big and small. To some extent, these debates on the
checkoff and promotional programs are part of a larger debate about the future of
agriculture. 33<f
Steven Vetter, editor of Western Livestock Journal, also viewed the checkoffs as
pawns. He stated: " . . . I really think the checkoff has been used as a pawn in efforts to
get under the skin of rival factions, if you will."331
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Terry Stokes, Chief Executive Office of the National Cattlemen's Beef
Association, identified the theme of change as an important factor for the checkoff
dissatisfaction: " . . . I do know that when you look at the changing industry structure that
is occurring today as a result of many factors, I think the changes that are going on within
the beef industry are drivers of some of the discontent as it relates to the response to
change."332
A similar view was expressed by a producer and member of the Pork Board who
also attributed the source of the checkoff conflict to change: "[I]t' s about the changing
landscape of rural America. And so farmers are lashing out wherever they can just to try
to take some control. "333
Another theme in the checkoff challenges is getting one's voice heard. A
representative of the Cattlemen's Beef Board noted that the Charter case arose because
the Charters " . . . refused to pay [checkoffs] so they could be given a forum to voice their
opposition to NCBA on some public policy issues with which they disagree."334 Jeanne
Charter would agree with this assessment. She summarized why she and her husband got
involved in the checkoff challenges: "It was basically that we felt that our money was
going to our own destruction."335 The checkoff lawsuit afforded a way for them to
communicate their dissatisfaction with the checkoffs and the forced speech they entail.
A Powerful Hegemony Exercised by the Industrial Agriculture Bloc

Applying Gramsci's theory of hegemony, the various entities joined in social
relation in the dominant group in agriculture may be seen as forming the "fractions" of an
332
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agricultural bloc comprised of government and civil society, similar to the historic bloc
outlined by Gramsci. (Gramsci uses the word "fraction" to refer to an hegemonic class.)
This bloc can be viewed as essential to exercising and maintaining a dominant hegemony
in agriculture centered around the corporate or industrial agriculture model, a business
model that has been widely adopted in the business community as a means to compete
globally and serve the culture and ideology of American consumerism. This bloc will be
referenced hereafter in this paper as the "industrial agriculture bloc" or "AgriBiz."
The "historic bloc" described by Gramsci refers to a unified group in which the
bourgeoisie class and its allies organize and dominate an entire social structure. In the
case of the "industrial agriculture bloc," large agricultural commodity producers that have
become increasingly concentrated and vertically integrated are analogous to the
bourgeoisie class. These commodity producers serve as central organizers of the
industrial agriculture bloc with allies from within the state (e.g., the United States
Department of Agriculture and the Justice Department), the media, academia, etc. The
dominant commodity producers exercise hegemony through their agents, including the
USDA, trade associations they have organized to further their commercial and political
interests, and the checkoff commodity boards. AgriBiz (or the "industrial agriculture
bloc") will continue to maintain or expand its dominant control in the current agricultural
environment in the absence of a viable counter-hegemony or, as Galbraith would argue,
in the absence of a legitimate countervailing economic power to prevent abuse and
exploitation.
The checkoff programs have become an integral part of AgriBiz. They have
impressively served the needs of the industrial agriculture bloc in strengthening the
152

connections between the political, business, agricultural and academic communities.
Such programs have become an ideal tool for "organic intellectuals" to legitimize the
activities and ideology of the agricultural hegemony. As noted in the literature review,
according to Gramsci, organic intellectuals are those in various professional occupations
who direct the "ideas and aspirations" of the dominant social group to which they
belong. 336 In the agricultural hegemony of AgriBiz, the organic intellectuals provide
homogeneity through their web of ideas supporting the dominant industrial agricultural
model.
The checkoff programs require a wide range of organic intellectuals to be
involved in: 1) developing economic, political and social justifications for the checkoff
programs; 2) participating in interlocking networks of private and government
intellectuals to administer the programs (including USDA employees, appointed boards
and commissions, state agencies, trade associations providing services under contract,
advertising agencies, etc.); 3) demonstrating the efficacy of the programs on an ongoing
basis, including their relevance to other goals of the dominant hegemony (e.g.,
importance of checkoff dollars to developing international trade); and 4) using money
gathered from outside the government coffers to advertise and promote the programs and
recruit new support for the programs.
Opinions differ regarding whether commodity checkoffs in various industries
have accomplished their stated purpose, namely increasing the demand for a commodity
through promotion. Professor Ronald Ward expressed the strict position of an economist
in stating during his interview : "[l]f the program [checkoff program] wasn't effective,
336
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then it shouldn't exist."337 Complex models of measuring the effectiveness of the
programs have been developed to justify the programs in the eyes of the producers who
carry the financial burden and to meet institutional requirements for periodic evaluation.
The conflict over checkoffs represents one prong of an effort by several fractions
seeking to establish a new historic bloc and a counter-hegemony centered around an
alternative agricultural model. But this group must effectively counter the value system
of the industrial agriculture bloc that has been extensively promoted through political,
economic and public relations efforts on a global scale. The diagram shown at Figure 5
visually represents the major global agricultural hegemony exercised by the industrial
agriculture bloc in the outer ring and the efforts of the counter-hegemony to break
through. The zone of conflict is the terrain where the crisis in agriculture is occurring in
a variety of ways.
AgriBiz is generating themes and representations that reinforce the industrial
agriculture model and the hegemony of the industrial agriculture bloc. Its agricultural
ethics and goals are incorporated into trade policies, economic decisions regarding
intervention in markets and enforcement of antitrust laws, decisions on genetically altered
commodities, farm policy and, last but not least, USDA activities related to the checkoff
programs. A thought-provoking 2002 book titled Fatal Harvest: The Tragedy of
Industrial Agriculture identifies seven popular themes of AgriBiz, referring to them as

"myths" and "corporate lies." Since the industrial agriculture bloc has been enormously
successful in winning the consensus of the American people, these themes have acquired
a legitimacy that makes them difficult to challenge. The primary themes (or myths)
337
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identified in Fatal Harvest include:
► Industrial agriculture will feed the world.
► Industrial food is safe, healthy, and nutritious.
► Industrial food is cheap.
► Industrial agriculture is efficient.
► Industrial food offers more choices.
► Industrial agriculture benefits the environment and wildlife.
► Biotechnology will solve the problems of industrial agriculture.338
The following additional ideas and themes advanced by the AgriBiz movement have also
earned legitimacy:
► Concentrated operations increase efficiency and production.
► Globalization makes it imperative for companies to buy the best product at the
lowest price on the global market at any given time.
► Sustainable prosperity for farmers.
► Investment in foreign markets is needed to export excess production and feed
hungry populations.
As a key element of its hegemony, AgriBiz has won the general population over
to the acceptance of the industrial business model (as adopted on a global scale) and
vertical integration as the preferred ideology for the success of agriculture as an industry
today. In fact, there are signs that the cost-benefit approach is persuading fractions
within the industrial agriculture bloc and some segments of the public to accept the
possibility that agriculture practiced in the U.S. under the old production paradigm is a
338
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"dead weight" on the economy. In other words, the only way in which the agricultural
industry can economically justify its presence in the American economy is to demonstrate
a major contribution to the gross domestic product (GDP) through competitive
agribusiness operating with global inputs and selling to foreign markets. Economist,
Steven C. Blank, an economist at the University of California, Davis, explored this
concept in his article outlining the economic threats to American farming. 339
Blank described the profit squeeze on American farmers by noting agricultural
producers experienced a decrease of seven percent in the USDA' s index of prices
received for their output from 1990 to 2000 while experiencing an increase of nineteen
percent in the USDA's index of prices paid for inputs.340 His research supported a theory
that American agriculture has moved up the farming food chain because "a falling world
price ceiling and a steadily rising cost floor" have caused many farmers to shift from
producing low-value annual crops to increasingly higher-value crops, such as annuals or
perennials, in the quest for more profit. 341 Finally, the farmer must resort to an
alternative income source as a better investment of his resources.
Blank concluded that all countries exhibit a pattern of climbing up the food chain
as they develop so that the importance of agriculture in the gross domestic product
declines. Agriculture is responsible for helping economies to grow in less-developed
countries, but in developing nations, the economic return is greater when agricultural
workers move to more profitable industries. However, other countries in the world must
be able and willing to sell America a sufficient food supply in order for the country to
339
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totally cease supporting agriculture as a viable industry. He outlined the following
possible scenario for countries at the top of the food chain:
Eventually, some developed countries will choose to leave agriculture due
to efficiency concerns-it, too, is an investment decision. At some point, it will
be inefficient for a country to invest resources in agricultural production when
more profitable investments will contribute to the nation's wealth (i.e.,
deadweight losses will occur if resources remain in agricultural production.) No
country has reached that point yet, but several small Western European countries,
Japan and the United States are getting close enough that the idea must be
faced . .. Much of our labor, capital, and management resources that remain in
American at culture are there by choice but could be better invested
elsewhere. 3 2
In Blank' s view, American agribusiness deserves recognitions for "taking a
global perspective" with regard to price and cost strategies. He stated:
Numerous examples exist of how American agribusiness is maintaining its boom
by increasingly seeking out the least-cost sources of agricultural commodities.
That means they are using strategic alliances, foreign direct investment, and other
methods of securing foreign sources of the commodities they use as inputs into
their processing and distribution industries .. . (citations omitted) By doing so,
American firms guarantee American consumers a steady supply of food and speed
the economic development of the countries supplying us. It is part of an
expandin:f system of mutual dependence that will ensure an uninterrupted food
supply. 34
The United States now has only 1.3 percent of its population in the agricultural
industry. According to Blank, government programs have kept certain segments of
agriculture in business longer than the market would allow because the added premiums
allow farmers to receive more than the global market price. He deemed such programs to
be risk management tools for farms. He concluded: "An increasingly urban America

342
343

lbid., 387.
Ibid., 388.

158

has tired of subsidizing farmers and ranchers. Agriculture is losing its appeal as an
investment for our nation."344
The Changing Face of the Checkoff Challenger

A comparison of the plaintiffs who have sought legal redress in the First
Amendment cases already decided and currently winding their way through the courts
shows that they are not a homogenous group. Erik Jaffe's interview reinforced the need
to compare the commodity checkoff challengers in each of the five industries (beef, pork,
fruit, mushrooms and dairy) and dispelled the notion that there is a single way to frame
the checkoff conflicts for all five industries selected for this study. Jaffe's comments
include the following:
If you look at the different industries that have had fights over this, different
industries have had different players fighting it. 345
You should try to figure out the structure of the industry and who benefits from
the checkoff and why . . . . You tend to have a different breakout of who's fighting
on which side of the issue. 346
[W]hen you're looking at these checkoff programs, you should be precise about
who pays the checkoff. 347
In each of the commodities, there exists an "industry commodity bloc" that
exercises hegemony over the industry. The groups serving the role as central organizers
(analogous to Gramsci's concept of the bourgeoisie as central organizers of large social
superstructures) differ for each commodity and may, in fact, be undergoing change. (For
example, the grocery retailers are showing signs of supplanting the packers and
processors as central organizers in the livestock industry.) Because the "industry
344
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commodity blocs" are aligned with the USDA, the challengers have found that the courts
offer them a new terrain to wage their "war of position" against the dominant hegemony.

The Livestock Checkoff Challengers. The search for key externalities
influencing the conflict over checkoffs pointed overwhelmingly in one direction for two
of the five commodities studied, beef and pork. Without a doubt, the most dominant
theme throughout the interviews and resource materials used to study these commodities
was the theme of crisis occurring through the rapid rate of concentration and vertical
integration in the agricultural industry. It defined the parameters of a major ideological
and political conflict in which First Amendment law regarding the constitutionality of the
checkoffs has provided an additional forum of the courts for the challengers to advance
their struggle against the political and economic power wielded by the groups who
control the businesses and organizations benefiting from concentration and vertical
integration. As a contributing factor, the globalization of agricultural markets is driving
the accelerated pace of concentration and vertical integration.
In this hegemonic battle in the livestock industry, the face of the challenger has
been the independent producer and small rancher who objects to his or her checkoff
dollar being used to promote messages and interests that generate profits for the large
processors, meat packers and retailers who control the industry farther up the food chain.
The short-term goal of these challengers is to win the "battle for the beef bucks"348 and
recover more of their profits being siphoned off into the checkoff programs. Their larger
goal is to create a countervailing power that will disrupt the hegemony of the
"commodity industry bloc," and to ideally force change in the "industrial agriculture
348
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bloc" by altering the relations of power that govern the organization of the commodity
industries and markets.
Figure 6 illustrates the position of the small independent livestock producers (in
the middle of the circle diagram) who are using the First Amendment legal actions in
their counter-hegemony. They are pushing outward to break the checkoff hegemony,
and, also, create an impact on the outer ring, the agricultural hegemony that includes the
elements of concentration and vertical integration that are of paramount concern to this
group.
The critical interests at stake for this group are to recapture a greater share of the
profit stream by eliminating mandatory checkoff payments and to close off some of the
ways in which the check-off generated benefits are being funneled to the checkoff
hegemony and the agricultural hegemony. The ultimate interest at stake for the
challengers is to find a way to improve their economic future in an industry that is now
rewarding them with paltry profits, as evidenced by a drop in the food price index for
major commodities of almost half in the forty years between 1960 and 2000. 349
Challengers are using an argument based in principle, claiming that it is unfair that they
cannot exercise any control over speech that they are forced to fund. At the legal level,
the challengers claim that the mandatory checkoff fees are a violation of their First
Amendment rights to free speech under the First Amendment that guarantees: "Congress
shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . . " 350
An executive of Livestock Marketing Association identifies the structure of the
349
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beef industry as an underlying major factor in creating the environment for the checkoff
legal actions. The LMA became active with its referendum challenge because of the
following complaints received from its members:
1) Producers should have the right under a compelled, mandatory program to have
some say about whether the program is doing right by them. ''Those who pay
should get a say."
2) The beef checkoff is not headed in the right direction.
3) The beef checkoff is not doing the producers any good. Producers are paying
money for no return because the benefits are realized by segments of the industry
farther upstream.
4) The trade association, National Cattlemen's Beef Association (NCBA), is getting
most of the dollars, and the packers are too much in control of USDA.
5) Producers object to the absolute control exercised by the NCBA and the
Cattlemen's Beef Board (CBB) over the programs.
6)

The NCBA is advocating policies with which the LMA members do not agree.
The Mushroom and Tree Fruit Checkoff Challengers. In contrast to the

Iivestock industry, the First Amendment checkoff challenges arising in the mushroom
and fruit industries resonate with branding and product differentiation themes. The
challengers in these cases are some of the largest producers in their industries who seek
to differentiate their products through high quality, customized service and branding. An
example is Gerawan Farming, one of the largest tree fruit growers in the world35 1 that
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has been involved in challenging checkoff legislation for the past 15 years.35 2 Gerawan
has implemented sophisticated marketing and advertising programs to inform and
persuade consumers to buy their unique commodity products. Strategies it has adopted to
distinguish its fruit include quality-enhancing methods in the areas of cooling,
transportation, and air handling (use of optimal temperatures and controlled atmospheric
gases in storage facilities to extend the shelf life of fruits after harvest). 353
These large fruit and mushroom growers have argued that the substantial fees
they pay for commodity checkoffs and the generic advertising generated by these
mandatory fees are highly detrimental in undermining their individual advertising
because: 1) they must still invest in their own advertising to promote their branded or
unique products and counteract the message that all of the respective products are
homogenous, so they pay twice for advertising, which reduces resources available for
further promotions or business investments, and 2) the generic advertising promulgates
an inaccurate message that all the products in their industries are homogenous, a message
that strictly benefits competitors.
The mushroom challengers in the United Foods case also further argued that an
increase in demand for a homogenous mushroom product would reduce their market
share due to the structure of the industry. Growers sell through three different channels:
1) whole fresh mushrooms to wholesalers or retailers, 2) lower quality mushrooms to
processors, such as Campbell's and Giorgio, and 3) discounted mushrooms to
352

Dennis Pollack, "Growers Get Chance to Influence Feds," The Fresno Bee (March 28, 2003); available from
http://www.fresnobee.corn/locaVagriculture/v-print/story/6459850p-74043 l lc.html; Internet; accessed 5 April
2003.
353
See U.S. Department of Agriculture, Administrative Law Hearing, before Judge S. Bernstein, San
Francisco, Cal., In Re: Donald B. Mills, Inc., MPRCIA No. 95- 1 , Testimony of John Haltrom, 17 August
1995; available from http://www.usdoj.gov/osg/briefs/2000/3mer/2mer/2000-0276.mer .j a.html; Internet;
accessed 5 April 2003 .

164

processors of last resort, which could include a company such as Monterey or
Campbell's. With greater demand, growers who sell to processors and processors of last
resort would switch to selling fresh mushrooms. 354 In addition, the challengers objected
to advertising that promoted mushrooms as aphrodisiac and associated them with wine
drinking. Their final objection was to exemptions in the Mushroom Marketing Act that
allowed all smaller mushroom producers who grow less than 500,000 pounds of
mushrooms a year to avoid paying the checkoff fees. 355
As major industrial agriculture players using advanced technology and
sophisticated strategies for branding and advertising, the challengers in the tree fruit and
mushroom cases are aligned with the "industrial agriculture bloc." They also appear to
be central organizers of commodity production and the structure of their respective
industries, playing a key role in the exercise of hegemony in their "commodity industry
blocs." However, the commodity industry blocs for these industries do not appear as
strong as in the case of the livestock industries. The large commodity producers have not
joined in exercising hegemony over the checkoff programs, which may explain why the
USDA does not seem to have joined them as an ally.
The challengers in the tree fruit and mushroom cases are not seeking to establish
countervailing power that will change the relations of commodity production in their
industry or create an alternative commodity industry bloc. On a broader scale, they are
not challenging the "industrial agriculture bloc." They would simply like to break the
checkoff hegemony for the sole reason of increasing their profits and strengthening their
power as a fraction within the "commodity industry bloc." This is an example of the
354 Ibid.
355 Ibid.
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conflicts that can occur within a hegemonic group as fissures develop due to conflicting
interests, and a fraction within a dominant bloc negotiates for power. The interests of the
large producers selling branded products in these industries are deeply at odds with the
interests of others in the hegemony who are supporting generic advertising and its
economic benefits to all the players, i.e., trade associations, the commodity boards, the
government and the academic specialists who are all pursuing goals related to generic
product advertising.
The diagram in Figure 7 shows that the position of challengers in the tree fruit and
mushroom industries as part of the agricultural hegemony and their counter-hegemony
launched through the First Amendment checkoff cases to attack the checkoff programs.
The critical economic interest at stake for them is to try to capture more of the profit
stream that is flowing to the small generic commodity producers. They can do this by
successfully eliminating their checkoff payments and using the money to expand their
advertising programs to differentiate their branded, higher-value products and services
from the generic producers. More of the profit stream will be funneled off in the first
ring and the amount reaching the generic producers will be significantly narrowed. A
legal ruling that commodity checkoffs are unconstitutional would ensure that no dollars
are diverted to support the checkoff hegemony.
At the level of principle, the challengers in the tree fruit and mushroom industries
would like the freedom to use their advertising dollars to engage in speech that supports
only their branded products, the special features of those products and the quality services
offered in connection with those products. The testimony of John Haltom, president of
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Pictsweet Mushroom Farms (a subsidiary of United Foods) showed that he did not
believe the checkoff programs would work in an industry such as fresh mushrooms where
the products are not homogenous and are sold to a regional market. Pictsweet has sought
to increase sales through its own local advertising of its premium mushrooms, in-store
promotions and direct distribution of products to retailers.
The checkoff dollars in this industry are also used for regional advertising in
direct competition with Pictsweet's branded advertising. Other than Campbell's (a
national operation) and Monterey Mushrooms (a semi-national operation with farms in
Tennessee and Texas), all other mushroom growers do not benefit from targeted generic
advertising in other regions. Pictsweet stands to gain nothing when the generic
advertising occurs in its region (thereby creating a false message that all mushrooms are
homogenous) or when it occurs in another region (in which case it would be
superfluous. )356
Haltrom's position included two other points. He asserted that processors and
smaller mushroom growers should not be exempt from the checkoff payments since they
also stood to benefit if the checkoff program was a success. He also disagreed with the
message of a Valentine's promotion for mushrooms purporting mushrooms to be
aphrodisiacs on the grounds that this was in poor taste. 357
At the legal level, the tree fruit growers have claimed in various cases that the
forced payment of checkoff violated their First Amendment right under the commercial
speech doctrine (i.e., that the statutory regulations do not pass the Central Hudson test)

356 Ibid.
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and/or that such regulations are a violation of the First Amendment right to be free from
compelled speech or compelled association under the Abood and Keller line of cases.
The U.S. Supreme Court decision in the tree fruit checkoff case of Glickman v.
Wileman in 1997 led to a much different result than the Supreme Court ruling four years

later in the mushroom challenge case of United States v. United Foods. As discussed
earlier in this dissertation, the Court upheld the fruit checkoff program in the Glickman
case on the grounds that it was part of a larger regulatory scheme and struck down the
mushroom checkoffs in the United Foods case because the government failed to show
that the checkoffs were germane to the purpose of the Mushroom Act.
One strong similarity in both cases is that the faces of the challengers were large
scale growers who felt a negative impact on their branding and marketing strategies from
the checkoffs. One difference is that the checkoffs in the Glickman case were
implemented through marketing orders as part of a marketing scheme and the checkoffs
in United Foods arose through stand-alone legislation. This is a critical difference,
leading the mushroom growers to prevail in breaking the hegemony of checkoffs in their
industry by securing a favorable ruling in United Foods, while the tree fruit growers in
Glickman failed. 358

Ironically, the United Foods case, which was brought by a dominant mushroom
358
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grower (the third largest in the United States)359 to seek relief from being forced to
subsidize advertising messages benefiting smaller growers, became the lightning rod for
cases brought by smaller independent hog and cattle farmers and ranchers in the beef and
cattle industry. The small producers in these cases rallied against use of the checkoffs
they claimed provided benefits only to the large producers, the meat packers and
processors, the retailers and agribusiness.

The Dairy Checkoff Challengers. A close look at the checkoff challenges in the
dairy industry reveals challengers with different faces and sharply different interests. For
purposes of this dissertation, the focus will be on the political, economic and legal aspects
of three key dairy cases: Gallo Cattle Company v. California Milk Advisory Board and
Ann Veneman, 360 Nature 's Dairy v. Glickman, 36 1 and Cochran v. USDA. 362

Joseph and Brenda Cochran, plaintiffs in a pending case in Pennsylvania, are
independent milk producers who do not belong to a farm cooperative. Instead, they
choose to sell their milk to a dairy owned by an individual proprietor. 363 They
differentiate their product from the homogenous (or standard) milk promoted and sold
nationwide because of their farming methods and they object to paying for generic
advertising that merely competes with their individualized efforts. It is also apparent that
certain parts of the dairy industry are experiencing a crisis of concentration and vertical
integration. So the underlying economic and political factors inherent in the dairy
conflict have elements found in all four of the other commodity conflicts covered by this
35 9
360

See Testimony of John Haltrom, 17 August 1995.
Gallo Cattle Company v. California Milk Advisory Board and Veneman, 185 F.3d 969 (9th Cir. 1999).
361
Nature's Dairy v. Glickman, No. 99-439, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 3547 (6th Cir. 1999).
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study (beef, pork, mushroom and fruit). Evidence showed that industry structure for
dairy differs according to the region of the country, the cooperative arrangements and the
different dairy commodities (cheese, fluid milk and others).
This was confirmed by Brenda Cochran (dairy farmer and challenger in the dairy
checkoff cases), who stated: "You are quite correct in picking up the fragmentation of
our producers in the industry on style of production, style of management, style of
marketing options, different regionalistic issues that seem to be continuing to divide
us."364
Dairy importers now must pay a promotion fee on all imported dairy products
under the 2002 Farm Act. As a consequence, they were seen as likely in 2003 to become
the next dairy checkoff challengers, claiming that they should be exempt from the
checkoffs because they already pay a tariff. They will be seeking to break the checkoff
hegemony so they can strengthen their position in the dominant "commodity industry
bloc"controlling the U.S. dairy industry.
Precipitating Conditions for Beef and Pork Checkoff Challenges: Industry
Concentration and Vertical Integration
Asked what he would do with the millions he 'd just won in the
state lottery, Farmer Jones scratched his chin and answered,
"Oh, I suppose I'll just keep on farming till it's all gone. " 365

Secretary of Agriculture Daniel Glickman, delivered testimony on September 28,
2000, at a hearing of the Antitrust, Business Rights and Competition Subcommittee of the
Senate Judiciary Committee. He stated:

364
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Cochran interview, 4.
Ashton Applewhite, William R. Evans, ill, Andrew Frothingham, And I Quote (N.Y.: St. Martin's Press,
1992), 227.
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Consolidation and concentration in agriculture is an extraordinary critical issue
facing agriculture because it threatens the foundation of rural America. The
effects of concentration on family farmers and independent producers have been a
dominant issue in agricultural policy for some time. Recently, however, rapid
transformation in agricultural markets has generated increasing concern, and
complaints that family farmers and independent producers, particularly in the
livestock industry, do not have open and fair access to those markets. As a result,
many small farmers believe they are being forced to compete at a disadvantage.
This consolidation is taking place across broad agricultural sectors transportation, the• grain industry, livestock, and even biotechnology. 366
The shift to increased consolidation, coupled with declining farm profits in the
last two decades, set the scene for a contentious relationship between the ever-expanding
mass of those supporting the industrial model for agriculture and those feeling exploited
and disenfranchised by their inequitable position in the production chain. The first group,
referenced herein as the "industrial agriculture bloc" or AgriBiz, is comprised of fractions
primarily from agribusiness, large producers, government, academia and trade
associations. The second group, referenced herein as "AgriChoice," seeks to challenge
the status quo by building a counter-hegemony and consensus in its own oppositional
movements. Its goal is to construct an alternative political force (or agricultural bloc)
founded on political and ideological positions, such as sustainable agriculture, respect for
the environment and community and social returns. Changes in the agricultural industry
arising from increased industry concentration and vertical integration have implications
for smaller independent farmers and ranchers, in particular, so they are an important
fraction in this historic bloc.
The evidence indicated that the agricultural industry is experiencing what
Gramsci called a crisis of hegemony:
366

U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Antitrust, Business Rights and Competition
Subcommittee, Testimony of Daniel Glickman, 28 September 2000.
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A crisis occurs, sometimes lasting for decades. This exceptional duration
means that uncurable structural contradictions have revealed themselves . . . and
that, despite this, the political forces which are struggling to conserve and defend
the existing structure itself are making efforts to cure them without certain limits,
and to overcome them. These incessant and persistent efforts . . . form the terrain of
the conjunctural and it is upon this terrain that the forces of opposition
organize. 367
As might be expected, the people who have taken a strong stance against the
commodity checkoff programs belong to the AgriChoice group. The pressures created by
industry concentration and vertical integration are explicitly recognized by many as an
overwhelming catalyst for the First Amendment checkoff challenges in the courts.
The language used to describe the increasing level of concentration ranged from
strident and alarmist on the part of the coalitions objecting to checkoffs to a bare whisper
of acknowledgement in some government publications.
At one end of the spectrum was Mike Callicrate, a beef producer in Kansas who
viewed vertical integration as follows:
. . . the problem is the alliances that the NCBA [National Cattlemen's Beef
Association] promotes take away market power from the producer and essentially
forces them into these supply chain arrangements much like chicken farmers have
experienced for years . . . . Complete vertical integration where the producer
becomes usurped and a slave in the supply chain only to consume his asset and go
bankrupt whenever he can't find a job on a farm providing enough income to
offset his losses. It is so wrong. The NCBA has been hijacked by the big packers
and retailers . . . The problem is "however the packer votes, so goes the big cattle
feeders. "368
Callicrate denounced the role of the USDA:
The USDA is not our friend. USDA does what the big meat packers and retailers
ask them to do. It is the government agencies that have just castrated the United
States government and their ability to enforce these antitrust laws . . .I don't know
what the government is trying to get done. My answer to this is we just need a
whole lot more buyers . . . We need enough buyers so that they can't sit around the
367
368

Gramsci, Prison Notebooks, 179 (quoted in The Politics ofThatcherism, 23).
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darn table together and fix the price. We have packers right now that are just
fixing prices and cooperating rather than competing. IBP [Iowa Beef Processor]
opens up the market every week by shooting everybody in the foot. The other
packers follow. It is the most anti-competitive situation you can imagine.369
The Corporate Agribusiness Research Project (CARP) has monitored corporate
agribusiness from a public interest perspective to "serve family farmers, farm workers
and consumers in their struggles for economic and social justice. "370 It focused a critical
eye on corporate agribusiness operations, claiming:
In another erea, they would have been called 'the robber barons.' Today, the
ADMs [Archer Daniel Midlands], the Cargills, the ConAgras, the IBPs [Iowa
Beef Processors], the Smithfield Foods, the Tysons, the Chiquitas and other
corporate agribusiness behemoths which produce and manufacture our food have
become the merchants of greed.371
CARP argued that corporate agribusiness has "deified the cost benefit analysis" at
the expense of the common good. 372 It raised the specter of a family farm system at the
brink of being swallowed by agribusiness in a wave of concentration orchestrated by the
"merchants of greed":
Thus, we have arrived at a point where our family farm system of agriculture is
facing its dark night of the soul, standing now on the threshold of eradication.
Throughout the 1980s we saw an ever-mounting numbers of farm bankruptcies,
foreclosures, and forced evictions reap a grim "human harvest" of suicides,
alcoholism, divorce, family violence, personal stress, and loss of community.
Continuing into the 1990s we witnessed the very economic and social fabric of
rural America being ripped asunder as the control of our food supply was seized
by those merchants of greed whose purpose is not to feed people, or provide jobs,
or husband the land, but simply to increase their cash flow and reduce their
transactional costs in order to placate their excess-profit-obsessed institutional
investors.373
369
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Internet; accessed 1 April 2003.
7 1 "The Merchants of Greed," Corporate Agribusiness Research Project; available from
http://www.electricarrow.com/CARP/tiller/index.html; Internet; accessed 1 April 2003.
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The AgriChoice viewpoint has been repeatedly voiced in Congressional hearings.
Michael Stumo, a former Iowa hog and cattle buyer who is now a lawyer employed by
the Organization for Competitive Markets, gave particularly ominous testimony bef ore a
hearing held by Senator Richard Lugar on agriculture concentration and enforcement of
the Packers and Stockyards Act:
I come before you today with a sense of urgency. This is not just another
farm crisis. This is the 'end game' of independent, family farm agriculture. The
crux of the issue is industry structure. There are tremendous amounts of money
being made in the food industry. The farm sector is not receiving that money
because of the oligopsonistic [buyer shared monopoly] meat packers and the
oligopsonistic retailers have positioned themselves to capture the bulk of that
profit. Thus, high retail margins, high packer margins, and the end of the family
farm . . . .How did we get here? First the meat packers consolidated horizontally.
Now they are appropriating the food chain vertically. If packers own or control
livestock, there is no independent livestock agriculture. Period. 374
On May 17, 2001, Peter Carstensen, George H. Young-Bascom Professor of Law
at University of Wisconsin Law School, provided testimony on concentration and
competition in agriculture before the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on
Agriculture, Rural Development and Related Agencies. He described the longstanding
history of "frequent abuses of temporary market dominance and unacceptable efforts to
exploit information or strategic advantage. "375 He emphasized that the Packers and
Stockyards Act (PSA) was enacted to eliminate purely anticompetitive conduct in the
market as well as control the unfair conduct of the packers. Suspect market structure and
conduct is not being addressed by the USDA or Grain Inspection and Packers and
374
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Stockyards Administration (GIPSA), however, a major failing that has been repeatedly
brought to the public conscience. He pointed out the abuses that can occur through
contracts of adhesion and an inoperative price reporting system:
Left to their own devices, the large buyers will, as the Attorney General of
Oklahoma has opined, force contracts of adhesion onto farmers and ranchers. For
example, such contracts often deny the producer access to the courts and at the
same time impose unfair and inequitable arbitration terms that effectively deny
the producer all recourse. Confidentiality clauses keep farmers and ranchers from
sharing information that would make them more concentrated. The fact would
seem to require special regulations to ensure equitable treatment of sellers in such
markets. Yet GIPSA has done and is apparently doing nothing to provide basic
regulation for any market. Market facilitating legislation is long overdue and this
committee should insist that GIPSA get on with the task. 376
Professor Carstensen concluded:
There is a manifest need for effective regulation of the livestock markets
to ensure efficiency, fairness and equity in light of the high concentration and
resulting incentives to engage in strategic conduct. The public record fully
documents the existence of serious problems concerning both fairness and equity
in these markets . . . Given the dramatic changes in the ways in which livestock are
sold, it is striking that the Department [of Agriculture] and GIPSA have totally
failed to exercise the rule making authority that they possess to craft appropriate,
market facilitating regulations to govern the new methods of buying and selling
livestock. 377
Jeanne Charter is a plaintiff in a major checkoff lawsuit and a voice for the
independent rancher. She identifies vertical integration as an underlying issue dividing
the agricultural industry for fifteen or twenty years. The following exchange took place
in an interview with Jeanne Charter in February 2003:
Interviewer: Well, the differences between your thinking and some of the more
dominant groups' interests, are they longstanding? They go back since you've
been involved?

376
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Jeanne Charter: "Yeah, they're longstanding with us, 15, 20 years. The basic
difference has been over whether the industry should stay organized in their own
competitive markets or go into a vertically integrated structure." 378
In a government report released in September 2001 titled Food and Agriculture
Policy: Taking Stock/or the New Century, the government ignored these topics. The

report set forth the Bush administration's farm policy principles with vague references to
improving the infrastructure, such as: "The infrastructure that supports market growth
and efficiency, which includes everything from border inspection services to research
endeavors, must be renewed and reoriented to fit today's realities, with input and
cooperation from every link in the food chain."379 The report acknowledged only briefly
the negative implications of concentration in the industry in a single paragraph:
While this structural change clearly is advantageous for some, it also
prompts concerns about competition, market access, and the use of market power
by some participants to the disadvantage of others. Moreover, reduced
competition could limit society's gain from structural change by stifling
innovation or tilting the market's results in favor of those with the greatest market
power. 380
There were no negative implications noted in connection with vertical integration.
The report merely stated: "Globalization of markets pressure firms to be more
competitive and to 'shorten the supply chain,' streamlining the system (eliminating
transactions and their associated costs) to efficiently meet rapidly changing consumer
demand."38 1
Other reports by the government shed light on how it is approaching the
concentration and vertical integration issues. Incredulously, one Congressional Research
378
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Service Report referred to the severe impacts of anticompetitive practices as "quality-of
life issues." The report began:
Many issues associated with concentration and consolidation, such as job
loss, change in ownership structure, and other quality-of-life issues, are not
addressed by antitrust laws, but it is these quality-of-life issues that often are the
driving force behind calls for stronger regulations and law enforcement in
agriculture.382
There are clear policy implications for the government' s continued acquiescence
in the current tolerance for concentration in the agricultural sector. It implies a
government facilitating the status quo.
Moving to the pro-checkoff end of the spectrum, Terry Stokes, President of the
National Cattlemen's Beef Association, provided his acknowledgement of the issues
raised by consolidation and described the situation:
It is a philosophical divide that is occurring in the industry today as it relates to
the free market system versus government intervention, free trade versus a
protectionist approach . . . . 383
I think there is concern within the entire industry about consolidation that is
occurring at various levels. An example of that would be you have four meat
packers that harvest about 80 percent of total production. You also have growing
consolidation in the retail segment. There is concern by some that there is less
return or when you look at the farm-to-retail spread, there is less of that dollar that
is going back to the cow/calf producer. Based on that particular data, that seems
to be a concern.
The question becomes do you correct the situation, for example, in the packing
segment by putting restrictions upon meat packers or do you facilitate more
competition within that segment? Last year, we had a debate, and we will have to
debate it again this year, over legislation that would ban meat packers from
owning cattle and feed yards. There is a group within the industry that wants to
have that legislation, and there are those who don't because those who don't feel

Jerry Heykoop, "Merger and Antitrust Issues in Agriculture: Statutes and Agencies," CRS Report for
Congress (May 21, 2002), CRS- 1 .
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like it's a restriction on the free market system and it would be detrimental to the
industry. The other group thinks it would facilitate competition." 384
Stokes' frank acknowledgement of the divisions existing within the various sectors of
beef production were in contrast to a general refusal by much of the dominant industrial
agriculture bloc to recognize the existence of serious issues related to industry
concentration and vertical integration.
It was the opinion of a representative from the Cattlemen's Beef Board that the
threat of integration should be distinguished from the checkoff issue. The representative
clarified this position as follows:
That's [the threat of integration] a policy issue. That's not a checkoff issue. But
it's one of the changes in the industry that does lead to anxiety. And I think it
underlies a lot of the legal challenges. But, oddly enough, the checkoff is not
responsible for the formation of those alliances, nor has it done anything to
encourage them. 385
This same individual also recognized the divisions within the cattle industry in the
following comment: "In our industry, there are a number of conflicts, the conflicts
between producers and packers, between segments of the industry, and between
organizations. It gets pretty complex."386
A secondary theme, intertwined with the impact of concentration and vertical
integration,was the shift to global food markets. Various fractions within AgriBiz have
driven the move toward a borderless food production and distribution system with inputs
and outputs based solely on economics and profitability. National corporations, adept at
operating within this paradigm, have furthered this shift. This theme has implications for
the beef industry because the small independent producers believe that imported foreign
384
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beef is "supplanting domestic production and acting to suppress market prices obtained
by United States cattle producers."3 87
If the move toward concentration and globalization in agriculture follows the
trend of other industries, there is every reason to believe that, without a change in the
balance of political and economic forces, transnational agricultural corporations will
dominate. In describing the transnational capitalist class, Leslie Sklair, defined
"transnational" as referring to "forces, processes and institutions that cross borders but do
not derive authority and power from the state."3 88 He noted that transnational
corporations are "owned by shareholders and controlled by Boards of Directors who can
be citizens of any country. The prime responsibility of these Boards is to make the
company as profitable as possible with no specific privileges extended to their states of
origin. "3 89
Sklair's description of transnational corporations and their global role suggested
that agricultural transnational corporations may become or already have become the
central organizers for the "industrial agriculture bloc," a socio-political-economic bloc
whose allies now include numerous agents of the state. Evidence suggests that fractions
of the "industrial agriculture bloc" within the United States government are quietly
negotiating away some of the national economic base for the various "commodity
industry blocs" that currently exercise hegemony within their respective industries. This
has occurred because allies of the transnational corporations who are negotiating trade
agreements appear willing to sacrifice the economic interests of various "commodity
387
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industry blocs" (and perhaps the economic interests of the nation) to strengthen the power
of the transnational corporations in the "industrial agriculture bloc. "390
Sklair summarized the argument of his book, Globalization: Capitalism and its
Alternatives, as follows:
The argument of this book is that the most important global force at the beginning
of the twenty�first century is the capitalist global system. Transnational
corporations provide the material base for a transnational capitalist class that
unquestionably dictates economic transnational practices, and is the most
important single force in the struggle to dominate political and culture-ideology
transnational practices. 391
He emphasized the importance of the "culture-ideology" of consumerism:
"[H]ow those who own and control the transnational corporations harness the
transnational capitalist class to solidify their hegemonic control of consumerist
culture and ideology, is the site of the many struggles for the global system. Who
will win and who will lose these struggles is not a forgone conclusion. "392
As noted earlier, the central organizing group in the "industrial agriculture bloc"
is comprised of large commodity producers (agribusiness). As food markets increasingly
become global and mergers and acquisition occur across borders, these commodity
producers will likely become transnational with businesses that cover chemicals,
biotechnology, food production and distribution and other related areas. (The alliances
are referred to by William Heffernan as "food chain clusters.") 393 These clusters have
already begun to assume control as the organizing force in the industrial agriculture bloc.
Clearly, the hegemony exercised within the agricultural industry has been and will
continue to be influenced by the role of large transnational agribusiness organizations

390 See generally,
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pursing strategies of increased concentration and vertical integration.
The First Amendment challenges to the checkoffs represent a strategy for the beef
and pork producers to regain the dollars that are currently being paid to fund industry
programs that they claim fail to provide them with benefits and, in fact, are counter to
their interests. It also represents the use of the legal system as a means for building
counter-hegemony and gaining power in the broader agricultural conflict between
AgriBiz and AgriChoice. The diagram shown as Figure 8 illustrates how the livestock
industry structure does not allow benefits to flow back to producers. An indication of the
diminished bargaining position of the producers and feeders can be seen in the lack of
profits in the sales from the U.S. livestock sector to the U.S. beef and pork sectors, but
growing profits at the next stage in which the processors, packers and grinders sell to
wholesalers and retailers. The diagram also reflects the impact of imported beef and
pork.
Without market power, the sales made by the livestock sector to the beef and pork
sectors allow little or no profit. The second sale made to the consumers is where the
benefits of any generic advertising will be realized. As long as the livestock producers
have no bargaining power, more sales at zero profit or a loss will not benefit them. The
adage used by the dominant industrial agriculture bloc "a rising tide floats all ships"
becomes "a rising tide floats all yachts."
Precipitating Conditions for Fruit and Mushroom Checkoff
Challenges: Branding and Product Differentiation

The anti-checkoff forces in the legal battles over mandatory assessments in the
fruit and mushroom industries are the large growers who are seeking to maximize the
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Independent Producers Claim:
• Forced to sell in non-competitive market
• Forced to sign inequitable contracts
• Forced to fund ad messages with which
they disagree
• U .S. trade policy has created inequities
• Checkoffmoney furthers the interests of
those in the beef and pork sector and not
the live livestock sector
• Any increase in profits due to checkoffs is
realized upstream and not by producers

Key Economic and Policy Issues Underlying Livestock
Checkoff Challenges
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benefits of advertising their uniquely different and branded products. The diagram
shown as Figure 9 illustrates an industry structure in which the anti-checkoff challengers
find that mandatory fees undercut their marketing efforts. The challengers in these
industries are sophisticated, large commercial production organizations who seek to
increase their market shares by coaxing consumers to buy their branded products or
recognizably high-quality products in place of generic products. Any increase in their
market shares will likely come at the expense of the generic commodity growers or
producers of other branded products. In either case, the net results of generic advertising
are negative for growers of products that are notably distinguishable by superior features
and/or a strong level of brand recognition acquired through extensive brand advertising.
The mushroom and tree fruit industries illustrate the tension that exits between the
goals of generic commodity producers and those promoting and selling products through
branding and the advertising of unique product features. However, given the trend
toward increased use of brands for all commodities, this tension may become more
apparent in the livestock and dairy industries. Once full-scale branding occurs in those
industries, the generic promotion of homogenous products may become an idea that has
outlived its usefulness, even for the larger agribusiness enterprises. However, if the
checkoff dollars can be captured by larger corporate interests for promotional efforts or
research efforts that enhance their own brands and products, the programs may still offer
strategic value to those entities.
Mix of Conditions in Dairy Checkoff Challenges
Three dairy checkoff cases will be considered in this dissertation. All are lower
court cases since no dairy checkoff case has come before the Supreme Court. The first is
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Anti-Checkoff Producers Claim :

• Must still invest $ in branded product ads
• Branded product ads are in competition
with generic product ads
• Generic ads give inaccurate message that
products are homogenous
• Small producers benefit at expense of big producers
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Key Economic and Policy Issues Underlying Tree Fruit and
Mushroom Checkoff Challenges
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a 1999 case decided by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, Gallo Cattle Company v.
California Milk Advisory Board and Veneman. 394 A Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
case, Nature's Dairy v. Glickman,395 was also decided in 1999 and a Pennsylvania
District Court provided an opinion in Joseph P. Cochran, et al. v. Ann Veneman, et al. 396
The chart shown as Figure 10 outlines the three cases and highlights the
underlying issues for each. The challengers in the first two cases were unsuccessful in
persuading the courts to strike down the dairy checkoffs. The plaintiffs in the first case,
Gallo Cattle Co. v. Ca. Milk Advisory Board and Veneman, were large companies within
the agricultural hegemony that have characteristics similar to the tree fruit checkoff
challengers. They are motivated to fight the checkoff hegemony in order to achieve
greater returns for their branding and product differentiation programs. In the case of
Nature 's Dairy v. Glickman, the challengers are among the largest dairy producers in the
United States and are, therefore, a major force within the agricultural hegemony. Their
goal in challenging the checkoff programs is purely profit.
The Cochrans, plaintiffs in the third case, Cochran v. Veneman, fit the profile of
the small independent ranchers and farmers fighting the checkoff hegemony in the
livestock industry. They describe themselves as committed to the goals of sustainable
agriculture, fair pricing, the right to be free from compelled speech under the Constitution
and the right to engage in independent farming practices not dictated by a milk
cooperative. Hence, the checkoff lawsuit in which they are involved symbolizes a bundle
of issues with one aim-to fight the large agricultural hegemony that they see as a
Gallo, 1 85 F.3d 969 (9th Cir. 1999).
Nature's Dairy, No. 99-439, U.S. App. LEXIS 12720 (6th Cir. 1999).
396
Chochran, et aL , 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4361 (Middle Dist. Penn. 2003).
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Case Name/Description of Plaintiffs
Case #1 :

Underlying Issues

-

--

Gallo Cattle Co. v. Ca. Milk Advisory Board
and Veneman, 185 F.3d 969 (9th Cir. 1999)

Checkoff fees pay for a generic advertising program
that uses "Real California Cheese" on a seal applied
to products and the slogan "It's the Cheese."

Plaintiff is a large California dairy operation (once the
nation's largest dairy farm) that uses 100 % of its
milk to produce cheese.

Gallo objects to the generic message because Gallo's
cheeses are superior and distinguishable.

Case #2
Nature's Dairy v. Glickman, No. 99-439, 1999

: Placing the compelled message on Gallo's product
falsely portrays its product as the same as others.
Checkoff program hamstrings progressive agriculture.

U.S. App. LEXIS 3547 (6th Cir. 1999)

The underlying issue is strictly desire to
increase profit.

Court upheld the dairy checkoff program,
finding it similar to the regulatory scheme in

These large dairies want to increase their profits by
avoiding any checkoff payments.

Glickman.

Plaintiffs include seventeen huge commercial
dairy operations (the largest in the nation).
All plaintiffs represented by lawyer, Ben Yale,
who represents Cochrans in case #3.
Case #3:

Cochran v. Veneman, No. 4: CV-01-0529,
2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4361 (Middle Dist.
II Penn. 2003)

I

The underlying issue is branding and product
differentiation.

Court upheld the checkoff program in an addendum
revising its earlier ruling that the program violated
Gallo's First Amendment rights.

1 Gallo promotes and sells premium, award-winning
cheese under the label "Joseph Farms." Its cheeses
are distinguishable from other cheeses.

I

I

-

Court upheld the checkoff program based on an
analysis under Glickman.

Large producers do not feel the checkoff promotion
, program is needed.
Other than the legal argument that free speech rights
have been violated, plaintiffs voice no other opinions
regarding issues that might be related to their
checkoff challenges.

There are multiple underlying issues:
Generic advertising does not represent the interests of
the challengers.
Milk pricing system is manipulated and inequitable.

Plaintiffs are a N.Y. couple who run a family dairy
operation of 150 head of cattle with three sons.

Concentrated commercial dairy farm operations have
gained industry power and favor with the government.

Plaintiffs are part of a dairy counter-hegemony
movement.

Competition from imported dairy products (e.g.,
"milk protein concentrates" or MPCs) has eroded
market for U.S. dairy products.

Plaintiffs are represented by Ben Yale, also counsel
for the commercial dairy farms in Case #2.

Figure 10

USDA misrepresents data and restricts access to data.

Diverse Plaintiffs in Dairy Checkoff Challenges
and Underlying Issues
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crippling influence on agriculture today. The district court upheld the checkoffs, so
Cochrans have filed an appeal with the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.
Brenda Cochran described the farmer's perspective on the dairy checkoff:
I just have to say on behalf of most dairy farmers I associate with, the constant
erosion of our economic strength through years and years and years of insane
milk prices makes any "deduct" [for mandatory checkoffs] on a milk check a
further stifling of our ability to reorganize and react to what we feel are unfair
powers exerted against us in the marketplace. . . That' s why we' re looking to the
Constitution to level the playin� field, so to speak. The Constitution, under
proper scrutiny, will be upheld. 97
As can be seen by the checkoff cases, the dairy industry has several different
types of producers functioning under different regulations depending on geographic
location and product category. The industry also has highly sophisticated and
concentrated cooperatives that have been perceived as a major negative force in the dairy
farmers' struggle for an equitable marketing environment.
According to Brenda Cochran, the diverse characteristics of the milk producers
create disadvantages, but the checkoff issue has prompted some unity.
You are quite right in picking up the fragmentation of our producers in the
industry on style of production, style of management, style of marketing options,
different regionalistic issues that seem to be continuing to divide us. So, we are
definitely an industry of division. And that has been one of our weaknesses at
least in the political forum. It's often used against us in personal meetings with
congressmen and senators. They will point to what appears to be tremendous
disagreement between regions and dairy farmers on how to best solve these
problems. This is something I think that we have moved into a positive zone on.
But I do think this case [the Cochran dairy checkoff case], this challenge, does
speak more generally to many different type producers than say some of the other
pricing issues.398
Brenda and Joseph Cochran were unable to see any benefits from the dairy
checkoff programs. Brenda Cochran summed it up by saying: "[T]he only benefit I see to
397

398

Cochran interview, 3.
Ibid., 4.
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generic dairy commodity checkoffs is to processors and ultimately retailers( (if they can
be seen as part of the picture) because they're moving more finished product.. 399 The
Cochrans and other commodity producers interviewed in this study are keenly aware of
the subordinate position of the producer at the bottom of the food chain in the industrial
agriculture model. Brenda Cochran referred to a "class struggle" that she first recognized
in the form of hostility toward farmers in the 1980s under the Reagan administration. The
privileged class or group in commodity production is the industrial agriculture bloc
organized by the processors and the retailers. The hegemony this bloc exercises allows it
to dominate milk producers of all sizes, creating tension and impetus for the challengers
to seek out new issues (the diary checkoff program) and new terrain (the courts) for
counter-hegemony. It is noteworthy that the checkoff challengers in the Gallo Cattle and
Nature 's Dairy cases were large milk producers dissatisfied with the checkoff system.

399 Ibid, 8. This assessment from one of the farmers in the trenches reinforces the idea presented in this

paper that the dominant hegemony is being organized by agribusiness to support and further its dominance.
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CHAPTER 7
CHASING THE CHECKOFF FEE: EXPLORING THE INTERESTS AND
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ACTIONS OF THE PLAYERS
The Investigative Frame
This analysis used the investigative frame presented earlier in this dissertation at
Figure 4 as a tool for gathering and organizing key evidence and findings for further
analysis. This frame required the researcher first to identify the entities involved in the
commodity checkoff conflicts. Once the entities were identified, the investigative frame
guided the researcher in locating evidence that provided an understanding of the general
history of each entity and its actions, the interests at stake for such entity, the principles
espoused by that entity and, finally, the legal positions that the entity has asserted in
furtherance of its objectives.
This section explores the evidence as it relates to all areas within the investigative
frame with the exception of the Federal and State judiciaries. A separate legal
investigation frame will be used to study the Federal and State judiciaries in chapter
seven.
The preliminary list of entities shown in the investigative frame proved to be
correct, namely: 1) Federal and state agencies, 2) political parties and elected officials, 3)
industry trade associations and agricultural commodity promotion boards, 4) commodity
producers defending hegemony, 5) commodity producers challenging hegemony, and 6)
activist groups seeking free speech and other goals. However, the evidence showed that
clearly the industry trade associations referenced in item three should be acknowledged
as falling within two groups - those supporting checkoffs and alternative organizations
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started by those against checkoffs. In addition, the evidence established that six
additional entities play roles in influencing (or attempting to influence) the ongoing
conflict between pro-checkoff and anti-checkoff forces: the media, agribusiness
(corporations whose business revolve around agriculture), advertising agency
associations, the AFL-CIO, and academic specialists whose work and source of funding
aligns them with either the dominant hegemony or the anti-checkoff challengers.
The final list of entities that were relevant in this study are shown in Table 2.
Federal and State Agencies. The primary agency with responsibility for

administering the checkoff programs is the Unites States Department of Agriculture.
Founded by Abraham Lincoln in 1 862 as ''The People' s Department,"400 it is an agency
of immense size today, ranking third in the civilian departments of the U.S.
Government401 with a host of employees throughout the United States and 60 countries
numbering more than 100,000. Its operations are broken into the following seven
mission areas: 1) Rural Development; 2) Farm and Foreign Agricultural Services; 3)
Food, Nutrition, and Consumer Services; 4) Food Safety; 5) Natural Resources and
Environment; 6) Research, Education, and Economics; and 7) Marketing and Regulatory
Programs.402 Several functional units, under the direct authority of the Secretary of
Agriculture, provide umbrella services to all of the USDA in matters related to
administration, communications, economics, finances and legal issues403
USDA' s responsibilities in overseeing mandatory commodity assessments fall

400

U.S. Department of Agriculture, Agriculture Fact Book 2000, (Wa. D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
2000), v (foreward by Daniel Glickman).
401
1bid., 49.
402
Ibid.
403
Ibid.
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Table 2

Key Entities or "Fractions" Involved in Commodity Checkoff Conflicts

Entities (G ramsci
referenced as "Fractions")
--

Federal and State
Agencies
Political Parties and Elected
Officials

I

--

Industry Trade Associations
Alhmed with He._gemony
Industry Trade Associations
Aligned with CounterHe�emony
Agricultural Commodity
Boards
Commodity Producers
Defending Hegemony
Commodity Producers
Opposing He_gemony
Activist Groups
1) First Amendment
Free Speech Groups,
2) Legal Coalitions,
3) Grass Roots Farm
Activist Groups, and
4) National Coalitions
for Amcultural Change I
The Media
Agribusiness

Advertising Agency
I Associations
AFL-CIO

I

Academic Specialists Aligned
with He.e:emony
Academic Specialists Aligned
with Counter-Hegemony

-

-

-

-

Anti-Checkoff
(Opposing Hegemony)

ProCheckoff
(Defending
Hegemony)

- -

Neutral
-

X
X

X

(Majority)

(Minority)
:

X

X (A prominent
example is R-Calf for
cattle oroducers)

I

I

X
X

I

X
I

X

I

I

X

X

X
X
X
X
X
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within the auspices of the Marketing and Regulatory Programs. The Agricultural
Marketing Service (AMS) is charged with administering the research and promotion
programs for thirteen industries, including: beef, pork, cotton, fluid milk, dairy products,
eggs, honey, mushrooms (only mushroom research programs are carried out using
checkoff dollars in the wake of the United Foods decision), potatoes; soybeans,
watermelons, popcorn and peanuts.404
Individual authority is given to the Secretary of Agriculture to appoint members
of the commodity boards, and the AMS interacts with the boards. Its staff facilitates the
oversight of the commodity checkoff programs. The staff member at the Agricultural
Marketing Service responsible for the livestock industry is Barry Carpenter. He reports to
Kenneth Clayton, who reports to A.J. Yates, acting administrator of the Agricultural
Marketing Service.
The enforcement of the commodity checkoff programs and their legal defense in
First Amendment actions challenging such programs on constitutional grounds is carried
out by the Office of the General Counsel at USDA and the United States Justice
Department. The activities of both agencies are funded by budget appropriations in the
Federal budget derived from U. S . taxpayer dollars .
Daniel Glickman offered the following opinion on the USDA's position on
checkoff programs: " . . . I think USDA has always been a strong supporter of the
promotion programs. Look, most of these were created by statute, not all of them, but
most of them. And that means Congress has gone on record in favor of them."405
404 Ibid., 230-23 1.
405 Glickman interview, 5.
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There is evidence that the USDA is cross-pollinated with individuals who have
been active professionally in commodity boards or associations, agribusiness, academic
projects or consulting projects paid for and aligned with the dominant pro-checkoff
hegemony. A closer look at the current leadership roster for USDA shows the following
professional crossovers:
► Ann M. Veneman, Agriculture Secretary - Secretary Veneman was sworn in to
this top position on August 9, 2002. Her background at the USDA included
service from 1986 to 1993 in positions at USDA's Agricultural Service (19861989), Deputy Under Secretary for International Affairs and Commodity
Programs (1989-1991), and USDA Deputy Secretary (1991-1993). She served as
Secretary of the California Department of Food and Agriculture from 1995 to
1999. Between her years of state and federal government service, Veneman
worked as an attorney with a legal services and lobbying firm in Washington,
D.C. (1993-1995) and with a firm in Sacramento, California (1999-2001.406
International trade is a top priority for Veneman, Her interest in this area
was enhanced by her experience as a U.S. negotiator in major trade policy
discussions during the past decade. Veneman is widely viewed as an advocate of
agribusiness and a "biotech absolutist," a perception that was reinforced when she
made the following declaration at an agricultural conference at University of
California in 1999: "We simply will not be able to feed the world without

406

See "Agriculture Secretary Ann M. Veneman,° United States Department of Agriculture (March 2002);
available from http://www.usda.gov/agencies/gallery/veneman.htm; Internet; accessed 14 June 2003.
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biotechnology."407 She served on the board of directors of Calgene Inc., the
biotechnology company that introduced the first genetically engineered food on
the market, the Flavr Savr tomato produced with fish genes. Later, she became a
director at Monsanto when it aquired Calgene. She also served on the
International Policy Council, a trade group formed and funded by agribusiness
enterprises such as Cargill, Nestle, Kraft and Archer Daniels Midland.408
► Dr. Charles Lambert , Deputy Under Secretary for Marketing and
Regulatory Programs - Prior to joining USDA on December 2, 2002, Dr.

Lambert was employed by the National Cattlemen's Beef Association for more
than fifteen years in various capacities. His final position at the trade association
was as chief economist.409
► A.J. Yates, Administrator of the Agricultural Marketing Service - A.J. Yates
began his service at the USDA in September 200 1. His background includef a
career in state government at the California Department of Food and Agriculture
(CDFA). Beginning in 1991, Yates served five years as Deputy Secretary of the
CDFA and three years as Undersecretary. He left in January 1999 for a two-year

407

"Bush's Corporate Cabinet, Ann Veneman, Secretary of Agriculture," MultiNational Monitor (May 1
2001); available from http://multinationalmonitor.org/mm2001/0 lmay/may0 1 bushcc.html; Internet;
accessed 15 June 2003. Also see John Nichols, "Meet Ann Veneman-Perhaps Bush's Most Dangersous
Cabinet Pick," Madison Capital Times, published online at Common Dreams NewCenter , 'f 4 (January 15,
2001); available from http://www.commondreams.org/views01/01 l5-04.htm; Internet; accessed 15 June
2003.
408
Ibid.
409 See "Biographical Sketch: Dr. Charles 'Chuck' Lambert," United States Department of Agriculture
(November 7, 2002); available from http://www.usda.gove/agencies/gallery/lambert.htm; Internet; accessed
21 March 2003.
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stint in private business as a senior marketing consultant for Panagraph Marketing
Solutions in Fresno, California, before joining the USDA.4 1 0
► Dale Moore, Chief of Staff - In February 2001, Dale Moore joined USDA as
chief of staff to Secretary Ann Veneman. He worked for the National
Cattlemen's Beef Association as executive director for legislative affairs for three
years prior to beginning his job at USDA. He is the member of Secretary
Veneman's staff cited most often in the press (and in the interviews for this
research) as being closely aligned with the industrial agriculture bloc working in
favor of agribusiness and against the interests of independent farmers. As
legislative director of the Committee on Agriculture at the U.S. House of
Representatives from 1995 to 1996, he was involved in Congressional work on
the 1996 Farm Bill. Prior to that, he held staff positions on the House
Agricultural Committee and performed three years as minority counsel for the
House Agriculture Committee's Subcommittee on Department Operations,
Research and Foreign Agriculture (1991-1993). He began his career working six
years from 1985 to 1991 as the agricultural legislative assistant for U.S.
Representative Pat Roberts from Kansas, now a U.S. Senator from Kansas.4 1 1
► Alison Harrison, Deputy Director of Communications and Press Secretary Alison Harrison was appointed to this position on October 12, 2001, after fifteen
years of employment with the National Cattlemen's Beef Association (NCBA).

410

See "Biography: A.J. Yates, Administrator, Agricultural Marketing Service," United States Department
of Agriculture (September 2001); available from http://www.ams.usda.gov/admin/YatesBio.htm; Internet;
accessed 21 March 2003.
411
See "Biography, Dale Moore, Chief of Staff," United States Department of Agriculture (February 2001);
available from http://www.usda.gov/agencies/gallery/moore.htm; Internet; accessed 21 March 2003.
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Harrison's responsibilities as Executive Director of Public Relations for the
NCBA included managing the organization's media and public relations
initiatives as part of its consumer marketing and public policy strategies.4 12
► Donna Reifschneider, Adminstrator of USDA's Grain Inspection, Packers
and Stockyards Administration (GIPSA) - Reifschneider joined the USDA on

April 2, 2002. She has held various positions in the livestock industry, including:
executive committee member of the Meat Export Federation ( 1999-2002),
president of the National Pork Producers Council, chair of the Pork Quality
Assurance committee (1992-1998) and chair of the Pork Food Safety committee
(1995-1998) and member of the Pork Trade committee (1999 to present).4 13
Reifschneider' s past employment with the Meat Export Federation and her
position as president of the National Pork Producer's Council have caused critics
to question her commitment to protect the rights of the independent pork
producers under the Packers and Stockyards Act (PSA). Anticompetitive
practices by the meatpackers have been ignored by GIPSA during Reifschneider' s
term (as well as during past administrations). A class action lawsuit, Pickett v.
IBP,414 brought under the PSA was scheduled for trial in January 2004. The

plaintiffs have challenged the captive supply arrangements of the meatpackers and
have alleged that they have unlawfully suppressed prices. The challengers have
publicly stated:
412

See "Veneman Names Alisa Harrison As Deputy Director of Communications and Press Secretary,"
News Release, United States Department of Agriculture (October 12, 2001); available from
http://www.usda.gov/news/releases/2001/10/0197.htm; Internet; accessed 21 March 2003.
4 3
1 "Veneman Selects Donna Reifschneider as Administrator of GIPSA," News Release No. 0130.02,
United States Department of Agriculture (April 2, 2002); available from
http://www.usda.gov/news/releases/2002/04/0130.htm; Internet; accessed 21 March 2003.
414
Pickett et al. v. IBP, Inc., Civil No. 96-A-1 103-N (Dist. Ct. MD Ala.).
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The packers have succeeded in convincing USDA and the Congress that
captive supplies are merely a natural change in the industry . . .They will
not be able to use campaign contributions and K Street lobbyists to
influence the decision of the jury that will hear this case. If the jury rules
for cattlemen, it will be the most significant event in the cattle industry
since the federal government broke up the packer-cartel in the early
1920's.415
Several of those interviewed for this study seriously questioned whether
Donna Reifschneider could be an effective administrator in enforcing the PSA,
given her alignment with the dominant hegemony in past employment. In the
end, GIPSA's complete failure to represent the interests of farmers in enforcing
the PSA against abusive captive supply practices has resulted in the counter
hegemony's choice to bypass Reifschneider's agency and use the court's for their
war of position. Regardless of the outcome, Reifschneider's name will be linked
with the first class action lawsuit ever under the PSA to challenge anticompetitive
practices of the meatpackers-primarily the result of GIPSA's failure to act in its
enforcement capacity.
► Dr. J.B. Penn, Under Secretary, Farm & Foreign Agricultural Services - Dr.
J.B. Penn assumed his position at USDA in April 2002, after pursuing a career in
the private sector for many years as an agricultural economist. He worked for
Sparks Companies, Inc., from 1988 to 2002, serving as vice president and
manager of their Washington office for more than twelve years before joining the
USDA. (Sparks is an agricultural and commodity market research, analysis and
consulting firm based in Memphis, Tennessee.) Penn had earlier experience in
415

"OCM's Cattlemen's Competitive Market Project Applauds Favorable Decision in Cattle Price
Manipulation Case," Organization for Competitive Markets (April 1 1 , 2003); available from
http://www.competitivemarkets.com/news_and_events/PR.Pickett.04 1 103.htm; Internet; accessed 22 May
2003.
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the private sector as president of Eco])omic Perspectives, Inc. from 1981 to 1988
and held several government positions early in his career as deputy administrator
f or economics with the USDA Economics and Statistics Service and senior staff
economist for the President's Council of Economic Advisors. Penn is the author
of Agricultural and Food Policy (fourth edition) and numerous articles and other
publications.
Jeanne Charter, an outspoken critic of the USDA and a plaintiff in a beef checkoff
case, described the connection between the National Cattlemen's Beef Association and
the USDA as being:
. . . kind of like snakes mating, you can't tell where NCBA ends and the USDA
begins in the beef industry. It's almost a truism with people passing back and
forth, either being a government bureaucrat or an industry bureaucrat. That part
of the question of the future character of the industry is how intertwined it is with
public agencies.416
The evidence suggests the existence of a loose community of agricultural elites
who move between government, industry and academia performing leadership roles. The
anti-checkoff challengers argue that these are crossover artists who sing the same song
wherever they are professionally located. They remain mouthpieces for the pro
commodity groups rather than neutral parties seeking to serve the public interest.
David Moeller stated: "I think there are industry ties in a lot of what USDA does,
and I think that drives their policy."417 Mike Callcrate succinctly stated: "The USDA is
industry. There is a revolving door from industry to the USDA and back again."4 1 8

416

Charter interview, 4.
Moeller interview, 2.
418
Callicrate interview, 9.

417
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In short, the evidence suggest that the United States Department of Agriculture,
the administrative organizations that carry out services under the checkoff programs and
the industry trade groups speak with one voice (or at least sing in harmony).
Political Parties and Elected Officials. The legislators who are in positions to

most likely influence the commodity checkoff programs are the senators who are active
on the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry for the Senate and the and
members of the House of Representatives who serve on the Committee on Agriculture for
the U.S. House of Representatives. At present, the following individuals provide
leadership on these committees:
► Senator Tom Harkin (Democrat, Iowa) - Former Chairman and ongoing
ranking Democratic member of Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition and
Forestry, U.S� Senate;
► Senator Thad Cochran (Republican, Mississippi) - Chairman, Committee on
Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry, U.S. Senate;
► Senator Richard G. Lugar (Republican, Indiana) - Foreign Relations
Chairman, Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry, U.S. Senate
(forfeited position of highest-ranking Republican on the committee when he
became Chairman of Foreign Relations);
► Congressman Larry Combest (Republican, Texas) - Departing Chairman,
Committee on Agriculture, U.S. House of Representatives (retiring, effective
May 2003);
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► Congressman Bob Goodlatte (Republican, Virginia) - Incoming Chairman,
Committee on Agriculture, U.S. House of Representative (effective May
2003); and
► Congressman Charles W. Stenholm (Democrat, Texas) - Ranking Democratic
Minority member, Committee on Agriculture, U.S. House of Representatives.
John Kingdon offered insight into the process of decision making by
congressional representatives in his book titled Congressmen 's Voting Decisions.419
Especially useful is a decisional flow chart that Kingdon used to model how
representatives make decisions regarding proposed bills or amendments based on a series
of considerations.420 Kingdon' s model, shown herein as Figure 1 1, sheds light on how
legislators and government decision makers have approached proposals for change
related to industry concentration and the checkoff fees. Specifically, Kingdon' s model
identifies a number of key points in the decision-making process where the industrial
agriculture bloc can exercise hegemony to influence on the behavior of the legislator or a
government official These are points of pressure for AgrBiz to win consent.
The first pivotal question is whether the proposal is controversial. Issues that are
noncontroversial are easy for the legislators to handle. They simply vote along with the
predominant view on the issue (Kingdon calls it "voting with the environment.")421
However, if the proposal is controversial, the congressional representative then will then
determine whether there is conflict among actors within his or her "field of forces"
consisting of his constituents, fellow congressmen, lobbyists, academics, industry
419

See John W. Kingdon, Congressmen's Voting Decision (Ann Arbor, Mich: The University of Michigan
Press, 1989).
420
Ibid., 244.
421
Ibid., 243.

201

A Model of Legislative Voting Decisions
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Model of Legislative Voting Decisions
(Reproduced by permission of publisher from
Congressmen 's Voting Decisions by John W. Kingdon,
The University of Michigan Press, 1989.)
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representatives and other reference groups. If this group shares the legislator's
viewpoint or is neutral, he or she will vote consistently with this circle of people. 422 It is
in the best interest of the various commodity industry blocs and the industrial agriculture
bloc to ensure that key legislators on agricultural committees and subcommittees are
surrounded by a cadre of individuals who can legitimize and support their interests. In
the case of checkoffs, this includes providing available information on the benefits of the
checkoffs, their historical value, evidence of the groups supporting the checkoffs, recent
academic evaluations of their effectiveness and so on.
At the next decision-making juncture, the legislator evaluates his or her goals
(constituency goals, policy goals, economic goals, etc.) and determines whether there is
conflict within those goals. If conflict does not exist, the legislator easily votes in
accordance with his goals.423 Through lobbying and aggressive promotion of their
positions, various individuals representing the hegemony can attempt to influence the
goal-setting agenda of legislators. The goals of the industrial model of agriculture are
easily aligned with the goals of the checkoff programs since increasing consumer demand
will create more sales to take advantage of higher levels of production and efficiency.
At the next step, if a congressional representative determines that a constituency
goal is involved and that it is highly salient, he or she will vote with the constituency.
Here, AgriBiz can again be extremely influential in identifying its various "fractions" (a
word used by Gramsci to identify the component groups in a dominant bloc) as key
constituents with demands and needs to be met.

422

423

Ibid., 245.
Ibid., 246-247.
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If the matter does not involve a constituency goal that is highly salient, the next
consideration is whether one of the legislator's own policy goals is involved. If he or she
has no policy goals regarding this issue, he will vote consistent with the goal of intra
Washington influence.424 This is another juncture for the dominant industrial agriculture
bloc to exert its hegemony over individual legislators since its agenda is part of an
underlying mindset among the majority of Washington actors supportive �f the
hegemony.
The decision making then turns on whether the President of the legislator's party
is placing a high priority on the issue and whether a policy goal is involved. The
representative votes with the President if the top executive deems the issue to be a high
priority, but votes with his or her own policy goal if the President has not placed a
priority on the matter. 425
If none of the legislator's goals passed the critical level of importance, the
legislator immediately considers whether there are fellow congressional representatives
of major importance voicing a position. If so, the legislator votes with these colleagues.
While Kingdon recognized that that the model cannot explain some cases, the model does
suggest numerous decision points at which the agricultural hegemony can attempt to
influence and gain consensus from legislators.426
An example of how commodity industry blocs attempted to exert hegemony on
the legislative process in the checkoff cases can be seen in a letter that was forwarded by
fifteen major trade groups to Tom Harkin, Chairman of the Senate Agriculture, Nutrition
424
425

Ibid.
Ibid., 248.
426 Ibid., 248-250.
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and Forestry Committee during the process of finalizing the 2002 Farm Bill. As a
strategy in their "war of position" against the checkoff challengers, the letter proposed to
the Senate Committee that Congress could help ensure that government was able to do its
job in collecting funds to run the checkoff programs by inserting language in the 2002
Farm Bill recognizing that the advertising and promotion involved in the checkoff
program was government speech. Detailed draft language was attached to the letter. 427
This prompted letters to the same Senate Committee from the anti-checkoff groups
pointing out that this was a "back-door" effort to circumvent the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the principle of government speech. With numerous other issues to
resolve in finalizing the 2002 Farm Bill, the legislators chose to ignore this attempt to
solicit their support for the controversial government speech principle, a hot potato that
was already within the jurisdiction of the courts.
An article written by Senator Bryon Dorgan (Democrat, North Dakota) in 2000,
characterized the way in which legislators have not sincerely represented the interests of
the family farmers. He writes: "We've shed crocodile tears over farmers while
promoting their demise. "428
Industry Trade Associations and Agricultural Commodity Promotion Boards
Aligned with Hegemony. Each of the five industries studied has a structure for
427

See Commodity Groups, letter from fourteen commodity groups to the Honorable Senator Tom Harkin
(March 5, 2002); available from http://www.electricarrow.com/CARP/agbiz/149.htm; Internet; accessed 16 May
2003. The trade groups signing the letter included: Alabama Farmers' Federation, Alabama Peanut Producers
Association, American Beekeeping Federation, American Farm Bureau Federation, American Mushroom
Institute, Georgia Agricultural Commodity Commission for Peanuts, National Cattlemen's Beef Association,
National Cotton Council of America, National Milk Producers Federation, National Pork Producers Council,
National Potato Council, The Popcorn Institute, United Egg Association, United Egg Producers, and Western
Peanut Growers Assocation.
428
Senator Bryon Dorgan, "Don't be Down on the Farm: How to Preserve a National Treasure," The
Washington Monthly Online, 'I 38 (January/February 2000); available from
http://www. washingtonmonthly .com/features/2000/000 l .dorgan.html; Internet; accessed 13 April 2003.
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implementing checkoff programs that includes several key players. The first stopping
place for the checkoff fees in several programs (pork and livestock) is a state council or
board. (The beef program has certified beef councils in forty-five states.)429 The state
entity then passes on at least fifty percent of the fees (more if it chooses) to a national
board responsible for deciding how the money will be allocated. In the beef industry, this
is the Cattlemen's Beef Promotion and Research Board (CBB), a board comprised of 1 10
domestic producers and one importer. In the pork industry, this management board is the
National Pork Board (NPB), a management group of fifteen pork producers that are
elected. These two boards then each contract with third parties to carry out the activities
necessary to implement the plans and goals established by the primary board.
The CBB has a contract with the National Cattlemen's Beef Association (NCBA),
a national trade association with open membership, and the NPB has a contract with the
National Pork Producers Council (NPPC). The NPPC is comprised of 175 members (a
minimum of two from each state and five importers) that are elected by producer and
importer representatives. It collects and allocates checkoff fees and administers the
checkoff programs.
The NCBA and the NPPC are service providers to the primary boards. However,
they are also major trade associations with their own agendas and a demanding
membership that supports the industrial agriculture model. This creates an obvious
conflict of interest. Jeanne Charter described the relationship between the NCBA and the
CBB as follows:
They [the NCBA] are essentially more of a checkoff contractor now than they are
a private industry group. They're living off of it. The policy part is kind of a side
429
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line . . . .their jobs are at stake. Most of their staff is part-time checkoff related and
part-time policy related. So they're able to kind of keep more people on staff and
a lot of their overhead is covered this way. People always do this with grant
monies and so on. It props things up that otherwise would be much more modest.
The other thing we heard in '96 when they got handed the program was that the
senior staff salaries tripled.
Livestock board managers have sought to coll:nter the conflict of interest claims
through rhetoric describing "firewalls"and strategies designed to demonstrate that the
checkoff programs are not sustaining the trade associations. But the anti-checkoff group
has not been persuaded. An executive of the Livestock Marketing Association described
the firewall between the CBB and the NCBA as a "glass wall you can see through. "430
The executive also offered the following comments about the personnel employed by
these groups:
It's all an incestuous relationship in which the NCBA board members serve on the
Beef Board and they serve on boards of the state beef councils. They interchange,
they intertwine. Former chairmen of the Beef Board . . . become presidents of the
National Cattlemen's Beef Association or former presidents of the Cattlemen's
Association eventually sometimes become chairmen of the Beef Board. They just
recirculate. 431
Although this research did not include a study of the movement of people in
management positions between the NCBA and the CBB, it is worth noting that those
fighting the checkoffs have the perception that this as a problem. The concern arises
because the membership of the NCBA represents an overwhelming number from the beef
commodity industry bloc. Although the CBB is charged with the responsibility of fairly
deciding how funds will be spent to best represent the interests of all producers paying
checkoffs, the hegemony in the beef industry can be exercised through the presence of
those on the board with strong NCBA connections. However, a representative of the
430
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Cattlemen's Beef Board interviewed for this research gave assurances that this has not
occurred. The representative clarified the relationship between NCBA and CBB as
follows:
NCBA is a contractor of checkoff funded programs, and we only reimburse the
costs they incur in those programs. We do not allow them to receive any profit
margin, if you will. We simply reimburse the actual costs incurred. So, through a
set of accounting practices and procedures, we've created a firewall that, we are
confident, prevents any of the checkoff money from flowing through to any of the
membership or public policy interests of NCBA . . . . We have conducted a series of
compliance audits using outside audit firms to examine the contracts and the way
charges were billed to the beef board and the way they were analyzed and paid to
make sure that we've achieved this cost recovery. 432
In the following interview excerpt, the representative emphasized that NCBA is
not allowed to use checkoff fees to further its policy agenda:
Representative: [T]he position NCBA takes on a public policy issue is not
relevant to their performance on managing an advertising program, for example,
or managing a research project when, in fact, they are subcontracting with an
advertising agency or with a university to conduct research.
Interveiwer: Do you think there's any flow over in the choices that are made and
the messages and so forth in those programs?
Representative: You mean a flow over from the policy position?
Interviewer: Right.
Representatative: I've sure seen no evidence of that. And I really think if there
had been evidence of that, as highly visible as both activities are and with the
regulatory control that USDA exerts over checkoff dollars, that would have been
exposed and stopped. 433
While the NCBA may be prevented from using checkoff funds for public policy
purposes, it does engage in extensive public relations efforts and politically motivated
strategies to promote the checkoff programs themselves. NCBA runs advertisements in a
432
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broad range of trade publications to gamer support for the checkoffs by extolling the
benefits of the various initiatives funded by the checkoff programs apart from the generic
advertising. These are advertisements promoting the checkoff program, not promoting
beef as a commodity. The advertisements are full-page and provide messages such as
following:
"Checkoff dollars educate consumers about beef."
"Your beef checkoff is focused on food safety."
''The checkoff educates consumers about beef safety."
''The checkoff is spreading the news of beefs nutritional value."
A similar approach is followed by the National Pork Board. Its industry-targeted
advertisements feature advertising messages such as the following:
The Pork Checkoff.
Uncovering new ways for producers to market their pork.
The Pork Checkoff is helping U.S. pork producers of all sizes explore niche
marketing opportunities for pork by finding new ways to work outside the
traditional commodity chain. Opening the door to unique market opportunities
is one way the Pork Checkoff is helping to build a better future for American
pork producers. Find out more about what your Pork Checkoff is doing for you.
Call 10800-456-PORK.
These internal industry ads are part of the hegemonic strategy followed by the dominant
industry bloc to maintain control of the checkoff program by building consensus around
the supplemental benefits of the programs.
Kathleen Merrigan, former administrator of the USDA Agricultural Marketing
Service (the administrative arm responsible for the mandatory commodity assessment
programs), pointed out the problems that existed with the close relationship between the
Pork Board and the NPPC:
The anti-checkoff crowd felt very angry about the allowed association
between the Pork Board and the National Pork Producers Council. (I think that
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could be said for beef, too.) The lobbying arms for the industry and the Board
haven't been-there's not been enough of a firewall between them. There were
actually staff people who had part of their time taken by the Pork Board and part
of their time by NPPC. That's just setting you on the road for trouble.434
It is significant that, in attempting to resolve the pork referendum issue by means·
of a settlement agreement, U.S. Secretary of Agriculture Ann Veneman brokered an
agreement between the USDA and the NPPC to move all of the checkoff-funded projects
and support staff for checkoff activities from NPPC to the National Pork Board. NPPC
then became primarily a member-funded lobbying group struggling to maintain funding.
As a result, efforts have been made to explore a "merger" between the National Pork
Board and the National Pork Producers Council. (However, if the pork checkoff
programs are ultimately held to be unconstitutional, the Pork Board and its deep pool of
checkoff funding would disappear.) Regardless of the restrictions on the use of checkoff
funds for political and public policy interests, the trade association and lobbying groups
in the beef and pork industries (National Cattlemen's Beef Association and National Pork
Producer' s Council) are loathe to be separated from these funds.
In the dairy industry, the National Dairy Promotion and Research Board (thirty
six representative milk producers) and the National Fluid Milk Processor Promotion
Program (twenty fluid milk producers) bear responsibility for implementing the dairy
checkoff programs. They contract with Dairy Management, Inc. (DMn, a domestic and
international non-profit organization. Several groups are funded and managed by the
dairy checkoffs, including the American Dairy Association, the National Dairy Council
and the U.S. Dairy Export Council.
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The International Dairy Foods Association (IDFA) is an industry trade
association that represent the interests of dairy processors and manufacturers. It claims
that 85 percent of the dairy products consumed in the U.S. originate from its members. 435
IDFA is the leading processor lobbying group with a strong presence in Washington. It
does not receive funding from the checkoff programs. On the other hand, a separate
group called the National Milk Producers Federation (NMPF), with membership of
approximately 55,000 dairy producers and cooperatives, receives checkoff money for
services it provides under contract with DMI, including evaluations of the effectiveness
of dairy checkoffs by economists it retains on staff.
The United Foods decision in June 25, 2001 , held that the mandatory
assessments for generic advertising and promotional programs for mushrooms under the
Mushroom Order436 were unconstitutional. This industry's checkoff programs had been
managed by the Mushroom Council, comprised of nine members appointed by the
Secretary of Agriculture, who are non-exempt producers (i.e., producers required to pay
the mandatory assessment fees because they do not meet any exemptions). After the
landmark ruling, the Mushroom Council voted to keep itself in business by continuing
mandatory assessments for non-promotional program initiatives and voluntary checkoff
fees for generic advertising and promotional efforts.
The Justice Department did not give up in the United Foods case, which moved
back before the U.S. District Court in Jackson, Tennessee, in the form of two district
435
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court actions that have been consolidated. 437 The government argued that the United
Foods decision was only an interlocutory ruling and not a final decision disposing of the

case. According to local counsel representing United Foods, this case is dormant while
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals considers the case of Michigan Pork Producers v.
Campaign for Family Farms.438 (Even if the Sixth Circuit rules that the pork checkoff

program is unconstitutional, the government will likely try to keep the United Foods case
open while the Michigan Pork Producers case or a checkoff case works its way up on
appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court.) In the meantime, the Mushroom Council has
continued all activities, including its generic advertising, with volunteer contributions.
The major trade association in the mushroom industry is the Mushroom Institute.
It has a history of 48 years of activity on behalf of mushroom growers, processors, and
marketers of cultivated mushrooms. Its stated goals sound very similar to the goals of the
Mushroom Order, but it is a voluntary organization funded by membership fees.
In contrast to the Mushroom Council, the Washington Apple Commission decided
to close its operations when the District Court for the Eastern District of Washington held
that the mandatory assessments for promotion of apples in the state of Washington were
unconstitutional.439 The Washington Apple Commission had initiated the legal
proceedings itself with the assumption that it would receive confirmation that its program
was unconstitutional. The ruling brought an end to a commodity commission that had
functioned in many ways as an industry trade group in providing support to its apple
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growers and handlers. The Washington state apple industry is now scrambling to develop
an alternative program that will allow it to continue funding certain activities that it
considers relevant to its infrastructure.440
A state circuit court in Florida held in March 2003 that a mandatory "box tax"
assessed on citrus for generic advertising was unconstitutional. The primary entity
responsible for administering this program was the Florida Citrus Commission. The
Commission has twelve members from within the industry who are appointed by the
governor to oversee and guide activities of the Florida Department of Citrus, including
the promotional initiatives funded by the box tax. The makeup of the Citrus Commission
(industry members and not government employees) and its method of self-governance
and decision-making were key in the court's decision that this commission did not meet
the requirements necessary to recognize the government's argument that the generic
advertising funded by the "box tax" was government speech. 441
A number of state and national trade associations represent the interests of fruit
growers in the United States. Many of their objectives are aligned with producing fruit
for export and foreign trade. This industry is feeling the impact of the industrial
agriculture model along with other agricultural sectors.
One strong theme that was noticeable throughout these interviews was that the
440
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challengers had opportunities to engage in the organizational processes and chose not to
avail themselves of these opportunities. They were perceived as not being willing to
pursue organizational avenues for voicing their views and implementing change. A
representative of the Cattlemen's Beef Board stated:
I frankly don't think the groups like the Charters or the LMA have attempted to
influence decisions with documented logical support. For example, we have met
with I.MA officers, we have asked them what it is you don't like about the
checkoff, what would you like to see changed. Some of their advertising to solicit
signatures in the referendum talked about wanting to make some changes in the
checkoff and the only way they could do it was with a referendum. So we asked
them, what changes do you want to make? And they either could not or would
not identify any, kept coming back, to the concept, we just want to vote. Well,
ok, then get ten percent of signatures. But, if there are some changes you want to
make, let's sit down and talk about them and maybe they'd be good ideas. Maybe
we can make them. So, it's a little difficult to assess... the effectiveness of an
organization if they won't even try. It's like the fellow who goes to the local
coffee shop every morning and complains about the local government, but never
bothers going to the city council meeting where something could be changed.442
The same representative emphasized this point later by stating:
I'd love to find a way that we could get LMA and the other oganiztions to open
up and tell us what it is they want changed. But, when you send at least six letters
a year to an organization asking them to attend meetings, providing them a copy
of priorities and plans almost a year ahead of time as they're in the developmental
stage, and ask for any input, concerns, questions, or even proposals that they
might want to brin§ forth, and those initiatives are greeted with deafening silence,
what can you do. 44
A pork producer and member of the National Pork Board expressed a similar view:
During my time on the board, we've invited them to come eat with us, gone out to
meet with them and nobody shows up to try to get their impact. Instead of killing
it [the checkoff program], how would you spend the money differently? But it's
easier to criticize than to offer new ideas. They've stuck to the strategy of just
being critical. We try to get them involved. And we've yet to have somebody that
got involved or really understood the programs that didn't come away being a
pretty good supporter. 444
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However, Mike Callicrate, beef producer and outspoken voice for the beef anti-checkoff
group, identified two factors that he considered to be barriers for effective participation
intimidation and block voting. Here is an excerpt from his interview:
Interviewer: Is there a process within the whole NCBA organization for your
voice to be heard and for folks who share your point of view to get some
leverage?
Mike Callicrate: No, there is not. I have been a member of NCBA for twenty
something years. Now with the meat packers on the board of NCBA, what
happens is when you go to an NCBA meeting, they ridicule you, they shout you
down, and they laugh at you in front of everyone. That has a terrible intimidation
effect, so people have simply refused to stand up and speak out. Then they just
get their butt whipped because we have the packers now and the big cattle feeders
that have put forth the proxy vote and won that decision into their policy to
where . . . I mean, these guys are holding up six cards each. They get to vote all
their votes in every single committee meeting, and it is just overwhelming against
the interest of the individual cattleman and for the big cattle feeders and big feed
yards who are in bed together.445
Steve Vetter, editor of Western Livestock Journal, raised the possibility that those against
the checkoffs might not be sufficiently aggressive:
Steve Vetter: I do think there are ways that people that do have programs that
aren't currently being funded by checkoff programs can go about getting their
ideas heard. It just is a matter of contacting the Beef Board and harassing them, if
you will, to hear their ideas. I do think that what some of the people against the
checkoffs don't do-I don't think they push hard enough to try to get their ideas
heard. If they've had one bad experience, they don't want to go back in and try
again. And I think that is a mistake on their part.
Interviewer: Do you think that they-the producers-have a certain reservation
about any repercussions if they voice a lot of negative concern, that there are
other parts of the industry that could fence them out, or refuse to work with them
or have reason not to buy their beef?
Steve Vetter: I don't think there'd be a reason as much in terms of the checkoff
programs. Now, there are other issues within the industry that if you voice your
opinion, I'm sure there could be some ramifications. But, just in terms of what
the checkoff does, I would be hard pressed to think that about the checkoff, which
445
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is primarily working toward promoting the consumption and sale of beef. I really
don't see that there would be a whole lot of repercussions. 446
These interview excerpts suggest individuals on the livestock boards, producers opposed
to checkoffs and outside observers have decided}y different perspectives on the structural
processes that exist for discourse and decision making about allocation of checkoff funds.
Industry Trade Associations Aligned with Counter-Hegemony and· Activist
Groups Seeking Free Speech and Other Goals. These two categories are presented
together since they have formed a network of alliances to collaborate on projects, share
resources and strengthen their political clout.
Two trade associations in the cattle industry are recognized as being aligned with
counter-hegemony against the beef checkoffs and against the industrial agriculture
model. The first is Ranchers-Cattlemen Action Legal Foundation (R-CALF), a non
profit national organization that offers membership to cow/calf producers and
independent stockyards and feedlots. It represents more than 6,700 cattle producers in
aggressively advocating trade and marketing positions that are favorable to their interests.
The cow/calf producers claim that the NCBA no longer represents their interests, since its
decision making is now dominated by meatpackers and importers, therefore, R-CALF has
offered these cow/calf producers an alternative. It has developed political strength in a
very short time, having only become a national membership organization in 1999.447
The second group aligned with counter-hegemony in the cattle industry is
Livestock Marketing Association (LMA), a non-profit trade association that serves a
membership of more than 800 livestock dealers, markets, order buyers and related
446 Vetter interview, 4.
447 See website of R-CALF at http://www.rcalf.com.
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businesses in North America. It became the catalyst group facilitating a controversial
pork referendum, and became a party to a lawsuit challenging the USDA' s handling of
the referendum. When the United Foods case was decided, LMA amended its complaint
to add an additional First Amendment claim.
The Kansas Cattlemen's Association is another politically active and outspoken
trade association aligned with counter-hegemony.
Two major national agricultural coalitions have been become respected for the
leadership in advocating change in agriculture. The first, Organization for Competitive
Markets (OCM), is committed to restoring equitable, competitive markets for agricultural
commodities and their end products. It was formed in March of 1998 and has a diverse
membership of commodity producers, attorneys, professors, grass roots and public
interest groups. Its activities include lobbying, providing a growing resource for legal
actions and educating producers that they can become part of a movement to reclaim fair
pricing. The Organization for Competitive Markets is concerned about looking at
competition issues within the livestock industry from the legal and economic standpoints.
The second coalition is the National Campaign for Sustainable Agriculture.
Begun in 1994, it has an impressive list of partner organizations as members that
collaborate with it to achieve change that will promote stewardship of the land. One of
its key roles is as a lobbying group to "shape and promote U.S. farm and food policies in
support of a food system that is environmentally sound, economically viable, socially just
and humane."448
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The Western Organization of Resource Councils (WORC) is a regional coalition
with an active presence in Washington, D.C. It has engaged in lobbying efforts with
other groups, filed amicus curie briefs, and joined Livestock Marketing Association as a
party to a checkoff lawsuit.
The Dakota Resource Council is a public interest group that has taken a stand
against the checkoff systems. Another non-profit group, The Land Stewardship Project
focuses on sustainable agriculture goals and has a broad range of policy, research and
education programs.
Three other groups previously mentioned in Chapter 2 have been major
contributors to the activities of the counter-hegemony. They include The Campaign for
Family Farms (CFF), a coalition that has served as an advocate for independent hog
farmers, the Farmers' Legal Action Group (FLAG), a nonprofit law center that represents
advocacy organizations, and the Center for Individual Freedom (CFIF), a First
Amendment rights advocacy group.
Doug O'Brien, attorney and agricultural legislative assistant for Senator Tom
Harkin, commented during his interview that groups such as OCM, National Farmers
Union, R-CALF, Campaign for Family Farms and even mainstream groups such as
American Farm Bureau "fear that farmers are in a very disadvantageous position with
spiraling consolidation and vertical integration."449 They are interested in restoring
competitive markets. O'Brien identified incremental changes in the 2002 Farm Bill that
expressly occurred because of the activities and involvements of these trade associations,
including additional protections for producers growing hogs under production contracts, a
449
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recognized right of a farmer to talk with his attorney, accountant or banker about a
contract, and country of origin labeling requirement. The ban on packer ownership was
eliminated from the Farm Bill, but new legislative proposals have kept the issue on the
table. O'Brien concluded:
[T]hey [the trade association groups] are affecting the debate. Is this a freight
train, does it have too much momentum to be able' to be stopped? It's not going to
be stopped. It can be steered a little bit. Before the Farm Bill, three years ago,
those things I just listed were really almost all thinJBs observers and the industry
would have thought were going to be impossible.4
Commodity Producers Defending Hegemony. In each court action, there have

been individual commodity producers aligned with the government. They generally join
the action as intervenors and ally themselves with the dominant commodity industry bloc.
In the livestock industries, the commodity producers defending the checkoff
hegemony are the large concentrated operations that engage in factory farming methods.
They typically are owned by one of the mega agribusiness companies or contract with
them. The checkoffs are useful in allowing these producers to have indirect bargaining
power, even in issues that appear unrelated to the checkoffs, such as country of origin
labeling or irradiation of meat. The ability to use checkoff funds for foreign promotions
and for deals with large processors and reatailers is a benefit. And finally, some of the
large commodity producers have more negotiating power to realize financial benefits
from increased demand that do not trickle down to the small independent producers.
Commodity producers aligned with hegemony in the dairy industry include
cooperatives as well as private companies. In the United States milk processing industry,
dairy cooperatives are an important link in the food chain. In 1999, it was estimated that
4so
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cooperatives handled 86 percent of the milk produced by farmers. Over half serve only
as bargaining cooperatives, marketing their members' milk, but performing no
processing. The remaining group of approximately 43 percent process products such as
butter, cheese, skimmed milk powder and whey powder. Dairy Farmers of America and
Land O'Lakes are the two largest dairy cooperatives in the United States. The private
dairy industry is dominated by the multinational companies, including Kraft (a Philip
Morris subsidiary), Dean Foods and Suiza. (Dean Foods and Suiza merged their
operations in 2002, creating a commercial dairy powerhouse.)
There may be commodity producers aligned with hegemony in the mushroom
industry and the tree fruit industry, but these are not noisy groups. They are the
independent small producers who are getting the advantages of the checkoff payments
paid by the large producers who sell branded products with distinctive features and
premium quality. The large producers are fighting the checkoff programs in order to
reduce the negative financial and marketing impact of the checkffs. They would like to
increase their advantage in competing with the smaller producers, but nothing in the
evidence suggested a war of position between the large producers and the small
producers. The war of position appears to be between the large producers and the USDA.
Commodity Producers Opposing Hegemony. The most visible commodity

producers against checkoffs are the plaintiffs in the pending lawsuits. In the beef and
pork industries, the evidence suggest that they represent the interests of a large group of
anti-checkoff farmers and ranchers who are seeking ways to have a voice and develop
counter-hegemony.
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The Media. The media offer a public site for hegemonic discourse. Within their

ranks are "organic intellectuals" who participate in hegemonic conflicts in agriculture at
the macro-level by constructing consent for the industrial agriculture model and at the
commodity level by engaging in discourse related to the hegemonic principles underlying
the power of the respective commodity industry blocs. Mainstream media have tended to
support the dominant industrial agriculture bloc. The large, well-funded public relations
apparatus of the dominant group has had an influence on news, editorial content and
advertising.
The themes and idea ensembles presented by mainstream media are open to
challenge by the minority voices of organic intellectuals who disagree with (or are
willing to report the opinions of those who disagree with) the assumptions, the methods
and the outcomes of the dominant power blocs in agriculture. Those engaged in counter
hegemony have tended to use alternative print and electronic media or radio.
Since the constitutionality of generic advertising is at issue in the commodity
checkoff challenges, media advertising as well as media content has become a part of the
hegemonic discourse. Thousands of advertising dollars are available for media to publish
two types of advertisements: ads in industry trade publications aimed primarily at
commodity producers and others in the food chain extolling the benefits of the
commodity checkoff programs, and generic ads in national mainstream media or regional
media outlets promoting the commodities to consumers. According to individuals
interviewed in this study, the majority of industry trade publications are known to report
on the checkoff challenges in a way favorable to the hegemony. A small number have
taken open positions against checkoffs.
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Terry Stokes, CEO of the National Cattlemen's Beef Association, confirmed that
the media has tended to focus on the positive aspects of the checkoff programs.
However, in his view, the media has reported fairly on the legal conflicts related to
checkoffs.
Interviewer: Do you feel that the media has aligned itself with one side or the
other, or are both sides in the conflict getting fair treatment-by the media?·
Terry Stokes: I think as far as the cases go, I think they have had fair treatment.
I think what we have seen in the media is that you see a focus of the media on the
results that have been achieved through the beef checkoff programs, but as far as
the case itself, I think there has been fair coverage. 45 1
He clarified the two different types of advertising used by the NCBA (consumer ads
directed toward the consumer and producer communications ads in trade magazines) and
emphasized that the law prohibits the NCBA from using checkoff dollars for advocacy
purposes in any of these ads.
Jeanne Charter, plaintiff in a beef checkoff lawsuit, asserted that the checkoff
money available in the beef industry does not compare to the budget for a big commercial
product, but it is sufficient to "really propaganidize within the industry." According to
her, that is how a lot of the checkoff money is spent. She stated:
They [those in control of the checkoff money] do big spreads in the monthly ag
publications. They're a big client for them. Hardly any of the monthly ag
publications have a discouraging word to say about the checkoffs. I think
they're compromised by the money. 452
Charter also referred to self-promotion ads that are published during the market news,
primarily on radio. According to Charter, the primary objectives of these industry
focused advertising programs promoting checkoff programs are twofold:
451
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I think the real purpose of the programs, at least in beef, is to, number one, try to
influence producer thinking. But I think that's even secondary to trying to
influence agricultural news reporting. With ag channels in Montana, I think
probably the checkoffs are their biggest single client. That's enough to where
they just don't report anything negative about them. Or, consequently, they're
very loath to report anything negative about the National Cattlemen's Beef
Association.453
Charter said that the NCBA's has an "institutional core" that benefits politically
by its control over checkoff money, including the economic relationship between the
NCBA and the media arising out of the purchase of broadcasting time or print space for
checkoff ads. Charter states: "It's like 'crony capitalism.' Their friends are always the
ones that get the contracts. If any, say radio station, gets out of line and really is critical,
they won't get any more ads. That is invaluable to somebody that's got an agenda. They
do."454
In his interview, Steven Vetter, editor of Western Livestock Journal, indicated his
commitment to presenting both sides of the checkoff issue equally in his publication:
I can honestly say that the key thing to a newspaper is news. With the exception
of your publisher's or your editor's comments that might come up every once in
awhile, news stories are there to present facts and let people come up with their
own conclusions. And I've really worked hard to stay that way. There are other
publications that aren't afraid to show that they are on one side of the issue or the
other. And there have been recent showings of that.455
He discussed the alignment of specific media with the pro-checkoff and anti-checkoff
groups:
. . . I think there are definitely a couple of instances where you could say there is
some media alignment with the various sides. I will say that I think that most of
the alignment I have seen has been going on the side that's against the checkoff
for the most part. That's not to say that there aren't instances where maybe there
is a publication out there that decides with the checkoff. But I have seen more
453
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cases where the groups that are adamantly against the checkoff have been able to
infiltrate some media, particularly trade media, organizations more heavily.456
Mike Callicrate, cattle producer and feedlot operator, was willing to be more
specific about the media players and their alignment in his interview. He identified the
following publications as being on the side of the packers, retailers and the NCBA: Beef
Magazine, Drover's Journal, CalfMagazine, BeefToday, · Cattlebuyer 's Weekly. 451

·

According to Callicrate, radio broadcasting media is also dominated by the industrial
agriculture bloc. He stated:
The major radio ag stations are really controlled with the industrial message.
They depend heavily upon Cargill and Monsanto. A lot of the chemical
companies advertise that are connected in this new industrial model that they are
trying to force onto us, and the radio stations in trying to keep adequate
advertising dollars generated have really turned their back on the family farmer
and rancher. There are some really good radio stations out there but darn
few ...Ron Thorson with a radio station in Illinois, he is the strongest voice for the
producer in that whole section of the country.458
With this information as a background, Gramsci's framework of hegemony can
provide a means of understanding the role of the media as a source of intellectual
discourse between: l) anti-checkoff challengers versus defenders of the checkoff
programs, and 2) advocates for sustainable agriculture, family farming and competitive
markets versus industrial agriculture and agribusiness. Since gaining the consent of the
majority is a vital goal of the ruling alliance, the media can play a key role in interpreting
the ideology and culture of the dominant group and promoting a unified view. While it
can promote legitimacy for the dominant view, certain segments of the media can also
choose to help explain and build the foundation for counter-hegemony. The dominant
456
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bloc in power must win the consent of organic intellectuals within the media and
negotiate such consent on an ongoing basis. (This Gramsci-based view of the media
recognizes a certain level of media free will that is not found in the strict Marxist view
that the media is an apparatus of the State that exists solely to serves the needs of the
historic bloc centrally organized by the bourgeois.) If the dominant bloc is successful in
getting the media to rely on "official" sources, this leads to greater consensus and
maintaining the status quo.
Stuart Hall, British cultural theorist and neo-Marxist researcher, collaborated with
other researchers in 1978 to analyze the way in which the British media portrayed
violence and the coercive government response to dissidents in Policing the Crisis:
Mugging, the State and Law and Order.459 Hall described the media as "a key terrain

where 'consent' is won or lost' and "a field of ideological struggle."46° Consistent with
Gramsci's ideas, the media is not bound to a deterministic role (as a communication tool
of the Marxist bourgeoisie) but instead reproduces "the interpretations of the crisis
subscribed to by the ruling-class alliance" in a manner that reflects the media's own
"constructions and inflections."46 1
Janet Woollacott examined the arguments of Policing the Crisis in the chapter
she contributed to the 1982 overview of the Marx and liberal pluralist views of mass
media, Culture, Society and the Media. Woollacott emphasized that Hall, et al. had
assigned to the media "a crucial transformative but secondary role in defining social
459

Stuart Hall, Charles Critcher, Tony Jefferson, John Clarke and Brian Roberts, Policing the Crisis:
Mugging the State and Law and Order (London: Macmillan, 1978).
460
Ibid., 220.
461
Ibid. Also see Janet Woollacott, "Messages and meanings," in Culture, society and the media, eds.,
Michael Gurevitch, Tony Bennett, James Curran and Janet Woollacott (New York: Methuen, 1982): 911 1 1, 109.

225

events."462 This relegated the media to a subordinate position lacking autonomy since
"(T]he primary definers are those to whom the media tum, their accredited sources in
,
government and other institutions.' 463 She questioned how the media can serve as a
field of ideological struggle when their work (the news) only serves "to reproduce and
reinforce 'primary definitions'. They are assumed thereby to signify a crisis which
already exists for the primary definers, a crisis already in operation in the realm of
politics and economics."464 (The primary definers are politicians, the courts, the police
and other institutional entities.)
Woollacott concluded that the struggle to construct consent described in Policing
the Crisis would, therefore, be outside the terrain of the media and "in the areas of class

experience and the cultural forms through which men and women live that
experience."465 In chapter one of Culture, Society and the Media, Woollacott, James
Curran and Michael Gurevitch state that researchers in the Marxist tradition in Britain
portray the media's role as that of "renewing, amplifying and extending the existing
predispositions that constitute the dominant culture, not in creating them."466
• Woollacott's conclusions rested on the assumption that the media can be viewed
in a collective manner. However, the evidence in this study suggested that the
mainstream media that amplifies and extends the idealogy ensemble of the dominant bloc
has its counterpoint in the alternative print and electronic media of those engaged in
counter-hegemony. Such media may be merely sympathetic to the challengers or may
462
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be fully aligned with the ideology ensemble of those seeking to build counter-hegemony.
The checkoff challengers and the industrial agriculture critics are able to interject their
counter-hegemony movement into the media and use the media as a terrain for struggle.
They do so in a systematic way by funding alternative news outlets, issuing press
releases, engaging in publicized debates covered by the media, providing media
workshops and other support for groups involved in counter-hegemony who wish to have
their voices heard.467 The Internet and new technologies allow publishing by activist
groups and create more opportunities for.the counter-hegemony to move the hegemonic
struggle to the terrain of the media.
In their interview, Brenda and Joseph Cochran, dairy checkoff challengers,
pointed out the value of the local press in supporting counter-hegemony:
"I always noticed that if you have a farmer, a motivated farmer in this community and he
develops a good relationship with the local press, the local media, they will pull very
related issues off the AP. They will put it in the local paper. And you eventually have
your power base in that town or that county more educated about the broader issues. "468
Media reporting on the checkoff challenges has been primarily in industry trade
publications. It is the conclusion of some individuals (including several interviewed in
this study) that money for advertising has been the glue that keeps many of these media
outlets closely aligned with the dominant industry blocs defending the checkoffs. They
have suggested that publications accepting advertising promoting the benefits of the
checkoff programs have less incentive to probe stories identifying the broader economic
467
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and political issues behind the checkoff challenges. The scope of this study does not
include a content analysis to explore this issue, but the evidence does show that all
participants in the checkoff conflicts have delivered messages to the media in various
forms in an effort to win consent to their legal, economic and political positions. In the
lawsuits challenging the commodity checkoffs, it is likely that the steady influx of
advertising dollars for checkoff advertisements targeting producers in trade publications
and consumers in mainstream media has created a media climate receptive to the
ideological principles of the commodity industry blocs.
The evidence shows that various media have become strategic tools to be used in
a field of ideological struggle between the dominant group and those launching counter
hegemony. But the involvement of the media has not been entirely formulaic. Stuart
Hall claimed that media operated within the Gramscian framework by reproducing the
"primary definitions" of the dominant bloc subject to the media's own "constructions and
inflections."469 However, there are pressures on modem media that require a greater
degree of "constructions and inflections" than Hall may have been prepared to recognize
within a strict Gramscian framework. First, there are institutional demands on the press,
such as the need to show profits to corporate media owners and the need to select stories
with titillating news or "infotainment" value. Second, there are societal and cultural
expectations that the press will perform a "watchdog" role on government to critically
report on activities that are contrary to the public interest. 470 Third, media are also
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influenced by how a topic, an issue, a group or an industry have been characterized or
framed by the press in earlier stories. 47 1
The "primary definitions" of the dominant bloc are powerful, but they exist
alongside institutional constraints and societal realities that create an operating
environment in which the media may on occasion find itself giving priority to some
factor apart from the hegemonic struggles taking place in its terrain. However, the
industrial agriculture bloc has been highly successful in winning the media's consent to
its economic, moral, political and cultural values.
While the voice of counter-hegemony seeking to publicize its views has
traditionally had an uphill battle, it has still been able to engage alternative media aligned
with the counter-hegemony (and occasionally mainstream media) in discourse about
alternatives such as sustainable agriculture, competitive commodity markets and family
farming. The research in this study indicated that, while the dominant power bloc has an
advantage in its ability to access and control the media, is still subject to the media's
decision-making process regarding the newsworthiness of material and the internal
structures and demands that influence the media. These are the factors that each side of
the hegemonic conflict must consider as they pursue their objectives in the media terrain.
An instructive example of a hegemonic struggle in the media is a legal conflict
arising out of the decision of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) to build the Tellico
In its last piece on Washington beat reporting, in April 1999, AJR found that many newspapers and
wire services had walked away from covering federal agencies and departments long regarded as the
meat of good reporting in Washington. Much of the media simply abandoned departments like
transportation or housing or agriculture. In the last two years, there has been further decline. Ibid., 35.
47 1
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Dam. This case also bears closer examination because the plaintiffs strategically used the
courts in an effort to break the hegemony that was exercised by a dominant bloc centrally
organized around the TVA. It is analogous to the efforts of the checkoff challengers to
use the First Amendment to create change in the agricultural industry.
In 1959, the TVA lacked a significant mission. With an increase in coal and
nuclear power sources, there were no new justifiable dam projects on the horizon. The
TVA settled on a land-development project to build a new dam, the Tellico Dam, that
would create a reservoir, flooding over thirty-three miles of the Tennessee River and over
three hundred forty farms containing some of the most fertile land in the state of
Tennessee. The facts showed that the project was not economically sound or
environmentally necessary. 472
In the 1970s, farmers and local citizens launched a lengthy battle to fight the
government's push forward on this project by challenging it on the basis of the
Endangered Species Act. Plaintiffs argued that the Tellico Dam project would endanger
a small, three-inch perch called the snail darter.473 The lawsuit was not brought by
extreme environmentalists, but rather citizens who were seeking economic review of
governmental action in spending millions of dollars to support an agency cause that could
not be justified on economic, environmental or public policy grounds. The legal action
represents an attempt to break the TVA hegemony.
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In a law review article, Zygmunt J.B. Plater, lead counsel in Tennessee Valley

Authority v. Hilr'74 discussed the manner in which the case was used by the citizens as a
public action tool:
Where in this country's modem industrial democracy is there an operative forum
to which stupendous mistakes can be brought for effective public interest review?
Apparently the answer is "nowhere," unless citizens have money, power, or press
enough to get traction ·and crack into the political process. There is ·nothing
within the process itself that goes out looking for ongoing major agency or
economic initiatives that need review, and courts for their part do not willingly
take on the function of project and program scrutiny.
But it may be different where citizens can find and prove a substantive statutory
violation in court, forcing the other branches of government to take account of the
larger questions.475
The courts became the terrain for the battle. The small coalition of farms and
concerned citizens ultimately convinced the courts to enjoin the dam project, but by then
the project was 95 percent completed. It was a $ 1 50 billion project that was unnecessary
and could not be economically justified. Plater's journal article identified ways in which
the press failed to report the complete story (and still fails to do so today as evidenced by
Rush Limbaugh's use of the snail darter lawsuit as an example of environmentalism run
amok).476 In the press, the story was presented as a cliche about "economic progress
versus environmental protectionism" and "little fish versus big dam."477
The hegemonic struggle was between the powerful, government-backed TVA and
the challengers, a group of farmers and others acting on behalf of the public interest.
Each sought to use the media, but the dominant power bloc was more successful in
getting the press to present its position. Plater identifies several reasons, including the
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ingrained perceptions of the press and the public that the TVA was a progressive agency
offering opportunities to bring social progress to backward rural areas rather than a
bureaucratic giant misusing its agency powers to initiate a pork barrel project. The
hegemonic political efforts of the TVA, seeing its project at risk, were also a huge factor.
For example, National Geographic had agreed to print an article about the Tellico Dam
project written by Supreme Court Justice William O Douglas, but reconsidered after the
TVA persuaded its editor not to run the story.478 The TVA engaged in other political
activities to influence the media' s reporting on the project. (The TVA's actions
undertaken to protect its authority and continue to exercise hegemony can be analogized
to the efforts of the USDA in the commodity checkoff cases.)
Another factor Plater identified that might explain why the dominant power bloc
was more successful in getting the media to frame the story in its favor was the manner in
which the press functions in choosing and presenting its stories to the public. Editors
demand stories with a hook or a simple, easily understood metaphor or catchy summary.
Factors that the media considers when deciding whether a story is newsworthy include:
conflict, impact, audience interest, novelty, prominence of people and institutions,
proximity and timeliness. 479 Plater stated:
It was hard to understand how persistent the little-fish-big-dam perceptual
frame would be. Reporters' and legislators' eyes glazed over when the citizens
rolled out maps, reports, and documents showing the weaknesses of the dam and
the beneficial role of the endangered species in facilitating altemati ve
development of the valley. The fish/dam rubric is quick, easy, funny, and
comforting. It is discomfiting and hard, on the other hand, for reporters and their
audiences to devote energetic attention to a complex and disruptively contrary
image that is not so familiar and crisp.480
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Plater ruefully observed that being correct on the merits of an argument is not enough if
the political process does not integrate the key principle at stake. A court victory does
not guarantee a political change. He concluded:
It is not enough that the citizens were correct on the merits of their argument that
Tellico Dam was a mistake.· The merits of challenged projects and programs are
irrelevant unless they can be authoritatively established and (even more
important) forced into the mechanics of the political structures that support those
initiatives. And, as so often happens in public interest cases, the citizens'
arguments on the merits missed the point of the players in the political process.481
The snail darter lawsuit sharply illustrates that those engaged in a war of position
simultaneously in the terrain of the media and the courts must be mindful of the media
environment and its requirements as they seek to create a "court of public interest" that
will enhance their battle in the courts.
On National Ag Day, March 25, 2002, Dupont and the Agriculture Council of
America sponsored a one-day seminar with the theme ''The Growing Gap Between
Farmers and the Media." Farmers expressed concerns with the way the media had
portrayed them in stories dealing with the environment, international trade and farm
subsidies. The media responded by providing tips to the farmers on how to avoid
becoming "media road kill." Their suggestions included "stop being defensive, tell their
stories in consumer friendly sound bites and be more accessible to the media."482
However, when the hegemony of the dominant power bloc has captured the major media
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outlets, it may be impossible for the farmers to shift the way in which the media portrays
a topic, regardless of tactics.
The press may simply grow weary of an issue. In The Corporate Reapers, A.V.
Krebs reported that this was the case in the early 1990s when the press got tired of
reporting on agricultural woes. He quoted Brian Ahlberg, former communications
director for the National Family Farm Coalition:
The real reason papers and broadcasters no longer run the kind of stories they did
in the 1980s is that they consider family farmers history, not news. The media,
once a proponent of the family farm idea, has largely abandoned it, perhaps in
fatalistic surrender to the forces which are eradicating independence, personality
and community responsibility from its own industry. Such is the predicament of
today's family farmers and their supporters. 483
Another factor that may have a bearing on how media report agricultural conflicts
and issues is that fewer media outlets in the early Twenty-first Century are family owned.
Corporate media owners and publishers may be less able or less willing to identify with
non-corporate interests. They identify with the idea that "big is better" and that
consolidated, larger agricultural enterprises will make more efficient use of resources.
Discourse about issues and ideologies important to hegemonic conflicts can occur
in the terrain of mediated communications in many ways, all contributing to the war of
position. Such discourse may arise in exchanges between different media outlets
expressing conflicting views or between the media and outside organizations. It may
feature the opinions of individuals, activist groups, officials speaking on behalf of the
USDA, legal representatives, agribusiness and other "organic intellectuals" aligned with
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the hegemony or the counter-hegemony. It may simply be a single article or series of
articles published by a media outlet pursuant to the editorial choices of the editor.
Agribusiness. A network of giant corporate agribusiness enterprises serve as the

central organizers within the agricultural hegemony. The annual revenue for the farming
business in the United States is estimated at $80 billion.484 One land-grant university
proclaims on its website: ''The agribusiness industry accounts for nearly one-fifth of the
U.S. gross national product and employs close to one-fourth of the U.S. labor force."485
Many of these companies are multinational and have business goals focused on
strengthening their presence in the world market. The Agribusiness Counci1486 describes
the challenge for U.S. agribusiness as follows:
As the world's largest and most efficient supplier of agro-food products, the
United States faces fierce competition from and ever-increasing number of world
"breadbaskets." Maintaining U.S. agribusiness global leadership requires a forum
capable of embracing our nation's agricultural constituents; and a mechanism for
action on broad, complex issues requiring multi-sectoral coordination and
representation at the highest national and international levels.487
A wide range of companies can be identified with agribusiness. A 1979 dictionary
definition of "agribusiness" limits the term to "a combination of the producing
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operations of a farm, the manufacture and distribution of farm equipment and supplies,
and the processing, storage, and distribution of farm commodities."488 While the term
"agribusiness" still encompasses traditional activities related to agricultural production,
processing and distribution, the research for this project show that it also includes other
businesses involved in supporting agriculture and the food chain in areas such as:
biotechnology, precision farming (global positioning tools), farm and financial
management, agricultural trade, pharmaceuticals, chemicals, land development,
agricultural e-commerce, environmental impact management, risk management,
utilization of agricultural byproducts and agricultural systems management. (The
process of trying to precisely define the term is like trying to put socks on an octopus.)
The important concept of "food chain clusters" introduced by Dr. William
Heffernan in his report to the National Farmers Union in 1999489 has been mentioned
several times in this dissertation. It was included in Figure 3 to show that the central
organizers of the industrial agriculture bloc will soon be the powerful "food chain
clusters." Heffernan used the concept of "food chain clusters" to refer to the manner in
which agribusiness entities are aligning and grouping themselves to exercise control over
the food system in a seamless, vertically integrated manner. 49° Clusters of firms are
formed through joint ventures, subsidiaries, partnerships, mergers, part ownership, or
contractual commitments. These clusters enjoy the economic, political and social
benefits of dominating a food process from seed to packaged product. The chain of
control includes owning intellectual property rights in genetically modified seeds, animal
488
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semen, etc.; interim stages of applying fertilizers or chemicals, feeding livestock or
poultry; and final stages of processing or meatpacking commodities into forms ready to
sell to retailers. The seamless system is the ultimate goal of the industrial agriculture
model. 491
Heffernan argued that the "emerging clusters of firms" will define the future of
the global food system. He stated: "Within this emerging system, there will be no
markets and thus no 'price discovery' from the gene, fertilizer processing and chemical
production to the supermarket shelf." 492 His work strongly supports the framework of
this dissertation study regarding the Gramscian theory of power blocs.
It is estimated that the processing/food manufacturing stage of the food chain
handles more than eighty percent of the raw domestic food products. According to
Professor Richard T. Rogers of University of Massachusetts-Amhurst, Department of
Resource Economics, ''The processing stage has the fewest number of establishments in
the vertical food system, but the processor/food manufacturer is often considered the
most powerful, influential firm in the system-the marketing channel leader."493 Rogers'
paper on structural changes in U.S. food manufacturing provides the following listing of
the top twenty-five food processing companies for the year 1998:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)

Philip Morris Companies, Inc.
Conagra, Inc.;
Cargill, Inc.;
Pepsico, Inc.;
The Coca-Cola Company;
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6) Archer Daniels Midland Company;
7) Mars, Inc.;
8) IBP, Inc.;
9) Anheiser-Busch Companies, Inc.;
10) Sara Lee Corporation;
1 1) HJ. Heinz Company;
12) Nabisco, Inc.;
13) Bestfoods;
14) Nestle USA, Inc.;
15) Dairy Farmers of America;
16) Kellogg Company;
17) Campbell Soup Company;
1 8) The Pillsbury Company;
19) Tyson Foods, Inc. ;
20) General Mills, Inc.;
21) Quaker Oats Company;
22) The Procter & Gamble Company;
23) Dole Food Co., Inc.;
24) Hershey Foods Coproation; and
25) Land O' Lakes, Inc. 494
These processors form a fraction within the industrial agriculture bloc. Their
ability to exercise hegemony is enhanced by well financed lobbying efforts, connections
with the USDA, relationships with academic institutions and mammoth advertising
budgets. Farmers sell their raw products to the processors and manufactures either on the
basis of a market price or a contract price.
In some industries such as livestock, the concentration at the processor/meat
packer level has arguably created inequitable market pricing for farmers who are unable
to receive price signals because of the large number of captive supply contracts imposed
by the meatpackers. Meatpackers are able to refrain from trading for several days due to
the large number of supply contracts and thus drive down the prices of the livestock
commodities. Rogers states that "as more product volume moves through non-market
methods, the less is known about true product values as key economic information
494
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summarized by price becomes more difficult to discover."495 As another strategy,
processors are entering into long-term strategic alliances with commodity producers
which require the producers to enter into contracts to grow their products pursuant to
defined specifications.496
The nation's four largest meatpackers have been key players in the agribusiness
environment. They include IBP (now owned by Tyson Foods Inc.), Swift & Co.
(ConAgra is 46 percent owner), Excel Corp., (the slaughterhouse subsidiary of Cargill,
Inc.), and Farmland. Referred to as ''The Big Four," these meatpacking enterprises
control an estimated 75 to 80 percent of the beef cattle slaughtered in the United States
each year.497
The Tyson/IBP conglomerate is a powerful "fraction" (as the term is used by
Gramsci) in the industrial agriculture bloc exercising hegemony in agribusiness. Formed
in late 2000 when Tyson Foods, the world's largest poultry producer and processor,
acquired controlling stock in IBP, the conglomerate became the nation's largest
meatpacking company. Two corporations, each powerhouses in their industries, merged
to create a $20 billion behemoth poised to "concentrate market power, reduce raw
material and labor expenditures and eliminate competition" across a broad swath of the
agric�ltural industry. 498 IBP is the largest beef meatpacker in the United States and the
second largest pork meatpacker. 499 To the extent that IBP and its parent company,
Tyson, use this concentration of ownership to exercise control over prices and goods, the
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losers in this union could be consumers and independent cattle and poultry producers. A
lawsuit filed by cattle producers in 1996, alleging that IPB engaged in illegal price
control practices, has been certified a class action for cash sellers of fed cattle to IBP and
is scheduled for trial on January 12, 2004. 500
Another major agribusiness player, Cargill Corp., has the distinction of being the
nation's largest private corporation with operations in seventy countries. 501 In addition
to its Excel meat processing business, Cargill is a major grain processor and one of the
largest seed companies in the world. Its agribusiness portfolio demonstrates vertical
integration with business enterprises in the areas of seed operation, animal feed, feeding
cattle operations, and processing plants. By entering into a joint venture with
Monsanto502 (one of the world's leading biotechnology companies), Cargill gained
access to the biotechnology that would allow it to create new genetic products. The
Cargill/Monsanto alliance is aggressively involved in application of the "terminator
gene" to create sterile seeds that can only be used one season. 503
Archer Daniels Midland (ADM) calls itself the "Supermarket to the World." Its
operations include a global network of processing facilities for the processing of grains
for the food and animal feed markets. ADM has entered into joint ventures with
numerous agricultural companies and cooperatives that will give it access to farmers and
the flood of raw materials that it needs, including: joint ventures with Countrymark,
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Riceland and United Grain Growers. 504 It is also involved in a joint venture with
Growmark, a company producing grains for energy products, and two feed cooperatives,
Goldkist and Ag Processing, Inc. (AGP). It has aggressively expanded into foreign
markets with commodity processing and feed operations in South America and oilseed
refining, feed and broiler processing in China. Its presence in the production and
processing of livestock has been felt through its joint venture with AGP and its continued
purchase of shares in IBP. 505
Smithfield Foods is an unmistakable major agribusiness player as the largest pork
producer in the United States and the world, with annual sales in 2000 of $5.2 billion. It
slaughters more than 12 million hogs annually, raised on hog farms it owns or sourced
through contracts with farmers. Known for its growing number of factory farms and
processing facilities, it is has come to the attention of public interest groups for
controversial corporate behavior related to the despoiling of land and water. 506 The
confinement facilities used by Smithfield produce large amounts of swine waste that are
kept in lagoons. They are difficult to disperse into the surrounding environment, and
have created environmental damage, especially in North Carolina, which is the number
two hog producing state in the United States. Robert F. Kennedy, Jr. and other lawyers
have brought legal actions against Smithfield, claiming that it illegally dumped untreated
hog waste and contaminants into the waterways of North Carolina. 507
504 Ibid., 9.
505 Ibid.
506 See A.V. Krebs, "Merchants of Greed," Corporate Agribusiness Research Project (undated); available from
hrn,://www .organicconsumers.org/corp/greed.cfm; Internet; accessed 10 July 2003.
507
See "Lawsuits Charge Smithfield Foods-Biggest U.S. Factory Farmed Hog Producer-Illegally
Dumping Millions of Pounds of Untreated Pig Waste, Other Toxins in North Carolina, Polluting Rivers,
Causing Fish Kills, Shellfish Disease," Earth Crash Earth Spirit (February 17, 2001); available from
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In the U.S. dairy industry, a recent merger between Suiza Foods Corp, the largest
fluid milk producer in the U.S., and Dean Foods Co., the second largest, has created a
mega operation poised to exert a dominant influence. As part of the merger, the Justice
Department required the two companies to sell dairy processing plants in eight different
states to avoid reduced competition. The plants were acquired by a new entity, National
Dairy Holdings, L.P., that is fifty percent owned by a dairy cooperative, Dairy Farmers of
America Inc. 508
Companies that supply farmers with seeds, fertilizers, pesticides and machinery
comprise another major group within agribusiness. Those involved in biotechnology have
acquired increasing commercial power as they have amassed patents and propriety
intellectual property assets in agricultural products such as genetically engineered seeds
and plants. Many of these assets are quietly being funneled out of land-grant institutions
as the universities agree to transfer rights in research to biotechnology companies.509
The roster of prominent biotechnology companies operating in the United States
includes: Monsanto, American Cyanamid, Dow, Pioneer-Hybred, Rhone-Poulenc,
DuPont, Inc. and United Agri5 Products, (a subsidiary of Con Agra).
Novartis, a Swiss producer of genetically engineered crops, pharmaceuticals and
chemicals, was formed in 1996 when CIBA-Geigy and Sandoz merged. The company
became the number one agrochemical company in the world after it aquired Merck in
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See Joshua A. Newberg and Richard L. Dunn, "Keeping Secrets in the Campus Lab: Law, Values and
Rules of Engagement for Industry-University R&D Partnerships," American Business Law Journal 39
(Winter 2002): 1 87-240.

242

1997.510 Novartis has a business connection with ADM through its part ownership of
Land-O-Lakes, an ADM business. This alliance could prove useful to Novartis over time
since its holdings do not include grain or food processing companies.
Another leader the chemical and industrial products is DuPont, Inc. It is also
involved in biotechnology. DuPont has entered into joint ventures with ConAgra's
United Agri Products business, thus joining the agrochemical and biotechnology interests
of DuPont with the array of businesses under the ConAgra umbrella.
Food retailers form another powerful fraction within the industrial agriculture. In
2001, the U.S. food industry ranked fifth in the ranking of most profitable industries
measured by percentage of return on assets."5 1 1 One reason for the impressive success of
this industry has been its strategy of forcing down the prices of raw materials from
producers and farmers while increasing the costs of food to consumers to ensure high
margins of profitability.
The fast pace of concentration in the retail grocery sector during the past decade is
changing the face of the supermarket business. The catalyst that has shaken up the
grocery business is Wal-Mart. The Arkansas-based company first began selling food in
1988. In 2002, it edged out Kroger (a national chain located in Cincinnati, Ohio) to
become the nation's number one grocer based on annual sales of more than $53 billion.
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http://www.tilrc.org/docs/0402drug$.htm; Internet; accessed 25 May 2003.
243

The third largest grocer is Albertson's (based in Boise, Idaho) and the fourth major
supermarket chain is Safeway (headquartered in Pleasanton, California).5 1 2
Wal-Mart targeted the grocery business as being ripe for entry in the late 1980s
when it noticed that concentration in the grocery business had resulted in higher food
prices by grocers seeking to expand their profit margins. The industry was vulnerable to
Wal-Mart's price cutting strategies, and Wal-Mart could still make a profit while
undercutting competitors by ten to fifteen percent. Competition is fierce between the four
top grocers and industry watchers predict that at least one of the supermarket chains will
not survive.5 1 3
Wal-Mart's food business success is the result of many strategies, but clearly its
ability to exercise enormous pressure on entities farther down the food chain gives it an
edge. Suppliers are pressured to source raw materials at lowest costs and provide them in
uniform packaging with uniform weights. No Wal-Mart stores offer meat cutting or
butcher services. The industrial agriculture business model meshes perfectly with the
Wal-Mart business model. Wal-Mart's move toward vertical integration can be seen in
its ownership of food distributors, AmeriService and McLane's.5 14
The competitors, Kroger, Albertson's and Safeway, have adopted new strategies
to compete, including cost cutting, expansion of their house brands and providing
consumers with meat butchering services. These supermarket chains also must shoulder
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See Patricia Callahan, "Wal-Mart supercenters top grocery listt The Wall Street Journal (June 9, 2003);
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additional costs incurred because their labor force is mostly unionized. In contrast, Wal
Mart has aggressively fought off all attempts to introduce unions. 5 1 5
Consultants with the Boston Consulting Group offer the following summary of
Wal-Mart 's powerful presence in the grocery industry:
Wal-Mart' s U.S. grocery sales have skyrocketed from $10 billion to more
than $45· billion in little over a decade-a 14.6 percent real annual growth rate.
We project these sales to reach nearly $70 billion by 2005 .. . . If Wal-Mart can find
the right entry vehicles, it aspires to expand in Japan, Western Europe, and many
developing countries. To be sure, its march across the United States-and the rest
of the world-shows no signs of slowing down. In its wake, Wal-Mart has left a
trail of shuttered grocery stores. Surviving retailers in the United States face
squeezed margins, diminished traffic, and a reduced share of grocery
purchases.516
So the newest fraction to ally itself with the industrial agriculture bloc is Wal
Mart. As the largest retailer in the world, the potential for this company to exercise
hegemony in the production of agricultural commodities is enormous. This research has
identified large concentrated agribusiness enterprises as organizers within the industrial
agricultural bloc. Wal-Mart's dominance in the food chain will allow it to wield power
within this group and ally itself with a multinational industrial agriculture bloc as it
expands internationally. A superstructure of economic, political and social relationships
may be defined by the modes of agricultural production generated by Wal-Mart as it
exercises hegemony over the agricultural industry.
Since 1962, agribusiness has operated under the prevailing influence of The
Committee for Economic Development (CED). The web site for CED describes itself as
515 See Wendy Zellner, "How Wal-Mart Keeps Unions at Bay," Business Week (Oct. 28, 2002);
republished on Labor Research Association website; available from
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/02_43/b3805095.htm; Internet; accessed 16 June 2003.
516 Marin Gjaja, Alexander Lintner and Henry M. Vogel, ''Dancing with the 800-Pound Gorilla," Boston
Consulting Group, 1 2 (2003); available from
http://www.bettermanagement.com/Library/Library .aspx?a=8&libraryid=4892; Internet, accessed 16 June
2003.
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"an independent, nonpartisan organization of business and education leaders dedicated to
policy research on the major economic and social issues of our time and the
implementation of its recommendations by the public and private sectors."517 Launched
by business leaders in the World War II years, this organization turned its full attention
to agriculture in 1962 when it released a report titled "An Adaptive Program for
Agriculture." The panel responsible for this report, two hundred businessmen, academics
and educators (many of them agricultural economists), began with the pronouncement:
"The movement of people from agriculture has not been fast enough to take full
advantage of the opportunities that improving farm technologies, thus increasing capital,
[will] create."5 1 8 In order to remove the excess resources (people) from farming, the
CED report outlined a program that was based in large part on changing the price system
to generate financial hardship.
The growing power of agribusiness in the food supply chain from farmer to the
consumer has been accompanied by the dwindling market power of the commodity
producer. The preferred use of contractual arrangements, alliances, joint ventures and
direct ownership by Agribusiness has all but eliminated open competitive markets and
hastened this result. These preferred means of controlling production are designed to
serve the industrial agriculture bloc and minimize the power of the subordinate producer
and the consumer at opposite ends of the food chain.
In early 2003, Hal Hamilton, founding co-chair of the National Campaign for
Sustainable Agriculture, attended a Harvard Business School Agribusiness Executive
5 17
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Seminar. Given his alignment with the counter-hegemony against the industrial
agriculture model, he reported that he "felt a bit like a fish out of water" at the seminar
with 160 top managers of large agribusiness companies. 519 His observations on the
agribusiness "mindset" are as follows:
Not only do incentives and rules of the competitive market stand in the way of a
'greener' business climate, but there's also an internal culture in the business
world that lulls its leaders into a cozy complacency . . . There's a 'school spirit'
among these executives that makes it difficult for any of them to question the
wisdom of transgenetic crops, even in the face of consumer resistance.
Technology equals progress which ensures the common good. They like to
believe that they have science on their side.520
Hamilton succinctly summarizes the business objectives of the agribusiness
companies represented by those attending the conference:
These companies have two powerful motivators: the drive for efficiency and the
search for unique values that increase market return. The whole system is
constructed on squeezing inefficiencies out, procuring and moving commodities
very cheaply, adding unique value at the lowest possible cost to the next customer
up the chain, or etting a premium by adding some desired attribute that the
customer wants. 21

f

This describes the industrial agriculture model. It is the guiding force for
agribusiness.
Advertising Agency Associations. One group caught in an awkward position by
the changing face of the challenger in these cases was the advertising associations. While
advertising agencies are clearly the recipients of the checkoff funds, the associations
represent their interests. Needless to say, advertisers have a keen interest in keeping the
millions of dollars flowing their direction for national campaigns such as "Got Milk,"
519 Hal Hamilton, "Agribusiness Executives Tune -Up at Harvard," Sustainability Institute, '1 1 1-2 (January
27, 2003); available from http://sustainer.org/pubs/columns/01.27.03Hamilton.html; Internet;
Internet; accessed 25 May 2003.
520
Ibid., TI 6-8.
521 Ibid., 1 9.
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California Raisins, "Beef, it's what's for Dinner." In the Glickman case, the American
Advertising Federation and several other advertising groups filed an amicus curie brief
in favor of the challenger, Gerawan Farming. Their brief argued that:
[T]ruthful commercial messages regarding lawful products and services are
entitled to full Constitutional protection.. . Assessed under the level of scrutiny
accorded fully protected speech, this becomes an extremely easy case. The
government obviously cannot compel a speaker to endorse or propound a
particular view. Moreover, whether assessed under Central Hudson or Abood, the
Secretary's program is clearly unconstitutional.522
While their primary objective in this brief may have been to argue for an
expanded level of protection for commercial speech, the advertising associations clearly
staked a position on the side of the challengers and argued that the checkoffs are
unconstitutional. In the Glickman case, this aligned them with the large producers
investing major marketing dollars in campaigns for their branded products. In an odd
twist, control of the checkoff advertising dollars in the cattle, beef and dairy cases, is
exercised by the USDA, state governments, commodity boards and those appointed and
hired by them to administer the checkoff programs. The challengers are the little guys
seeking a ruling that the checkoff programs are unconstitutional while the government
and other fractions in the dominant hegemony claim that the government can compel a
speaker to endorse a particular view when the message constitutes government speech.
The dominant hegemony argues that the government speech doctrine applies, so First
Amendment protection is not afforded to the individual producers.
It would appear that this puts the advertising associations at odds with their clients
in the beef, pork and dairy cases who are arguing for reduced First Amendment
522
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protection of generic advertising under the government speech doctrine. However, the
Supreme Court has largely ignored the commercial speech doctrine in Glickman and
United Foods, preferring to decide the cases under a freedom from compelled speech

analysis based on the Abood and Keller cases. Given this direction of the court,
advertising agencies and their associations who are interested in expanding the
commercial speech doctrine may have little to gain (and everything to lose in terms of
client goodwill) by filing an amicus curie brief case before the Supreme Court on this
point when the next checkoff case is heard.
American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations
(AFL-CIO). The AFL-CIO filed an amicus curiae brief in Glickman v. Wileman in order
to state its views on the agency shop cases (the line of cases based on Abood v. Detroit
Board of Education governing freedom from compelled speech) and to clarify for the

court how these cases should properly be applied. The AFL-CIO foresaw that the
challenges to compelled speech in the form of checkoffs created the potential for new
application and possibly a new interpretation of the Abood principles. Abood held that
employees who chose not to belong to a union could be forced to pay service fees to a
union, provided that such fees were used strictly for purposes germane to the reason why
the unions were established, i.e., to serve the purpose of collective bargaining.
Clearly, it was in the manifest interest of the AFL-CIO to ensure that the Supreme
Court did not alter the Abood analysis to disturb the status quo vis-a-vis the manner in
which service fees have been collected from non-union members for more than twenty
years. The AFL-CIO' s brief characterized the free speech claim of the fruit growers and
handlers challenging the checkoffs in Wileman as a "negative First Amendment right" to
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abstain from making financial contributions to generic advertising or speech. (The
nomenclature of "negative First Amendment right," which refers to the constitutional
right to refrain from speaking, has been used at times to identify the corollary to the
affirmative First Amendment right to speak or express oneself.) An interpretation of the
Abood line of cases most favorable to maintaining the status quo was offered by the AFL
CIO in its amicus brief:
. . . the fruit handler's claims are like other claims this Court has considered
by members of regulated groups urging that their compelled association with
expressive activity contemplated by a legislative regulatory scheme violates their
constitutional right of non-association. Most closely analogous are claims of this
nature that have been brought by employees challenging union expenditures in
agency shop cases, and attorneys challenging bar expenditures in unified bar
cases.
In these cases, the Court has repeatedly rejected these claims so long as
the positive group speech activity serves the overall goals of the regulatory
scheme. And, unless the challenged speech activity is political or ideological
speech at the core of protected First Amendment values, the Court has taken a
generous view in considering whether the expenditures are rationally related to
the overall legislative purpose. [emphasis added]523
The goal of the AFL-CIO was to persuade the Supreme Court to take a "generous
view" in concluding that the checkoff fees are rationally related to the overall legislative
purpose of the marketing orders governing the tree fruit industry. The AFL-CIO brief
makes a broad assertion that a regulated party' s ability to exercise "a broad constitutional
right to opt out of the affirmative portion of an overall system for regulating a facet of the
economy" will threaten "important economic and social programs." In other words, it
will threaten the First Amendment principle that allows unions to collect service fees
from non-union members.
523
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Academic Specialists Aligned With Hegemony or Aligned With Counter
Hegemony. The history of the academic community's involvement in agriculture sheds
light on the role played in the early Twenty-first Century by academic specialists in the
industrial agriculture bloc and their counterparts engaged in research and activities
supporting counter-hegemony.
The agricultural research establishment traces its roots to the passage of the
Morrill Act in 1862,524 legislation that provided public land for universities in each state
charged with responsibility for establishing and supporting agriculture and mechanical
arts. This was followed by the Hatch Act in 1887,5 25 authorizing federal funds for
experiment stations that would function in conjunction with the land grant universities.
Congress passed a second Morrill Act in 1890526 that granted funds to any state that
wished to secure them for "separate but equal" land grant colleges for black students.
(Seventeen states elected to establish black colleges, now referred to as "1 890 colleges or
universities.") A final prong of this agricultural research system was the Extension
Service. Created by the 1914 Smith-Lever Act,5 27 this was a system for using county
agricultural extension agents to provide rural America with information and farming
practices developed by the land grant universities and research stations. 5 28
In his critical overview of agribusiness, The Corporate Reapers: The Book of
Agribusiness, agricultural analyst, A.V. Krebs, traced the relationship between land grant
524 Morrill Act of 1862, 7 U.S.C. §§ 301 et seq.
525 Hatch Act of 1887, 7 U.S.C. §§ 36la-36li.
526 Morrill Act of 1890, 7 U.S.C. §§ 32 1 et seq.
527

Smith Lever Act of 1914, 7 U.S.C. §§ 341 et seq.
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universities and industry. He asserted that the connection between business and
agriculture arose during the early years of the land grant colleges. Krebs stated:
After gaining a certain measure of self-respect, these colleges began to ally
themselves with the movement for scientific agriculture, which had begun in the
1 8th century, and went on to build an educational foundation on which a new
organization of agriculture could take place. 529
In Krebs' opinion, the new organization of agriculture created inequitable conditions for
farmers. Rural farmers and the public have not been served well by an educational
system that has favored industrial interests.
Krebs is not alone in his assessment. This same view has been advanced by
various strong voices during the last five decades. In 1972, a particularly critical and
powerful report was issued by the Agribusiness Accountability Project, a public interest
project that was founded by Jim Hightower and a former Nader's Raider, Susan
DeMarco. 530 The Agribusiness Accountability Project formed a Task Force on the Land
Grant College Complex that documented how government and agribusiness dominated
the research agendas of the land grant institutions to the disadvantage of family farmers.
The resulting report, titled Hard Tomatoes, Hard Times, created a major stir in
government and agribusiness circles. It identified pervasive ties between business and

529 Krebs, 264.
530 Prior to his leadership on the Agribusiness Accountability Project, Jim Hightower served as a
congressional aide. While working on the project, he became an advocate for consumers and farm workers.
He later served two controversial terms as Commissioner of the Texas Department of Agriculture from
1982 to 1990. He carried his activism into this position, promoting organic farming, regulation of
pesticides, small-farm cooperatives and consumer causes. In the early Twenty-first Century, he worked as
an author and host of a radio show with a progressive, populist outlook. See "Politician Turned Political
Sparkplug Jim Hightower is Keeping the Grassroots Connected and Radio Active," Horizon Magazine
(1999); available from http://www.horizonmag.com/7/Jim-Hightower.asp; Internet; accessed 1 1 July 2003.
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the land grant colleges. 53 1 The report claimed that the participants were a "close-knit
bunch" that were "inbred and rather tightly drawn."532 The group is described as follows:
The land grant college community includes more than those who are on campus:
administrators, faculty, researchers and extension agents. In addition, the
community also includes officials of the national Association of State Universities
and Land Grant Colleges (NASULGC), the Cooperative State Research Service
and other USDA officials, various local and national advisory structures, private
agricultural and research foundations and agribusiness clients of the system. 533
The one external element that became integrated into the land grant community
was agribusiness. The report asserted that "agribusiness ingratiates itself."534 By
offering money for grants and research, agribusiness secured a place for itself in the land
grant community. However, in addition to the wellspring of financial support offered by
corporate agriculture, Hard Times, Hard Tomatoes alleges that agribusiness was
welcomed as a partner because its "attitudes and objectives were shared by the land grant
communities."535 This suggests that organic intellectuals in academia and agribusiness
were building an "ideology ensemble" that would provide agribusiness and land grant
institutions with a foundation for sharing power within the industrial agriculture bloc.
The report also argued that "the community serves itself' by the movement of
people among three spheres of society-the land grant college community, government
and agribusiness. It questioned the integrity of the land grant officials and staffs:
Corporations make a sizeable investment in teaching, research and extension
work, and they are repaid amply in (1) research products, (2) graduates prepared
to work in agribusiness, and (3) legitimacy for their commercial products. Land
grant officials and staffs, on the other hand, work hard to meet the requests of
53 1 See Jim Hightower, Hard Tomatoes, Hard Times: A Report of the Agribusiness Accountability Project
on the Failure ofAmerica 's Land Grant College Complex (Cambridge, MA: Schenkman Publishing
Company, 1973).
532 Ibid., 87.
533 Ibid., 86.
534 Ibid., 90.
535 Ibid., 90-91.
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agribusiness, while many are on corporate retainers and a few actually hold seats
on corporate boards of directors. It is a sharing process that raises serious
questions of conflict of interest and of intellectual and scientific integrity.536
The concluding chapter of the Hard Times, Hard Tomatoes report presents a
picture of an industrial agriculture bloc with two important fractions (agribusiness and
land grant institutions) that exercise hegemony. The report states:
America's land grant college complex has wedded itself to an agribusiness vision
of automated, vertically-integrated and corporatized agriculture. It has accepted
corporate agribusiness as an integral part of its community, applying some three
quarters of a billion tax dollars a year to help big business work its will in rural
America . ...It has been a deliberate choice-corporations over people.537
Hightower's report described the effect of this hegemony by concluding that "the
colleges have mistaken corporate need as 'the changing needs of a changing nation.' That
is proving to be a fatal mistake-not fatal for the corporations or for the colleges, but for
the people of America."538 The Task Force emphasized the need for others to get
involved in challenging the dominant position of the land grant college-agribusiness
power bloc by stating:
Today, the complex [land grant complex] serves only one constituency:
corporate agribusiness. Others must get into this public complex, and they must
get in on an equal footing with corporate executives. But the land grant
community will not break off it monogamous relationship with agribusiness
simply because it ought to do so. Significant change will come only under
pressure.
The recommendations of the Task Force, therefore, are directed toward
opening this closed world to public view and to participation by constituencies
that today are locked out.539
This was a call for counter-hegemony, made in 1972 by a public interest
organization that promoted a movement to break the hegemony exercised by two primary
536
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537
Ibid., 138.
538
Ibid., 139.
539

Ibid., 139-140.

254

players in the dominant industrial agricultural bloc, the land grant colleges and
agribusiness. Their ally was the U.S. government. The three entities are intertwined
because: ''The bow on the agribusiness-agrigovemment relationship is tied on the land
grant campuses. "540 The Task Force issued a challenge for changes that would increase
the power of "consumers, environmentalists, independent family farmers, farm workers,
minorities, small town businessmen, rural public officials and other interests directly
affected by the work of the land grand complex."541
The same challenge could have been issued thirty years later, since the same
relationships between land grant institutions and agribusiness are prevalent in 2003. (In
fact, the author of Hard Times, Hard Tomatoes, Jim Hightower, has continued to speak
out against the corporatization of agriculture and other public interest issues in books, a
monthly newsletter, the Hightower Lowdown, radio commentaries and a column in the
Nation magazine.)

Legislation passed in 1980, the Bayh-Dole Act,542 proved to be revolutionary in
spurring academic-corporate partnering. It permitted universities to patent research
discoveries resulting from federal funding. The legislation was the result of intense
lobbying by a coalition of business and educational leaders seeking to create new
opportunities for collaboration between business and academia. It was controversial,
raising the question of whether the university' s role as a center of learning engaged in
research for the public good should be expanded to allow the university to become a
source of viable commercial ideas. Academia saw the chance to earn royalties for its
540
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scientific endeavors, and industry saw a way to vacuum valuable ideas out of the ivory
tower. The timing was right with pressure for innovation resulting from declines in
United States productivity and foreign competition and the need for universities to mine
new sources of revenue from grants and royalties as costs rose and tax support fell.54�
Congress enacted other statues since 1980 to create incentives for academic
industry alliances, but the Bayh-Dole Act remains a turning point. Through this Act,
Congress provided legitimacy for the notion that a university should develop and own
intellectual property for its own financial gain. The Act provided an incentive for
universities to accept a stronger corporate presence and set the scene for the invasion of
the biotechnology firms in the 1980s and 1990s.
At issue in the new millennium are the rights of universities to retain ownership
over seed lines developed during decades of research. Private corporations seek access to
the seed lines to develop genetically modified plant varieties over which they then wish
to exercise proprietary ownership. If this happens, a university loses control over its
scientific resources-it is unable to share them with other universities or make them
available to the public. There is a huge loss to those who share in the benefits of these
resources.
Land grant universities are increasingly choosing to sacrifice their resources for
the research dollars that will serve the narrow purpose of building corporate profits. In a
significant move, North Dakota State University decided in 2001 to reject a
biotechnology contract proposed by Monsanto that would have required a portion of the
543
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universitfs genetic plant resources to fall under the control of Monsanto. This was
heralded as a special act of public service.544
One of the most stunning examples of the opposite approach by a university is a
$25 million deal signed in November of 1 998 between University of California-Berkeley
and the Swiss agribusiness powerhouse, Novartis, a global biotechnology and
pharmaceutical company interested in research to develop genetically engineered crops.
As noted earlier in this dissertation, the arrangement gives Novartis unprecedented
control. It allows Novartis to fill two seats (out of five) on the research committee for the
Department of Plant and Microbial Biology and grants Novartis the first right to negotiate
licenses for approximately a third of any research discoveries resulting in proprietary
intellectual property arising from any projects within the department, however funded. 545
These are astounding concessions to private business. The deal struck by this
department (one of four within the College of Natural Sciences), was met with opposition
from other faculty, public interest groups and students. There were sharp divisions over
whether the agreement diminished Berkeley' s commitment to conduct research for the
public good and whether it would be possible for members of the department to freely
exchange ideas with Novartis waiting in the wings to capture intellectual property rights.
(The ability to patent genetically engineered organisms has provided a powerful
hegemonic tool to the agribusiness organizers in the industrial agriculture bloc. )546
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Dean Gordon Rausser, dean of the College of Natural Resources and proponent of
alliances between universities and private business, claimed "Without modem laboratory
facilities and access to commercially developed proprietary databases . . . we can neither
provide first-rate graduate education nor perform the fundamental research that is part of
the University' s mission."547
An article in The lAnd Stewardship online newsletter (an electronic publication
aligned with counter-hegemony against the industrial agriculture bloc) emphasized that
the goals of the biotechnology sector have played an important role. The article stated:
[I]n recent years various agreements between universities and private industry
have locked up the fruits of land grant science at a dizzying pace. Ties between
private industry and public institutions have always been a part of U.S.
agricultural research. However, biotechnology has accelerated and deepened
those ties considerably in recent years. Its incredible expense and insatiable
appetite for resources has sent 'life sciences' corporations and universities rushing
into each other's arms (citation omitted).
This trend is raising concerns among advocates of public research that land grant
institutions are becoming little more than field stations for private corporations. 548
The troubling manner in which universities today are serving the profit needs of
corporate America rather than undertaking research and programs to advance the public
good has come to the attention of the American Association of University Professors.
This organization issued a "Statement on Corporate Funding of Academic Research"549
in 2001 that outlined certain standards and actions that should be followed by faculty to
help reduce conflicts of interest that arise due to the university-industry relationship. In
its online and print publications, this association has expressed the need to preserve
Ibid., 'I 8, quote from Rausser article in Berkeley alumni magazine.
DeVoire, <Jr}[ 4-5.
549
"Statement on Corporate Funding of Academic Research," American Association of University
Professors (2001), available from http://www.aaup.org/statemst/Redbook/repcorf.htm; Internet; accessed
29 May 2003.
547
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academic freedom and independence in a world of corporate influence and power.
However, the evidence in this study suggests that, in the agricultural communities of the
land grant institutions, the effort to "preserve independence" is largely a hollow goal,
since academic independence may already have been sacrificed at the alter of the
industrial agricultural model several decades ago. In an effort to achieve some degree of
transparency, American biological journals in the latter part of the 1 990s began requiring
authors submitting papers to identify any personal or family interests in biotechnology
firms and specify the source of their funding. 550
The quest for academic autonomy by agricultural specialists in modern times may
be pursued by the few assertive voices willing to: 1) publish scientific results that may
not be favored by corporate America, and 2) speak out on behalf of the need to direct
research and resources toward furthering the public good. These activities are viewed as
a threat to the entrenched and dominant industrial agricultural bloc. Instances of
retaliation by university administrations and by corporations targeting researchers in legal
battles are examples of the war of position the dominant bloc and those attempting to
engage in counter-hegemony. Evidence that the industrial agricultural bloc has
"captured" the university administration of universities can be seen in instances where
professors have been stripped of duties and prohibited from speaking as well as in
academic environments where researchers are discouraged from criticizing large
corporate donors. The legal actions are coercive attempts to not only silence an
individual researcher, but to exercise an intimidating effect on the publication of any
550 Jean-Pierre Berlan and Richard C. Lewontin, The Genetic-Industrial Complex: CASIIlNG IN ON
LIFE," Norfolk Genetic Information Network, 1 6 (December 1998); available from
http://ngin.tripod.com/pblinks2.htm; Internet; accessed 15 June 2003.
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future scientific research that would disclose negative information about corporations or
their products. 55 1
This historical overview provides a framework for understanding the role of
various agricultural specialists involved in the commodity checkoff programs and the
legal conflicts related to these programs. The specialists supporting the agricultural
business model are aligned with the commodity industry blocs exercising control in the
checkoff hegemony.
The most visible professors in the group aligned with the checkoff hegemony are
those that publicly extol the benefits of the checkoffs or those that appear as witnesses on
behalf of the government and testify that the checkoff programs are overwhelmingly
beneficial to particular industries and producers. They typically provide econometric
testimony attesting to the success of a specific commodity program in generating an
increased demand for the commodity. Examples include Dr. Ron Ward of the University
of Florida and Dr. Wayne Purcell of the Virginia Polytechnical Institute, who has written
a paper titled A Primer on Beef Demancf52 for the American National Cattleman's Beef
Industry Planning Group. Dr. Purcell has published numerous articles and other
publications that address issues of profitability and growth in the cattle industry. His
research and writings revealed a fundamental alignment with the industrial agricultural
bloc. In his view, the middleman and the beef packing plants are exonerated from
responsibility in contributing to the low prices experienced by cattle producers. This
551 See Donna R. Euben, "Academic Freedom of Individual Professors and Higher Education Institutions:
The Current Legal Landscape," American Association of University Professors (May 2002); available from
http://www.aaup.org/Com-a/aeuben.HTM; Internet; accessed 79 May 2003.
552 See Wayne Purcell, A Primer on Beef Demand, RILP Publications (April 1998); available from
http://www.aaec.vt.edu/rilp/publications.html; Internet; accessed 19 June 2003.
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perspective can be seen in the following excerpt from his publication "The Source of
Better Prices for Cattle Producers":
Like it or not, producers have to recognize that regulating the marketplace
or controlling how packers can do business is not going to push calf prices up in
any significant way . . . The facts simply do not support the claims that producers
are being robbed by middlemen. What the facts do show are price spreads being
extracted by retailers that are growing dollar for dollar with their possible
increases in costs. At the packer level, the facts show spreads that are growing ·
slower than general price inflation, perhaps testimony to the low-cost operations
of the huge beef packing plants of the 1990s. 553
It was Purcell's opinion that an expansion of consumer demand is the secret to
increasing producers' profitability. He stated:
The facts show another hard truth: Any increase in middlemen's spreads,
even increases economically justified by rising costs, will push producers' prices
down if retail prices are stagnant because of weak demand for beef. In expanding
on this now-obvious point, we come to a better understanding of where the
needed dollars are: They are in the pockets of the modem affluent consumer. If
we will support and push the emerging programs that are finally starting to move
to a high-quality, consistent, and consumer-friendly (read "convenient") beef
product offering, we will save some of the cattle-producing families that will
otherwise be pushed out of business by a marketplace that has no conscience. To
get that done, we will need investments in new technology and in new product
offerings by the big packers. 554
The National Institute for Commodity Promotion Research and Evaluation
(NICPRE) at Cornell University is a formalized way in which the hegemony has given
legitimacy to checkoff programs through its research to determine whether the
commodity promotion programs are effective. The institute, funded by a special grant
from Congress, engages in research on commodity promotion economics. Dr. Harry
Kaiser is director of the NICPRE and, also, serves as director of an affiliated

553 Wayne Purcell, ''The Source of Better Prices for Cattle Producers," RILP Publications (June 1999);
available from http://www.aaec.vt.edu/rilp/publications.html; Internet; accessed 19 June 2003.
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organization, the Cornell Commodity Promotion Research Program (CCPRP). The stated
purpose of CCPRP is:
(1) to provide the public with information to judge the appropriateness of
continuing authorization for commodity checkoff programs and continuing
support of export promotion programs, and (2) to collaborate with and provide
information to boards of directors and managers of commodity promotion
checkoff programs to help them better utilize promotion funds. The CCPRP
serves as a central source of knowledge on the economics ·of commodity ·
promotion checkoff programs.555
In their interviews for this study, Dr. Ward and Dr. Kaiser both indicated that
their work as economists was necessary to provide the commodity research boards and
the government with the independent research necessary for policy decisions related to
whether to continue the programs and how to spend checkoff money. They asserted that
their research unequivocally demonstrated the economic benefits of the checkoff
programs.556 The following is an excerpt from Dr. Ward's interview:
Interviewer: And does your research show that the goals for enhancing the
market demand for these products.. . that the goals are achieved by the checkoff
programs?
Ron Ward: Well, the ones I've looked at have. I think you could find a lot of
exceptions and you could find problems with any of them. But the big ones
we've looked at, you can measure the impact on demand. You absolutely can.
It's just not my work-it's a lot of people's work. And you can determine
whether or not it had an impact in terms of shifting the demand for the product.
Then, you have to figure out was it worth the cost. Some of the commodities
have done a better job than others in terms of doing that evaluation. 557
Dr. Kaiser had the following comments about the benefits of the programs:
And all of the economic research-well, that may be a little bit of an
overstatement-but most of the economic research, probably at least 90 percent
555
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plus, has indicated that these programs have benefits and the benefits exceed the
costs.558
He described the extent of the benefits as follows:
For most commodities, what we find is that there are benefits to the people that
pay for these programs in the aggregate. So, let's say you have a commodity and
it' s got 100,000 producers in the United States, and they're in the mandatory
program. What we tend to find is that the aggregate net income, net revenue of
that industry at the farm level goes up by more than the cost of the· program. And
typically we see that in the magnitude of like four-fold so that if the program costs
$ 1 million, we see that the industry benefits by infusing another $4 million in
terms of farm net revenue into the industry . . .
We don't know how that money is distributed. Do large producers get more of
the benefits than small producers? I have done a little bit of research on that,
some theoretical research, that actually indicates that, in fact, the smaller farmers
may be benefiting more than the large farmers on a per unit basis.
Kaiser emphasized that the large benefit ratios are often hard to detect, because the level
of investment overall is so small:
Harry Kaiser: Most of these programs are yielding very good benefit cost ratios
for the benefits that they're getting from the advertising, the promotion, or
whatever they're doing. And the typical rate of return is usually 4, 5 or 6,
something like that. So that if you invest $1, you get $4 or $5 back in the
aggregate to the industry . . . .
Interview: And at what point would the producers start seeing a return? The
profits for producers have been increasing going down, so there must be some
point where if it gets high enough, those people on the end would see a return.
Harry Kaiser: Yeah. They're getting a return. They just don't see it, because it's
so small . . . My point is that the returns on a percentage basis are humongous, 400
percent or 500 percent. But they're putting such a small amount in, you can
barely distinguish it from other factors. 559
He also pointed out that, while the processors and retailers are free riders, the farmer still
realizes benefits:
558 Kaiser interview, 2.
Ibid., 7.
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So there are benefits, there are positive benefits to the farmers. They outweigh
the costs in general. But, having said that, there are huge free rider benefits to the
processors and to retailers of these programs because they don't pay for them, but
they get benefits from the programs. Processors see higher prices because of
these programs and higher demand. And with the exception of food milk
processors, most processors don't pay a penny for these programs . . . so when
farmers say, "this is unfair because we're paying for these programs and other
people are getting benefits" it's tiue . . . . But what is not true is when they imply
"when the processors and retailers are better off, we are worse off." That is not
true.560
The benefits of generic advertising have been strongly asserted by a host of other
researchers who have performed various economic analyses, including a team from Texas
A&M University, led by Dr. John Nichols, director of the Texas A&M Center for
Consumer and Food Marketing Issues. Nichols and his team of agricultural economists
(Dr. George Carroll Davis, Dr. Oral Capps, Jr. and Dr. David A. Bessler) were
commissioned by the National Pork Board (NPB) to conduct a study to investigate the
returns to pork producers as a result of the pork checkoffs. They delivered a report titled
"An Economic Evaluation of the Pork Checkoff Program, Texas A&M Department of
Agriculture Economics, 2001 Departmental Technical Report No. 01-1 ," dated January
200 1 .561
In deposition testimony Dr. Capps provided in the case of Michigan Pork
Producers v. Campaign for Family Farms, he outlined details of the pork study. Capps

identified two different economic models that were used by the researchers to conclude
that pork producers were realizing returns based on the pork checkoffs. 562 In fact, their
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562 Capps referred to the two models used in the study as the "structural model" and the "time series
model." Both models showed that the pork checkoff delivered a positive benefit. (The time series model
was more conservative, but still showed benefits.) Ibid. at 50, 55, 64-65.

264

report stated: "Unequivocally all producers benefit from the demand enhancing
expenditures of the checkoff program."563 Capps testified that Technical Report No. 01-1
was "peer reviewed" by another faculty member in the same department as the research
team at Texas A&M. It was also reviewed at a preliminary stage by two outside
academics, Dr. Marvin Hayenga of Iowa State and Dr. Harry Kaiser of Cornell who
received financial reimbursement for their services. It did not receive a traditional "blind
peer review" as required for published journal articles.564
The groups challenging the checkoffs are quick to point out that the majority of
the research showing positive benefits of checkoffs was performed by academic
specialists with funding from the government and various commodity promotion boards,
who openly admit to "collaborative" goals. While academic specialists give assurances
of their autonomy in perfonning independent, scientific research, a reasonable
assumption can be made that an academic specialist who is paid by the government or a
commodity promotion board may be predisposed to support the viewpoint (or
"ideological ensemble" in the language of Laclau and Mouffe) of the industrial
commodity bloc exercising hegemony.
Agriculture specialists aligned with the counter-hegemony against the industrial
agriculture bloc are in the minority. John Bunting, a New York dairy farmer, activist and
writer for the online farm newsletter, The Milkweed, attributes this to the fact that the
land grant university system is a major player in supporting the industrialized system of
agriculture. 565 He expressed concern in his interview about the close relationship
563
Ibid., 55.
564 Ibid., 26-29.
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between agribusiness and the land grant universities, and stated that he was not aware of
a single "dairy economist" that was critical of the industrialized agriculture model566
However, he ·commended one food marketing economist, Dr. Ron Cotterill, for his work.
Cotterill, director of the Food Marketing Policy Center at the University of
Connecticut, has a record of clashing with corporate giants when his studies have
disclosed monopoly pricing practices in the food industry. He ·recently published a study
that showed supermarkets and milk processors in New England had gouged consumers
by significantly overcharging for milk under the guise of meeting federal requirements of
the Northeast Dairy Compact (a federal program that ran from 1997 to 2001 and
guaranteed New England farmers a minimum price for milk). The research agenda
followed by Cotterill aligns him with the counter-hegemony against the industrial
agriculture model as evident by his own admission:
Most of the economists in my subject area of industrial organization and
anti-trust economics work for the big guys. Only a very small fraction work for
the little guy and the public interest. As the trend continues toward economic
concentration and fewer big firms, our research becomes all the more
important.567
John Bunting reported on a face-off between Cotterill and another economist, Dr.
Ken Baily, associate professor of dairy markets and policy economist at Penn State
University, who has attempted to discredit Cotterill's study on the milk pricing in the
Northeast Dairy Compact. Bailey's work is clearly aligned with dominant corporate
interests. (Bunting referred to Bailey's work as "defending the status of corporate

566Ibid.
567 Elizabeth Omara-Otunnu, "Cotterill Analyzes Competition, Monopoly in Food Industry," Advance on
the Web (March 3, 2003); available from http://www.advance.uconn.edu/03030307.htm; Internet; accessed
30 May 2003.
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truth.")568
Dr. Neil Harl, agricultural economist, lawyer, and director of the Center for
International Agricultural Finance at Iowa State University, has been another academic
voice for the agricultural counter-hegemony. His writing, speaking and leadership
suggests that he may be a central organizer for organic intellectuals within academia and
in other sectors seeking to build a power bloc against the dominant hegemony. His
assertion that the "the greatest economic threat to farmers as independent entrepreneurs is
the deadly combination of concentration and vertical integration" 569 has appeared in his
various public talks and papers, providing the counter-hegemony with a phrase from an
academic specialist to identify the practices it strongly opposes.
The Organization for Competitive Markets (formed in 1998 to increase accuracy
and fairness in the food chain market}570 hosted a debate at its annual meeting between
Dr. Harl and an advocate for the industrial agricultural model from Texas A&M, Dr. Ron
Knudtson. Harl argued for a diverse industry structure that would replace the "deadly
combination of horizontal concentration and vertical integration" and Knudson responded
by arguing "bigger is more efficient" so consolidation is the answer for the future.
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In another head-to-head in the academic "war of position" between hegemony and
counter-hegemony, Harl took on the economist, Steven C. Blank. As noted earlier in this
dissertation, Blank predicted that food production in the United States will disappear and
agribusiness will flourish as raw products are provided from foreign sources. Harl wrote
a review of Blank' s book, The End of Agriculture in the American Portfolio that disputes
many of Blank' s conclusions and questions the factual basis for many statements. Harl
acknowledged the accuracy of Blank's observation that economic forces will determine
the direction of the agricultural sector, but objected to Blank' s "extrapolation of trends at
the margin" to predict the future for American agriculture.571
Harl has joined other academic colleagues in research and publications relating to
monopoly by the meatpackers in the livestock industry, including: John Connor,
agricultural economist and professor of Agricultural Economics, Purdue University; Peter
C. Carstensen, agricultural law expert and Young-Bascom Professor of Law, University
of Wisconsin School of Law; and Roger A. McEowen, agricultural law expert and
associate professor of Agricultural Economics and Extension Specialist, Agricultural Law
and Policy, Kansas State University.
The four scholars released a report in 2002 titled "The Ban on Packer Ownership
and Feeding of Livestock: Legal and Economic Implications."572 The report discussed
legislative efforts to balance the economic power between producers and processors in a
highly concentrated and vertically integrated meatpacking industry. The authors
571 Neil Harl, "Review of The End ofAgriculture in the American Portfolio (Steven C. Blank)," Iowa State
· University faculty website (1998); available from
http://www.econ.iastate.edu/faculty/har/Book_Review.html; Internet; accessed 30 May 2003.
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criticized captive supply arrangements and disputed claims by the meatpacking industry
and its supporters that it alleged were misleading, e.g., the legislation curbing ownership
of livestock would have a severe detrimental impact, that shared risk arrangements would
become illegal, etc.
This economic report became a banner document for the counter-hegemony in the
war of position, especially when a contrary report was released by the Sparks Company,
Inc., a commodity market research firm hired by the National Cattlemen's Beef
Association and the National Pork Producer's Council to study the impact of the
proposed law banning packer ownership and feeding of livestock fourteen days prior to
slaughter. The Sparks report concluded that the proposed would have a severe negative
impact on the beef and pork industries that a Sparks executive outlined as follows:
The end result likely would be lower producer prices, higher costs, smaller
markets and diminished returns for the foreseeable future. Losses for cattle and
hogs could be as hip as $10.9 billion and $3.5 billion of that cost would be on
the beef industry. 57
A similar war of position between the experts occurred on May 8, 2003, when a
report was published by an academic team challenging the USDA' s published
conclusions regarding costs for country of origin labeling. Such labeling has been
strongly opposed by agribusiness (the industrial agricultural bloc) that seeks to avoid
informing consumers about the source of food products. The May 2003 report carefully
evaluated the numbers and methods used by USDA economists and found that such
numbers were "excessively high" and based on numerous inaccurate assumptions. This
team included: Dr. Harl, Dr. McEowen, Dr. Connor and two other agricultural
573 "New Report Concludes Packer Ownership Proposal Could Cost Cattle Industry $3.5 Billion," site
affiliated with beef.org, website of the National Cattlemen's Beef Association, 'I 2 (March 1 8, 2002);
available from http://policy.dnsalias.net/sparks; Internet; accessed 9 July 2003.
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economists, Dr. John VanSickle of the University of Florida and C. Robert Taylor of
Auburn University. 574
The 1996 Farm Act required all commodity programs to demonstrate the
effectiveness of their generic advertising on a periodic basis as a condition for
maintaining such programs. The agriculture economists performing this research have
played an important role in maintaining the checkoff hegemony. This was evident from
the interviews conducted with Dr. Ron Ward and Dr. Harry Kaiser for this study. A
significant number of agricultural economists have built their careers around performing
research relating to the mandatory commodity promotion programs.
Although agricultural economists and law experts aligned with the agricultural
counter-hegemony may agree with using First Amendment strategies as another means to
wage a war of position against the industrial agriculture bloc, they have not been
outspoken in challenging the commodity checkoffs. They have not launched a counter
challenge to the research demonstrating that the commodity checkoff programs have
achieved the goal established by the legislature, namely, "to increase the primary
demand (i.e., size of the pie) of a product."575 In the conflict over commodity checkoffs,
the agricultural specialists on the side of counter-hegemony seem willing to concede the
issue of the effectiveness of the generic advertising and let the free speech argument be
the primary f ocus of the hegemonic battle. (However, Erik Jaffe, a constitutional lawyer
representing checkoff challengers emphasized in his interview that the formulas and
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procedures used to support the findings that the commodity programs were effective had
never been subjected to a rigorous examination in a legal challenge.)576
In a study on ''The Influence of Generic Advertising on Brand Preferences," two
marketing professors (Amitav Chakravarti, assistant professor of marketing, Leonard N.
Stem School of Business, New York University, New York, and Chris Janiszewski, Jack
Farley professor of marketing, Warrington College of Business, University of Florida,
Gainesville, Florida) asserted that "the concern of these commodity producers [filing
lawsuits in the checkoff cases] is not that generic advertising is ineffective at increasing
primary demand but that it is also redistributing 'shares of the pie,' especially in markets
that have become differentiated."577 Markets can become differentiated by branding or
by advertising unique product attributes. The agricultural economists have touted the
effectiveness of the programs, but Chakravarti and Janiszewski argued that the issue
driving the checkoff lawsuits is the potential for generic advertising to: 1 ) influence the
distribution of market shares among brands in differentiated markets, and 2) cause
consumers to become more responsive to price. They stated:
Generic advertising is designed to increase primary demand, or the 'size of
the pie,' without affecting selective demand, or the 'share of the pie' . We find
evidence to the contrary-generic advertising increases the consumer's sensitivity
to changes in price and systematically alters brand preferences. These effects of
generic advertising can be attributed to the tendency of generic ads to change the
relative importance of the attributes used to evaluate the brands. The results have
implications for the public policy issue of how to effectively implement generic
advertising without differentially benefiting certain brands and the managerial
issue of how to integrate generic and brand advertising in order to achieve product
category and brand differentiation goals. 578
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Chakravarti and Janiszewski's study was the only research identified during this
dissertation project that explored the interrelationship between generic and branded
advertising. This is clearly a key issue in the tree fruit and mushroom checkoff lawsuits
and may also be an issue for livestock and dairy commodities as the trend toward
branding becomes more prevalent in those industries.
. The researchers questioned the positive or negative effect that generic
advertising has on the whether "generic advertising may mitigate or amplify the
advertising efforts of individual brands." 579 They noted the concerns exemplified in
recent challenges to generic advertising and stated:
In each case, the plaintiff argued that generic advertising was not achieving its
legislatively mandated goal of increasing primary demand for all of the sellers in
the commodity market. In this article, we will demonstrate that the concerns of
United Foods and small cattle producers are legitimate.
In study 1, we show some generic ad campaigns increase, and others decrease,
brand differentiation in a product category. These changes in brand
differentiation result in changes in brand choice. In studies 2 and 3, we show that
generic advertising influences the competitive structure of a market because it
increases the importance of an advertised product attribute by decreasing access
to information about non-advertised product attributes. We also show that
decreasing access to information about non-advertised product attributes results in
an increased sensitivity to price, a consequence unique to generic advertising .. . 580
The researchers reached the following two conclusions based on a series of four
experiments conducted with generic and branded advertisements. "First generic
advertising has the potential to redistribute market shares among brands. Second, generic
advertising has the potential to make people more responsive to price."581

579 Ibid., 4.
Ibid., 4-5.
581 Ibid., 33.

5 80

272

The two academic specialists involved in this study are marketing professors who appear
to be in a neutral position with regard to the checkoff hegemony.
Several former government agricultural officials that have moved into academia
were interviewed in this study, including: Daniel Glickman, Enrique Figueroa and
Kathleen Merrigan. While they may retain loyalties toward political parties and powerful
private business contacts that are aligned with the dominant industrial agricultural model,
they were willing to acknowledge both the negative and positive aspects of the checkoff
programs and to assess ways in which the USDA could have done a better job handling
checkoff matters arising during their tenures. One explanation for why they may feel
more freedom to admit weaknesses of the checkoff system than other agriculture
economists and academic specialists is because they hold academic posts that are not
politically or financially beholden to the checkoff system. 582
The Government's Position (or Lack of a Position)

"There is a near universal frustration at the inactivity of the USDA. "
~ Doug O,Brien (commenting on the government,s
failure to address concentration in agriculture)
The Government and Change in Agriculture. A children's fairy tale spins the

yarn of a royal leader who hired tailors to weave cloth and sew a new set of clothes for
him. In furtherance of a self-serving scheme, they kept the gold the emperor gave them
for their services and spread the message that "stupid people and those not good at their
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jobs are unable to see the fabric and the new clothes. "583 Time passed and no one in the
emperor's entourage acknowledged the obvious-that the tailors produced no clothes.
Finally, the tailors pocketed the last of the gold and the king modeled his nonexistent new
clothes in a parade. A young child finally spoke the truth, "He hasn't got anything
on!"s84
Like the emperor and his entourage, the United States Department of Agriculture,
legislators and politicians have watched the disappearing rural farm population, the major
shift in agriculture represented by growing concentration and the glaring structural
inequality in the agricultural economy with a singular failure to acknowledge and address
these developments. A member of Senator Harkin's staff, Doug O'Brien, succinctly
summarized this by noting that there is a "near universal frustration at the inactivity of
the USDA" in responding to the higher degree of concentration in the agricultural
industry. 585 In the face of inescapable evidence of change (reports by advisory panels
and commissions, testimony before Senate and House committees and subcommittees)
and numerous efforts by to raise the consciousness of the State, the legislators and
political actors have been sluggish in acting.
The Farm Bill of 2002 provided for a shift back to a farm dependency paradigm
with significant farm subsidies, but did nothing to address the inequitable economic
structures that have arisen through concentration and continue to become more extreme.
Many scholars believe that this legislation, in fact, reinforces the interests of corporate
agriculture since almost half of the farms receiving assistance are commercial farms with
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annual income of $250,000 and higher. 586 Activist agricultural organizations and
individuals continue to push legislation that will seek to limit ownership of cattle by meat
packing operations and to seek better enforcement of the Packers and Stockyards Act by
GIPSA. The issues surrounding the increased importation of foreign beef and its impact
on the demand and price of domestic beef do not appear to be on the radar.
A number of special advisory councils and hearings have put the issue of
concentration before legislators and the USDA. Likewise, objections to the checkoff
challenges have been communicated through referendums (clearly an indication that a
certain percentage of the industry population disagrees with paying the checkoff fees).
But the government and politicians have chosen to let the tailors continue to collect the
gold and ignore the reality that the emperor has no clothes.
Gramsci's theory suggests that this is an example of AgriBiz hegemony - a
dominant group seeking to avoid a "crisis of hegemony" by quietly reinforcing its power
bloc and refusing to recognize or address the agricultural crisis. The ideology of AgriBiz
can be seen in their vision of an industry that "shuns a commodity system and embraces
value-added production"587 and in the Federal government's approach to farm policy.
In the 1960s and 1970s, the government's policies fell heavily under the influence
of commercial business leaders and economists at the Committee for Economic
Development (CED). In his 1992 book, The Corporate Reapers, A.V. Krebs argued that
the government became more than an observer in the structural changes required. In a
1974 report by the CED, it concluded:
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''The diagnosis [previously made by the CED in 1962] was that agriculture
was using too many resources; fewer farms and farmers could produce all the
output then required or even more than could be marketed. As a result of these
findings, we prescribed programs 'for the better use of our resources in
agriculture [that], vigorously prosecuted, would enable the people involved in
farming to receive higher incomes without government controls or subsidy.'
In general, policies of this nature have been pursued by the U.S.
government, with the result described in the present statement; namely, that U.S.
agriculture today is far more efficient, a far more productive industry."588
While it has not expressly endorsed the industrial agricultural model and its
attendant commercial values and ideology, the USDA almost thirty years later has
provided full tacit support for this approach as the preferred means for the future of
agriculture within the American economy. This is implicit throughout the language
found in the USDA publication titled Food and Agricultural Policy: Taking Stock for the
New Century published by the USDA in 2001 as a comprehensive report on American

agriculture. A close reading of the USDA's leading publication shows language such as:
"Globalization makes it imperative for companies to diversify their
sources of raw materials and buy from the farmer, wholesaler, or food processing
company that provides the best product for the lowest price at any given time.
All of our experience and evidence points to increasingly fierce
competition in the agricultural system, suggesting that the innovative, cost
effective producers will prosper. Mergers, acquisitions, and further globalization
of the food system can be expected to continue. Helping consumers eventually
get what they want can be good business, and businesses that can do this quickly
and efficiently tend to succeed while those who are slow to understand key trends
face rapid erosion of competitive position."589
This report embraced "mergers, acquisitions and further globalization of the food
system," and the benefits of increased contractual arrangements, size economies and
reduced transaction costs occurring as the result of structural changes (i.e., vertical
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integration).590 It made only passing reference to the potential antitrust concerns with
regard to monopolies created by structural change in the following paragraph:
While this structural change is advantageous for some, it also prompts
concerns about competition, market access, and the use of market power by some
participants to the disadvantage of others. Moreover, reduced competition could
limit society' s gain from structural change by stifling innovation or tilting the
market's result in favor of those with the greatest market power. 59 1
In this publication, the USDA discussed the diverse farm sector in terms of
commercial farms, intermediate farms, and rural farms. Woven throughout is a message
of encouragement to intermediate farmers and rural farmers to move toward "off-farm"
income. The executive summary glibly noted: ''Today, fewer farmers are full time,
choosing to merge farm and nonfarm employment opportunities."592 The publication at
no point acknowledged the reality of the forced exodus of thousands of farmers or their
painful efforts to work second and third jobs to maintain a subsistence level of income.
The USDA does point out the disparity in farm program benefits intended to bolster the
farm industry. In regard to the most financially disadvantaged segment of farmers, the
USDA report noted:
This limited-resource group comprised about 6 percent of farms, had
average household income of $9,500, but received less than 1 percent of direct
government payments in 1999. In contrast, 47 percent of payments went to large
commercial farms, which contributed nearly half of program commodity
production and had average household income of $135,000 . . . .Even though many
intermediate farms and rural-residence farms receive some program benefits, only
one in four generated enough revenue to cover economic costs. Even more
problematic is the inability of these farms to improve their cost efficiency at the
same pace as larger commercial operations, whose investment in new
technologies and ability to expand are aided by program benefits. 593
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Intermediate farmers are encouraged to consider direct marketing and value-enhanced
products, but the commitment of the USDA to this group is questionable when this
suggestion is followed by: "Moreover, the importance of off-farm earnings clearly
suggests that large benefits accrue to these farmers from efforts to expand off-farm
employment opportunities and strengthen rural communities."594 At the same time it has
minimized the importance of the intermediate farmers, the USDA is forced to solicit their
participation in addressing environmental issues. It stated: " . . . this group of farms
controls a significant portion of the farmland (45 percent), and supporting their
compliance with environmental regulations is important to the quality of the Nation's
resources. "595
The USDA dismissed economics as unimportant to rural-residence farms with the
observation that "(O]bjectives other than farm profitability, such as enjoyment of a rural
lifestyle and farm work, keep them in agriculture. "596 It further minimized their role as a
non-participant in the economics agricultural game by noting:
Not surprisingly, traditional agricultural policy has very little influence on
the financial well-being of these households. They are very little connected to
commodity prices but much more so to wage rates, interest rates, employment
levels and tax policies. Their needs obviously are more effectively addressed by
rural development and other policies that most affect them. 597
Again, an annoying reality for the USDA is that, while the rural farmers fail to
contribute economic value, they own a great deal of farmland. The USDA report sought
to find a redeeming role for the rural farmers in conservation and environmental
programs:
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These farms are small individually, and they account for only a small
proportion of total output, but collectively they control a large proportion (29
percent) of the farmland, suggesting that their participation in appropriately
designed conservation and environmental programs potentially could make
important contributions to national objectives in those areas.
It is telling that only one of the USDA' s target initiatives for rural farming are
related to any future role in agriculture. The three new policy initiatives include:
" . . . expanding value-added agricultural production, finding alternative methods to
increase rural income from the natural resource asset base, and providing leadership in
education, specifically entrepreneurial skills."598 In the absence of an economic
contribution that can increase Gross National Production (GNP), there is no other role for
rural farmers so they need to retrained and moved to other industries, consistent with
Steven Blank' s assertion that agriculture is a "dead loss" to the nation if it cannot
contribute to the global agribusiness movement. While mentioning environmental and
health concerns, the promise of biotechnology and other scientific advances, the report
makes no reference to the larger issue of "sustainable agriculture" that has begun to
capture the attention and concern of activist groups and the public who are interested in a
longer-range vision of how the current industrial model with allow the earth to sustain its
resources in the face of practices of commercial farming and depletion of agricultural
assets. Sustainable agriculture and an expanded range of values relative to environment
and quality of life are absent from the discussion.
In addition, the USDA has quietly refused to address in this report and elsewhere
the growing economic inequities inherent in the agricultural industry dominated by
commercial agriculture (i.e., the industrial model and vertical integration). For example,
598
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although concerns have been growing among the public and legislators regarding the
dominance of a small number of meatpackers and the level of their profits accrued
through a variety of practices such as captive supply arrangements, this issue and the role
of the Grain Inspection and Packers and Stockyards Administration in protecting the
interests of farmers and the public is noticeably ignored in Food and Agricultural Policy:
Taking Stock/or the New Century.

The USDA' s vision of American agriculture is through the eyes of the industrial
agriculture bloc. Alternative agricultural models based on any conceptual foundation
other than the economic cost-benefit of the industrial model are literally off the USDA' s
radar. Even organic farming and smaller operations with value-added crop features
appear to be tolerated as enterprises operating at the fringes of the dominant model, but
not as opportunities for developing legitimate alternative models. As organic food
products have gained consumer popularity, some organic farming operations have begun
to operate more fully within the industrial agriculture model, and the USDA has slowly
begun to give greater recognition to organic farming.
The favored treatment that the USDA has given to the ideology of commercial
agriculture and the global industrial agriculture model and its implicit acceptance of the
ideology for the future of agriculture can be seen in this USDA report. The USDA
summarized its position as: "Foremost, our strongly held view is that agricultural policy
must recognize that the marketplace is the best guide for allocating resources and
provides the most objective reward for efficiency and good management."599 However,
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this is a hollow statement if competition in the marketplace no longer exists due to
concentration and vertical integration.
In addition, the report asserted that the globalization of markets and culture and
other fundamental changes in society and agriculture are trends that are "positive and
unstoppable."600 This is a huge challenge for those seeking to build an historic bloc
capable of counter-hegemony that is sufficiently powerful to break the current hegemony
in agriculture. They must first generate a public consciousness and then win consent to a
set of beliefs and values based on the platform that the trends are negative and can be
stopped or changed.
The Government and the Checkoff Programs. Dr. Ron Ward emphasized

during his interview that the USDA and the AMS must support the current checkoff
program because the law requires this role. According to Ward, they must carry out their
responsibilities in four areas: 1) administration of the program, 2) message and delivery,
3) monitoring and evaluation, and 4) equity and legal challenges. 60 1 The commodity
checkoff statutes require evidence that the programs are effective so this becomes a
threshold requirement for an ongoing program. Ward stated: "I don't think they would
defend one [checkoff program] if they felt like it was totally not effective."602 He
suggests that the government should be expected to stand behind the checkoffs as part of
its agency function:
The USDA has a responsibility in every one of those [areas of oversight]
by law. So, they're supporting them legally. Part of it is because they think it's a
600
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good program maybe, but part of it is just the fact that it is a piece of legislation
that's in place. So, they just couldn't say, well, we're walking away fro� it.603
It can be argued that the USDA has reluctantly stepped up to its role in handling
the commodity referendums for livestock. The government's role in responsibly carrying
out the mandates of the checkoff legislation requiring referendums have been seriously
scrutinized by many, including the courts. However, during the interviews for this study,
the views on the referendums and how they were handled varied widely, depending upon
whether the interviewee was aligned with the commodity industry bloc or the group
challenging checkoffs.
A representative of the Cattlemen's Beef Board thought the USDA should have
moved more quickly in handling the beef referendum, but was satisfied with the USDA's
actions in conducting a signature verification process, providing the following comments:
[l]t was clear in the manner in which LMA gathered signatures, there had to be
some kind of verfication process in order to comply with the law, which says that
if 10 percent of America' s beef producers want to petition for a referendum, then
the secretary can call one. So the question becomes, "Are these beef producers?"
And as you probably know . . . USDA, yeah, I would have liked them to move a
little faster. But USDA hired Price Waterhouse to conduct a verification process,
and LMA fell way short of the number of bona fide cattle producers necessary to
hold a referendum . . . So it's unfortunate that LMA didn't conduct a factually
sound-or just didn't go about gathering the signatures in a manner that would
have assured that they were cattle producers, that they really knew what they were
signing. 604
Daniel Glickman had the following response when asked whether he was satisfied
with the way the USDA handled the pork matter:
No, because I think that first of all, we were not election officers, and we were in
the midst of conducting a hotly contested election and, frankly, not very capable
of doing that. And we did not do it very well. It's one of the things we talked
about at the end, I mean, we did the best we could, and I think that my
603
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certification was in good faith as close as it probably was. But the whole process
of ballot counting and verifying signatures, it was just a monumental mess. And
it was not one the government was really set up to do. 605
A pork producer and member of the Pork Board strongly agreed with Secretary
Glickman' s assessment:
[T]he referendum, in my view, was a flawed process from the beginning. When
USDA set it up under Secretary Glickman, they did a number of things that we
challenged that were wrong. Primarily, that you didn't have to verify eligibility to
vote . . . You could challenge someone's elibigility if you wanted to. It was on the
different sides to challenge each other. But then they made it really burdensome
to challenge because when you challenge somebody, you had to do it in writing,
and that letter could only challenge one vote. If you wanted to challenge 1,000
people, you'd have to send 1 ,000 letters. So, it wasn't done to really have a fair
election, in my view. We challenged in the beginning, and I think the next time
it's done, USDA learned from that. 606
Several of those interviewed in this study expressed the viewpoint that the
position of the government in the checkoff challenge has not been one of neutrality
because of the government's stake in using the checkoff programs to create and enhance
its authority. Enrique Figueroa, former administrator of the Agricultural Marketing
Service (AMS), the group within the USDA responsible for overseeing the checkoff
programs, pointed out how close the ties are between the AMS and the commodity
industries. In order to generate a more arms-length relationship, he wanted to remove
administrative oversight of the commodity promotion programs to a group that was not
involved in the certification products in exchange for use fees. He noted:
One idea that I had that I was not successful in implementing that I wanted AMS is organized by commodity, the avocado program, the poultry program-I
wanted to reorganize where I would have a division of research and promotion
oversight so that the people there strictly did that, whether it was pork or beef or
cotton. The reason I wanted to do that is because historically, the divisions
tobacco or whatever it is-their livelihoods are a direct function of how well
605 Glickman interview, 3.
606 Interview with anonymous pork producer and member of the Pork Board, 5.
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those industries are willing to pay AMS in user fees. The Agricultural Marketing
Service is probably the one agency within the entire federal government that has
the largest proportion of its operational budget coming from user fees." 607
User fees are the payments made by the commodity producers for the government's
testing, certification and grading of the commodities. A satisfactory relationship between
the dominant industry blocs and the USDA with respect to checkoff programs will
strengthen the relationships needed for a steady flow of user fees. Expecting the
government to take any take steps that would jeopardize the checkoff programs without a
statutory directive from Congress or a legal mandate frqm the courts is tantamount to
asking the foxes to lock the door on the henhouse.
The Challenger's Story
The hegemony is quick to emphasize that the origin of many of the stand-alone
checkoffs occurred through the initiatives of producers themselves as they hopefully
voted for self-directed programs that would be administered by the government to assist
them in addressing the severe conditions they were experiencing in the deteriorating farm
markets in the 1970s and 1980s. 608 This is a painful irony to the producers who feel
betrayed by the promise of enhanced returns through checkoff programs. In a poignant
commentary, George Naylor (an Iowa farmer elected president of the National Family
Farm Coalition, a coalition of 34 grassroots farm and rural groups) reflected on how
naive he and others were initially about the goals of checkoffs, voting for the com
checkoffs in the 1970s with faith that promotions would be good for farmers. Now he
believes differently. He concluded that a primary goal of checkoffs is to generate
Figueroa interview, pp. 3-4.
The foundation for the checkoff programs seems deeply at odds with the argument of "government speech"
used by the USDA and the trade associations to defend against the First Amendment claim violations alleged by
the challengers.
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higher production to get more cheap commodities for export. Naylor implicates the
media along with the corporations:
" .. [t]he only beneficiaries of checkoffs are the big corporations who can increase
their volume and margins. If the American people really knew how they and
farmers have been lied to, they would wonder what has really happened to our
country. Unfortunately today's campaign tactics and shallow, misleading news
reporting leaves the average citizen bewildered or numb."609
There was a consensus among the individuals interviewed that the lawsuits
challenging the constitutionality of mandatory commodity fees were prompted partially
by the lack of a guaranteed vote on a periodic basis. Several individuals expressed their
opinion that the conflicts could have been avoided if regular elections or referendums
were in place. A Livestock Marketing Association executive stated:
Personally, I think the largest mistake that was made by the proponents of the
checkoffs when they drafted the legislation-and I know why they didn't do it,
but I think it was a very large mistake on their part-was that they didn't establish
a period vote in the law. I think they did it because they didn't want to take the
chance that this thing would come back to a vote and would end the
program . . . And when they took away their right to get a vote other than through
the ridiculously difficult, almost impossible petition drive, that said to producers
as they became unhappy, well, how dare they force me to pay when I can't have
any right then to say at any point whether I think the program ought to continue to
exist or not. They can't tell me on one end it's directed by me, I have a free right
to make a decision whether it should continue or not when they don't have any
means within the law to make that happen. 6 1 0
This same individual emphasized the importance of a periodic vote several more
times during the interview:
I do think that, again, if NCBA or NBBC and others of these commodity
checkoffs had permitted periodic votes after some of the issues came up, they
would be in existence today and there probably would be no lawsuits . . . .I still
think that most of these checkoffs have shot themselves in the foot by not
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allowing producers to have a periodic referendum in which they could tell these
guys, I agree with how you've done it or I don't. 611
The editor of the Western Livestock Journal, Steven Vetter, voiced his opinion in
favor of periodic referendums:
I do think that there probably are better alternatives in terms of language to allow
for referendums automatically every seven, eight, ten years, five years, whatever
would be deemed appropriate. And I sure think it would help take things to a
better level in terms of having all interested parties involved in the system.612
Daniel Glickman expressed a similar view several times during his interview:
I would say the larger more established interests have kind of viewed this as very
proprietary. These are their deals. The larger guys are contributing most of the
money into it, and they haven't viewed it as a very democratic process for small
producers.
If you'll notice, in many of these programs, there's no automatic requirement for
a revote after a certain number of years. It's only if a certain number of people
ask for a vote is there a vote. So, to the small guy, that's always looked like a
ruse to keep elections from happening. In my judgment, I think the small guys
are right on that. I think all these checkoff programs would be a lot better and
there would be a lot less political activity associated with their demise or
attempted demise if the processes appeared to _be more open and transparent and
there were automatic referendums every three years or five years, the same way
we have elections on everything else. But the promoters of these programs have
tended to resist that. 61 3
He emphasized the need for a democratic process to maintain industry confidence:
I believe there ought to be a structured process, whether it's part of the
existing government operation or maybe as a self-regulatory body that would do
this [handle elections for continuing checkoffs]. But there needs to be a body, a
formal body that could be conducting these elections. I don't see how these
promotion and marketing programs can stay in effect for the longer term without
people having confidence in them that they're being run in a democratic way and
that the election process is democratic. I think if you did that, then you would
have a little less of a tendency to run to the courts and use interesting and novel
theories to probably kill them.61 4
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The litigation challenging checkoffs in the beef and pork industries attests to the
lack of confidence in a democratic process. Doug O'Brien, staff member for Senator
Tom Harkin, observed that the pork checkoff conflict was fueled by the perceptions of
the hog farmers that the USDA had not followed a democratic process because the
referendum process -"resulted in the fact that 53 percent of the· people did not have their wishes abided by. And the USDA was the one that made that happen."6 15 He stated:
I think it [the checkoff conflict] started out. . . as a release valve for the frustrations
created by the development of a more industrialized model of livestock
production. But how it grew into something bigger than it was because of the
process, because of the sort of painful process that the referendum went through
and how the settlement seemed to take away the democratic voice for a lot of
folks who voted in that thing.6 1 6
Counter-Hegemony
"We only admit to the truth when we recognize
that our economic problems are moral problems."6 17
~ M. L. Wilson
AgriChoice, the group engaged in counter-hegemony against the industrial
agriculture bloc, is attempting to construct elements into a moral-political force that will
shift the terms of the agricultural debate. The checkoff challenge is in the "zone of
conflict" and contributes to this counter-hegemony movement in four ways.
The first is by establishing a moral ground in the First Amendment right to be free
from compelled speech. This is a much more powerful platform than an argument that the
mandatory assessments amount to commercial speech and, therefore, should be afforded
First Amendment protection. It is true that legal counsel may be persuaded that the
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Abood standard is a stricter test and a better fit in legally analyzing the First Amendment

checkoff challenges than the commercial speech doctrine, but the Abood approach is also
valuable in offering a more recognizable moral ground for the checkoff challengers in
their efforts to build counter-hegemony. They can argue "my First Amendment rights are
violated by being forced to pay for speech I do not approve" or "those who pay should
have a say" with greater moral indignation than "forced payment of checkoff fees
violates the commercial speech doctrine." In order to solicit support from a wider public
for the second argument, they must explain why the mandatory payment of fees amounts
to commercial speech (i.e., advertising) and what the standard is for protecting
commercial speech and so on. Using this argument to build an "ideological ensemble"
for a counter-hegemony movement would not be an easy task.
The second and third contributions of the checkoff challenge arise only through
the efforts of the anti-checkoff challengers in the livestock and dairy industries.
However, these are important ways in which the checkoff challenges benefit the efforts to
build counter-hegemony.
The second contribution is to generate political outrage at the inequitable
distribution of checkoff benefits (and profits) in the agricultural chain. The dollars are
extracted from the producers at the bottom of the chain, but the beneficiaries of the
generic advertising are entities higher in the chain. The statistics bear this out: the
producer's share of the total beef dollar has sunk to the lowest point in American history
and, between the years 1995 to 2000, the spread between wholesale meat prices and the
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price producers are paid has increased by 54 percent for beef and 24 percent for pork. 6 1 8
The challengers in the tree fruit and mushroom industries are not involved in making this
contribution, because they are not motivated by a goal of more equitable distribution of
profits in their industries. Instead, these checkoff challengers are the major players in
their commodity industry blocs seeking to increase their market shares.
The third way in which the checkoff challenge helps build a moral-political
foundation is by characterizing the checkoff program as an integral part of an
irresponsible system that interferes with efficient and accessible competitive markets and
inflicts damage on the environment. Again, this argumentative platform resonates in the
challengers' rhetoric in the livestock and dairy industries, but does not apply to the
mushroom and tree fruit industries where the producers and handlers have challenged the
checkoffs for profit reasons. They have not engaged in any public rhetoric or actions that
indicate that the checkoff lawsuits are part of a larger strategy to attack current market
practices or the industrial agriculture model and its impact on the environment. Indeed,
this is logical since the current economic and agricultural paradigm has generated success
for them.
The fourth way in which the checkoff challenges may contribute to a moral
political force in the broader counter-hegemony movement against the industrial
agriculture bloc is by delivering a message through a judicial victory. A win for the
checkoff challengers would communicate to the agricultural industry and the public that
the courts offer a means for correcting injustice when other parts of the State apparatus
618
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have joined the dominant group in creating and maintaining unjust agricultural
conditions. It would demonstrate that the courts are a favorable terrain for fighting a
"war of position."
Mike Callicrate, beef producer and plaintiff in a beef checkoff case, stated: ''The
courts are our last resort, and we just hope we can find fair judges that will let us
prevail."619 Similar statements were expressed by other anti-checkoff challengers, such
as Joseph and Brenda Cochran, plaintiffs in a dairy checkoff case. Brenda Cochran
explained their decision to become involved in legal action as follows:
[F]or awhile, it appeared that Congressmen and Senators weren't always
cooperating with what appeared to be an agenda that was coming out of USDA.
Then after awhile, we noticed a peculiar change, and they were deaf, certainly
they were dumb. They weren't listening, they weren't doing. We slowly had to
give up on the executive branch, the legislative branch. And our last hope was the
judicial system. . . We still have hope, more hope in the judicial system than
executive or legislative branches right now. They've been co-opted.620
Ultimately, the challengers are seeking a shift in power. Jeanne Charter, a
producer of a ranch with 250 cattle, described this objective as follows:
Jeanne Charter: By far, the huge investment in our industry is in people our size
because of the conditions under which you've got to raise cows and
calves . . . Then, you get all the power going to the centralized, organized end. It's
bad enough anyway, and then this checkoff arrangement's made it worse. Our
industry goal is to cut them down to size because they really are the less important
part of the industry. But the tail's wagging the dog. This is one place where
strategically they could be cut down to size. And USDA, too. Like I say, I'm
increasingly appalled at how they think they should run things.
Interviewer: When you say "them," to cut "them" down to size that are less
important, who is that?
Jeanne Charter: The processing sector. The feeding and processing sectors have
power out of proportion to their investment, basically. It doesn't come near the
investment people like us collectively have . . .. The processing and feeding sector
always wins the policy debates.
619
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Interviewer: And those that don't win the policy debates are who?
Jeanne Charter: The smaller producers that need competitive marketing.
Interviewer: So when you say the processing sectors and the National
Cattlemen's Beef Association, are you talking about the same group?
Jeanne Charter: Yeah. They're members, but they're more than that. They're
kind of an inner circle that runs things. ·They're dominant players. 621
Ms. Charter and other challengers were frank in identifying the way in which they are
using checkoffs to further their battle against the hegemony of centralization:
That's what the fight is over, kind of that the checkoff is aiding and abetting
further centralization, both in terms of the programs and in terms of empowering
National Cattlemen's. Both those ways. What they've relied on for the most part
was . . . most people in agriculture are pretty private. They kind of hope things will
tum out. That's about as far as it goes. But, it [the checkoff legal battle] is a
major result against the idea that the powers that be will look out for us. An awful
lot of people decided, well, that' s not going to happen.622
She clarified that the challengers were motivated by a realization that the beef
commodity industry bloc (referenced as the "powers that be") is not looking out for the
best interest of a lot of people in agriculture. This view is echoed by another rancher and
feedlot operator, Mike Callicrate, who viewed the NCBA as a major player in the
dominant industry group that is using checkoff funds contrary to the best interests of the
beef producers. He focused on ways in which he felt the National Cattlemen's Beef
Association (NCBA) had followed a wrong path: ''The NCBA has hijacked the checkoff.
The NCBA has failed to represent the cattle producer who pays the checkoff on any of
the most critical issues affecting them, those being competitive markets, open markets,
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free markets as well as unfair imports."623 He explained the importance of the increas�d
representation in NCBA by the importers of foreign beef:
[T]he importers hold the second largest voting block of anyone on the checkoff
right behind Texas, which has the largest inventory of cattle of any state. That is
scary. In fact, when we saw the reorganization the last time, U.S. producers lost
three seats because of the cattle herd liquidation going on in the United
States . . . So we are forcing cattle herd liquidation in a market that is the highest
and best market in the world for beef, and we do not have access to it as U.S.
producers. In fact, importers of foreign beef have preferential access, and, of
course, it is not the Australian producer we import from. It is Con-Agra. It is
IBP. It is the big processors, and those guys are buying it in Australia below its
cost of production.
That is what angers the U.S. cattlemen so much, that they have now decided to
just simply "defund" NCBA by calling for an end to the checkoff. That is what
it's about. It's about taking the money away from an organization that has lost its
way and essentially turned against U.S. cattlemen.624
Dan Alberts, a Nebraska lawyer, concluded that the checkoff assessment
programs are a "cozy method to tie the agribusiness system together and to minimize
counter speech." 625
To maximize its influence and become the representative voice of a significant
mass of people, the AgriChoice group must find a philosophical position that will allow a
new historic bloc to form and infuse the debate with new elements of ideological
discourse that will be meaningful for a broader scope of consumers, producers,
legislators, government officials and academic representatives. One of the tasks for the
challengers is to find a way to express their alternative ideology in a populist idiom.626
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Comments provided by Doug O'Brien, attorney and staff member for Senator
Tom Harkin, suggested that the success of the counter-hegemony would only be realized
if the public gets involved. He observed: "Some would argue that this tide will not tum
until the consumers start to feel this. You're just not going to reach those legislators from
more urban districts until consumers begin to understand the implications of this food
system."627
Stuart Hall, in his analysis of ''Thatcherism" and the emergence of the hegemony
of the radical right in Britain, pointed out the importance of capturing the commitment of
the people in determining the success of a political movement. His paragraph describing
how the underlying theoretical ideologies (Keynesianism and monetarism) must be
translated into populist language that can be understood and assimilated by the citizens is
particularly instructive:
Neither Keynesiansim nor monetarism, however, win votes as such in the
electoral marketplace. But, in the discourse of 'social market values,'
Thatcherism discovered a powerful means of translating economic doctrine into
the language of experience, moral imperative and common sense, thus providing a
'philosophy' in the broader sense-an alternative ethic to that of the 'caring
society' . [referring to the ideology of the left] This translation of a theoretical
ideology into a populist idiom was a major political achievement: and the
conversion of hard-faced economics into the language of compulsive moralism
was, in many ways, the centerpiece of this transformation. 'Being British'
became once again identified with the restoration of competition and profitability:
with tight money and sound finance . . . 628
While the AgriChoice counter-hegemony has begun to consolidate its fractions
and define its ideological base, it has not advanced an idiom yet that fully engages the
public. Several themes or phrases that are being used with some degree of success

m O'Brien interview, 6.
Stuart Hall, "The Great Moving Right Show," in The Poltics of Thatcherism, eds., Stuart Hall and Martin
Jacques (London: Lawrrence and Wishart, 1983), 28-29.
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include: sustainable agriculture, competitive markets, environmentalism, market
transparency. The checkoff challengers have introduced freedom from compelled speech
as one theme for counter-hegemony and have used the phrase ''Those who pay should
have a say." However, this theme has not translated into a popular symbol or phrase or
idiom that would allow the counter-hegemony to leverage this legal conflict fully to its
benefit outside the beef industry.
Several groups involved in delivering the messages of the counter-hegemony
serve as "umbrella or facilitation groups" for organizing and focusing the philosophies
and resources of the counter-hegemony. The most prominent among these (and the most
successful thus far in influencing agricultural legislation and the dominant hegemony) are
the Organization for Competitive Markets, the National Campaign for Sustainable
Agriculture and the Western Organization of Resource Councils. It is worth noting,
however, that these organizations have clearly defined missions and are sensitive to
"mission creep."
For example, the Organization for Competitive Markets (OCM) is highly focused
on creating change that will influence the industrial model by creating more competitive
market conditions to benefit farmers who are victims of industry concentration and
vertical integration. The organization debated the issue of whether to get involved in the
legal challenges to checkoffs. However, as this research has pointed out, concentration
and vertical integration do not appear to be issues in the fruit and mushroom checkoff
cases (which are driven by branding and product differentiation concerns). Furthermore,
the organization would have to make the assumption that the commodity checkoff
programs are improperly used by agribusiness and the large corporate players to the
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disadvantage of the producers paying the checkoffs. The nexus to the mission of OCM
was tenuous and the group decided not to use its resources to weigh in on the issue.
Doug O'Brien, who was associate legal counsel for OCM for fifteen months, described
the OCM consideration of the checkoff issue as follows:
OCM is one of those groups that's very cognizant about mission and tries
to stay on consolidation: It was a debate within the organization all the time,
whether this [the checkoff challenge] was really a competition/consolidation issue
or not. . . . I think most people probably agreed with the proposition that the
checkoff is a consolidation issue. But they had so much on their plate, they never
got directly involved. 629
In the beef industry, the counter-hegemony related to the beef checkoffs is
occurring simultaneously with another separate, but parallel, counter-hegemony against
the beef commodity industry bloc launched by beef producers who are alleging violations
of the Packers & Stockyards Act (PSA)630 by the meat packers in three different legal
actions. The three lawsuits include: Pickett v. IBP,63 1 Republican Valley Feeders, Inc.,
et al. v. ConAGra,632 and Murdoch v. Excel. 633

The lawsuit that has captured the attention of the beef industry most dramatically
is Pickett v. IBP because it is the first class action lawsuit to be brought under the PSA, a
629

O'Brien interview, 4.
Packers and Stockyards Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 181 et seq. The PSA was enacted in 1921 to address meat
packer concentration problems when the "Big Five" meat packers controlled 55 percent of the beef
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or quality. The goal of the legislation was to ensure competition in the livestock industry. It remains an
important (but largely ineffective) enforcement tool at a time when the packer concentration in livestock
has exceeded 80 percent. Its enforcement agency, the federal Grain Inspection, Packers and Stockyards
Administration (GIPSA) has failed to respond to complaints and petitions and is understaffed. It was
criticized by a 2000 report of the U.S. General Accounting Office for failing to carry out its responsibilities,
despite the fact that it has anti-trust authority that exceeds that granted to the Justice Department in the
Sherman Act. See United States General Accounting Office, Packers and Stockyards Programs: Investigations
of Competitive Practices Need Improvements, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Administrative Oversight
and the Courts, Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, GAO/RCED-00-299 (Washington, D.C.:
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statute that has been on the books for more than eighty years.

It

was filed in a federal

district court in Alabama in 1996 by a small group of cattle producers: Henry Pickett
from Alabama, Mike Callicrate from Kansas, Pat Googins from Montana, Chris Abbot
from Nebraska, Johnny Smith from South Dakota and Robert Rothwell' s family
corporation from Nebraska. The District Court Judge for the Middle District of Alabama,
Judge Lyle Strom, certified the case as an anti-trust class action suit against IBP on April
30, 1999, despite extensive maneuvering by IBP to avoid this result. It is one of the
largest antitrust cases in the United States in the early years of the Twenty-first Century
and represents the first success by cattlemen in reaching trial in an antitrust class action
lawsuit against meatpackers.
The beef producers in the Pickett case claim that IBP, Inc. has engaged in abusive
market practices by using "captive supplies" of cattle. Captive supply arrangements can
occur through IBP' s ownership of cattle or through its use of forward contracts,
marketing agreements or joint-venture arrangements. The case is scheduled for trial in
January 2004. It is an example of counter-hegemony occurring in the same terrain with
different parties and different causes of action (First Amendment issues and anti-trust
issues) but with the same industrial agriculture bloc being the target.
Countervailing Power
In advancing his theory of countervailing power, John Kenneth Galbraith
recognized that one outcome of modem capitalistic society was monopolistic power
wielded by centers of concentration. However, this was not necessarily a negative
phenomenon if the concentrated power triggered strong economic and business strategies
by countervailing institutions that would serve as a check on the monopolistic systems
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and prevent economic exploitation of consumers, smaller players and subordinate
enterprises. In the agricultural context, the question is whether such countervailing
power has emerged or can emerge in the future.
Terry Stokes, CEO of the National Cattlemen's Beef Association, described
examples of livestock producers forming alliances and creating economically successful
production units. This suggests the possibility of developing countervailing economic
power as conceptualized by Galbraith. Stokes stated:
[T]oday within the industry you have producers who are wanting to get into the
meat packing business to capture more of that value. For example, we have a
quality beef project, which an Iowan cattleman put together a co-op and bought
the Tama Packing Company. There was establishment a few years ago of the
U.S. Premium Beef Co-op. Raleigh Beef in Southern California is a group of
cattlemen who went together and built a packing company . . . The same thing was
done with certified Angus Beef. I could name you a dozen different types of
arrangements where people have come together and looked at ways in which they
want to market their cattle.634
He described the concept of beef producers and industry partners working together to
produce high quality beef products that satisfy consumer needs as follows:
Well, you will have participants from different segments of the industry coming
together to produce a branded product. For example, if you go to King Super' s
here in Denver, they have Cattlemen's Collection. That is the brand of beef that
they sell there. In Cattlemen's Collection, there is cow-calf producers, feeders, a
packer and a retailer that are participating in that to produce a value added product
for consumers. 635
Stokes identified branding as another way in which the cattle industry is getting
more value from products. He cited the Cattlemen's Collection alliance and the Certified
Angus cooperative as examples of this.636
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However, several hurdles emerge when considering whether independent
Ii vestock producers (or dairy producers) can launch a successful countervailing power
structure as suggested by Stokes.
First, the group launching the countervailing power must have capital and
resources. At this time, the smaller independent producers are universally strapped for
cash. This also translates into a shortage of time as fewer farmers struggle to farm
operations with reduced farmhands and have less time for developing relationships and
exploring new collaborative efforts.
Second, the producers in this group are generally highly opposed to the industrial
business model so it is illogical to assume that this group will generate a legitimate
countervailing power within the framework of the agribusiness corporate model. Apart
from the philosophical differences over commercial commodity production, the
independent producers, by nature, also prefer a business model that offers privacy and
autonomy. This was mentioned by several farmers interviewed in this study as a
drawback in generating collective action to develop countervailing power.
Third, the bargaining power of the producers is woefully diminished. Without
aggressive strategies to change their bargaining position, the producers will continue to
operate from a severely disabled position in seeking to form a viable countervailing
power. Producers are cautiously optimistic that the class action antitrust lawsuit by the
beef producers against IBP, ConAgra and Excel Corporation may improve the bargaining
position of livestock producers sufficiently for them to consider new possibilities for
countervailing power. Producers hope that the First Amendment cases holding
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commodity checkoffs unconstitutional will provide a shift in the bargaining position of
the producer as well.
A fourth hurdle relates to the hegemony's control over information and its access.
Dairy farmer John Bunting has experienced lack of cooperation by the USDA in
providing him with information that should be readily available to the public without this
filing a Freedom of Information request.637 It is his opinion that the small, independent
American farmer is highly disadvantaged in business decision-making by his or her
inability to access information controlled by government agencies. To the extent that an
effort to build countervailing power requires up-to-date information that the government
can delay in providing or even refuse to provide, the counter-hegemony will be
disadvantage.
Possibilities do exist, however, for countervailing power. In every instance,
though, the producers need to address the need for a new business model outside the
industrial business model that has garnered acceptance. Given the long-term critical
importance of adopting new agricultural practices more attuned to maintaining the
resources needed for a healthy agricultural industry, a successful countervailing power
may likely be founded on sustainable agriculture principles. The values and ideology
behind these principles are aligned with the predominant viewpoints of the smaller,
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Bunting interview, 13. Bunting gave an example of his efforts to confirm how the milk produced on his
farm was priced. He sought this information to better understand "dairy numbers and diary policy and
everything about the politics of it." He knew that some groups were selling milk to the government, which
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commodity checkoffs and milk programs) and was deliberately misled. Ibid., 19-20.
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independent farmers, so it makes sense that this commitment to natural resources could
be leveraged to build countervailing power.
Retired University of Missouri professor of agricultural economics Dr. John Ikerd
has written extensively about sustainable agriculture. He is a visionary who sees a post
industrial paradigm for agriculture already starting to emerge consistent with the shift
from the industrial society to the knowledge society. In a 1 997 article, Ikerd wrote:
The conventional wisdom among those in the agricultural establishment is that
trends toward industrial production for mass markets are trends of future for
American agriculture. Agriculture is becoming just another industrial sector of
our industrial economy. But the world is continually changing. A growing
number of people who make their Iiving forecasting the future, the futurist, see a
new post-industrial era where there is room for more than one model or paradigm
for economic and human progress. (citations omitted)638
Industrial work requires large scale operations and bigger outputs. On the other
hand, " .. . the smallest effective size is best for enterprises based on information and
knowledge work."639 Alvin Toffler, recognized for his futurist writings, offered the view
that efficiency and productivity are losing credibility as the guiding standard for business
success.640 The progressive business model is no longer identified with mass production,
but instead with the ability to "produce customized goods and services aimed at niche
markets, to constantly innovate, to focus on value-added products and tailored
production.''641
John E. Ikerd, ''The Role of Marketing in Sustainable Agriculture," presented at the 87th Annual Meeting of
American Society of Agronomy in Oct.lNov. 1995, online article on University of Missouri faculty website; 1 35
(1996); available from http://www.ssu.missouri.edu/faculty/jikerd/papers/stl-mkt.htm; Internet; accessed 1 3 April
2003. The author cites the following sources at the end of this paragraph: Alvin Toffler, Power Shifts (N.Y.:
Bantam Books, 1990); Peter Drucker, The New Realities (New York:: Harper and Row, 1989); Peter Drucker,
The Post Capitalist Society (New York: Harper Business, Harper Collins, 1989); John Naisbitt and Patricia
Aburdene, Megatrends (New York: Hearst Corporation, 1990); and Robert B. Reich, The Work of Nations (New
York: Random House, 1992).
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It is Ikerd' s prediction that "[D]ifferences in organizing principles may be
critically important in determining the future size and ownership structure of economic
enterprises, including farms.642 The flexible, dynamic possibilities inherent in the
philosophy and practice of sustainable agriculture make it highly compatible with the
emerging paradigm of knowledge work.
Ikerd proposed that building a new agricultural model around the economics and
marketing strategies of niche marketing will be an effective way of competing with the
industrial model. However, he draws a clear distinction between farmers competing in
markets for value-added products and farmers producing and selling agricultural products
in niche markets:
Farmers who attempt to add value through processing, transportation, or storage
must be willing and able to perform those functions better or at a lower costs than
can existing marketing firms, if they expect to make a profit. Even if such
farmers are successful, they are not engaging in niche marketinf Instead, they
have become successful players in the mass marketing game. 64
As pointed out above, there are real and substantial financial and organization hurdles
that smaller, independent farmers must overcome to effectively launch countervailing
power by playing the mass marketing game. Ikerd suggested that their success lies in
using the niche marketing model as a viable alternative, and concluded:
"If the road to agricultural sustainability leads toward larger numbers of smaller,
more diversified farms, then niche marketing represents an opportunity for
smaller, diversified farms to expand vertically and to compete commercially with
larger, specialized agricultural enterprises . . . In the post industrial era of human
progress, niche markets may well become the norm rather than exception. "644
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The countervailing power in niche marketing may be enhanced and perhaps
depend upon acquiring the ability to adopt sophisticated branding techniques that will
serve to support the goals of the producers. This nod toward consumerism recognizes the
strong role and power that resides in branding programs and commercial
communications. In addition to serving as a critical selling tool, a branding program for a
niche market can expand the assets of an agricultural producer and build goodwill in its
intellectual property.
Another aspect of building a new model that can emerge as a countervailing
power is the need to market directly to the consumer or to build an alternative system of
processing and/or distribution to the consumer that bypasses the concentrated areas of
control that exist within commodities. In the tree fruit and mushroom industries, this has
taken place as small producers have generated direct marketing relationships with
retailers and developed their own distribution systems.
An alliance between producers and consumers could become the pivotal point in
building countervailing power. It could afford the relationships to bypass corporate
agribusiness or could promote new attitudes and demands by consumers that will force
change in the industrial agriculture model. Jeanne Charter emphasized the importance of
the relationship with the consumer in creating change:
There's a growing network of active family farm groups basically that has been
holidng on and, in the beef industry, has been actually growing in the last five
years just because people are seeing they better do something or get out . . . They're
starting to be rival groups . . . I think the thing that's happening with the family
farm groups, the challenge farm groups, is we're beginning to talk to consumers
more. That kind of alliance could be potent. 645
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Farm cooperatives organized under the Capper-Volstead Act seem to offer some
possibility for countervailing power. Cooperative are exempted from anti-trust laws
under the Capper-Volstead Act.646 Enacted in 1922, this statute provides that agricultural
producers may: " . . . act together in associations, corporate or otherwise, with or without
capital stock, in collectively processing, preparing for market, handling, and marketing in
interstate and foreign commerce, such products of persons so engaged."647 Such
enterprises may enter into agreements, but must be "operated for the mutual benefit of the
members thereof' and meet certain other requirements. 648 Farmer cooperatives are not
permitted to enhance their product prices and members are not permitted to be vertically
integrated in their operations.649
In a 2003 conference paper on the structure of the agricultural sector, Neil Harl
discussed the possibility of farmers building alliances among producers to establish
countervailing power. He suggested collective action under the Capper-Volstead Act as
a strategy for farmers seeking countervailing power, but pointed out one of the drawbacks
already mentioned in this section: "Historically, however, farmers have been unwilling
to accept such a disciplined approach to achieving bargaining power. "650 Professor Harl
stated:
The key question is whether producers will be willing to sacrifice
independence of action in order to bargain collectively for access to inputs and for
greater market power in marketing their products. The most likely avenue for
such collective action is through organizations specifically created for that
646
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purpose. The time may be near when that will be the only practical alternative to
vulnerability and serfdom.65 1
Countervailing power by producers seems unavoidably linked to collective
activity. In American Capitalism: The Theory of Countervailing Power, John Kenneth
Galbraith said: ''The development of countervailing power requires a certain minimum
opportunity and capacity for organization, corporate or otherwise."652 The challenge for
independent farmers is to find the minimum opportunity and capacity for organization,
whether through use of the Capper-Volstead Act or other means.
A number of legal commentators have expressed the opinion that the Capper
Volstead Act falls short of the potential it could offer to commodity producers as an
effective tool for economic competition because the judiciary has failed to clarify issues
related to member qualification, specifically what should be the boundaries of
permissible integration by cooperative members. 653 In an increasingly integrated and
industrialized agricultural environment, this has become an issue for producers since one
integrated member in a cooperative could taint its immunity status. Rather than focusing
on the goals of cooperative ventures, producers participating in cooperatives are
distracted by concerns related to losing their anti-trust statutory immunity. The USDA is
also unduly burdened with assisting farmers in setting up cooperatives rather than
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Because the protections Congress envisioned [for farmers through Capper
Volstead] have been hampered, and the text of the Capper-Volstead Act has been
ignored at times, farmers and cooperatives have a renewed fear that they will be
subject to prosecution under antitrust laws . . . In order to alleviate these concerns
and fulfill the wishes of Congress, the courts must engage in a renewed and
refreshed reading of the Capper-Volstead Act and apply its language in a manner
consistent with the Congress's desires. Such an application must involve a
definitive interpretation of the terms "producer" and "farmer." The proper
interpretation would focus on risk assumption by the individual, as well as
personal involvement in the farming operation. Going one step further, Congress
should consider a certification program administered by the USDA for
cooperatives that would provide prima facie evident of their Capper-Volstead
status. Addressing this issue is critical to agriculture in the United States.
Farmers must be permitted to integrate their operations and engage in cooperative
action. The future of agriculture depends on it. 654
While cooperatives have continued to offer an alternative means of establishing
countervailing power and success stories are recognized, cooperatives have not mustered
the economic strength to become a countervailing power against the powerful
concentrated agribusiness enterprises. It should be noted that cooperatives in dairy are
the exception, having gained more power and control than cooperatives in other
industries. Several individuals interviewed for this study have suggested that they have
become a key player in the dairy commodity industry bloc aligned with business
conglomerates such as Kraft, Inc.
Professor Neil Harl emphasized that there is critical need for legislatures to enact
legislation to improve the diminished market power of producers. He declared:
It is unlikely that countervailing power can be achieved in one grand move to get
large numbers of producers to bargain collectively for inputs and for the sale of
commodities. Rather, greater market power is likely to be achieved, if at all, by
bargaining groups of relatively modest size and comprised of producers
committed to collective marketing and committed to producing commodities at a
quality level desired by processors and on a schedule consistent with the
purchaser's capacity.
654
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To facilitate the formation and operation of such collective marketing (and input
supply) groups, enabling legislation at the state (or federal) level is needed to
assure that-(1) agribusiness firms would be required to bargain in good faith; (2)
would assure that recriminatory behavior would not be allowed by agribusiness
firms; (3) members of the unit would be required to be producers (to bring the
group within the exemption from antitrust strictures found in the Capper-Volstead
Act.
Professor Harl' s position is consistent with John Kenneth Galbraith's concept of
how the government can play a role in facilitating countervailing power. Galbraith
stated: "In light of the difficulty in organizing countervailing power, it is not surprising
that the assistance of government has repeatedly been sought in this task."655 He
described the difficulties faced by government in responding:
The role of countervailing power in the economy marks out two broad problems
in policy for the government. In all but conditions of inflationary demand,
countervailing power performs a valuable-indeed an indispensable-regulatory
function in the modern economy. Accordingly, it is incumbent upon government
to give it freedom to develop and to determine how it may best do so. The
government also faces the question of where and how it will affirmatively support
the development of countervailing power.656
Again, the importance of connecting with the consumer can be seen in the process
of laying the groundwork for countervailing power through legislative action. It is a
prerequisite for generating support among legislators for new laws along the lines
proposed by Neil Harl-support that must be substantial to overcome strong resistance by
those in the dominant power blocs. Doug O'Brien's statement (quoted earlier in this
dissertation) succinctly summarized this: "Some would argue that this tide will not turn
until consumers start to feel this."657
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Commodity checkoff programs for generic advertising would not appear to play
any role in a post-industrial economic model based on a paradigm of diversity and
smaller scale farming. The idea of creating a demand for homogenous products is
inconsistent with a model for countervailing power based on tailoring agricultural
resources with specific tastes and preferences of consumers. This alternative model
would suggest a strong focus on branding, the antithesis of commodity checkoff
programs based on promoting like commodities. It is possible that checkoff programs
might be imposed for collecting voluntary or mandatory fees for other uses, such as
education and research, which might contribute toward the goals of countervailing power,
if the objectives and goals of the producers could be unified in these areas.
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CHAPTER S
IN THE LEGAL ARENA
"There is hardly a political question in the United States
.
. h does not sooner or later tum znto
. a JU
. l one. ,,658
. d zcza
wh zc
~ Alex de Tocqueville
The Legal Investigative Frame

The federal and state judiciaries have created a growing body of controversial law
addressing the constitutionality of mandatory commodity assessments. The use of a legal
investigative frame guided the researcher in a structured analysis of this legal activity by
focusing on five areas: 1) the cases, parties and courts that have rendered decisions on
checkoffs; 2) the history of factual and legal developments underlying each case; 3) the
interests at stake for the presiding federal or state judges and the legal institutions in
which they serve; 4) the opinions and legal doctrines or principles on which such
opinions are based; and 5) the status of each case and its relevance with regard to the line
of cases on compelled commercial speech. The legal investigative frame used for this
analysis is shown at Table 3. The cases included in the legal investigative frame also
appear along with others in the annotated list of cases in Appendix B.
The legal investigative frame begins with the case of U.S. v. Rock Royal CO-OP,
Inc., 659 a case brought by milk processors in 1939 challenging the constitutionality of a

milk order under the 1937 Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act.660 In the face of a
distinctly unreceptive U.S. Supreme Court, no constitutional challenges were raised for
almost fifty years.
658
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660
Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of June 3, 1937, Pub.L.No. 137, 50 Stat. 246 (codified as
amended as scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.).
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Table 3
-

Characteristics
of Checkoff
�lrnlltngt>rs

Case
U.S. v. Rock

Royal

CO-OP, Inc.,

307 U.S. 533
(1939)

I

Mille processors
who refused to
pay assessments
under Mille Order
No. 27 were
defendants in a
lawsuit filed by
the U.S.
government to
collect the
mandatory fees.
Mille processors
alleged they were
aggrieved parties
on the grounds
that Mille Order
No. 27 violated
their 5lh

I Amendment, 1 O

dl

Amendment and
14111 Amendment
rights.

Legal Investigative Frame
-

History
Mille Order No.
27 governed milk
produced for sale
in a defined
metropolitan area
of New York.
All cooperatives
paid money into
a milk pool
called the
"Producers
Settlement
Fund."
Withdrawals
were made
primarily by a
large, favored
cooperative, the
Dairymen's
League.
District court
struck down the
milk order,
finding the order
discriminatory
and based on
property taken
without
compensation
and transferred to
another.

Interests at Stake
for Judiciary
Respect for
Constitutional
separation of powers
Scope of

11 Congressional

authority to authorize
regulatory powers
Scope of the
Commerce Clause

Consistency with
earlier cases finding
, Agricultural
Adjustment Act of
1935 was
unconstitutional
because powers given
to the Secretary were
overbroad
Legitimacy of the
institution of the
Supreme Court in
upholding one
portion of the New
Deal legislation
while striking down
others
Recognizing the
scope of state rights.
Balancing equities
when facts showed a
abuse of a regulatory
scheme (Sec. of
Agriculture colluded
in misinforming
public to get
referendum vote.)
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-

Legal Opinion
and Doctrinal
Basis
_

-

Supreme Court
upheld constitutional
validity of the
programs developed
under the marketing
orders. (5-4)
Congress is entitled
to regulate economic
sectors
Statutory language
narrowly defines the
delegation of
authority to the
Secretary
Majority: '"The
associations of
producers of milk
have a vital interest
in the establishment
of an efficient
marketing system. . . If
the Act and Order are
otherwise valid, the
fact that their effect
would be to give
cooperatives a
monopoly of the
market would not
violate the Sherman
Act." At 559-560.
Dissent: "As the
order is drawn and
administered, it
inevitably tends to
destroy the business
of smaller handlers
by placing them at
the mercy of their
larger competitors . . .
i t operates to deny
the appellees due
process of law." At
587.

Status of
Lawsuit and
Relevance
Final ruling.
Case established
constitutionality of
the 1937
Agricultural
Marketing and
Agreement Act.
It privileged
government
regulation that
openly favored
control shared by
the Secretary of
Agriculture and
dominant groups.
It clarified that
marketing orders
will not be
rendered unlawful
simply because
"ulterior motives
of corporate
aggrandizement
stimulated their
activities." At
560.
The
constitutionality of .
the 1937 Act was
not challenged
again until two
cases arose in the
1980s, U.S. v.
Frame, 888 F.2d
1 1 19 (3rd Cir.
1989) and Cal-

Almond v. USDA,
14 F.3d 429 (9111

Cir. 1993).

Table 3
-

Characteristics
of Checkoff

Case

('halll'llgl·r,

I

--

Beef producer and
cattle auction
operator in

U.S. v. Frame,
888 F. 2d 1 1 19
' (3rd Cir. 1989)

Pennsylvania.

Frame objected to
paying $ 1 .00 per
head of cattle as

I

producer and

collecting the fee
as auction

operator under the

Beef Promotion
: and Research Act.

11
. He made a 1
Amendment claim
arguing that the
Act violated his
rights of free
association and
· free speech under
the Abood case.

I

I

Cal-Almond v. In Cal-Alm nd I,
USDA, 14
i three almond
F.3d 429 (9th
handlers
, challenged federal
Cir. 1993)
(Cal-Almond
marketing orders
administered by
I)
the Almond Board
of California.
Cal-Almond,
Inc., v. USDA,
67 F. 3d 874
(9th Cir. 1995)

I
I

USDA v. CalAlmond, Inc.,
1 02 F.3d 999
(1996).
1

I

(He made
additional
constitutional and
statutory claims as
well.)

In the 1995 case,
the 9th Circuit
reviewed a district
court ruling
ordering the
USDA to pay
money owed to
the almond
handlers.
Almond handlers
objected to a
checkoff system
designed to favor
the almond
producers who
sell to the end
market and not to
processors.

History
----

Toe Act of 1937
was amended in
1954 to allow
mandatory fees
to be used for
advertising
purposes.

Toe Beef

Promotion and
Research Act

was passed in
1976 and
amended in 1985
Government
brought suit
against Frame to
collect fees.
District court
held no violation
of 1 st
Amendment
because speech
was deemed
"government
speech".

Blue Diamond
Almonds, the
largest almond
handler, held
over 90 % of the
retail market and
controlled the
Board through
"bloc voting."
Plaintiffs were
unable to recoup
ad costs incurred
in helping fund
ads for cereals,
ice creams and a
chain of minimarkets.
Board denied
credit based on
its regulations
requiring that
products contain
over 50%
almonds to
qualify for
reimbursement.

(Continued)
Interests at Stake
for Judiciary
Respect for

Constitutional
separation of powers
Respect for precedent
in choosing which 1 st
Amendment doctrine
to apply (Central
Hudson test or Abood

Legal Opinion
and Doctrinal
Basis
Court rejected the
constitutional
challenges to the
Beef Act. (2-1 )

Held no infringement
of challenger's 1 11

Amendment rights.

analysis).

Government interests

Dissent

and "ideologically

acknowledged

" . . . there is no
. precedent for the
kind of compelled
commercial speech at
issue here." At 1 146.
Maintaining
legitimacy of the
institution in
choosing how to
apply the
"government speech"
principle.

Legitimacy ,of the
institution in
reaching position
contrary to the 3rc1
Circuit in the Frame
case.
Ability of the
judiciary to enforce
its decisions against
the Secretary of
Agriculture.
(Judicial authority vs.
executive and
administrative
authority.)
Should the court
privilege the
Commerce Clause or
the First
Amendment?
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were "compelling"
neutral."

Any infringement of
freedoms is slight.

Status of
L.m suit and
Relevance
Fmal decision.
Significant
because the court
chose the Abood
analysis as its
preferred 1 11
Amendment
analysis.

Also significant
because the court
rejected the

government
speech argument.

Text from the
opinion has been
quoted in later
documents:
"[A]lthough the
Secretary's
extensive
supervision passes
muster under the
non-delegation
doctrine, it does
not transform this
Dissent: Argued that self-help program
the checkoff program for the beef
did not even pass the 1' industry into
lesser Central
'government
speech."' At 1 1 33.
Hudson standard.
In Cal·Almond I, the Toe conflict
9th Circuit held that
continued in Calthe Almond
Almond II, III and
Marketing Order
N. (see below).
forced the almond
handlers to engage in In the 1996 legal
compelled speech in
squabble, the
violation of their l 11
USDA appealed
Amendment rights in the district court's
free speech and free
order to put
association.
assessments into
escrow and the
district court's
Toe 9th Circuit
remanded the case to stay of an
the district court. It , enforcement
ordered the USDA to 1 action against the
refund several
almond handlers.
million dollars owed I
to the almond
Toe 9th Cir. ruled
handlers (from
in favor of the
escrow accounts,
handlers and
credits for
chastised the
advertising, etc.) Toe Secretary for
USDA appealed.
seeking to pursue
the enforcement
In the 1995 case, the
action while
9th Cir. upheld part
delaying the
of the order for
administrative
reimbursement.
decis_ion.

Majority: Court held
Central Hudson test
applied to the free
speech claim and
Abood analysis
applied to the free
association claims.
So it applied the
stricter scrutiny of
Abood.

Table 3
Case

Characteristics
of Checkoff
Challengers

Wileman Bros.
&: Elliott, Inc.
v. Espy, 58
F.3d 1 367 (91b
Cir. 1995)

Tree fruit
growers, handlers
and processors in
California.

Glickman v.
Wileman Bros.
&: Elliott, Inc.,
521 U.S. 457

Tree fruit and
citrus packing
companies and
handlers

(1997)

Large producers
Plaintiffs
challenged the
tree fruit
checkoffs
implemented
under Marketing
Order 916 for
nectarines and
Marketing Order
917 for peaches,
pears and plums.
At issue were $3.1
million in
contributions held
in a trust fund
account.

History
Challenged
regulations in the
nectarine and
peach marketing
orders, including
assessments for
generic ·
advertising
The 3ro Cir.
considered both
compelled
speech and
commercial
speech 1 11
Amendment
analyses in the
Frame case and
upheld the beef
checkoffs.
The 91b Circuit in
Cal-Almond I
and Espy used
the Abood
compelled
speech and
compelled
association
analyses to hold
the mandatory
fees for almond
and tree fruit
unconstitutional.
The Congress
responded to the
91b Circuit cases
with language in
the Fair Act
indicating its
displeasure with
this judicial
direction and
clarifying and
justifying the
mandatory
commodity fee
programs.

(Continued)
Interests at Stake
for Judiciary
Respect for 91b
Circuit precedent.
Legitimacy as a
judicial institution
when taking a
position contrary to
the 3"' Circuit.
Respect for
Constitutional
separation of powers.
(Is there a
sufficiently strong
basis for overriding
Congress? Is this a
constitutional
question or an
economic policy
issue for Congress
and the Executive to
resolve?)

Legal Opinion
and Doctrinal
Basis

Struck down generic
advertising program
for Calif. nectarines
and peaches.
Cited its earlier
decision in CalAlmond l as
precedent.
Supreme Court
upheld checkoffs and
reversed Espy. (5-4)
"Doubts concerning
the policy judgments
that underlie many
features of this
legislation do
not. . .justify reliance
on the First
Amendment as a
basis for reviewing
economic
regulations." At
2141 .

Macro issues are at
stake relating to
which principles
should be privileged. , Court created a threeShould the Court
part test for whether a
privilege free market
111 Amendment
or government
analysis is required:
regulation? 1 11
1) Does the
Amendment or the
advertising program
Commerce Clause?
impose a restraint on
the producer's
Beliefs regarding
freedom to
economic and social
communicate a
realities and values in message to the
this doctrinal area.
audience? 2) Does
(Balancing free
the ad program
speech vs.
compel producer to
governmental and
engage in any actual
or symbolic speech,
societal interests)
and 3) Does the ad
program compel
Respect for
producer to endorse
Constitutional
principles and
or finance any
political or
precedents regarding
ideological views
commercial speech
and freedom from
that are not germane
to the purposes for
compelled speech.
(Court's credibility in which the compelled
association is
choosing proper 1 1t
Amendment doctrine justified?
for future cases.)
The court held that
Cost to governmental the generic ads did
interests if mandatory not warrant scrutiny
under Central
checkoffs for generic
Hudson and applied
advertising come
11
the Abood
under 1
Amendment scrutiny. "gennaneness test."
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Status of
La\\ suit and
Relernnce
The government
sought Supreme
Court review.
Congress tried to
nullify the Espy
case and CalAlmond n in the
FAIR Act of 1996.
This decision
served as
precedent for
checkoff cases
during four
subsequent years
impacting six
decisions noted
below before the
Supreme Court
decided U.S. v.
United Foods,
which represented
a change in
approach.
The case of
Glickman v.
Wileman Bros. &:
Elliott, Inc. was
highly criticized
by commentators
for its failure to
apply 1 1t
Amendment
principles.
The dissent by
Justice Souter was
considered by
many to be the
correct analysis.
Dan Gerawan filed
a new "lSA
Petition"
challenging the
legality of the tree
fruit marketing
order on the
grounds that the
industry no longer
regulates fruit out
of marketing
channels, so such
regulatory scheme
is moot. A loss in
the administrative
proceeding will
allow him to argue
this in a new court
challenge.

Table 3
Case
USDA v. CalAlmond, Inc.,
521 U.S. 1 1 13
(1997)
(Cal-Almond
II)
Cal-Almond,
Inc. v. Dept. of
Agriculture,
No. 94-17160
(9th Cir. Sept
4, 1997)
(Cal-Almond
III)

Goetz v.
Glickman,
149 F.3d 1 13 1
(H>°' Cir.
1998)

Gallo Cattle,
Inc. v. Ca.
Milk Advisory
Board, 185
F.3d 969 (9th
Cir. 1999)

Characteristics
of Checkoff
Challen �l'rs

Almond handlers
were subject to an
almond marketing
order.
After early
success before the
9th Circuit, the
challengers
experienced a
reversal after the
Glickman v.
Wileman decision.

Kansas cattle
producer, buyer
and trader.
Joined by others
in contesting
mandatory beef
assessments under
Beef Promotion
and Research Act
of 1985.
Intervenors were
Kansas Livestock
Ass'n, National
Cattlemen's Ass'n
and National
Livestock and
Meat Board.
Cheese producer
and one of the
nation's largest
dairy farms

objected to
mandatory
assessments under
the California
Milk Promotion
Marketing Order.
Gallo Cheese is
sold under the
'Joseph Farms'
label and is
distinguished as a
premium cheese.

Ilistory
The 9th Circuit
took a firm
stance against the
compelled
payment of
checkoff fees in
the 1993 case
and in its other
decisions in 1995
and 1996 related
to remedies and
enforcement of
its 1993 decision.
The 9th Circuit
was engaged in a
struggle with the
USDA over the
repayment of
money in escrow
and resolution of
administrative
proceedings.
The district court
decision in 1996
relied solely on
the Frame case
in holding for the
government and
did not even
reference the 9th
Circuit cases.

(Continued)
Interests at Stake
for Judiciary

Legal Opinion
and Doctrinal
Basis

Status of
Lawsuit and
Relevance

Conformance in all
jurisdictions. Need
to impose new
approach on the 9th
Circuit immediately
to change the
direction of the CalAlmond case and the
decision-making of
the 9th Circuit.

After granting
certiorari, the
Supreme Court in
Cal-Almond II
vacated the CalAlmond I decision
and remanded to the
9th Circuit for
reconsideration one
day after its decision
in Glickman v.
Wileman.

The case was sent
back to the district
court for a
decision under the
Glickman v.
Wileman
precedent.

Need to extend the
analysis in the tree
fruit case to other
commodities to
reinforce the choice
made to privilege
government
regulation over free
markets and
Commerce clause
over 1 1t Amendment.
Judicial deference to
U.S. Supreme Court
Judicial restraint in
restricting decision to
scope of this case.
(Avoiding a nding
on the government
speech argument.)

The government
asserted the
"government
speech"
argument.

Maintaining
legitimacy of the
institution

The Glickman
decision involved
tree fruit, a
generic
commodity.

Judicial deference to
U.S. Supreme Court.

This case
introduced issues
of branding and
product
distinctiveness.
(Generic
commodity v.
premium branded
product.)

Beliefs regarding
economic and social
realities and values in
this doctrinal area.

Maintaining
legitimacy of the
institution when
required by the U.S.
Supreme Court.
to change positions.
Proper interpretation
of Glickman to
indicate compliance
with the position of
the U.S. Supreme
Court regarding 1 1t
Amendment
challenges to
checkoffs.
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In Cal-Almond III,
the 9th Circuit
remanded case to the
district court to
dismiss the 1 1t
Amendment claims,
citing the Wileman
case.
The I om Circuit
affirmed the district
court decision
holding that the Beef
Act does not infringe
the 1 1t Amendment
rights of the
challengers.
The court held that
the 1 11 Amendment
challenge was
foreclosed by
Glikcman v.
Wileman.

The 9m Circuit
affirmed the district
court's grant of
summary judgment
in favor of Ann
Veneman in her
official capacity as
the Secretary of the
California
Department of Food
and Agriculture.
The court found that
the Milk Marketing
Order was a "species
of economic
regulation" that did
not violate l't
Amendment rights

Supreme Court
denied certiorari,
so the 10th Circuit
decision was final.
Relying on
Glickman, the 1 0th
Circuit found that
the district court
erred in applying
the Central
Hudson test.

In its Jan. 2003
Delano Farms
opinion, the 9th
Circuit addressed
the soundness of
this decision (and
its 1999 CalAlmond decision)
in light of United
Foods.
It held both
opinions were not
undermined by
United Foods,
because both
involved
marketing orders
like Glickman.

Table 3

Nature 's
Dairy v.
Glickman, No.
99-439, 1999
U.S. App.
LEXIS 3547
(61h Cir. 1 999)

Large milk
producers.
Claimed that the
Dariy Production
Stabili1.ation Act
of 1983 violated . .
their 1"
Amendment
rights.
Action was
against Secretary
of Agriculture and
National Dairy
Promotion Board.

Cal-Almond v.
USDA, 192
F.3d 1 272 (91h
Cir. 1999)
(Cal-Almond
IV)

Almond handlers
who objected to
an Almond
Marketing Order
on 1• Amendment
grounds.
The Almond
Order afforded
ways to receive
credit for the
mandatory
assessments when
almond handlers
met certain
requirements with
their own
advertising
programs (called
"creditable" and
"credit-back"
programs).
Cal-Almond and
other almond
handlers alleged
that these credit
schemes related to
the checkoff
programs violated
their free speech
rights.

District court
granted summary
judgment to the
government and
the board.
This case was . .
decided
chronologically
in time after the
90.. Circuit upheld
the California
Milk Promotion
Marketing Order
in Gallo.

(Continued)

Deference to U.S.
Supreme Court and
deference to 91h
Circuit.
Respect for
Constitutional . .
separation of powers.
(Constitutional
question versus
eonomic policy issue
for Congress and the
Executive)

Cal-Almond filed
a petition with
the USDA
challenging the
credit programs.

Judicial deference to
U.S. Supreme Court.

The
administrative
law judge (AU)
relied on the 9lh
Cir. decision in
Cal-Almond I to
uphold CalAlmond's
constitutional
rights. Both
sides appealed .
The USDA
judicial officer
stayed the case
while Glickman
was pending.

Interest in providing
finality to the CalAlmond litigation.

Consistency in
applying Glickman.

After the 91h
Circuit remanded
the case for
dismissal in CalAlmond IIL the
USDA judicial
officer reversed
the decision of
the AU, holding
that Glickman
foreclosed the l 11
Amendment
claims.
The district court
a eed.
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1 Upheld checkoffs
Court rejected the
argument of Nature's
Dairy that the
contested provisions
of the Dairy Act
create a stand-alone
program unlike the
comprehensive
marketing order in
Glickman.
The court recognized
that "federal
regulation has
permeated the milk
industry for more
than fifty years." At
11.
The court affirmed
the decision of the
district court that
Cal-Almond's claims
were foreclosed by
the decision in the
Glickman case.
The court held that
Cal-Almond's
objections called
into question the
administration of the
almond checkoff
program, but were
not relevant in
determining the
constitutionality of
the program.

Final decision.
Petition for writ of
certiorari was
denied by the U.S.
Supreme Court.
Example of .
another appellate
jurisdiction
following
Glickman.
The court made
clear that it was
deferring to the
judgment of
Congress.

The 9 Circuit
confirmed that
Cal-mond I was
implicitly
overruled.

(Continued)

Table 3
Case
-- -

-

Gerawan
I, Farming,
Inc.
v. Lyons, 24
Ca. 4111 468
(2000).

Gerawan
Farming, Inc.
v. Lyons, No.
F03 1 142
(Court of
Appeal, Fifth
Appellate
District, Dec.
17, 2001).

I

Characteristics
of Checkoff
('ha!h:n�t•rs

U.S. v. United
Foods, 533
U.S. 405
(2001)

Consolidated
administrative
proceeding
' and
enforcement
proceeding
pending before
the district
court in
Jackson,
Tennessee:
U.S. v. United
Foods, No. 961252 and U.S.
v. United
Foods, No. 981082 r,Nestern
Dist. Tenn.)

I

These
consolidated
court actions
are on hold
pending the
outcome of the
6111 Circuit
Michigan Pork
Producers
case.

Legal Opinion
and Doctrinal
Basis

Status of
La" suit and
Relevance

The Cal. Supreme
Court held that the
Cal. Plum Marketing
Program
''implicated"
Gerawan's free
speech rights under
the Cal. Constitution,
article I, sec. 2,
subdivision (a), but
not under the 1 11
Amendment.

The Cal. Supreme
Court
characterized the
mandatory fees for
generic advertising
as "commercial
speech" that was
protected by the
State Constitution.

- --

Respect for free
speech rights in
California State
Constitution

Gerawan
claimed that the
Cal. Plum
Gerawan is a large Marketing
Program,
enterprise using
violated his 1 11
advanced
Amendment ·
technology and
rights and his
sophisticated
'1 free speech rights
marketing
under the Cal.
practices.
Constituition.
Tree fruit growers
and handlers

Judicial deference for
U.S. Supreme Court ·
decision in Glickman
Respect for federal
Constitutional
principles and
precedents regarding
commercial speech
and freedom from
compelled speech.

The district court
granted the
secretary's
motion for
judgment on the
pleadings and the
appellate court
affirmed.
Gerawan
appealed to the
Cal. State
Supreme Court.

I

!

Interests at Stake
for Judiciary

History

Respect for Cal. State
Constitution.
Judicial consistency
between state and
federal judiciary
Maintain legitimacy
of the Court

The district court
held that
Glickman was
controlling and
granted the
government
summary
judgment.

Fresh mushroom
handler required
to pay a
mandatory
assessment under
the Mushroom
Promotion,
Research, and
Consumer
Information Act.

Respect for
precedent while
acknowledging
changed beliefs about
social and economic
realities. (Criticism
of Glickman.)

The 61h Circuit
reversed, holding
that the
Concessions to the
mushroom
swing voters
checkoff
(Kennedy and
program was a
Stevens) by not
violation of the , overruling Glickman
free speech rights
ofthe mushroom 1 Respect for
handlers.
I Constitutional
separation of powers.

The assessments
were used
primarily for
generic
advertising
promoting
mushrooms.

I

I
I

Macro issues are at
stake relating to
which principles to
privilege. Free
market or government regulation? 1 st
Amendment or the
Commerce Clause?

. Choice of 1 11
Amendment doctrine

i

I
II

I

Principal of judicial
restraint in deciding
case oarrowly,
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It remanded to the
appellate court to
decide the level of
protection article I
offered commercial
speech and what test
should be used.
Appellate court held
for Gerawan based
on an intermedialte
level balancing test.
U.S. Supreme Court
affirmed the 6111
Circuit and struck
down the mushroom
checkoff program.
It distinguished the
stand-alone program
for mushrooms from
the comprehensive
regulatory scheme in
Glickman.
Justices Kennedy and
Stevens switched to
the free speech side.
The court applied the
Abood compelled
speech analysis and
declined to apply the
Central Hudson test.
(The decision states
that there would be
no basis to sustain
the checkoffs even if
commercial speech
was afforded lesser
protection.)
Court did not address
the government
speech argument
since it was not
raised in lower court
proceedings.

After United
Foods, the 9111 Cir.
applied an Abood
compelled speech
analysis, an
intermediate level
of scrutiny.
So both state and
federal courts in
Cal. have applied
an intermediate
test to compelled
commercial
speech.
Govem.m.ent has
argued that the
Supreme Court
only disposed of
the summary
judgment motion,
so it can raise the
government
speech argument
in district court
proceedings.

I

This case
represented a
change in the
Supreme Court
approach within a
span of four years.
It signaled that the
Court would
recognize 1 11
Amendment rights
in compelled
commercial
speech cases.

I

It showed
movement toward
iI
privileging free
market over
government
regulation and the
1 11 Amendment
over the
Commerce Clause.

Table 3
Case
Livestock
Marketing
Association
v. USDA,, 207
F.Supp.2d 992
(D.S. Dakota,
2002)
Livestock

Marketing

Association v.
USDA. Nos.
02-2769 and
02-283 2 (9111
Cir. 2003)

Jean and Steve
Charter v.
USDA, 230
F.Supp.2d
1 1 2 1 (D.
Montana
2002)

Michigan Pork
Producers v.
Campaign for
Family Farms,
229 F.Supp. 2d
772 (W.D.
Mich. 2002),
as corrected
October 3 1 ,
2002.

Characteristics
of Checkoff
Chalkngt.'r-,

An association of
livestock
producers (I.MA),
an association of
organizations for
family farms and
natural resources
(WORC) and
individual beef
producers.
Plaintiffs sought:
1) declaration that
Beef Act and the
Secretary's failure
to act on a
referendum
violated equal
protection and due
process rights, and
2) an injunction to
stop collection of
checkoff fees.
Small independent
beef producers
seeking a
declaration that
the Beef Act is
unconstitutional,
an order barring
assessments and
refund of past
assessments.
The Charters
produce grass-fed
beef and object to
paying for ads that
tteat all beef the
same.
Challengers are
individual pork
producers and
four advocacy
groups within The
Campaign for
Family Farms
(CFF).
Challengers
objected to the
mandatory
assessments in the
Pork Production,
Research and
Consumer
Education Act of
1985 on 1 st
Amendment
grounds.

Ilistor}
The district court
struck down the
beef checkoff
and enjoined
collection of fees
on the basis of
United Foods.
The court also
rejected the
government
speech defense,
calling it an
"evolving
concept'' rather
than a doctrine.
At 2003.
1 1t Amendment
claim was added
after United
Foods decision.
Producers
refused to pay
beef checkoffs.
Administra tive
law judge
ordered payment;
they appealed.
USDA argued
that the government speech
defense applied
or, in the
alternative, the
checkoff
program was
constitutional.
Case began as a
controversy over
the outcome of a
referendum to
determine
whether the pork
checkoff
program should
continue.
The parties filed
various
dispositive
motions to
dispose of the
case and strike
certain evidence.

(Continued)
Interests at Stakr
for Judiciary
Respect for
constitutional
principles.
Deference to
precedent, i.e.,
Supreme Court
rulings of Glickman
and United Foods.
Beliefs about social
and economic
realities.
Judicial consistency
(or independence)
with decisions in
other jurisdictions.
(Dist. court in
Montana upheld beef
checkoffs using same
evidentiary record.)
Respect for
constitutional
principles.
Deference to
precedent, i.e.,
rulings of Glickman
and United Foods.
Beliefs about social
and economic
realities.
Judicial consistency
(or independence)
with decisions in
otherjurisdictions.
Respect for
constitutional
principles.
Deference to
precedent, i.e.,
Supreme Court
rulings of Glickman
and United Foods.
Beliefs about social
and economic
realities.
Judicial consistency
with decisions in
other jurisdictions.
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Legal Opinion
and Doctrinal
Basis
glh Circuit Court of
Appeals found the
beef checkoff was
unconstitutional
based on a Central
Hudson commercial
speech analysis.
Court "inferred" that
the Supreme Court
would have used the
Central Hudson test
in United Foods if
the government had
argued it
The glh Cir. rejected
government speech
defense and found
government speech
does not create total
immunity from 1 st
Amendment scrutiny.
The district court
declared the Beef Act
constitutional since
the speech compelled
by the Act is
government speech.
The court declared
the judicial reasoning
rejecting the
government speech
defense in the Goetz
and Livestock
Marketing cases was
faulty because it
incorrectly applied
Frame as precedent.
The court decided in
favor of CFF, et al.
It granted their
Motion for Summary
Judgment, Motion to
Dismiss Affirmative
Defenses and an
injunction prohibiting
the collection of fees.
Judge Richard Alan
Enslen held the pork
checkoff program
resembled United
Foods more than
Glickman.
1 The court rejected the
government speech
defense.

Status of'

Lan suit and
Relevance
This decision
makes a statement
that the Central
Hudson test is a
viable approach
for compelled
commercial
speech cases.
It shows doctrinal
tension that exists
as the judiciary
must address the
intersection of the
compelled speech
and commercial
speech doctrines.
(Both may be seen
as intermediate
tests, but require
different proof.)
Appeal expected.
Appeal pending
before the 9lh
Circuit Court of
Appeals.
The district court
held the Beef Act
constitutionally
sound as "nonideological,
content-oriented
government
speech which does
not violate free
speech or free
association." At
63.
Appeal pending
before the 61h
Circuit Court of
Appeals. Oral
argument occurred
Mar. 1 4, 2003.
Opinion has been
widely quoted:
''The government
has been made
tyrannical by
forcing men and
women to pay for
messages they
detest. Such a
system is at the
bottom
unconstitutional
and rotten." At
791.

Table 3
Case
Delano Farms
v. Ca. Table
Grape
Commission,
No. 00-16778
(glh Cir. 2003)

Characteristics
of Checkoff
Challengers
Three table grape
growers objected
to mandatory fees
required by the
Cal. Table Grape
Commission.
The growers sell
grapes under the
brand names of
Delano Farms,
Silver King and
Grape Royale.

Joseph and
Brenda .
Cochran v.
Ann Veneman,
No. 4:CV-010529,
2003 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS
4361 , (Middle
Dist. Penn.
2003)

In Re
Washington
Apple
Advertising
Commission,
No. CS-010278-EFS
(E.D. Wa.
2003)

State of Fla. ,
Dept. of Citrus
v. Graves
Bros. Co.,,
Tampa Juice
Services, et al.,
Case No.
2D003-2276,
(2nd Dist. Ct.
of Appeal,
Fla.)

Pelts &: Skins,
LL C. v.
Jenkins, Jr.,

No. 02-384-A
(Middle Dist
La. 2003)

Challengers paid
fees into escrow
since 1996.
Milk producers
who run a family
dairy operation of
150 head of cattle
with three sons,
using traditional
farming methods.
Producers claimed
that payment of
dairy checkoffs
violated their free
speech rights.
The Washington
Apple
Commission
initiated this
lawsuit as a class
action suit against
itself to clarify
whether its
mandatory
commodity
assessments were
constitutional.
Large citrus
growers claimed
that a tax on fruit
that was used to
fund generic ads
("box tax")
violated their 1 11
Amendment rights
and filed a
declaratory
judgment action.
Alligator farmer
who sells
premium alligator
hides under its
own brand as a
high-end item.

History
Dist. court
upheld grape
checkoffs based
on Glickman.
Parties stipulated
to dismissal of all
claims except the
constitutional
claim after

United Foods.

Dist. court held
for Commission
on that claim.
Grape growers
appealed.
Producers sought
a declaration that
the Dairy
Promotion and
Research
Program was
unconstitutional
and sought to
enjoin further
fee collection.

The Commission
selected two
growers as
proxies for the
class action.
7 organic
growers and 3
warehouses that
sell branded
apples joined as
interveners.
Cases of five
original plaintiffs
joined by other
growers were
consolidated with
a case by foreign
citrus processors
who objected to a
tax on imported
juices equivalent
to the box tax.
The Dept. of
Wildlife and
Fisheries used
mandatory fees
for alligator hide
promotions.

(Continued)
Interests at Stake
for Judiciary

Legal Opinion
and Doctrinal
Basis

Status of
Lawsuit and
Relernnce

Judicial deference to
U.S. Supreme Court

The 9lh Circuit ruled
that the grape
growers were entitled
to First Amendment
protection and
reversed the
dismissal.

The Grape
Commssion
declined to appeal
and the case is
now before the
district court.

Maintaining the
legitimacy of the
institution in view of
its changed position ·
that checkoffs can
Case could then
violate free speech
return to the dist.
rights. (Court must
Court for trial.
either distinguish its
Gallo and CalThe court found the
Almond decisions
from United Foods or grape checkoff
i
program was aligned
concede that they are
with United Foods.
no longer good law.)
Respect for
constitutional
principles.
Deference to
precedent, i.e.,
Supreme Court
rulings of Glickman
and United Foods.
Beliefs about social
and economic
realities.
Respect for
constitutional
principles.
Deference to
Supreme Court
precedent.
st

Choice of 1
Amendment doctrine
(compelled speech or
commercial speech).
Deference to
Supreme Court
precedent.
Consistency between
federal and state
judiciary.
Beliefs about social
and economic
realities.
Respect for
constitutional
principles.
Deference to Sup.
Court precedent.
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District court upheld
the dairy checkoffs
because the facts
were consistent with

Glickman.

It held that the dairy
checkoff program
was part of a larger
regulatory scheme
and that the statute
passed the Glickman
3-part test.
The district court
struck down the
apple checkoff
program by applying

United Foods.

The court found no
government speech
and rejected Central
Hudson as an
inappropriate test.
Court granted the
growers partial
summary judgment
and held the box tax
was unconstitutional
It applied Glickman
and United Foods
and rejected the
government speech
defense.
Court held fees were
unconstitutional
violations of free
speech. It rejected
the government
speech defense.

The 9lh Cir. held
that its rulings in
Gallo and CalAlmond were
''plainly
distinguishable"
since the checkoff
schemes in those
cases were similar
to Glickman.
Producers have
filed an ap�l
with the 3 Circuit
Court of Appeals.

The Commission
shut down its
offices. It is in
settlement
discussions with
growers to allow
the Commission to
collect small
assessments for
export promotions
and to support
industry groups.
Declaratory
judgment for
growers granted
May 1 4, 2003.
State of F1a. has
appealed rulings.
Court recognized
1 st Amendment
immunity for
government
speech.
The Dept. of
Wildlife and
Fisheries has filed
an appeal with the
5lh Cir. Court of
Appeals.

The next case included is U.S. v. Frame, 661 decided by the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals in 1989. It ushered in a busy era of commodity checkoff litigation.
The investigative frame traces this line of cases, including two somewhat contradictory
U.S. Supreme Court cases, Glickman v. Wileman662 and United States v. United Foods. 663
In these cases, the Court interpreted the First Amendment rights of tree fruit growers and
handlers compelled to pay mandatory assessments for generic advertising differently
than such mandatory fees imposed on mushroom growers. Three district court decisions
in 2002 resulted in appeals before appellate courts in the Sixth Circuit, Eighth Circuit and
Ninth Circuit. Oral argument occurred in March 2003 for the cases in the Sixth Circuit
and the Eight Circuit. In a decision issued on July 8, 2003, the Eighth Circuit held that
the beef checkoff program was unconstitutional. The Sixth Circuit decision should be
forthcoming soon. The legal investigative frame concludes with four district court
decisions and one state court decision issued in the year 2003 on the constitutionality of
compelled checkoff programs for generic advertising of table grapes, milk, apples, citrus
fruit and alligator hides. Legal battles are continuing all but one of these cases. The legal
investigative frame presented in Table 3 is a snapshot in time that will be expanded and
modified as the courts move forward in addressing the key issues in these cases, creating
new legal, social, economic and political realities for the parties involved.

Favored Doctrine: First Amendment Doctrine
Based on Freedom from Compelled Speech
The evidence clearly indicated that the Supreme Court has chosen to analyze the
cases challenging mandatory commodity fees by applying the First Amendment doctrine
66 1

U.S. v. Frame, 888 F.2d 1 1 19 (3 nt Cir. 1989).
Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 52 1 U.S. 457 (1997).
663
United States v. United Foods, 533 U.S. 405 (2001).
662
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relating to freedom from compelled speech and compelled association rather than the
commercial speech doctrine.
In Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 664 the U.S. Supreme Court held that a strict
scrutiny standard was appropriate in cases involving freedom from compelled
association.665 Such explicit language has not been stated in cases involving freedom
from compelled speech. Accordingly, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals was at a
crossroads when it considered the most appropriate First Amendment doctrine to apply in
interpreting the constitutionality of the mandatory assessments under the Beef Act in
United States v. Frame. It concluded that the appropriate standard for evaluating

challengers' right to free speech was the Central Hudson test and the proper test for
determining infringement of their right of association was a strict scrutiny test (as
required by the Roberts case). However, since one of the claims in the case was a
freedom from compelled association claim, the Frame court decided that it was bound to
apply the strict scrutiny standard as established in Roberts rather than the lesser standard
established in Central Hudson, even though the speech involved was commercial
speech. 666
In contrast, the Ninth Circuit applied the Central Hudson test in reaching its 1993
decision in Cal-Almond v. USDA. 667 Even though the Central Hudson test is an
intermediate test, the government did not fare well under the Ninth Circuit application.
In order to establish that a regulation on commercial speech is constitutional, the
government had to show: 1) the commercial speech in question was not false or
664

Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
See Roberts at 623.
See Frame at 1 134.
667
See Cal-Almond v. USDA, 14 R.3d 429, 437 (9th Cir. 1993) (Cal-Almond I).
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misleading, 2) the asserted government interest necessitating the commodity program
was "substantial," 3) the program directly advanced that interest, and 4) the program was
no more extensive than necessary to serve that interest. 668 The appellate court found that
the first and second prongs of the test were met, but the government failed to meet the
third and fourth prongs of the test. It fell short in convincing the court that the generic
advertising was more effective than advertising by individual producers and that the tree
fruit program was narrowly tailored. 669
Under the third prong, it faced the impossible task of showing that the checkoff
program directly advanced the government's interests, because it had no data to
demonstrate the effectiveness of the program. Furthermore, the dominant almond
grower, Blue Diamond, commanded a whopping share of the almonds sold in retail
grocery stores (over ninety percent in the year 1987).670 This meant that, in order for the
checkoff program to be deemed effective, the government would need to show that the
program had given Blue Diamond an incentive to advertise more. This it could not do.
In addition, the evidence showed that the almond checkoff program served to "hinder the
efforts of the challengers to increase sales and returns to growers [emphasis in
original]"671 because the program denied credits to growers that advertised products that
contained less than fifty percent almonds. Advertisements by the plaintiff almond
growers were for products not meeting the fifty percent standard because they sold their
almonds as ingredients for use in cereal and ice cream.

668

Central Hudson at 566.
See Cal-Almond, Inc. (Cal-Almond I) at 437-440.
670
Ibid. at 438, n. 9.
671
Ibid. at 438.
669
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Under the fourth prong, the government was again at a disadvantage in showing
the fit between the goal of the legislation and the means chosen to implement such
legislation, because it submitted no evidence to show that the Almond Board was making
better use of the checkoff money than other forms of advertising. The government did
argue that "the regulations reflect the reasonable judgment that the Board will make
better use of these monies in its market promotion programs."672 The court was not
impressed with the many restrictions in the program that prevented credits to the almond
growers who sold their crops as ingredients while providing advantages to Blue
Diamond. The opinion of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals stated:
" . . . USDA offers no justifications for the restrictions that deny credit for certain
advertisements: ads promoting more than two complementary branded products
(§ 981.441 (c)(5)(i)), ads promoting a product that also has "competing nuts"
(§ 981.441 (c)(5)(ii)), or ads promoting retail stores not owned by handlers
(§ 981.441 (c)(5)(iii)). It is true that the fit between means and ends need not be
perfect, but there seems to be no logical justification for these types of restrictions
other than the restrictions are designed to benefit Blue Diamond, who
overwhelmingly dominates the retail almond market, at the expense of smaller
handlers such as appellants, who sell primarily to ingredient manufacturers. 673
By applying the Central Hudson test, the Ninth Circuit had fleshed out the
hegemonic structure of the almond industry and revealed an inequitable program
administered by the dominant industry bloc with the collaboration of the USDA. Any
pretense that the program was enhancing market share was stripped away by this
analysis. During the .following two years, the USDA failed to cooperate in paying money
owed to the almond handlers and the Ninth Circuit ruled on the Cal-Almond case again in

672

673

Ibid. at 440.
Ibid.
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1995 to enforce an order requiring the USDA to make such payments.674 The Ninth
Circuit denied a motion filed by the USDA to reconsider the opinion in Cal-Almond I.
Demonstrating its continued willingness to apply First Amendment scrutiny to
checkoff programs, the Ninth Circuit in 1995 struck down marketing orders for collection
of mandatory assessment for nectarines, peaches and plums in the case of Wileman Bros.
& Elliott, Inc. v. Espy 615 (the case was renamed Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott,

Inc. when it was argued before the U.S. Supreme Court). The Ninth Circuit based its

finding of unconstitutionality on a Central Hudson analysis. It concluded that the
checkoff programs did not "directly advance" the government' s interest because the
generic advertising did not increase consumption more effectively than what might be
accomplished by individual growers conducting their own targeted marketing campaigns.
In addition, the Ninth Circuit determined that the mandatory checkoff programs for the
tree fruits were not narrowly tailored by comparing them with the less restrictive almond
marketing program in Cal-Almond I that the Court previously held was not narrowly
tailored.676
Alarm bells went off all over the United States when the Ninth Circuit struck
down these two checkoff programs within the space of two years and began to establish a
line of cases based on its interpretation of the commodity checkoff cases under the
Central Hudson test. Dominant industry blocs in numerous industries got involved in a

legislative initiative to add language to the Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform
Act of 1996 (FAIR Act of 1996) to attempt to clarify the intentions behind the
674
675

Cal-Almond v. USDA, 61 F.3d 874 (9th Cir. 1995).
See Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc. v. Espy, 58 F.3d 1376 (9th Cir. 1995).
676
Ibid. at 1379-1380.
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commodity promotion laws, hoping to avoid certain death of a commodity program at the
hands of a court diligently applying the Central Hudson test. A report on this can be
found in the January/April 1996 online Agricultural Law Letter published by McLeod,
Watkinson & Miller, a pro-checkoff law firm aligned with the checkoff hegemony that
has been involved at times in drafting legislation for mandatory assessment programs for
promotion of commodities. Under the subheading "Congress Steps In," the newsletter
stated the following about ne� language contained in the FAIR Act of 1996677 that
supported checkoff programs: "Because the position taken by the Ninth Circuit raised
serious concerns about the future of commodity checkoff programs that provide for
generic advertising of agricultural products, Congress felt compelled to address this issue
in the Farm Bill . . . "678
The FAIR Act sought to counter the Ninth Circuit's requirements that the
government must show that generic advertising programs sell products more effectively
than the advertising conducted by independent producers and that the programs are not
narrowly tailored. For example, it carefully distinguished between the purpose of the
advertising of individual producers or processors (to increase individual market share)
and the purpose of the generic advertising for commodities (to increase overall demand
for an agricultural commodity). Other legislative language attempted to clarify what the
Congress intended in setting up the legislative framework for the mandatory assessment

6
77

Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104- 127, 1 10 Stat. 888 (codified
as amended at 7 U.S.C. 7201).
6 8
7 Richard Rossier, "Congress Addresses Confusion Over Commodity Promotion Programs," The
Agriculture Law Letter, McLeod, Watkinson & Miller (January/April 1996); available from
http://www.mwmlaw.com/janapr96.htm; Internet; accessed 6 June 2003.
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programs.679 Some of these were self-serving proclamations, but one significant change
required that all commodity checkoff programs conduct periodic studies to evaluate their
effectiveness. This would generate the necessary data to perhaps withstand scrutiny under
the Central Hudson test. The Congress (or certain dominant fractions within Congress
allied with the USDA and major commodity checkoff supporters) had delivered a
message that it supported commodity promotion programs that imposed mandatory
assessments and disapproved of the First Amendment scrutiny of such programs
An amicus brief filed by the AFL-CIO with the Supreme Court in the Glickman
case contended that the lower court (the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals) erred "in
mechanically reaching the conclusion that the Central Hudson analysis applies to every
form of regulation touching upon commercial speech."6 80 Indeed, the U.S. Supreme
Court in 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island held that such an error could result in
"concluding that all commercial speech regulations are subject to a similar form of
constitutional review simply because they target a similar category of expression."
[emphasis in original]681
In February of 1996, a district court in the District of Kansas decided Goetz v.
Glickman,682 a case brought by a cattle producer, buyer and trader challenging the
679

Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-127, 1 1 0 Stat. 888 (codified
as amended at 7 U.S.C. 7201).
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Motion for Leave to File Brief Amicus Curiae and Brief of the American Federation of Labor and Congress of
Industrial Organizations as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Glickman v. Wileman (1997) (No 95- 1 184),
in the Supreme Court of the United States, October Term, 1996, 7.
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Ibid., quoting 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 5 17 U.S. 484 (1996). The 44 Liquormart opinion authored
by Justice John Paul Stevens suggests that some State regulation of commercial speech warrants a stricter
First Amendment review than the intermediate Central Hudson standard. He described the basis for stricter
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mandatory beef assessments under the Beef Promotion Research Act of 1985. 683 The
court upheld the checkoff program based squarely on the precedent of the Frame case. It
expressed its disapproval of the two Ninth Circuit cases that had relied on the Central
Hudson test to strike down the almond and tree fruit checkoffs by omitting any reference

to these cases in its opinion. The Goetz case was significant in demonstrating the
alliances between various industry associations and the USDA. Intervenors on behalf of
the government included: Kansas Livestock Association, the National Cattlemen's
Association, the National Live Stock and Meat Board and four Kansas cattle ranchers.
The U.S. Supreme Court issued the Glickman v. Wileman decision in 1997, one
year after Congress demonstrated its support for the producer funded generic commodity
promotion programs. The Court chose to ignore the protected status of commercial
speech under Central Hudson and applied an analysis tenuously based on the Abood line
of cases in determining that no First Amendment issues were raised. The Glickman
decision diminished First Amendment values relating to the protection of commercial
speech by declaring that no free speech issues were involved because producers were not
prohibited from communicating any message, compelled to engage in actual or symbolic
speech, or compelled to endorse or finance political or ideological views. 684
Commentators expressed the view that the Court' s analysis was flawed because it
relied on the assumption that First Amendment issues were raised only if the compelled
fees for commercial speech were germane to the purpose of the overall regulatory scheme

683 Beef Promotion and Research Act of 1985, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2901-29 18; 7 C.F.R. §§ 1260.101-1260.217.
684 Glickman at 469.
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and the objectionable speech was ideological in nature.685 The Abood court expressly
stated that "nothing in the First Amendment or our cases discussing its meaning makes
the question of whether the adjective political can properly be attached to these beliefs
the critical inquiry."686 (This flaw in interpretation was acknowledged in the United
Foods case four years later when the Court declared the mushroom checkoffs
unconstitutional.) In addition to the misinterpretation of the case law in Abood, the court
appears to have mischaracterized the facts set forth in the record. Commentators have
criticized the court' s failure to recognize that the fruit growers and handlers had, in fact,
voiced speech-related objections and were not all interested in marketing the fruit
advertised as claimed by the Glickman court.687
It has been said that the Supreme Court in Glickman v. Wileman allowed "a
governmental regulatory scheme to bootstrap a commercial speech restriction. "688 One
reason this occurred was because the Central Hudson test was ignored. This legal
analysis suggests that the Court was able to achieve the following by avoiding application
of the Central Hudson test and introducing the Abood test as an alternative in Glickman:
1) The Court avoided a First Amendment analysis of the checkoff programs by
characterizing marketing orders as purely economic in nature. This gave the
Court the freedom to ignore the manner in which the third and fourth prongs of
the Central Hudson test presented problems for the government. It also
privileged the position of government over free speech rights in commercial
685

Edward J. Schoen, Margaret M. Hogan and Joseph S. Falchek, "United Foods and Wileman Bros.:
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speech by not requiring that the government show that the marketing orders were
more effective than other independent advertising and were narrowly tailored.
2) By avoiding the Central Hudson analysis, the Court avoided addressing two
thorny issues, namely:
► Does commercial speech warrant the same level of protection as political
and ideological speech?
► How should the Central Hudson test be applied to a marketing order such
as the one at issue in Glickman v. Wileman? Did the Ninth Circuit apply it
properly?
3) The Court avoided overriding the actions of Congress in the FAIR Act of 1996.
4) The Court avoided a conflict with the United States Department of Agriculture.
The majority in the Glickman v. Wileman decision consisted of Justices John Paul
Stevens (author of the majority opinion), Anthony Kennedy, Ruth Bader Ginsburg,
Sandra Day O'Connor, John Paul Stevens and Stephen Breyer. Those in the minority
were Chief Justice William Rehnquist, Justices David Souter (author of the minority
opinon), Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas. In his dissent, Justice Souter declared
that the majority erred in not applying the Central Hudson test.
United States v. United Foods689 presented the U.S. Supreme Court with an

opportunity to remedy its failure in Glickman to recognize the First Amendment
principles for protection of commercial speech. In particular, it offered the Supreme
Court a chance to clarify the level of protection that should be afforded to commercial
speech and a chance to demonstrate the proper application of the Central Hudson test
689 United Foods, 533 U.S. 405 (2001).
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which imposes a heightened level of scrutiny that does not exist under the Abood
germaneness test. (Abood held that a union could compel the payment of dues to further
the State's interest in collective bargaining, but could not use the funds for ideological
communications or activities not germane to the purpose of the compelled association,
i.e., collective bargaining.)690
The Supreme Court in United Foods did not frame the case broadly as a
commercial speech issue. That would have likely forced the Court to overrule Glickman.
Instead, it chose to frame the issue narrowly as follows: "whether the government may
underwrite and sponsor speech with a certain viewpoint using special subsidies exacted
from a designated class of persons, some of whom object to the idea being advanced. "691
This approach allowed it room to distinguish the United Foods case from Glickman and
still incorporate certain portions of the Glickman ruling that appeared consistent (or
salvageable) in view of the modified direction of the Court in United Foods. The Court
did this by initially establishing that the government was prohibited from compelling
individuals to express speech with a certain viewpoint, citing Wooley v. Maynartf92
(establishing that the government does not have the right to compel a citizen to purchase
and display a license plate with the motto "Live or Let Die") and W. Va. State Board of
Educ. v. Bamette693 (establishing that a public school cannot compel a student to salute

the flag). The Court then acknowledged the case law defining the principle that the
government likewise cannot compel citizens to fund speech that is objectionable to them.

690 See Abood at 235-236.
United Foods at 2338. Also see Schoen, Hogan and Falcheck, 506.
692
See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
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It cited Abood v. Detroit Board of Education and Keller v. State Bar of California for this
proposition. 694
The next step the Supreme Court took was to apply these First Amendment
principles to the commercial speech at issue, i.e., the funding of generic mushroom
advertising from mandatory checkoff fees. This was the first time that the Supreme
Court had connected these principles to commercial speech. In spite of the Court's lack
of emphasis on this expansion of Abood to commercial speech, the step was
significant.695 It was not an anomaly, however, since the Abood analysis had been
extended to other diverse fact situations involving compelled speech. 696 The Court found
that First Amendment issues were involved in the compelled funding of generic
mushroom advertising.
It then relied upon its Glickman decision to hold that programs with mandatory
commodity assessments may avoid First Amendment scrutiny if they are part of a
broader regulatory scheme and if the compelled funding of commercial speech is
germane to the purpose for which the regulatory scheme was organized. The Court in
Glickman held that the tree fruit marketing order fell within the parameters of these

limitations on First Amendment protection since "the mandated assessments for speech
were ancillary to a more comprehensive program restricting marketing autonomy." 697
The commodity promotion program for mushrooms fell outside these exceptions, hence
the Court found it was unconstitutional.
694

United Foods at 212, citing Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 43 1 U.S. 209 ( 1977) and Keller v.
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By recognizing that issues of First Amendment rights were raised by the
mushroom mandatory commodity assessments in the mushroom checkoffs, the Supreme
Court repaired some of the damage that it inflicted by denigrating First Amendment
rights in the Glickman case. However, by clinging to its characterization of certain
checkoff programs as economic regulations, it created a source of ongoing confusion.
The Supreme Court in United Foods tried to distance itself from the three-part test
it established in Glickman for determining whether a First Amendment analysis is
required. 698 The Court referenced the government' s attempt to avoid First Amendment
scrutiny by claiming that the mushroom checkoffs met the requirement of this test. It
then stated: 'These points were noted in Glickman in the context of a different
regulatory scheme and are not controlling of the outcome."699 It is noteworthy,
however, that one lower court (Middle District of Pennsylvania) performed a detailed
analysis under this test in its effort to apply the precedents of both Glickman and United
Foods in its decision making. 700 The dissent in United Foods also defended the use of
this three-point test. 701
The Glickman decision admonished the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals for using
the Central Hudson test to evaluate the constitutionality of mandatory assessments by
stating:
698

The three-part test set forth in Glickman for determining whether a First Amendment issue is raised is as
follows: 1) Does the compelled funding of speech impose a restraint on the freedom of the objecting
commodity producer to communicate its own advertising messages? 2) Is the objecting commodity
producer compelled to express any actual or symbolic speech to which the producer objects? 3) Does the
mandatory promotion program compel the producer to endorse or fund political or ideological views that it
disfavors?
699 United Foods at 2338.
700 See Joseph and Brenda Cochran v. Ann Veneman, No. 4:CV-01-0529, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4361 ,
(Middle Dist. Penn. 2003).
701
Untied Foods at 2343-2344, J. Breyer dissenting.

329

The Court of Appeals fails to explain why the Central Hudson test, which
involved a restriction on commercial speech, should govern a case involving the
compelled funding of speech. Given the fact that the Court of Appeals relied on
Abood for the proposition that the program implicates the First Amendment, it is
difficult to understand why the Court of Appeals did not apply Abood's
'germaneness'test. 702
Some commentators have assumed that, in the wake of Glickman, the United
Foods decision also specifically rejected the Central Hudson test as being inappropriate

for compelled commercial speech cases. This has been argued in briefs filed in several of
the pending checkoff cases. However, a close reading of the opinion does not bear this
out.
The majority opinion written by Justice Anthony Kennedy simply indicated that
the Court was refraining from a Central Hudson analysis since it found that the
compelled funding of commercial speech was unconstitutional under lesser standards. It
also noted that the government had not relied upon Central Hudson in its appeal.703 (This
is not surprising, since it would not be in its best interest to invite a heightened Central
Hudson review similar to the Ninth Circuit reviews in Cal-Almond I and Espy.)

The fact that the government did not rely on Central Hudson in its appeal would
not have prohibited the Court from analyzing the case under Central Hudson. It appeared
that the Court may have cited this fact to bolster its position in choosing to narrowly
frame the issue for review in such a way that it did not have to scrutinize the
government's action under Central Hudson. (As noted earlier, its chosen framing of the
issue was "whether the government may underwrite and sponsor speech with a certain
viewpoint using special subsidies exacted from a designated class of persons, some of
702 Glickman at 474, no. 1 8.
703 United Foods at 2337-2338.
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whom object to the idea being advanced.")704 In short, the majority opinion of the Court
sidestepped applying the Central Hudson test rather than expressly holding that it did not
apply.
In his dissent, Justice Breyer held fast to the concept that the disputed speech is a
species of economic regulations. He reached a conclusion opposite to that of Justice
Kennedy regarding the outcome of a Central Hudson analysis:
Even if I were to classify the speech at issue here as 'commercial speech' and
apply the somewhat more stringent standard set forth in the Court's commercial
speech cases, I would reach the same result [that the First Amendment does not
seek to limit the Government's regulatory choices in the manner supported by the
0
majority]. 7 5
Justice Breyer than performed a brief Central Hudson anlaysis, arguing that: 1) the
government interest was substantial, 2) the compelled funding for speech directly
advanced a substantial government interest in maintaining a collective advertising
program and avoiding free riders, and 3) the government's program is effective as shown
by the data introduced in the record.7

06

The manner in which Central Hudson was referenced in both the majority and
minority opinions indicated that the Court was aware of its relevance to compelled
commercial speech. While the majority in United Foods clearly preferred using the
Abood standard, it did not summarily dismiss the Central Hudson test or foreclose future

application of the test to cases involving compelled funding for generic advertising.
Why have the anti-checkoff plaintiffs so easily accepted the Abood test over the
Central Hudson test when the cases decided by the Ninth Circuit under Central Hudson
704 Ibid. at 2339.
705 United Foods at 2348.
706

Ibid.
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favored the challengers? Even though commentators have questioned the Supreme
Court's decision not to incorporate a Central Hudson commercial speech analysis in its
United Foods opinion, all five lawyers interviewed for this study (four with attribution

and one anonymously) unanimously concurred that the Abood analysis is a better fit for
the checkoff lawsuits. They pointed out that the Central Hudson test involves a
government restriction on commercial speech as opposed to the checkoff cases which
involve compelled funding of speech through mandatory commodity assessments. In
addition, several of the attorneys are unwilling to characterize the speech in question as
strictly commercial, taking the position that the advertising to which their clients object is
political and ideological. In their opinions, the checkoff cases are thus more akin to the
Abood line of cases. Moreover, the germaneness test under Abood may offer the courts a

simpler analysis than the four-step test in Central Hudson. Clearly, courts in several
cases, including United Foods, have indicated that they prefer not applying the Central
Hudson standard if another doctrinal basis for First Amendment analysis can be

employed.
An exception is the July 8, 2003 decision by the Eighth Circuit in Livestock
Marketing Association v. USDA. The appellate court "inferred" that the U.S. Supreme

Court would have used the Central Hudson test if the government had relied upon it in
presenting its case. Accordingly, it applied the Central Hudson test to analyze the
constitutionality of the beef checkoff program:
[W]e conclude that Glickman does not provide a complete answer to this
commercial speech issue. We infer that, had the government relied upon Central
Hudson in United Foods, the Supreme Court would have adapted the Central
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Hudson test to the circumstances of that case, but would nevertheless have held
that the Mushroom Act unconstitutionally regulated commercial speech.707

The court expressly weighed use of the commercial speech doctrine and use of the
compelled speech doctrine and concluded that the commercial speech context should
control. The Court stated:
We reach this conclusion [to use Central Hudson] recognizing that Central ·
Hudson involved a restriction on speech while the present case involves
compelled speech. In our view it is more significant that Central Hudson and the
case at bar both involve government interference with private speech in a
commercial context.708
The appellate court then applied the four-prong Central Hudson test and found
[T]he government' s interest in protecting the welfare of the beef industry by
compelling all beef producers and importers to pay for generic beef advertising is
not sufficiently substantial to justify the infringement on appellees' First
Amendment free speech right.709
The "inference" made by the 8th Circuit Court of Appeals regarding the Supreme
Court' s willingness to use the Central Hudson test if the government had relied upon it
provided the means for the appellate court to apply a commercial speech analysis and still
reconcile its decision with United Foods. The inference also invites the Supreme Court
to take another look at applying the Central Hudson test to the compelled commercial
speech cases and creates an expectation that the Supreme Court will either confirm or
deny the Eighth Circuit's inference in another checkoff case.
Renee Giachino, attorney for Center for Individual Freedom, questioned whether
the Central Hudson case will continue to set the proper standard for protection of
commercial speech since the U.S. Supreme Court has indicated its discomfort with the
707
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test in several of its recent cases. 7 1 0 The case of Nike, Inc. v. Kasky,

11 1

which was

argued before the Supreme Court during the 2002-2003 term was expected to shed light
on whether the Court was ready to reassess the Central Hudson standard. The Court's
dismissal of the case for procedural reasons provided an indication that it was not
prepared to reevaluate Central Hudson or that the Nike case did not offer the fact
situation the Court may be seeking for a reassessment of the commercial speech doctrine.
Barry Richard, constitutional attorney and counsel for the State of Florida Citrus
Commission in the challenge to the citrus "box tax" in Florida expressed his view that the
Central Hudson and Abood analyses are, in fact, linked:
Central Hudson is kind of the granddaddy of these commercial speech cases, and
it sort of sits at the base of the body of case law. I think people [in the checkoff
cases] don't talk about Central Hudson so much because Central Hudson stood for
the kind of seminal principles that don't really give us much guidance when you
get to the more specific issues in these cases. Central Hudson laid out the
methodology and so forth. But that really doesn't do much to help us here.
That's why I think they turned to Abood and Keller. The other thing, by the way
is that Central Hudson wasn't a case that involved financing. The current cases
are a step away. Central Hudson was a direct regulation of speech . . . .. here you're
dealing with a cases in which the government isn't saying "you can't do
something" or "you must say something." They're saying "you must provide
money that we will use to give a message." So, it's kind of a step away from
Central Hudson. 7 1 2
Richard explained that the Abood decision held that the government could force the
contribution of money and the only question at issue was what to do with such money.
He stated:
The answer was, you can only do the stuff that was related to the governmental
interest. So if you look back at Central Hudson, that really was the same
question. But they [the court in Abood] were saying "once you get it, how can
you use it? If you use it for something beyond collective bargaining, then you're
710
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no longer serving the substantial governmental interest Central Hudson said you
had to have in order to regulate speech. So that's how the two are tied together.
. . .I don't think it's an either/or between the Central Hudson and the Abood/Keller
analyis. I think Abood and Keller was another step-maybe it's better to say a
more specific step-after Central Hudson.7 1 3
David Moeller, attorney with Farmers Action Group, Inc. and counsel for
independent pork producers and the Campaign for Family Farms in the Michigan Pork
Producers case, draws a distinction between "commercial speech" and "compelled

speech." He deemed this to be an important difference since his clients claim that the
generic advertising for pork is political and ideological in nature. Here is an excerpt from
Moeller' s interview:
Interviewer: Do you think it's correct for Central Hudson not to be a part of the
analysis?
David Moeller: That's what we argue in our brief. We argue that, basically the
Supreme Court foreclosed that in the United Foods decision. Plus, we argue that
Central Hudson does not apply because Central Hudson talks about regulation of
advertising or commercial speech. This is compelled, forced speech. And the
standard in Central Hudson is not applicable to compelled speech. And, as we
said in our brief, USDA even said that this doesn't apply in both the Glickman
and the United Foods decisions in their United Foods arguments.
Interviewer: If the court recognizes the First Amendment doctrine for freedom
from compelled speech in a case where the speech involved is commercial
speech, it sort of comes in the back door, or at least it appears that way . ..do you
think that's a possible result?
David Moeller: In a way that's what United Foods did where they didn't have
ideological objections like what we have in our case. In our case, it' s more than
just commercial objections. It's also ideological and political objections, which is
another reason, going back to your last question, why Central Hudson doe not
apply.11 4
Another attorney involved in representing checkoff challengers, Renee Giachino,
shared the view that the Central Hudson analysis is inappropriate for the commodity
7 13

7 14
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checkoff cases involving compelled funding for generic advertising. Giachino is in
house counsel for Center for Individual Freedom, a non-profit group that is serving as
co-counsel representing checkoff challengers in two cases, Steven and Jeanne Charter v.
USDA (a beef checkoff case) and Joseph and Brenda Cochran (a dairy checkoff case).

Here is an excerpt from her interview:
Interviewer: These cases that you're involved in revolve around First
Amendment commercial speech issues, is that right?
Renee Giachino: Arguably, yes, they do involve speech. I think that there is
certainly some debate as to the level of scrutiny that is applied to that speech. I
know that the government asserts that the speech at issue is commercial in nature.
However, we maintain that their reasoning is wrong on several counts.
Interviewer: Do you want to mention these, the reasons why you think their
reasoning is wrong on that?
Renee Giachino: Well, they are relying upon the Central Hudson test, with
restrictions on commercial speech. As we lay out in some of our briefs . . . most
particularly, in one of our briefs, we walk through the numerous reasons that we
believe that Central Hudson does not apply in this instance. First of all, the
Supreme Court in the United Foods case recognized that the Central Hudson
test-it was made clear in the Wileman case--does not govern a case involving
compelled funding of speech. It think there' s a clear distinction there from the
Central Hudson case, which some even question nowadays whether or not it' s still
good law . . . . But, the Central Hudson case involved a restriction on commercial
speech . . . .I also think what's very important to note, particularly in the checkoff
programs, is that much of the speech involved is, in fact, not even commercial
speech. There is speech that talks about issues of nutrition, of let slation. These
are to me political or opinion issues about an economic subject. 15
Erik Jaffe, constitutional lawyer representing anti-checkoff challengers in the Charter
case and the Cochran case was unequivocal about Central Hudson being an inappropriate
test. He stated:
The commercial speech anlaysis made no sense here. Commercial speech
analysis was developed for attempts to squelch commercial speech, to forbid
advertising, to stop people from doing things, which raises a whole host of
715 Giachino interview, 1-2.
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different questions and has potentially different balances than the notion that you
can make people say something or make people support speech. So, at the end of
the day, you can track back and find a macro theory that encompasses them both,
it's not that hard. But in terms of the "on the ground" doctrine . . .it was a lot
cleaner to do it the other way [under Abood] because at some point, there's a
couple of nice clean kickouts like the germaneness inquiry that avoid having to
jump through a hundred million hoops every time. 716
As noted earlier in this dissertation, the Abood line of reasoning provides the
counter-hegemony challenging the checkoffs with a strong, simple basis for presenting its
moral argument and ideological themes to the industry and the public. Its task becomes
far more difficult when it must explain how the commercial speech doctrine applies to the
compelled funding of generic advertising programs. As Jaffee observed, the lawyers
representing the anti-checkoff challengers also can present their clients' cases more easily
and by relying on Abood principles. It is likely that this partially explains the
willingness by various factions within the counter-hegemony (legal representatives, trade
associations, public interest groups, etc.) to accept the Supreme Court's obvious
preference for analyzing these case under the Abood standard and ignoring the Central
Hudson test.

Stretching the Limits of Government Speech
"The so-called 'government speech ' doctrine is not so much a
doctrine as it is an evolving concept that the government may
compel the use of coerced.financial contributions for public purposes. " 71 7
~ U.S. District Judge Charles Kornmann
District of South Dakota, Northern Division

The dominant hegemony has advanced the theory of government speech as a
defense to the claim of the challengers that their First Amendment free speech rights have
been violated. Objective seven requires the researcher to critically examine the scholarly
71 6 Jaffe interview, 7.
717 Livestock Marketing Association v.
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literature and federal and state cases on the "government speech doctrine" to determine
its viability as a defense against the compelled commercial speech challenge.
In the mandatory commodity assessment programs, the acknowledged
governmental policy is to create and maintain a demand for agricultural commodities.
Commodity producers endorsed the mandatory programs as industry self-help programs
that would allow them to promote their products as a group and avoid free-riders who
reaped benefits but were not willing to contribute. The government speech argument
requires an assumption that the government not only has a vital interest in regulating the
commercial speech of the producers for this purpose (either under the Abood
germaneness test or the Central Hudson test), but that it has become the voice of the
industry, controlling its generic advertising messages. The government has claimed that
it is speaking whenever a generic ad appears promoting the commodities produced by the
cattle industry, the fruit industry, the dairy industry, the grape industry and the alligator
hide industry.
Can the underlying government policy of promoting demand for all comities with
checkoff programs be implemented aggressively and effectively for each industry when
all generic advertising generated is the government speaking? The government's claim
of government speech is an extreme position that seems to impede competition and the
free exchange of ideas within industries and interfere with competitive messages between
industries. If all generic commodity advertising is government speech, how can the
desire to increase the demand in every industry be met? Generic advertising for pork
competes with generic advertising for beef. Generic advertising for tree fruit competes
with generic advertising for citrus fruit. Generic advertising for homogenous products
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competes with advertising for branded products. By successfully advertising and
increasing the demand for one commodity, the government reduces the size of the pie for
another commodity. The government has thus expanded its role overseeing the checkoff
programs to become a participant in the commercial marketplace by using mandatory
fees collected from various discrete groups to deliver messages that it claims represent
government speech. U.S. District Court Judge Charles B. Kornmann refers to the
peculiar result that occurs when the government becomes the speaker for agricultural
commodities: "Common sense tells us that the government is not 'speaking' in
encouraging consumers to eat beef. After all, is the 'government message' therefore that
consumers should eat no other product or at least reduce the consumption of other
products such as pork, chicken, fish, or soy meal? The answer is obvious."7 1 8
The government's justification for speaking on behalf of all citizens is abundantly
clear when it is seeking to recruit military personnel, advising of health concerns,
promoting political issues relevant to government business and so forth. It does not
create a risk that its voice will displace or monopolize private speech or interfere with the
gatekeeping function of the media and other private speakers, since U.S. citizens can tell
that the government is speaking and its message is related to recognizable government
functions. Public understanding and public choice is not hindered
By attempting to stretch the government speech principle to cover the producer
funded generic advertising in the commodity programs, the government seems woefully
out of step with the deregulation trend that has characterized legislative activities during
the last decade. Renee Giachino, attorney for the Center for Individual Freedom,
718
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identified additional government involvement that, in her opinion, would be needed to
justify the claim of government speech:
Interveiwer: Do you think that if the government speech argument was accepted,
there would be any changes in the decision-making and the power exercised by
the USDA and dominant groups?
Renee Giachino: There would have to be. In order to justify it as government
speech, they are really going to have to elevate these programs to what we see
with our military. True government involvement, not a rubber stamping instance.
I also think that they are going to have to go back to the individual commodities
producers and re-vote. They sold these programs to them as self-help industry
programs. Now, they're tryinf: to convert it to government speech. It's extremely
misleading, it's disingenuous. 19
The viability of the government speech defense will depend on three factors:
1) How will the U.S. Supreme Court define "government speech"?
2) How will the Court interpret the facts in a case involving compelled funding
for generic advertising vis-a-vis this definition?
3) In the event that the Court finds that the generic advertising under the
checkoff programs constitutes government speech, will the Court recognize
that such speech is immune from First Amendment scrutiny or will it apply
some standard of First Amendment review?
A definition of government speech could take into account considerations such as
the following: whether there is government attribution, the level of government control
and involvement, whether funding occurs through general tax revenues or mandatory
contributions from a targeted group, whether the targeted group is a discrete or narrow
segment of society with common interests or widely representative of the general
population, who retains copyrights in any creative work, etc.
719

Giachino interview, 10.

340

Possible Hegemonic Relationship Between Judicial Decisions and
Economic/Political Interests of the Dominant Group
Objective number eight requires the researcher to examine the court decisions and
other evidence to explore whether there is a hegemonic relationship between the
decisions of the judiciary on compelled commercial speech and the economic and
political interests of the dominant groups involved· in the commodity checkoff programs.
The following research questions are relevant to this inquiry:
RQ 1 : Do the existing policy goals of the respective external entities (including
the USDA and powerful trade organizations) remain in direct conflict with First
Amendment free speech rights for compelled commercial speech?
RQ 2: Have the Supreme Court and other federal courts failed to recognize the
First Amendment constitutional right not to participate in compelled commercial
speech by privileging the economic and political interests of the dominant parties
in the agricultural hegemony?
Policy Goals Versus First Amendment. In analyzing Research Question 1 , it is
helpful to reference Table 2, the chart that includes a listing of the entities that have been
identified in this study. The chart also indicates each entity's affinity for or against the
checkoffs. While it would be unfair to assume that all entities favoring checkoffs can be
characterized as being against First Amendment free speech rights for compelled
commercial speech, this research suggests that this may be true in many cases.
As evidenced by their legal claims in commodity checkoff cases since 2001, the
USDA, the industry trade associations aligned with hegemony and large commodity
producers have taken the position that generic advertising of commodities funded by
private parties is equivalent to government speech and, therefore, enjoys full immunity
from First Amendment scrutiny. This is in direct conflict with the First Amendment
rights of all individuals seeking protection against compelled speech or compelled
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association. The government speech argument indicates a desire for increased control
over privately funded speech and the flow of checkoff money without accountability
under the First Amendment. Rene Giachino, legal counsel for Center for Individual
Freedom, provided the following assessment of the USDA's interests:
I think it's a cash cow for them. I think they have put into play this incredible
monster. At a time when our economy is already suffering, of course no one
wants to see any program that helps support America's families be dismantled.
But it should not happen at the expense of trampling the constitutional rights of
other individuals."710
The policy goals of the USDA have been to increase efficiency and production in
the United States under the industrial agricultural model so that the United States can be
competitive in the global marketplace. Even if generic advertising can be shown to help
accomplish this, the goal needs to be balanced against the First Amendment rights of its
citizens. This was the opinion of Renee Giachino, as well as others interviewed who
were aligned with the counter-hegemony. Giachino stated:
Even if you assume that the beef checkoff communications are characterized as
government speech, they would still run afoul of the First Amendment. I think
that whenever individuals are compelled to subsidize the expression of
viewpoints with which they disagree, the First Amendment test is going to be the
same, regardless of whether the speaker is being subsidized by a third party
favored by the government or by the government itself. 72 1
A representative of the Cattlemen's Beef Board described the goals of his board:
"I think our sole purpose for existence is to administer this program in such a way
that will increase demand for beef and enhance profit opportunities for cattle
producers. And, as an organization, that's what we're all about. 722
A critical question remains unanswered. Which cattle producers is the representative
taking about?
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Judicial Decision Making. Research Question 2 requires an analysis of the

behavior of the U.S. Supreme Court and other courts in order to assess whether such
behavior indicates a failure to "recognize the First Amendment constitutional right not to
participate in compelled commercial speech by privileging the economic and political
interests of the dominant parties in the agricultural hegemony."
Richard H. Fallon, Jr.' s book titled Implementing the Constitution 723 served as a
primary resource in providing a conceptual framework for exploring the nature of the
judicial decisions in the checkoff cases. Fallon's book examined the Supreme Court's
responsibilities in specifying the meanings of constitutional norms and creating doctrinal
tests to protect or implement these norms. His perspective on how the Supreme Court
implements the Constitution is practical, incorporating elements of two major models of
Supreme Court decision making: the legal model and the attitudinal model The aim of
the Supreme Court justices is to produce "coherent, workable constitutional doctrine."724
Both of these distinct models attempt to explain the behavior of the U.S. Supreme
court. The legal model emphasizes four factors that are used by the Justices in their
decision making: plain meaning, intent of the framers (or legislators), precedent and
balancing. 725 This is the model that Supreme Court justices profess that they follow in
applying the law. 726 In cases dealing with First Amendment issues, the considerations
are: 1) How do the facts of the case compare with precedent? 2) What is the plain
meaning of the First Amendment and the statutes that are being challenged as being
723 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Implementing the Constitution (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press,
2001).
724 Ibid., 37.
725 Jeffrey A. Segal and Harold J. Spaeth, The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1993), 33.
726 Ibid.
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contrary to that meaning? 3) What was the intent of the Constitutional framers and the
legislators? and 4) How should societal and constitutional issues be balanced?727
The attitudinal model asserts that the Supreme Court justices decide cases the way
they do "in light of the facts of the case vis-a-vis the ideological attitudes and values of
the justices."728 Professors Jeffrey A. Segal of the State University of New York, Stony
Brook and Harold J. Spaeth of Michigan State University are major proponents of this
model and have been instrumental in testing and developing it. It is their opinion that the
unique position of the U.S. Supreme Court justices as employees of the government, but
without political or electoral accountability, allows them to make decisions based on their
personal ideologies, attitudes and values. 729
According to Fallon, Congress and other institutions bear the primary
responsibility for implementing the Constitution.730 The Supreme Court becomes
involved through the process of judicial review. The process requires the Court to
engage in two functions: "identifying constitutional norms and specifying their meaning"
and "crafting doctrine or developing standards of review."73 1 First Amendment norms
are often vague and must be converted into rules of law in the form of doctrines and tests.
Fallon states:
[E]ffective implementation requires the crafting of doctrine by courts. The
Supreme Court has responded accordingly. By no means illegitimately, it has
developed a complex, increasingly code-like sprawl of two-,three-, and four-part
tests. Critics have protested that the Court's multipart tests are inappropriate
because they do not plausibly reflect the Constitution's true meaning. The critics
may be correct about the gap between meaning and doctrine, but their protest is
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largely beside the point. The measure of the soundness of constitutional
doctrine-including 'prophylactic' rules as well as three- and four-part tests-is
whether it implements the Constitution effectively.
Once established, the Court's doctrinal formulations matter enormously, at least if
they are successful. ...a test established in one case will generally be viewed as
thereafter binding the Justices themselves. In most cases in the Supreme Court,
the argument among lawyers and Justices alike turns predominantly on the
meanings of previous cases. 732
Fallon noted a rough distinction between "ordinary" and "extraordinary"
adjudication of constitutional law cases. Ordinary adjudication occurs when a majority
of the Court is satisfied that existing doctrine adequately frames the key issue for judicial
consideration in a pending case. Extraordinary adjudication results when the Court finds
that established doctrine falls short of providing the basis for resolving a conflict,
prompting the Justices to reexamine the doctrine's applicability or to launch a new
doctrinal approach.733 The new doctrine often bears the name of the case in which it was
first introduced by the U.S. Supreme Court, such as the Central Hudson test.
Several additional points by Fallon are useful in providing a foundation for the
analysis of the line of cases dealing with compelled commercial speech. First, he
maintained that "every ultimate conclusion must at least be reconcilable with the written
constitutional text."734 Secondly, he identified "value arguments" as important in
allowing the Supreme Court justices to decide which approach is better when they find
that more than one reasonable meaning can arise from the language of the Constitution.
Such value arguments can influence the manner in which all participants in the legal
process read the text of the Constitution, interpret precedents and apply their view of
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original understanding to current facts."735 The six categories of value arguments that
Fallon identified are:
1) Ultimate ideals of constitutional justice (moral values or principles, what is
right);
2) Institutional concerns (need to reach a majority decision);
3) Costs to governmental interests (costs incurred in enforcing constitutional
values, whether interests are compelling, etc.);
4) Judicial manageability and enforceability;
5) Risks of error in acting versus risks of legal uncertainty; and
6) Democratic acceptability in light of reasonable disagreement.736
In recognizing that value arguments play an important role in constitutional
adjudication along with considerations of established doctrine and precedent, Fallon
infused his approach with elements of the attitudinal model of judicial decision making.
Another key aspect of Supreme Court decision making was explored by Robert
Kahn in the essay he authored as chapter four in Supreme Court in American Politics. He
examined the relationship between beliefs about social, political and economic reality and
changes in Supreme Court doctrine. Kahn suggested that Supreme Court decision
making be analyzed in two stages:
The first stage is the identification of the presence and nature of constitutional
principles at issue in a particular case. The second stage then asks how the
recognition and definition of political, economic, and social facts change over
time and how changes in the definition of social facts inform changes in
constitutional law or doctrine.737
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Kahn applied his concept concerning the relationship between beliefs about
reality and doctrinal change to three sets of landmark cases in which the Supreme Court
rendered strikingly different opinions at different periods in time. 738 He also explored
how changing conceptions of social, economic and political realities have been relevant
in the doctrinal·changes that have evolved in cases dealing with capital punishment.
Kahn theorized that "beliefs about social reality are built into the development of
an area of case law or doctrine as precedents."739 However, as new facts create fresh
constructions of reality, this puts pressure on existing beliefs, casting doubt on
established case law or doctrine. 740 Doctrinal change may be the result, but not
necessarily. Kahn uses the following quote from a 1995 article by Michael McCann to
illustrate the failure of some courts to respond to new circumstances:
New facts sometimes can pose an awkward dilemma for particular policy
arguments of normative positions . . . . Yet more often, 'inconvenient' facts are
simply ignored, discounted, countered by other facts, or interpreted differently by
our adversaries. Again the key point is that facts have no meaning apart from the
interpretive frames themselves-the beliefs, values, knowledges-in which they
are understood; facts cannot resolve interpretive disagreements.741
Kahn's ideas on changing social facts and doctrinal development and Fallon's
framework for understanding Supreme Court decision making were used in this research
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project to study the behavior of the U.S. Supreme Court and lower courts (by analogy) in
cases dealing with compelled commercial speech.
The Hunt for a Hegemonic Relationship. The legal investigative frame shown
at Table 3 offered a starting point for examining the possibility of a hegemonic
connection between the decisions of the courts relating to compelled commercial speech
and the economic and political interests of the power blocs in each industry. Fallon's
approach suggested that the manner in which each case served as precedent for later cases
is important to note as well as any "value arguments" that might be identified. The shift
in the Supreme Court's doctrinal position in the four years between the decision in
Glickman in 1997 and United Foods in 2001 strongly suggested that it would be useful to

look at changing social, political and economic realities during this time period. The
investigative frame adds another element to the hegemonic analysis by identifying
"interests at stake" for the judiciary at the time each case was decided.
While the research did not discl?se the positions held by the U.S. Supreme Court
justices regarding concentration and vertical integration in agriculture, other beliefs and
values about commerce and free speech rights were evident in the way they chose to
interpret precedent and apply doctrine. Starting with U.S. v. Rock Royal, the Supreme
Court in 1939 was highly responsive to the justifications given for regulation and ignored
the inequities and abuses inherent in the structure for implementing the program. The
opinion of the court and other materials indicate that there was an industrial agriculture
bloc in place in New York city at this time that was exercising a strong hegemony. The
large milk processors, specifically the Dairymen's League, were the central organizers
and the form of commodity production that evolved was highly supportive of their
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interests and discriminatory of the smaller milk processors. The Secretary of Agriculture,
Henry A. Wallace, was allied with the hegemony as evidenced by his involvement in
allowing pamphlets to be printed misinforming the public about the facts of the program
in order to secure a favorable vote. The small milk processors attempted to use the courts
as a new terrain to challenge the milk hegemony, but found an unreceptive judiciary.
Two possible conclusions can be reached. It may be that the court was wary of
striking this part of the New Deal when it was aggressively striking down other parts of
the New Deal in other cases. Strategically, they could defer to Congress on this
legislation by simply recognizing its right to regulate economic sectors. On the other
hand, the Court may have been sympathetic toward a highly regulated milk environment
as the United States and farmers were trying to work their way out of a deep depression.
The Court's very pointed statement that it would tolerate a monopoly in the market if the
rest of the program passed muster indicated that the Court prioritized the need for an
efficient marketing system and disfavored the rights of the small cooperatives, knowing
that they would go out of business. It is not clear whether the intent was to deliberately
favor the dominant industry bloc, but the justices had to be aware that this would, in fact,
be the result.
The decision in the Frame case in 1989 in the Third Circuit was based on a
Central Hudson analysis. There are institutional reasons to see why this court may have

been inclined to rule against the challenger. It was the first case of this type to be heard
for almost forty years and the appellate court had little recent case precedent. Farmers
were suffering a depression at the time and there would be good reason to assume that the
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mandatory beef checkoff program (which was fairly new at that time) could provide
relief.
The two Ninth Circuit cases in Cal-Almond and Espy were decidedly in favor of
the challengers and expressed a commitment to protect commercial speech, a
commitment that was also evident in the Gerawan case. The court in both cases applied
the Central Hudson test to strike down the almond and the tree fruit checkoffs. The
Ninth Circuit did not have any more precedent to look at than the Third Circuit did in the
Frame case, but its appellate judges saw a different social, economic and political reality

than the Third Circuit. For example, the dominant almond grower, Blue Diamond, was
receiving highly favorable treatment under the checkoff program compared to the other
growers. The facts suggested a highly inequitable checkoff program which the Ninth
Circuit noted in its opinion. The Ninth Circuit ruled on the remedies aspect of this case
in 1995 when it become obvious that the USDA would not cooperate in reimbursing
moneys dues.
Congress reacted by passing legislation that attempted to bolster the position of
the government in future checkoff challenges, especially when the Court applied the
Central Hudson test. This strong reaction by Congress was not missed by the Supreme

Court in 1997 when they decided the Glickman v. Wileman case. The dissatisfaction of
Congress with the direction the case law had been heading with Central Hudson being
the preferred doctrine used to determine constitutionality was no longer a problem. The
Court deferred totally to the Commerce Clause and the regulatory justifications for the
legislation, ignoring issues of commercial speech and the First Amendment. The Court
in Glickman even chastised the Ninth Circuit for applying the Central Hudson test. This
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was an odd thing for it to do since there was no Supreme Court precedent (other than the
early Rock Royal case, which was quite dated and not fully on point). The Court also
interpreted the facts in a questionable way, indicating that the fruit growers were all of
one accord with the chosen advertising messages when the record clearly indicated
otherwise. It has been suggested by several people interviewed in this study and at least
one law review article that the program, as implemented, did not fit the definition of a
collective. The Court' s dismissal of the First Amendment issue without any discussion of
the merits of the claim indicated a heavy-handed approach in deferring to Congress'
regulatory powers and a lack of sensitivity to First Amendment issues. The possibility
exists that the industrial agriculture hegemony with its allies at the USDA and Congress
had given a strong message that it disapproved of any tampering with the checkoff
programs.
Four years later in United States v. United Foods, the Supreme Court struck down
the mushroom checkoff program. What happened during those four years to create the
switch? The research showed a legal community highly critical of the Supreme Court's
decision making in Glickman. The California Supreme Court had published a scathing
opinion in Gerawan Fanning, Inc. v. Lyons, 742 criticizing the U. S. Supreme Court's
failure to recognize commercial speech rights. Lower courts were trying to apply the
Glickman case with some confusion. In addition, the Supreme Court had decided another

case under a modified Abood analysis during that time period, Board of Regents of the
University of Wisconsin System v. Southworth.

743

The evidence showed that the justices

(or at least the two justices who switched sides, Justice Kennedy and Justice Stevens) had
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Gerawan Farming, Inc. v. Lyons, 24 Ca. 4th 468; 12 P.3d 720, 101 Cal. Rptr. 2d 470 (2000).
See Board ofRegents of the University of Wisconsin System v. Southworth, 520 U.S. 217 (2000).
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developed different beliefs regarding the economic, social and political realities
surrounding the mandatory commodity assessment programs.
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CHAPTER 9
CONSEQUENCES OF LEGAL OUTCOMES
This chapter will address objective number nine which instructs the researcher to
assess the legal and political consequences of the various legal outcomes on compelled
commercial speech issues, with attention to how the public interest will be served by such
outcomes. The spheres of agriculture, First Amendment doctrine and public interest will
be impacted by such consequences. The potential legal outcomes could include one of
the following Supreme Court findings:
1) the checkoffs are constitutional when they are part of a broader regulatory scheme
(such as the regulatory framework governing the fruit growers in Glickman v.
Wileman 744), but unconstitutional when they are imposed as stand-alone orders

like those assessed against the mushroom growers in United States v. United
Foods; 145 or

2) the checkoffs are unconstitutional and a violation of First Amendment rights
regardless of the regulatory scheme in which they reside, because they do not pass
scrutiny under First Amendment analysis (either through application of the
Central Hudson test or an analysis based on Abood principles); or

3) the checkoffs are constitutional regulations not protected by the First Amendment;
or
4) the checkoffs are constitutional under a "government speech" exception to the
First Amendment.
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See Glickman, v. Wileman, 521 U.S. 457 (1997).
See United States v United Foods, 533 U.S. 405 (2001).
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The direction chosen by the U.S. Supreme Court to resolve the First Amendment
commodity checkoff cases will have consequences for agriculture, the development of
First Amendment doctrine and the public interest. However, the degree of impact on
each area will be directly related to which resolution the Supreme Court adopts.
Since the government defendant in every checkoff case in the federal and state
court systems has asserted government speech as a defense, the Supreme Court will be
able to choose one of the first three options outlined above only if it rejects option number
four, i.e., the checkoff programs are constitutional under a government speech exception
to the First Amendment. The government speech defense presents certain tollgates for
the Court. If it determines that the generic advertising funded by compelled checkoff
dollars does not qualify as government speech, then it can immediately consider which of
the first three options it will choose. If it decides that the generic advertising created
pursuant to the checkoff programs does constitute government speech, then the Court
must decide whether to automatically exempt the compelled speech from First
Amendment protection or whether to subject it to a First Amendment analysis resulting in
one of the first three alternatives.
Once the analysis moves past the government speech hurdle (by a finding of no
government speech or a rejection of the government speech exemption to the First
Amendment), the Court will be guided by its most recent precedents, the United Foods
case and the Glickman case. It is important to note that alternative number three, which
states that the checkoffs are constitutional regulations not protected by the First
Amendment, was a much-criticized holding of the Court in the Glickman decision. It was
considered an aberration by most First Amendment scholars, an opinion also shared by
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the California Supreme Court in its Gerawan v. Lyons decision. The U.S. Supreme Court
moved away from this position in United Foods by recognizing that mandatory
commodity assessments for generic advertising raise First Amendment issues. Given the
direction the Court has taken, any future decision that the checkoff programs are
constitutional because they are not protected by the First Amendment is an extremely
remote possibility.
At this juncture, it is also less likely that the Court will choose option two (the
checkoffs are unconstitutional and a violation of First Amendment rights regardless of the
regulatory scheme in which they reside) because it adopted option one as its preferred
approach in the United Foods case. Under option one, the Court found that the checkoffs
were constitutional when they were part of a broader regulatory scheme, but
unconstitutional when they were imposed as stand-alone orders. The United Foods
decision clarified that the fundamental justification for treating the tree fruit program
differently than the mushroom program for First Amendment purposes is that the
compelled commercial speech in Glickman, which was part of a regulatory scheme set up
by a marketing order, met the germaneness test of the Abood line of cases. In other
words, the compelled funding for speech was sufficiently germane to the purpose of the
marketing order to pass First Amendment scrutiny. United Foods also indicated the
Court's preference to avoid First Amendment analysis under the commercial speech
doctrine in cases dealing with mandatory commodity assessments.
The manner in which the United States Supreme Court will address the
government speech defense ( option four) in the checkoff challenges is an open question.
If it recognizes generic advertising as government speech that is exempt from any First
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Amendment analysis, further First Amendment analysis is moot. However, if the Court
moves on to a First Amendment analysis (by holding the generic advertising is not
government speech or that such advertising is government speech that must meet First
Amendment scrutiny), all three of the options outlined above are available. The Court
embarked on a path in United Foods that recognized option one as its road map for future
cases involving First Amendment challenges to checkoff programs. In applying the
approach outlined in option one, the Court would have an opportunity to further clarify
the "germaneness test" and extend the First Amendment doctrine it developed in Abood
and its progeny of cases.
One factor that could be a consideration for the Supreme Court is the recent
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals decision in which the appellate court "inferred" that the
Supreme Court would have used the Central Hudson test had the government relied on
it.746 If the Supreme Court wishes to change directions, this suggests a way for it to shift
to the commercial speech doctrine in a future checkoff case without the change appearing
inconsistent with United Foods. This would be an unexpected move, however, given the
Supreme Court's past reluctance to apply the commercial speech doctrine to the First
Amendment challenges to the forced funding of generic advertising.
Consequences for Agriculture

The future of agriculture in the United States in different contexts (environmental,
social, cultural and political) and the potential role of commodity checkoff programs can
only be envisioned within the reality of the history and current state of the relevant
746

See Livestock Marketing Association v. USDA. Nos. 02-2769 and 02-2832 at 1 8, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS
13630 (8 th Cir. 2003).
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economic production for agricultural commodities. According to the base and
superstructure analysis of Marx and Engels, also incorporated by Gramsci in his writings,
the key to understanding how the agricultural apparatus functions today and how it may
function in the future is to look at the relations involved in production. Marx and Engels
clarified this in the Preface to a Contribution to the critique ofpolitical economy:
In the social production of their life, men enter into definite relations
which are indispensable and independent of their will, relations of production
which correspond to a definite state of development of their material productive
forces. The sum total of these relations of production constitutes the economic
structure of society, the real foundation on which rises a legal and political
superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness.
The mode of production of material life conditions the social, political and
intellectual life process in general.747
Analyzed within Gramsci's theory of hegemony, the relations of production have
generated a dominant hegemony in agriculture that is aligned with the industrial
production model. Consistent with other areas of economic development, agribusiness
has transformed the agrarian industry and culture in accordance with industrial
agriculture and has forever altered the relationships of farmers with other entities in the
food chain. Agricultural journalist and analyst, A.V. Krebs, observed:
Throughout the history of the United States corporate agribusiness has
steadfastly sought to economically concentrate the nation's food delivery
system's means of production by seeking to totally control its source of raw
materials through the substitution of capital for efficiency and technology for
labor.
At the same time corporate agribusiness has also sought to standardize the
food supply by shifting its main source from the farm to the factory, from being
produced by thousands of family farmers to being manufactured, marketed and
sold by a diminishing number of large, publicly unaccountable and increasingly
private corporations. [emphasis in original] 748
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Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Selected Works (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1973), 262-263.
Krebs, acknowledgements page.
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Krebs noted that an "evolving economic and government farm and food policy
has furthered such efforts."749 The outcome is a two-tier system of agriculture with
large, profit-oriented corporate farms in one sector and a divided group in the second
sector, including organic and niche farmers, some intermediate farms still able to make a
profit and break even and all the remaining farmers that are increasingly dependent on
off-farm income or whatever farm supports are available for survival These are the
relations of production that define the agricultural industry and from which arise the
current legal and political superstructure.
Commodity checkoff programs have emerged as one branch in the socio
economic superstructure of agriculture, given life through the consensual agreement of
producers, but sustained through increasingly stronger claims of control by government
and industry forces. These include the virtually impossible hurdles that must be
overcome to secure a referendum vote in several commodities, the discretionary behavior
by the Secretary of Agriculture, Ann Veneman, with respect to commodity checkoffs,
and ultimately, the coercive argument that all generic commodity advertising is
government speech. How can the success or failure of the checkoff challenges impact
this situation?
Consequences for Counter-Hegemony. A ruling by the U.S. Supreme Court

that checkoff programs are unconstitutional can occur if the Court applies a First
Amendment analysis upon finding that generic advertising is not government speech or
upon rejecting the government speech immunity argument. In holding that generic
advertising for a commodity in addition to mushrooms is unconstitutional, the Supreme
749

Ibid.
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Court would provide the anti-checkoff forces engaged in counter-hegemony with a model
for strategically using the courts to effectuate change. It would be a practical model for
utilizing one fraction of the State apparatus against another (judiciary branch against the
executive branch) as well as a symbolic and inspirational model for those seeking to build
a historic bloc capable of counter-hegemony.
Brenda Cochran and her husband, Steven Cochran, are dairy farmers and
plaintiffs in the diary checkoff case, Joseph S. Chochran and Brenda s. Cochran v. Ann
Veneman. 150 In her interview, Brenda Cochran said: "Breaking down the dairy checkoff

would chip away at the power base of those in control."751 Joseph Cochran described the
effect as follows: " I kind of look at it as striking a blow for the little man."752 He noted
that the checkoff is a "very, very miniscule part" of the overall effort to bring about
change, but it could be important as an example. The experience of Brenda and Joseph
Cochran is that, as farmers, they are "voiceless and powerless."753 Success in the courts
would give the minority groups in the commodity industries a voice.
If the Supreme Court continues its current path of distinguishing between two
types of commodity checkoff programs-those that are constitutional because they fit the
parameters of the regulatory scheme in the Glickman case and those that are
unconstitutional under the United Foods case-the agricultural community could feel
consequences if various commodity programs are restructured to withstand a
germaneness test.
150 Joseph S. Chochran and Brenda S. Cochran v. Ann Veneman, No. 4:CV-01-0529, 2003 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 4361, (Middle Dist. Penn. 2003).
75 1
Chochran interview, 3.
752
Cochran interview, 3.
753 Ibid., 2.
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Consequences for Hegemony. Regardless of which commodity is involved, a

ruling by the Supreme Court in favor of the USDA based on recognition of the
government speech argument would create tension among different fractions of the
checkoff hegemony that could prompt a renegotiation among those with power and
influence in the chec�off programs. This is because the USDA will have sacrificed some
credibility by claiming it was the puppet-master all along controlling the commodity
programs, when other fractions within the dominant group understood that the programs
were designed as self-help mechanisms.
An executive of the Livestock Marketing Association referred to the reluctant
acquiescence to the government speech argument by the trade associations and large
producers as "swallowing the pill."754 The same individual noted that the trade
association representatives who were required to testify must be "choking on their
words" 755 when they assured the courts that the USDA controlled the programs and all
messages.
Various fractions within the checkoff hegemony may harbor nagging perceptions
that the government speech argument is a legal fiction, and they may not truly recognize
the government's authority. In addition, they may resent efforts by the USDA to increase
its control of the programs to position itself more favorably with regard to its government
speech claim. Historically, the leadership of the trade commodity groups has not
responded well to the increased control by the USDA. Dr. Kathleen Merrigan, former
administrator of the Agricultural Marketing Service, described the reaction of the pork
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Interview with anonymous executive of the Livestock Marketing Association, 19.
Ibid.
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industry when the AMS increased its oversight of communications when the pork
referendum was pending:
But the supporters of the checkoff argued that they should be allowed more
autonomy than they were given. When it was starting to get toward the time of a
referendum, we required them to submit all their materials to USDA for
clearance . . .. And they accused us of micromana�ng and bureaucratic inertia
would slow them down so they'd be ineffectual. 56
Gaining legal legitimization of the government speech argument as applied to
commodity checkoffs is no guarantee of legitimization in the eyes of all those with
political and economic power in the checkoff hegemony.
Further rulings striking down checkoffs as unconstitutional would be welcomed
by certain fractions within the broader agricultural hegemony, since plaintiffs in several
commodity industries are large producers who sell highly differentiated, branded
products. Even where this is not the case, there is some indication that some larger
producers are quietly watching in the wings with the desire to see the checkoff programs
curtailed. For example, some the largest dairy producers in the United States (Bos Dairy,
DenDulk Dairy Farm, Rio Grande Dairy, County Line Dairy, etc.) were involved in an
unsuccessful challenge of the dairy checkoffs in 1999 in Nature 's Dairy, et al. v.
Glickman.757

The constitutional lawyer that represented this group of large dairy challengers,
Benjamin Yale, is now representing Brenda and Joseph Cochran, independent dairy
farmers who do not sell to a milk cooperative and identify themselves as part of an
alternative agricultural movement. Given their position, they may be more successful
than the large producers that are part of the dominant hegemony. However, a success by
756
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Merrigan interview, 3-4.
See Nature 's Dairy, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 3547 (6th Cir. 1999).
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the Cochrans would clearly inure to the benefit of the larger dairy farmers who would
also like to avoid the burden of paying checkoffs.
If the Supreme Court holds more commodity checkoff programs to be
unconstitutional, the impact will be felt by the hegemony in several identifiable ways:
1) Assuming that the generic advertising was successfully creating demand, some
entity in the food chain hegemony will lose those benefits.
2) In certain industries, the checkoff dollars have been used to promote the branded
products of a few major producers so these producers would lose these windfalls.
(An example is the checkoff funded advertising for HORMEL meats.)
3) There will be a loss of money for funding research and education. This could
mean that private industry would have to increase its investment for these
endeavors. Corporate agribusiness might lose a lot of free product development
and promotion for hormones and genetically engineered crops. 758
4) The United States government will lose funds that it has been using to penetrate
foreign markets with generic advertising.
5) The USDA will lose both a source of income from outside general revenue and a
convenient platform for engaging in activities and rhetoric that enhances its image
as an agency helping all farmers (i.e., a means for building hegemony).
6) The administrative organizations supporting each commodity group will no
longer have a purpose unless voluntary checkoffs are instituted or checkoff funds
are used strictly for research and education. This includes boards and

758See David

Dechant, "Checkoffs, mushrooms and dominoes," Cropchoice.com (July 16, 2001); available from
http://www.cropchoice.com/leadstry.asp?recid=373; Internet; accessed 20 March 2003.
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commissions at the federal and state levels that handle the checkoff funds and
direct the promotional and advertising activities.
7) The industry trade associations will lose a structured means of support for
ongoing activities that organize themselves around the checkoff program.
To further expand on the last point, this means there will be an impact on the
indirect ways in which these organizations have been able to share and wield influence
with agribusiness, media, legislators, government and ad agencies because of the flow of
checkoff money and the political nature of the way in which the funds are allocated for
selected generic messages. The dominant hegemony will lose an important tool for
furthering its various goals and this may prompt some economic and political reposturing
to build another means of accomplishing some of the same goals.
Consequences for First Amendment Doctrine

Government Speech Principle. The Supreme Court could hold that the USDA's

activities do not constitute government speech, thus refusing to recognize the
government's primary defense in these cases. This would shift the court's focus to a First
Amendment analysis of the particular checkoff commodity program being challenged
and leave the thornier problem of clarifying the constitutionality of government speech
for another day.
Such an outcome is indeed, likely, since many lower courts have already
concluded that the USDA's government speech argument with regard to a self-directed
commodity program is disingenuous. Moreover, given the U.S. Supreme Court's
preference for taking incremental steps in establishing new doctrine or expanding
existing doctrine, it may deal with the government speech defense in its next checkoff
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case by talcing the opportunity to outline a test for determining whether the speech in
question is government speech. Possible prongs for such a test might be whether the
speech has been expressly attributed to the government, whether it has been paid for by
general federal and state revenues, the makeup of the implementing board or commission,
and the level of autonomy and authority afforded this governing group. 759 The court
could conclude that the generic advertising does not constitute government speech
because it fails the newly-established test.
On the other hand, if the Supreme Court upholds commodity checkoff programs
by accepting the government speech argument, it will provide legitimacy for a scenario
where commercial speech (or art or another area of expression) implemented under the
guise of a self-directed program with government oversight can then be commandeered
by the government as an instrument for government expression without regard to First
Amendment rights. Figure 12 shows a continuum of how generic advertising programs
can be structured so that they constitute commercial speech, compelled commercial
speech and government speech.
The question in the compelled speech cases that have arisen since the United
Foods decision is whether the government has created a role for itself in these programs
sufficient to support an assertion of government speech. If the Supreme Court concludes
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Both of these conditions were cited as grounds for disqualifying generic advertising from the category of
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that this has happened, the USDA would then urge the Court to conclude that First
Amendment scrutiny is no longer necessary by virtue of the "government speech"
designation. However, the fact that the government is speaking does not obviate the need
for a First Amendment analysis.
It should be noted that the Supreme Court has never adopted a government speech
doctrine. All of the cases that mention the government speech doctrine do so in dicta.
Keller v. Bar of California760 expressly said the speech being litigated was not

government speech. In Board ofRegents of the University of Wisconsin System v.
Southworth, 761 the parties conceded it was not government speech. The closest the

Supreme Court has come to outlining a government speech doctrine was in the Rust v.
Sullivan 762 case in which the Supreme Court held that the government was not obliged to

subsidize the speech of doctors who were engaged in communications relating to
abortion.
As Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia observed, this was not a case of
government speech, but rather a case about the government not subsidizing speech. The
doctors claimed that they were entitled to speak their own messages about abortion and
the government responded that it paid them to provide medical services and not to
subsidize their speech on abortions. This case is, therefore, more accurately stands for
the proposition that "government is not obliged to subsidize the speech of the doctors"
rather than "government can speak about anything it wants." Dicta in the Southworth
case raises the question of whether traditional political checks are enough with regard to
760

Keller, 496 U.S. 1 (1990).
Southworth, 529 U.S. 217 (2000).
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government speech, but does not answer this question. 763 (Interpretations of this case
concluding that the court affirmatively indicated that political checks on government
speech are enough are overstating the court's opinion.)
Erik Jaffe, constitutional lawyer and counsel for beef checkoff plaintiffs, Jeanne
and Steven Charter, asserted: "If you accept the government version of this [government
speech], it will create gaping loopholes in the First Amendment, not just here but
everywhere."764 This is because a finding that the government's involvement in generic
advertising promoting individual commodities amounts to government speech raises
serious questions about the First Amendment distinctions between speech and conduct.
Jaffe noted: "While the government may have a free hand to engage in all kinds of
controversial conduct, there are limits on its ability to engage in or to compel others to
engage in speech."765 If there is a macro principle under the U.S. Constitution that
people cannot be compelled to support speech, then that principle would seem to also
apply to the U.S. government, unless the government is able to establish that compelled
support for particular types of speech meets an appropriate standard of proof.
This is the 800-pound gorilla that the courts have shied away from addressing in
cases that involve government speech. If they render a decision containing a strong
argument against government speech, will it invite an avalanche of claims by people who
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disagree with what the government is doing and demand a refund on their taxes? How
can the government's free expression be restrained by First Amendment principles
without causing dozens of lawsuits against government entities who are engaging in
daily activities that require expression? The answer is that government (and the courts)
will not become vulnerable to such an onslaught if the Supreme Court adopts a standard
that delineates with clarity the nature of government speech that violates the First
Amendment. The germaneness test of the Abood and Keller line of cases would afford
such a clear-cut standard to identify unconstitutional government speech and prevent
these types of lawsuits.
If the Supreme Court accepts the government' s argument that the speech in
question is government speech, it appears that it would have no choice but to address the
constitutionality of that speech. A strong holding by the court that the government
speech involved is unconstitutional because it does not meet the germaneness standard
would be a doctrinally significant step, because it would recognize that speech is different
than the non-speech activities of the government. On a theoretical level, the significance
of this doctrinal holding would lie in the fact that government speech would now be
recognized as having First Amendment restrictions on its speech activities.
On a practical level, it would not have dramatic consequences, since the
government and its representatives in all avenues would still be entitled to engage in
speech that is germane to legislation, policies and the business of running the
government. In his interview comments, Erik Jaffe notes that a court holding that
government speech must be evaluated under a First Amendment standard such as Abood
"would be taking the principle that speech is different and applying it uniformly across
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governments and across private actors, across all forms of government conduct, whether
it involves direct or indirect efforts to manipulate speech."766
Government speech would need to be closely tied to substantive conduct that is
germane to a government interest. For example, compelled support for government
speech that furthers health and safety concerns would meet this standard (e.g., a safety
seal that must be displayed on every product). However, a stand-alone statute that
requires a producer to pay for generic advertising conducted by a state to promote a
commodity would not meet this standard, unless the state had actually entered into the
commercial business of selling the commodity or was able to show that the generic
advertising was germane to some regulatory scheme. The gist of the United Foods case is
that, if the government is not regulating the industry, it does not have the right to compel
support for speech. The Supreme Court could extend this doctrine by concluding that
government speech is also subject to this restriction.
A decision by the Circuit Court in Florida in the consolidated Tampa Juice
Services, Inc., et al. v. State of Florida, Department of Citrus,

767

provides an example of

an effort by a state judiciary to tackle the government speech issue with an unpredictable
result. The case arose when Florida citrus growers and handlers challenged a checkoff on
citrus (called a "box tax") that required the citrus handlers to pay mandatory fees for use
by the Florida Citrus Commission to fund generic advertising forcitrus.
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As noted by Barry Richard, counsel for the Florida Department of Citrus, the
rationale for this tax is to "maintain a high level of quality and wholesomeness in Florida
citrus" and to also "bring to the attention of the general public the end result of that." He
claimed that the two must go hand in hand since "[T]here's no sense regulating quality
and wholesomeness if nobody knows about it."768
On the surface, there did not appear to be ambiguities regarding the fact that the
speech was government speech, because the program was carried out by the State of
Florida through the Florida Citrus Commission. The state title of the Commission
implied that it was an arm of the state government. As shown by Figure 12, the court
would be expected to move to the analysis on the far right on that continuum. Once the
speech was characterized as government speech, the circuit court would then have two
choices: 1) accept the argument of the state of Florida that the government speech status
exempts the checkoff program from First Amendment scrutiny, or 2) determine whether
the government speech in question is constitutional by analyzing whether it meets the
requirements of germaneness as outlined in United States v. United Foods and Glickman
v. Wileman, i.e., whether it is part of a regulatory scheme and such speech is germane to
the purpose of such scheme.
Circuit Judge Dennis P. Maloney was willing to grant government speech an
exemption from First Amendment analysis. In his opinion, he stated: "If the Box Tax is
'Government Speech' it is immune from First Amendment analysis."769 But he
concluded that the generic advertising was not government speech despite the appearance
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that the program and its messages were those of the state of Florida. He found that the
Citrus Commission was similar to self-help boards and commissions in other cases he
cited as precedent and, therefore, the Citrus Commission could not be seen as a
government agency entitled to claim the government speech exception to the First
Amendment. 770
While the members of the Commission are appointed by the Governor for three
year terms, they must meet eligibility requirements as growers, growers and shippers or
growers and processors of citrus fruit. Judge Maloney reviewed heavily on his
determination that the Commission operated with a high level of autonomy in its rule
making and enforcement, administration of the advertising campaigns and the box tax,
enforcement of the rules, ability to reduce the "tax rates" by vote of nine members, etc.
As a second consideration, Judge Maloney noted that the funding for the citrus box tax
came from compelled payments from a specified group of citizens (rather than from
general revenue funds). Citing the Michigan Pork Producers case, he determined that
this was a case of "an unconstitutionally coercive action by the government which is,
therefore, not subject to the governmental speech exemption."77 1
Judge Maloney' s finding that the generic citrus advertising was not government
speech led him to apply an analysis similar to that performed by the Court in United
Foods. The analysis thus stayed within the boundaries of the middle section of the

continuum shown in Figure 12 ..
The citrus decision suggests that, in the absence of guidance by the U.S. Supreme
Court, lower courts are stepping into the vacuum to create rules for determining what is
770 Ibid. at 4-5.
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government speech, whether the speech in question meets the definition, and whether is
exempt from First Amendment scrutiny.
In the flurry of decisions in checkoff cases in 2003, only one court has endorsed
the government speech argument. A ruling by District Judge Richard F. Cebull in a beef
checkoff challenge in the Western District of Montana upheld the beef checkoffs on the
grounds that generic advertising for beef was government speech. Judge Cebull applied a
cursory First Amendment analysis to find that the Beef Act was "constitutionally sound"
because it was "non-ideological, content-oriented government speech which does not
violate free speech or free association."772 The Center for Individual Freedom, a non
profit group that has supported checkoff challengers, notes the following on its website:
The Montana district court's decision is the first ever to hold that an agricultural
promotion program is the government speaking and that compelled support for
that speech was immune from First Amendment scrutiny. The legal brief filed
with the 9th Circuit argues that both the reasoning and the result of that decision
are in error and, if allowed to stand, it will create a vast loophole in the First
Amendment and render meaningless several well-established lines of First
Amendment case law. 773
Clearly, a move by the Supreme Court to provide a test for whether speech may
be defined as government speech would be a step forward in clarifying the questions
surrounding the concept of government speech and possible developing a doctrine for
government speech. In the event that the USDA loses because the generic advertising in
a particular case fails to meet the requirements for government speech, it is highly
predictable that the government will then modify the generic advertising to meet the
requirements. The challengers will not overlook the importance of the unresolved First
772
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Amendment issue for government speech and a new spate of lawsuits will be filed to
prod the Supreme Court into more thorough!y addressing how the First Amendment
impacts government speech.
In his overview of government speech, Professor Mark G. Yudof observed:
''The recognition of the constitutional ramifications of government expression calls
attention to broader norms of majority rule, democracy, and consent . . . "774 The USDA's
claim that it is exempt from First Amendment restrictions because the generic advertising
funded by compelled fees is government speech, indeed, raises issues of majority rule,
democracy and consent. As part of the dominant checkoff hegemony and the broader
agricultural hegemony, the USDA has assumed the role of speaking for the majority. The
USDA has asserted that it has the consent of the majority, but confusing and
controversial referendums in the pork and beef industries have rendered this claim open
to speculation.
Even if it can be said that the USDA has a significant level of consent, a zone of
conflict (or as Gramsci calls it, a "war of position") arises with respect to Yudof s final
element of "democracy." The minority voices are looking to the courts to recognize their
First Amendment rights under the U.S. Constitution to be free from compelled speech or
association. The manner in which the Supreme Court eventually interprets the USDA' s
claim that it is exempt from First Amendment restrictions because the mandatory
checkoffs are used for generic advertising that qualifies as government speech will have
direct consequences on the individual First Amendment rights of the checkoff
challengers.
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By concluding that First Amendment scrutiny does not apply to government
speech, the government will be given new authority for viewpoint discrimination. One
area that would clearly be at risk is the public forum doctrine. If the government builds a
facility or creates another forum over which it exercises control (such as an electronic,
on-line forum), it can claim that its purpose is to deliver its own message. Accordingly, it
has the right to allow only private citizens who agree with its viewpoint to speak and is
entitled to prohibit others with contrary viewpoints from speaking. The government can
argue that it is entirely acceptable to impose a viewpoint restriction, since the message is
government speech. The government can analogize its situation to the government
speech in the checkoff cases to claim that it is using private citizens to deliver its
preferred government message in the same manner that the USDA used mandatory
checkoff fees from private citizens to deliver its generic advertising message. In both
cases, the viewpoint discrimination is immune from First Amendment scrutiny because it
is the government speaking.
First Amendment Doctrine on Compelled Speech and Association. While the
Supreme Court's approach to the government speech argument remains open to
speculation, the path it has taken in the United Foods by choosing to analyze the First
Amendment rights of the challengers under Abood and Keller has predictive value for
how it will handle future checkoff challenges. This is an established line of cases that has
utilized the "germaneness test" as a straightforward way of determining whether the
compelled speech or association can withstand First At:nendment scrutiny. The Supreme
Court might offer some refinement of this test or modify it in some manner, but the

374

Abood analysis has proved durable in its application by the Supreme Court in a broad

range of contexts.
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals decision in the Livestock Marketing case775
suggests that the Central Hudson commercial speech analysis may not be completely
disregarded by the Supreme Court in a future case challenging commodity checkoffs. It
would be a major switch, however, given the Court's reluctance to apply the Central
Hudson test to compelled commercial speech and its history in Glickman of chastising

the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals for using the Central Hudson test to analyze the
constitutionality of the tree fruit marketing orders.
It is likely that the Glickman v. Wileman case will continue to relied upon as
precedent in guiding the court to determine, as a threshold issue, whether the checkoff
regulations are part of a broader regulatory scheme in which the government has an
important interest and whether the compelled support of speech is germane to furthering
the purpose for which the regulation has been enacted. However, the Court has distanced
itself already from several of its questionable holdings in the Glickman case. It is
noteworthy that two of the Justices that joined the majority in the Glickman opinion
quickly switched sides four years later to constitute a majority in the United Foods
decision.776
The Supreme Court's continued application of the Abood and Keller analysis
should not introduce anything novel into the First Amendment doctrinal arena, provided

775 See Livestock Marketing Association v. USDA, Nos. 02-2769 and 02-2832, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS
13630 (8th Cir. 2003).
776 Justice Anthony Kennedy and Justice John Paul Stevens joined Chief Justice William Rehnquist, Justice
Antonin Scalia, Justice David Souter and Justice Clarence Thomas in the majority opinion in United States v.
United Foods, 533 U.S. 405 (2001).
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that the interpretation of "germane" remains consistent with the current line of cases. In
Abood, a union could not use the union dues of a dissenting employee for activities
outside collective bargaining, i.e., for activities not "germane" to the purpose for which
the compelled association was justified. Likewise, in Keller v. State Bar of California, et
al., the U.S . Supreme Court held that compulsory state bar dues by the California State
Bar could not be used for ideological speech that was not germane to the purpose of the
States interest "in regulating the legal profession and improving the quality of legal
services."777
While the Supreme Court' s approach to the government speech argument in the
next case dealing with a checkoff challenge is less certain, the path it has taken in relying
on Abood and Keller in the United Foods case has predictive value for future checkoff
challenges. 778
First Amendment Commercial Speech Doctrine. Prior to Glickman, the lower
courts analyzed the First Amendment aspects of compelled commercial speech cases by
applying the four-prong Central Hudson test. In United States v. Frame, the Third
Circuit Court of Appe� s evaluated the case under both an Abood analysis and a Central
Hudson analysis. 779 The Supreme Court in Glickman rejected the approach used by the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in analyzing the case under Central Hudson. In United
Foods, the Court merely declined to apply the Central Hudson test on the grounds that it
would not find the compelled assessments on mushrooms sustainable under even the

m Keller, 496 U.S. 1 (1990).
ns Abood, 43 1 U.S. 209 ( 1977).
n1
n9 Frame, 885 F.2d 1 1 19 (3 Cir. 1989).
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lesser standard of protection of the commercial speech standard set forth in Central
Hudson. The Court also noted that the government does not rely on Central Hudson.180

The USDA declined to use the Central Hudson test as an alternative argument in
United Foods or any other cases in which it is now involved. This may be because the

Supreme Court in Glickman expressly indicated that the Central Hudson test was an
incorrect standard to apply or perhaps the USDA recognized that it had a weak case
under the Central Hudson test and, therefore, concentrated on an Abood analysis
combined with a government speech defense in its briefs. However, as already
mentioned, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals re-introduced the Central Hudson test in
it opinion in the Livestock Marketing Association case 781 on July 8, 2003, and may be
prompting the U.S. Supreme Court to begin applying the Central Hudson test or explain
more fully why the test is inappropriate for cases on compelled funding of generic
advertising.
Although the Supreme Court has frequently acknowledged that members of the
Court are not comfortable with the Central Hudson commercial speech test, the Court
does not seem eager to clarify or modify its position. Court watchers who thought the
Nike, Inc. v. Kasky case782 argued on April 23, 2003, was the vehicle that would prompt

the Supreme Court to clarify its position on commercial speech were disappointed when
the court dismissed the case on June 26, 2003 on the ground that the writ of certiorari was
"improvidently granted." The Court found that the case was not final, that the parties
didn't have standing to sue in a federal jurisdiction and that the court should avoid
780
78 1

See United Foods at 2337-2338.

Livestock Marketing Association v. USDA, No. 02-2769and 02-2832, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 13630 (8th

Cir. 2003).
782

Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. _, 2003 U.S. LEXIS 5015, No. 02-575 (2003).

377

deciding novel questions of constitutionality prematurely. The case is moving forward in
the lower courts in California and is expected to come back before the U.S. Supreme
Court again in several years. While these proceedings occur, the United States Supreme
Court may have an opportunity to address commercial speech in the checkoff cases if it
chooses. However, the Court may conclude that the compelled commercial speech cases
are not the best vehicle for breaking new ground in the commercial speech area,
especially when such cases are amenable to an Abood analysis.
Consequences for the Public Interest
Congress authorized the generic advertising program for mushrooms in 1990
based on its express finding that the mushroom program was "in the public interest" 783
"to maintain and expand existing markets for mushrooms."784 Congress made an even
stronger statement in the FAIR Act of 1996 (an agricultural reform act) that the generic
advertising programs for a number of commodities are "in the national public interest and
vital to the welfare of the agricultural economy of the United States."785
Almost all of those interviewed in this study expressly acknowledged that the
commodity checkoff programs have provided benefits in the areas of research, education
and food safety. These benefits, enjoyed by the public as well as the industry, will be
diminished if additional mandatory commodity checkoff programs are deemed
unconstitutional. Arguably, efforts can continue through voluntary checkoff programs
strictly for these purposes, but a number of pro-checkoff interviewees in this study
emphasized the problem with "free riders" or those in the industry who realize the
7 83
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7 U.S.C. 7401(b)(l). See U.S.C. 7401{a)(10) specifying the commodity programs that are covered by the
FAIR Act.
784

378

benefits without contributing their fair share. Past voluntary programs h_ave shown a
level of participation by producers lower than what might be anticipated if the only
abstainers are those who object to the messages and ideology of the dominant group.
Clearly, there are producers in agreement with the dominant group who simply do not
wish to participate for strictly financial reasons, especially if a sufficient number of other
producers are willing to sustain the programs.
One example of the impact of striking down a commodity checkoff system can be
seen in the aftermath of the decision by the district court in Washington that the
mandatory promotional program for apples was unconstitutional. The Apple
Commission shut its offices, and a number of groups and associations that received
funding through the Commission are now looking for alternative funding.7 86 The Apple
Commission also performed certain regulatory and administrative services for
Washington apple growers, such as administering the export program and dealing with
the government Market Access Program (MAP) funds. Apple growers have expressed
concern that a vacuum now exists in the absence of the organizational and service
functions provided by the Washington Apple Commission and the termination of the
funding to support the industry's infrastructure. 7 87
A consumer activism website has characterized the checkoff conflicts as against
the best interests of consumers, since the checkoffs are being challenged by alternative
farmers who "raise and market fringe products that cost more to produce and appeal to a
786
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tiny fraction of the public."788 While there is a public interest in low-cost food, a
definition of the consuming public would have to include a growing segment of those
who prefer products produced by alternative farming methods. To the extent that these
farmers are penalized in their ability to use their money for advertising purposes of their
choosing or for sustaining farming operations that produce organic and naturally grown
products to a public seeking such items, the public interest is not served.
There remains a question whether the public interest is being served by answering
public demand for cheap food by following the industrial agriculture model. Senator
Bryon Dorgan argued:
[l]f you think the farmer's travail has been the consumer's gain, you might check
your local supermarket. Somehow, those Depression-level prices on the farm
haven't shown up on the bar codes. Prices of hamburger and bread have inched
up, even as farm prices have plummeted.
Someone is getting the spread, and that someone is the food processing and
packing industry, which has scored big off the misery of U.S. farmers. The big
four cereal manufacturers have returns on equity of upwards of 29 percent even as
farmers go bankrupt. From a loaf of bread that costs $1.59 at the store, the wheat
farmer gets about five to six cents. In 1981 the wheat farmer got about double
that. The processors can reap where the farmer sows, in large part because the
industry has become so concentrated in recent years.789
A.V. Krebs, editor and publisher of The Agribusiness Examiner, has noted the
following about the pivotal role of agriculture and food:
Food, next to life itself, has become our greatest common denominator. Its
availability, quality, price, its reflection of the culture it feeds and its moral and
religious significance make it quite literally history's 'staff of life.' Today, in the
never-ending worldwide struggle to determine who will control its production,
quality and accessibility, food is no longer viewed first and foremost as a
7 88
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sustainer of life. Rather, to those who seek to command our food supply it has
become instead a major source of corporate cash flow, economic leverage, a form
of currency, a tool of international politics, an instrument of power - a weapon ! 790
In modem days in the United States, many political and ideological controversies
are fought through advertising. However, the Supreme Court's standard for protection of
commercial speech under the Central Hudson test makes it clear that speech does not
have to be political or ideological to be protected by the First Amendment. Likewise, the
Supreme Court's decision in the United Foods case makes it clear that the First
Amendment will protect commodity producers who are not governed by comprehensive
regulatory schemes against being forced to pay for objectionable commercial advertising,
regardless of whether such advertising is political or ideological in nature. Commercial
communications can constitute a means of persuasion and influence with regard to
products as well as social and cultural controversies.791
Since money has become a key factor in determining access to modem
communication channels, the future ability of commodity producers to participate in the
expression of commercial messages without being compelled to fund objectionable
speech is a notable thread in the broad fabric of a participatory democracy. A system of
mandatory fees paid by a limited group for commercial messages that the government
claims are its own under the government speech principle does not support democratic
self-government. If the government speech argument is rejected, it is still equally
troublesome to democratic principles to require a minority group in an industry to support
790
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the commercial speech of the dominant group and to be associated with the views of the
dominant group unless there is a vital government interest at stake.
The legal arguments focus on how strong the government interest must be to
support the intrusion of the government on First Amendment rights. Does the
government's interest in promoting the demand for commodities under any regulatory
scheme justify the infringement of First Amendment rights? The Supreme Court in
United Foods held that this economic goal of the government supported the violation of
First Amendment rights when the regulations were germane to the objective of a
comprehensive regulatory scheme (such as the marketing order in the Glickman case),
but not when they were found in a stand-alone statute. Although the Supreme Court has
relied on the Abood line of cases to clarify why the mandatory fees are permissible in one
instance and not in another, from a public interest standpoint, what difference does it
make? A legal distinction can be made, but the impact of overriding First Amendment
rights is the same regardless of the legislative vehicle in which the regulation resides.
Mandatory checkoff programs have afforded the dominant industrial blocs in
each industry with opportunities to manipulate producer-funded programs to further their
specific business goals. Examples can be seen by glancing through the legal investigative
frame used with this research (see Table 3). In many cases, there are inequities in the
industry that are enhanced or sustained by the checkoff programs. While the pro-checkoff
forces have discounted the theme of inequity as legitimate concern, this research
nevertheless showed that checkoff programs were vulnerable to manipulation by the
dominant group in each industry, enabled and supported by the USDA. It is worthwhile
asking the question whether the public interest is served when even some of the checkoff
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programs are held to be constitutional (i.e., those within the context of complex
regulatory schemes) if the programs lead to abuse of regulatory schemes. Do the
political, social and economic realities of the new Millennium prompt the same Supreme
Court response as the 1 937 decision in United States v. Royal Rock CO-OP, Inc.? The
Supreme Court in Rock Royal held that the government interest in an efficient marketing
system justified giving cooperatives a monopoly in the market.
Another area of concern for the public interest will arise if the Supreme Court
continues in the direction of recognizing the constitutionality of programs for producer
funded compelled commercial speech only when they are part of comprehensive
regulatory schemes. It can be assumed that the dominant hegemony supporting checkoffs
in those industries where the checkoff programs are created by stand-alone legislation
will refashion their programs to accommodate this Supreme Court requirement. So an
incentive exists for a number of industries to create more complex regulatory schemes
affecting other areas of economic and market control merely to achieve a constitutional
mandatory commodity assessment program.
The current trend toward branding agricultural commodities has been embraced
by a public that has become highly responsive to consumer goods differentiated by
commercial brands. There is a question whether the public interest will be served in the
years ahead by requiring producers to fund generic advertising when the public is
accustomed to purchasing based on brand differentiation and expects to learn about
specific characteristics of products through branded advertising.
A Supreme Court willing to recognize the constitutionality of the mandatory
commodity checkoff programs will enhance the authority of the government. Such
383

authority will be enhanced even more if the Supreme Court recognizes that the speech
compelled through mandatory advertising is government speech. It is notabl� that as
generic advertising has become more pervasive, the government has sought a more
invasive role as an aggressive player. This suggests that critical. consequences for the
public interest as a result of the legal outcomes may be related to the following research
question posed in this study:
RQ 3: Does the government's efforts to use "government speech" as a
justification for mandatory commodity assessments create a heightened risk that
the government may displace or monopolize private speech or interfere with the
gatekeeping function of private speakers?
At the producer level, there is evidence that the government' s speech will displace
private speech, since the producers paying checkoff fees to fund the government speech
must forfeit money' that would otherwise be available for its own advertising If an
increase in branding for commodities follows the current trend, the government speech in
the form of generic advertising will interfere with the private commodity producer' s
branded advertising programs at an even greater level," since the producer will then have
to spend money on commercial advertising to counteract the government's message,
while still paying the mandatory fees and investing in advertising programs to build its
brand.
While these outcomes have already occurred within the context of the checkoff
programs, the Supreme Court in United Foods has at least recognized First Amendment
protection for producers compelled to fund checkoff programs created by stand-alone
legislation. These First Amendment protections could be stripped away if the Supreme
Court holds that generic advertising is government speech and, therefore, immune from
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First Amendment scrutiny. The government would have complete control over the
funding and the messages of private producers without even the less burdensome First
Amendment requirement under Abood that the speech involved be germane to the
purpose of the government interest underlying the regulatory program.
The media serve as primary gatekeepers. Therefore, several Supreme Court cases
dealing with the compelled right of reply on television or in newspapers and compelled
access to media advertising are instructive in providing background for the considerations
raised in this first research question. In the 1969 case of Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v.
FCC,792 the U.S. Supreme Court exhibited a strong bent for allowing compelled speech in
the area of broadcasting by upholding the right of the Federal Communication
Commissions (FCC) to impose "fairness requirements" on broadcasters, including the
"personal attack rule." This rule required broadcasters to afford equal air time to
individuals or groups whose character or honesty had been attacked on the air during a
discussion related to topic of public importance. Broadcasters were finally successful in
getting the FCC to cease enforcing the "personal attack rule" in the year 2000 (an effort
that required a writ of mandamus form a D.C. Circuit Court). It is noteworthy that the
rule was upheld by the courts and enforced by the FCC for almost five decades.
In a contrary decision five years later, the U.S. Supreme Court in Miami Herald
Publishing Co. v. Tomillo 793 held that a newspaper could not be compelled to give

political candidates the right to equal space to respond to criticism levied by the
newspaper. A third case, Resident Participation of Denver, Inc. v. Love, 794decided by a
192 Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
793 Miami Herald Publishing
794

Co. v. Tomillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
Resident Participation of Denver, Inc. v. Love, 322 F.Supp. 1 100 (D.Colo. 197 1).
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panel of three federal judges in Colorado, involved three Denver newspapers that refused
to run the advertisement of an activist citizens group that opposed building a rendering
plant within Denver city limits. The citizens group brought suit to compel the
newspapers to print their ads, but the district court panel held that newspapers, as private
entities, were entitled to refuse the advertising.
The courts have supported their decisions providing less First Amendment
protections to print broadcasting by different rationales, such as: spectrum scarcity
(scarcity of frequencies on the electromagnetic spectrum requires more government
regulation), need for the government to act as a trustee for the public, the pervasive
nature of the broadcasting medium and the need for the government to protect children
against the impact of the medium.
Would newspapers that are aligned with the counter-hegemony against mandatory
commodity checkoffs (or simply in disapproval of a message in a particular
advertisement) be free to refuse the generic advertising cloaked in the guise of
government speech? While the Tomillo case and the Resident Participation case could
provide the media with some ability to refuse the advertising, the power of the USDA,
together with the power of other dominant industrial blocs allied with the USDA, could
create opportunities for coercion against the media, especially with regard to smaller
agricultural media outlets. In addition, the courts might align themselves with the
government agency as evidenced by the history of the "personal attack rule."
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An insightful law review article by Schoen, Hogan and Falchek discussed the
topic of "government-imposed counter-advertising."795 The authors emphasized that
"[T]he U.S. Supreme Court has insisted on several occasions that compulsory speech in
the context of commercial speech should be limited to mandatory disclosure of
information that prevents consumer deception."796 Accurate and fair information will
assist the consumer in participating in a fair bargaining process. This constitutional
principle, the authors contended, was overlooked by the Supreme Court in the United
Foods case because of its focus (fixation may be a better word) on regulatory schemes.

Funding for compelled speech in commodity programs such as those reviewed in
Glickman and United Foods furthers an objective "to enhance consumer awareness about,

and promote the sale of, the regulated commodities" rather than "to enhance the
dissemination of accurate and useful information to consumers."797 It is the opinion of
the authors that the Central Hudson test must be used to analyze these commodity
checkoff cases because the compelled funding of commercial speech falls outside the
permissible category of "mandatory disclosure of information that prevents consumer
deception."798
The rulings in Glickman and United Foods provide ammunition for advocates of
government-imposed counter-advertising. Because United Foods was decided on such a
narrow basis, it affords First Amendment protection to only a discrete group in a discrete
situation. The article states:
795
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The Court appears to limit First Amendment protection against compelled
commercial speech to situations in which membership in the association is
required, the government regulatory scheme is less pervasive, and the government
regulation is centrally aligned with the purpose of the message. 799
The authors identify the alcohol and tobacco industries as completely outside the
scope of this ruling. They suggest that no First Amendment protection will be afforded in
cases where government programs impose counter-advertising in favor of temperance for
alcohol or abstinence for smoking. The authors clarify this point and its implications for
the media as follows:
[T]here has been some pressure for advertisements warning consumers about the
health dangers of drinking and cigarettes. In assessing the viability of mandatory
counter-advertisements, two levels of inquiry are required: whether a business
organization can be forced to counter-advertise and whether media can be forced
to accept such ads. 800
The authors argue that "forcing the disclosure of information in commercial
speech should be limited to truthful, factual information that preserves the fair bargaining
process." 801 In their opinion, forced counter-advertising relaying health information
would be a permissible area for government-mandated communications, but
advertisen:;tents encouraging consumers to refrain from drinking or smoking would not.
A number of organizations have argued otherwise, including the National Council on
Alcoholism and Drug Dependence and Mothers Against Drunk Driving. These groups
and others petitioned the FCC in 1997, seeking a ruling that broadcast licensees who air
advertisements for alcohol must also broadcast counter-advertisements free of charge. 802
(This was the practice when for cigarette advertising on television until these ads were
799
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banned on broadcast media.) The government has also compelled commercial speech in a
handful of corrective advertising situations where misleading advertising had a "residual"
effect on consumers so that stopping the misleading ads was not sufficient to educate
consumers.
The courts have yet to establish whether the media will be able to refuse
government-mandated counter-advertisements containing messages designed to
convince the public to abstain from using alcohol and cigarettes. Some guidance is
provided by the Tomillo case, which stuck down a Florida right of reply statute. The
U.S. Supreme Court held that newspaper editors are entitled to refuse to publish replies to
articles critical of political candidates. The government can argue that Tomillo should
be distinguished from the counter-advertisements because the speech in Tomillo is
political rather than commercial speech. If the government can establish that its counter
advertisements are government speech, this will distinguish the facts from Tomillo even
further, since the courts may recognize that government speech is immune from First
Amendment scrutiny.
The 1969 Red Lion Broadcasting case is also of interest because the Supreme
Court in that decision upheld the right of the FCC to require a broadcasting company to
offer equal air time to a third party that the broadcaster or a party using a licensee's
facility had attacked during a broadcast. This case can also be distinguished from
government-imposed counter-advertising, because the "personal attack rule" regulated
speech that expressed political or ideological viewpoints and not commercial speech.
(The Court relied upon the concept of "spectrum scarcity" to justify its ruling.)
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Further development of the government speech principle could provide guidance
on how government-imposed counter-advertisements will be treated by the courts. In its
next review of a case challenging a mandatory commodity promotion program, the U.S.
Supreme Court will have an opportunity to define "government speech" since the USDA
has argued in every pending case that generic commodity advertising constitutes
government speech that is immune from First Amendment scrutiny. If the Supreme
Court finds that the generic advertising funded by compelled commodity assessments
falls outside the definition of government speech, it may be able to avoid taking the next
step of deciding whether all government speech is immune from First Amendment
protection. (A threshold question, in the view of Schoen, Hogan and Falchek, is whether
the government speech in question serves to "enhance the dissemination of accurate and
useful information to consumers. "803)
The United States Supreme Court has yet to clarify the level of government
involvement or control that will trigger the government speech immunity. It is expected
that this could be one factor included in a working definition of "government speech" that
will hopefully be established by the Court. In the absence of clear direction, the parties in
the pending checkoff cases are presenting evidence on this point.
The pro-checkoff parties are seeking to prove heavy involvement and control of
the checkoff programs and the anti-checkoff parties are trying to show the opposite. The
heightened risk to freedom of speech arises because the government has claimed control
sufficient to establish government speech after the fact. The commodity checkoff
programs were characterized as self-directed with oversight by the government and
803 Schoen, Hogan and Falchek, 5 1 5.
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endorsed by producers based on that understanding. The strategic move by government
to control the programs at a level necessary to control the speech does not bode well for
other programs in which the government is involved in an oversight capacity. All
programs of this nature (including those in telecommunications, health and medical
industries, etc.) would need to be on guard for a similar strategic move that would result
in government interference in private communications. Increased regulatory oversight
and control by a government agency would increase the chances for the government
oversight to parlay itself into government speech.
If the government speech activities in the commodity programs (i.e., the generic
advertising) is not subject to any First Amendment scrutiny, government authority and
control is greatly enhanced in the agricultural commodity environment. This would
suggest that the government might find similar success in other sectors. In addition, the
government could create it own forums for the exchange of messages (online forums or
physical facilities) and allow only speakers whose messages are consistent with the
government speech to participate. It is conceivable that private parties would then need
to engage in counter-speech to respond to the government's message.
The purpose of the generic advertising in the commodity programs is persuasive
in nature. It is designed to convince consumers to buy more agricultural commodities.
This serves as a model for authorizing government to engage in a range of other
persuasive communications characterized as government speech without First
Amendment limitations. (Anti-checkoff challengers argue that the generic advertising in
several industries is outright misleading in delivering the message that the commodities
are all alike when clear differentiations exist.) In addition, the government has never
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identified itself as the source of the generic advertising messages. Accepting such
disguised government speech as an acceptable standard, would require consumers to
assume that any commercial message may be the government speaking. (How many
citizens today would assume that the government was the source of a message urging
them to consider "Beef, it's what's for dinner" or asking if they "Got Milk?")
The U.S. Supreme Court has indicated that a primary objective of the First
Amendment is safeguarding the public's interest in the free flow of truthful commercial
information. 804 If the producer funded generic advertising created by the checkoff
programs is deemed to be government speech, there is a likelihood that the free flow of
truthful commercial information in the agricultural commodity industries (and possibly in
other industries) will, at minimum, experience governmental interference. Given that the
USDA is allied with a strong dominant industry bloc, the interference could rise to the
level of monopoly or displacement of speech in some cases.
The Battle Continues
"People usually think this checkoff thing is a kind of side issue.
And, in a sense, it is. We view it as one battle in a lot larger war.
But, it 's a strategic war. They 've got our money. " 805
~ Jeanne Charter

The greatest weakness of the AgriBiz position and its major roadmap, the
industrial agriculture model, lies in its assumption that better productivity and better
efficiency are the primary goals for agricultural progress. Justification for AgriBiz is
based strictly on a quantitative approach rather than a qualitative approach. The AgriBiz
status quo reflects an overwhelming focus on achieving greater and greater returns for
804

See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 764
(1976).
805
Charter interview, 18.
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retailers and packers at the expense of the producer groups in a manner that seems to beg
for antitrust enforcement scrutiny and enforcement. There is little or no flexibility within
the structure itself for different approaches, even though some of the trade industry
leadership may personally aspire to tolerance and industry diversity.
The AgriChoice position's greatest weakness is that it is out of step with the
current business models as illustrated most dramatically by the example of the success of
the WalMart retail store chain replacing the mom and pop general stores. Supply chain
management, vertical integration and concentration is the present paradigm for
demonstrating business acumen and success.
Is the conundrum created by two divergent agricultural models irreconcilable?
AgriBiz and AgriChoice both involve the use of agricultural resources in combination
with a set of management practices to generate income to support an ongoing agricultural
industry. They seek to accomplish this through sharply differing structural industry
models. But they could theoretically share a common foundation. That common
foundation could be a public policy commitment to: 1) maintain competitive market
structures by forbidding anticompetitive conduct through antitrust laws, and 2) seek
faimess and equity in the marketplace by enacting industry and topic specific legislation
to provide a balance between the interests of contending groups of economic actors. 806
The industrial agricultural model followed by AgriBiz could function successfully
if it were grounded in a commitment such as this, but it has no incentive to do so.
Through inaction, short staffing and policy decisions, the USDA and GIPSA have failed
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U.S. Congress, Senate, Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Agriculture, Rural Development and Related
Agencies, hearing on Concentration and Competition in Agriculture, testimony of Peter C. Carstensen, 17 May
2001 ; available from http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/recent/120.pdf; Internet, accessed 7 July 2003.
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to enforce the Packer and Stockyard Act. Through limited resources and lack of judicial
decision-making, the USDA has failed to pursue enforcement against monopolistic
behavior of cooperatives under the Capper-Volstead Act. And through a combination of
its weak internal processes and the USDA's strong alliance with the dominant industry
power blocs in livestock and dairy, the USDA has failed to perform its referendum
responsibilities in these industries.
In short, there has been little reason for AgriBiz to adopt policies and practices
consistent with furthering competition or ensuring fairness and equity. Instead, economic
and political goals push the industrial agriculture bloc to use all means available to
achieve even greater concentration and centralized ownership, exert greater control over
the lower levels in the agricultural chain and increase their returns. Their strategies have
included aggressive efforts to continue the checkoff programs through referendum
challenges and through the legal argument that generic commodity advertising is
government speech. In the livestock industry, the beef industry bloc and the pork
industry bloc vigorously opposed legislation providing for a ban on meatpacker
ownership of livestock, resulting in the deletion of the proposed language from the Farm
Bill of 2002.
However, the war of position against the industrial agriculture bloc moved to the
courts, a terrain in which the State (acting through the U.S . Supreme Court and lower
courts) does not appear to have aligned itself with the dominant industrial agriculture
bloc. The struggle for hegemony in this terrain presents the potential for creating change
in the commodity production system. The engines for change are two counter-hegemony
movements, the checkoff cases fighting for the right to be free from compelled speech
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and the captive supply cases attacking the anticompetitive behavior of the meatpackers.
Both are moving through the courts with strong degree of success.
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CHAPTER IO
BROADER IMPLICATIONS OF THE RESEARCH APPROACH
This research on the broader context and meaning of a First Amendment line of
cases was based on the assumption that legal battles over constitutional issues signify
struggles in other arenas of American life. As an example, the civil rights cases
referenced at the beginning of this dissertation represent past and present conflicts arising
from deep divisions among American people with unequal power. 807
The researcher developed an approach that, for clarity, will be identified as the
"Gramscian/Galbraith Legal Context Analysis" and referenced informally as the "legal
context analysis." This study successfully demonstrated that the approach provided an
effective, structured means to explain the complex realities of the compelled commercial
speech cases and suggested that it can be applied equally well to explain other
constitutional political struggles that manifest themselves in the courts.
The legal context analysis facilitated an examination of the structural organization
and power relationships that govern the production of commodities in five industries. It
revealed sharp political, economic, social and cultural differences between dominate
groups exercising hegemony and subordinate groups seeking transformative change or
counter-hegemony. These conflicts, arising from different values and ideologies, were
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The affirmative action cases of Grutter v. Bollinger and Gratz v. Bollinger, decided by the U.S. Supreme
Court on June 23, 2003, signified political and social conflicts over civil rights that have continued to
divide and polarize Americans. In upholding the affirmative action practices of the University of Michigan
Law School and striking down the affirmative action procedures followed by the University of Michigan
undergraduate school, the U.S. Supreme Court once again expressed its constitutional values in the area of
civil rights. See Grutter v. Bollinger, No. 02-241, 2003 U.S. LEXIS 4800; 71 U.S.L.W. 4498 (U.S.
Supreme Court, decided June 23, 2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, No. 02-5 16, 2003 U.S. LEXIS 4801, 71
U.S.L.W. 4480 (U.S. Supreme Court, decided June 23, 2003).
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the puzzle pieces that fit together to explain how an environment and a set of political and
economic circumstances created an issue ripe for constitutional review.
As a threshold step in this study, the researcher selected a line of cases in which
the courts had addressed the constitutionality of laws related to First Amendment free
speech rights, i.e., the cases challenging the compelled funding of generic advertising
through commodity checkoffs. This required a preliminary study to: 1) define the
relevant cases addressing the specific constitutional issue (compelled commercial
speech), 2) gain a general understanding of the opposing legal positions of the parties as
presented in their official legal documents, and 3) identify the constitutional doctrines
that the U.S. Supreme Court and lower courts used in deciding the cases. (Some basic
knowledge about broader political contests relating to the constitutional topic would
assist a researcher at this stage, but is not required. Since all legal battles over
constitutional issues signify underlying political, economic and cultural conflicts, the
researcher can assume that later stages of the research will illuminate such conflicts.)
In determining that compelled commercial speech cases were appropriate for this
study, the researcher observed that various individuals, groups and the U.S. government
had sought judicial intervention in their disputes over the constitutionality of commodity
checkoffs since 1986. The legal positions of the parties were clarified in seventeen
different cases. Finally, the constitutional doctrines applied by the U.S. Supreme Court
and the lower courts during those years in such cases were not consistent, indicating
judicial conflict in addition to the broader political contests that appeared to be involved.
The next pivotal step in developing the legal context analysis involved using the
Gramsci theory of hegemony to guide and inform the evidence gathering and analysis.
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Gramsci's theory explained how hegemony operated within large social formations,
while this study focused on hegemony in agricultural commodity production. Therefore,
the researcher extended Gramsci's concept of hegemony to encompass "Gramscian
power blocs" as shown in Figure 3. The Gramscian power bloc is analogous to the
"historic bloc" that Gramsci used to describe a group comprised of civil society and the
State allied with the central organizers, the bourgeoisie. In the same manner that the
historic bloc exercises hegemony over the whole of society, the industrial agriculture bloc
and the commodity industry blocs exercise hegemony over all agricultural commodity
production.
This expanded Gramscian theory proved to be imminently well suited as a
framework for examining the political, economic and cultural conflicts underlying the
First Amendment conflicts over checkoffs. It provided a perspective that directed both
the collection and analysis of evidence.
In gathering evidence, the theory prompted the researcher to seek out elements of
hegemony in the agricultural industry as a whole and hegemony in the political struggles
over commodity checkoffs in each commodity industry. This included collecting
evidence that would pinpoint which entity was the central organizer. The theory also cued
the researcher to look for activities showing counter-hegemony by a subordinate group
interested in changing the laws on checkoffs-a group that might have the potential to
wield countervailing power to curb economic exploitation by the hegemony.
At the analysis stage, the expanded Gramscian theory ensured that the researcher
would focus on two areas: 1) how the dominant power blocs and their allies were
organized and how they acted to ensure continued hegemony through consensus,
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negotiation, control or coercion, and 2) how the challengers and their allies were
organized and how they acted to create counter-hegemony designed to disrupt the
hegemony, establish countervailing power and alter the relations of power that govern the
organization of the commodity industries and the markets. This focus directed the
researcher to consider the strategies of both sides, including their choice of "terrains" to
best serve them in their war of position. Such terrains may include the legislature, the
media, trade association networks, the courts or agencies of the state, such as the USDA.
The researcher recognized the need for a targeted method to uncover and analyze
hegemonic structures within the agricultural industry and details of the political,
economic and cultural conflicts arising from such structures. The next step, therefore,
was to create a method for gathering and analyzing evidence through use of
"investigative" frames (a general investigative frame and a legal investigative frame).
The frames served as templates for the researcher to supply with contextual information.
The categories in the frames provided meaningful ways to organize a wide variety of
facts for effective analysis. Samples of the general investigative frame and the
investigative frame are shown as Tables 4 and 5 .
Table 4

Table 5

Format for Investigative Frame

Format for Legal Investigative Frame
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In addition to their value as an organizational tool and as a mechanism for
gathering information critical to understanding hegemony in an industry, the investigative
frames served three other important functions during the legal context analysis. First, as
the general investigative frame was fertilized with interrelated and sometimes
contradictory facts, new questions about hegemonic relationships and the issues at stake
for the parties began to emerge. This allowed the researcher to develop meaningful,
theoretically-informed research questions that could be used to further analyze the body
of evidence in the general investigative frame and to collect and examine the evidence in
the legal investigative frame from a more critical perspective.
Second, the information in the investigative frames represented a simple
acquisition of facts until it was interpreted within the expanded Gramscian hegemony
theory and the Galbraith countervailing power concept. The investigative frame with its
strategic categories served as a catalyst in infusing the facts with meaning from the
theoretical framework. It was a link in permitting the researcher to analyze a complex set
of actions and discourse by political players (the reality reported by the evidence) within
the theoretical perspective created by an understanding of hegemony and countervailing
power, dominant power blocs exercising hegemony, challengers seeking counter
hegemony, strategic maneuvering and wars of position to further the interests of the
respective groups (the reality revealed through theoretical enlightenment).
Third, the investigative frames were instrumental in identifying the issues that
were in the "zone of conflict" between dominant power blocs and the challengers,
participants with unequal power locked in a political contest in a changing agricultural
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industry. Issues within the "zone of conflict" arose from clashes in values over things
such as:
► the benefits of generic advertising to the industry and the public as balanced
against protection of free speech values;
► the value of a majority consolidating the resources of an industry to achieve its
goals versus the value of recognizing the democratic voice of all participants in
the industry (the value of large research and education advances versus the value
of not compelling support by those who disagree with the goals of the majority);
► the value of the industrial agriculture model versus alternative agricultural
commodity production models;
► the role of the USDA in favoring agribusiness over support for independent
farmers (the value realized by the USDA in the national and international arenas
by promoting corporate interests versus the value it would recognize by
supporting individual farming interests);
► the role of a government that enforces antitrust laws to ensure that all farmers and
the public have the benefits of a competitive and fair market system (the value of
permitting an anti-competitive status quo to continue to ensure close relations
between corporate and government interests versus the value of breaking up
abusive practices);
► differences in how the contributions made by all farmers to American society
should be measured (the value of agriculture's gross profit margin versus a
measure based on maintaining resources and a quality of life);
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► the value of increased efficiency, economies of scale and uniformity arising from
concentration and integration versus the value of maintaining crop diversity and
long-term land preservation and stewardship;
► the value of increased use of branding versus the value of established practices
based on homogenous handling and sales of commodities (such as the commodity
checkoffs) and the cost of building and promoting brands;
► the value of foreign trade policies and sourcing low-cost raw food materials from
the international market versus the value of policies protecting farmers;
► the value of subsidies for fanners versus the value of an agricultural industry that
is strictly market-driven;
► the value to the consumer of source of origin identification for food commodities
versus the costs and possible impact to profits if consumers choose not to buy
foods from certain sources;
► the value of genetically engineered commodities to consumers, the food
production industry and the ability to feed the hungry versus unknown health or
agricultural risks and the value of farming with seed supplies that can be saved
from year to year; and
► the value of irradiation of livestock and poultry for health and safety versus the
value of avoiding an additional processing step that may reduce taste.
The opposing values covered a range of political, economic, social and cultural
issues. This list is representative of the range and complexity of the value dichotomies
that may be identified when a legal context analysis is performed. Political contests that
shift to the courts for resolution by application of the law tend to be complex battles with
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numerous issues at the forefront in the zone of conflict. Judges must articulate their
understanding of these conflicting values in rendering their decisions . .
It was important in this study for the researcher to identify and discuss only those
issues in the zone of conflict that are most meaningful to the First Amendment challenges
to the commodity checkoffs. The evidence showed that the five industries involved had
different issues that precipitated battles in the zone of conflict. Industry concentration
and vertical integration were the major issues in the zone of conflict in the livestock
industries where the challengers were the small, independent producers. The zone of
conflict for the tree fruit and mushroom industries reflected key issues related to branding
and product differentiation. Challengers in these industries sought to stop the use of their
dollars for generic advertising in competition with their own branded advertising. A mix
of plaintiffs and cases in the dairy industry showed that it was experiencing clashes in
values that created a zone of conflict related to all of the key areas-industry
concentration, vertical integration, branding and product differentiation.
The "Gramscian/Galbraith legal context analysis" may be used to study other
judicial battles over constitutional issues that signify a myriad of conflicts between
political and social forces with differing ideologies, economic interests and cultural
values. It offers a structured method for gathering and analyzing evidence to facilitate a
broader understanding of what is at stake for parties in lawsuits engaged in intense
hegemonic struggles over constitutional issues. The method will also assist in tracing
the external realities and influences that surround judicial decision making on an issue.
Finally, a clear understanding of how political and economic power is exercised between
groups who have an interest in a constitutional conflict will assist in analyzing ways in
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which the consequences of various legal decisions will affect the parties and society in
the immediate and extended future.
The Gramscian/Galbraith legal context analysis is comprised of nine
components:
1) a theoretical framework based on Antonio Gramsci's theory of hegemony
(expanded to encompass Gramscian power blocs) and John Kenneth Galbraith's
concept of countervailing power;
2) a set of objectives specific to the area of conflict being studied (reflecting a
preliminary awareness of existing regulatory apparatus and laws of the State and
applicable legal principles).
3) a thorough collection of evidence, including interviews;
4) an "investigative frame" (as shown by Table 4) to examine the elements giving
rise to the constitutional challenge, with attention to the entities and their
alignment for or against the hegemony;
5) a "legal investigative frame" (as shown by Table 5) for tracing judicial decision
making in a line of constitutional cases, and for identifying possible influences
from the dominant hegemony or societal, legislative or judicial sources;
6) an identification of issues in the zone of conflict based on the investigative frames
(and a narrowing of the issues for study and analysis, if appropriate);
7) a formulation of key research questions based on the investigative frames;
8) an analysis of evidence under the Gramscian and Galbraith theories, and
9) a report on the conclusions.
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Other constitutional legal conflicts that may be suitable for analysis using the
Gramscian/Galbraith legal contest analysis are related to the rights of parties engaged in
hegemonic battles regarding such issues as intellectual property in a digital age,
restricting adult access to Internet media in order to protect children, freedom of religion,
abortion, stem cell research, privacy and other cases involving an established hegemony
that is being challenged by a counter-hegemony on constitutional grounds.
The line of the cases challenging the constitutionality of the anti-circumvention
provisions in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act808 can be used to briefly illustrate the
broad applicability of the legal context analysis developed in this study.
The constitutional basis for all copyright laws is the intellectual property clause in
the U.S. Constitution: ''The Congress shall have Power. . . to Promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."809 The area of copyright
law was not subject to turmoil until the rapid diffusion of computers and new technology
into homes in the United States during the 1990s generated a huge pool of Internet users
who have aggressively engaged in "on-line piracy" or the misappropriation of creative
material in disregard for copyrighted rights. 8 1 0 On-line piracy of music and other
materials has created a tension between those who seek to use the Internet and new
Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 1 12 Stat 2860 (1998) (codified as
scattered sections in 17 U.S.C.).
809
U.S. Const., art. I, 8, cl. 8.
810
However, as Christopher Mays notes in his critique of intellectual property, the definition of "piracy" in
terms of theft is not necessarily a technical term, but a rhetorical device that is used by those certain
industries to stress the rights of the individual owner. It implies that a property right has been recognized.
If no right exists, then there can be no piracy. By framing the debate over use of information in terms of
theft and piracy (rather than social utility or access), the rights of copyright owners are privileged above
social rights. Under the Gramscian theory, this suggests a strategy by the copyright power bloc to maintain
its hegemony. See Christopher Mays, A Global Political Economy of Intellectual Property Rights: The
New Enclosures? (New York: Routledge, 2000), 150- 1 5 1 .
808
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technology to sustain an "open public domain" model for free exchange of knowledge
and those who feel compelled to impose a "closed public domain" model to exercise
control over access and copying in reliance on their proprietary rights under copyright
law.
The "closed public domain model" is the preferred solution of those with a
protectionist viewpoint because, in a digital world, complete control over copying can
only be achieved by complete control over access. Proponents of this model successfully
persuaded Congress to integrate their views into the current copyright law, the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA") passed by the legislature on October 28, 1998. 81 1
Those supporting the DMCA are producers of movies, music, boo�s, databases
and computer software. Under the Gramscian/Galbraith legal context analysis, these
entities form the hegemony in the sphere of society concerned with the production,
protection and use of creative works. They rely on the copyright laws to protect their
interests. (The fact that the current copyright laws are referred to as the current
"copyright regime" is a clear indication of the powerful impact of these laws as a tool for
exercising hegemony.) Two major trade associations, The Recording Industry
Association of America (RIAA) and the Motion Picture Association of America
(MPAA), are clearly major players in the copyright power bloc exercising hegemony.

The "Big Five" major record companies dominating the music recording industry
(Universal Music Group, Sony Music, Time Wamer Music Group, BMG Entertainment
and EMI Recorded Music) have also been active in lending their support in legal actions
and lobbying for strict copyright laws.
811 Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 1 12 Stat 2860 (1998) (codified as
scattered sections in 17 U.S.C.).
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The challengers seeking to establish counter-hegemony against the copyright
power bloc include computer technology industries, academics and computer hackers.
Library associations have been outspoken against restrictive copyright laws in
representing the needs of libraries to have continued access to materials needed to serve
their patrons. Some artists and authors are aligned with the copyright counter-hegemony,
while others are aligned with the copyright power bloc. (A few artists and authors
opposed to the current model of copyright ownership and distribution of creative works
have experimented with alternative models that may offer future potential for counter
vailing power.) The public, especially Internet users age 35 or younger, play a role in the
effort to establish counter-hegemony against the copyright power bloc, primarily because
of the sheer numbers engaging in the downloading and use of copyrighted works ..
The "heart of the DMCA"812 has been identified as the provisions that make it
illegal to gain access to a copyrighted work by circumventing a technological measure
that "effectively controls access"8 1 3 to such work. These anti-circumvention provisions
are deemed by the challengers to create a conflict between property rights of the
copyright holder and the political right of free speech. Since the right of access is a key
component of free speech rights, it is argued that the DMCA violates these rights.
Challengers have also argued that the Digital Millennium Copyright Act's provision
preventing access to materials that are subject to fair use is unconstitutional and an
infringement of First Amendment rights.

81 2

L. Ray Patterson, "Copyright in the New Millennium: Resolving the Conflict Between Property Rights
and Political Rights," Ohio State Law Journal 62 (2001): 703-732, 703.
8 13
17 U.S.C. § 1201 (a)(l)(A) (Supp. IV 1998).

407

A line of cases has developed as the judicial system has begun interpreting the
DMCA and its anti-circumvention provisions. They involve efforts by the government to
enforce the provisions through criminal actions and efforts by the copyright dominant
bloc to stop actions by individuals or groups engaged in decoding programs for purposes
they claim are within the scope of the fair use doctrine. The courts have responded to
critical issues raised by the DMCA regarding fair use and access.
Those in the group seeking counter-hegemony assert that the DMCA virtually
ignored the public interest as it granted sweeping new rights to major stakeholders in the
dominant hegemony, the copyright owners, the publishers and distributors. A broad
conflict of values centers on how U.S. copyright laws can best balance the need to create
incentives for authors to produce while allowing the public to benefit from the increased
body of works by maximizing public access. The value that authors have the right to
economically benefit from their creative works is pitted against the value that access to
information is imperative for producing the knowledge and growth of society.
Without introducing further details, it can be seen that this preliminary sketch of a
line of cases in which the parties are engaged in a legal struggle over the constitutionality
of the anti-circumvention provisions of the DMCA signifies a broad range of underlying
conflicts related to values of proprietary ownership and control of intellectual property
versus freedom of access and use of creative works.
The Gramscian/Galbraith theoretical framework focuses the researcher on issues
of hegemony and counter-hegemony at preliminary stages of the research. The
investigative frame allows the researcher to begin organizing the evidence relating to the
key entities and their history of involvement with the production, protection and use of
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creative works. The interests at stake for each entity can be explored with attention to the
public positions of the entities and the unspoken political and economic interests that
have contributed to the political contests and prompted the legal actions. Actions of the
legislature and the courts could be influenced by external influences, such as the U.S.
signing of the WIPO Copyright Treaty on December 20, 1996. 8 1 4 There are indications
that Congress is a strong ally of the copyright dominant bloc.
The legal investigative frame should be particularly useful in this case to clarify
the rulings on the law and legal principles (such as the fair use doctrine) and the values
that the judges are expressing through their opinions. The Gramscian and Galbraith
theories and the investigative frames suggest issues that are within the zones of conflict
and help the researcher develop research questions that require a deeper analysis of the
evidence on ownership, protection and use of creative works.
The context legal analysis developed in this dissertation assumes that every
constitutional legal challenge will signify underlying political conflicts that can be
understood by exploring relationships and actions based on hegemony and
counterhegemony. In concluding that Gramsci's theories remain viable in today's
political environment, Richard Bellamy and Darryl Schecter state:
[T]he dialectic between State and civil society to which he [Gramsci] drew
attention continues to be of fundamental importance for understanding the nature
and exercise of political power within industrial societies. Existing State
formations are currently undergoing dramatic and often contradictory
transformations, assailed as they are by international pressures from without and
increasingly localized national pressures from within . . . the general problem he

8 14

Paul Goldstein, International Copyright: Principles, Law, and Practice (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2001), 32.
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sought to address-namely, the construction of a viable democratic political
culture suited to a socially and economically diverse society-is more pressing
than ever. 815 .

815 Richard Bellamy and Darrow Schectert Gramsci and the Italian State (New York: Manchester
University Press, 1993), 167.
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APPENDIX A
DEFINITIONS
Agribusiness - Businesses related to agriculture and the food chain, including
agricultural production, processing and distribution, biotechnology, precision farming
(global positioning tools), farm and financial management, agricultural trade,
pharmaceuticals, chemicals, land development, agricultural e-commerce, environmental
impact management, risk management, utilization of agricultural byproducts and
agricultural systems management.
"AgriBiz" - Term used by author of this dissertation to describe a network of groups
that form the "industrial agriculture bloc" that exercises dominant hegemony in the
agricultural industry and is also an influence in the checkoff hegemony. The dominant
ideology of the AgriBiz hegemony in agriculture is centered around the corporate or
industrial agriculture model, a business model which has been widely adopted in the
business community as a means to compete globally and serve the culture and ideology
of American consumerism.
"AgriChoice" - Term used by researcher writing this dissertation to identify the counter
hegemony movement within the agricultural industry to recognize the rights of
independent ranchers and farmers to be have access to competitive markets, to support
sustainable agriculture as a viable alternative model to industrial agriculture, and to
engage in farming without coercive measures to participate in vertical integration and
concentration.
Amicus Curiae Briefs - "Friend of the court" briefs filed by an individual or
organization not a party to a lawsuit to present arguments on a case before the court.
Captive Supply - The USDA defines "captive supply" as "cattle that are controlled by or
committed to a packer more than 2 weeks prior to slaughter." See United States
Department of Agriculture GIPSA Report, Evaluation ofAgency Efforts to Monitor and
Investigate Anticompetitive Practices in the Meat Packing Industry (Wa. D.C.: GPO,
February 1997).
Agricultural Marketing Orders - Instructions issued by a Secretary of Agriculture at
the federal or state level for regulating the marketing and distribution of commodities.
Approximately three dozen commodities are subject to extensive federal regulation under
"marketing orders."

Central Hudson Test - An intermediate scrutiny test developed by the Supreme Court of
the United States in 1980 in the case of Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public
Service Commission ofNew York for determining whether a statute or regulation
restricting commercial advertising violates the First Amendment. · Under this test,
commercial speech does not violate the First Amendment if: 1 ) it concerns lawful
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activities and is not misleading, 2) the government interest is substantial, 3) the
regulation advances the governmental interest asserted (i.e., there is a reasonable fit
between regulation and policy goal), and 4) the regulation is no more extensive than
necessary.
Checkoffs - Term used to describe the mandatory commodity assessments used
primarily for generic product advertising that is intended to maintain and expand the
market for commodities. In addition to generic advertising, checkoff money is used for
administrative salaries, research and educational activities. Examples of generic
advertising slogans include: "Got Milk?" "The Other White Meat" and "Beef, It' s
What' s for Dinner." Checkoff programs are based on marketing orders that were first
implemented in legislation dating back to 1937 or on more recent stand-alone legislation.
Commodities - Livestock, raw milk, crops, fruits and vegetables.
Commodity Checkoffs - Mandatory assessments levied on commodities producers to

support generic commodities advertising. While commodity checkoffs are use primarily
for the promotion of commodities through generic advertising, they are also often used
for research, education and administrative purposes.
Commodity Industry Bloc - A power bloc comprised of the dominant groups (or
"fractions" according to Gramsci) within a particular commodity industry who are
aligned through alliances and ideology and exercise hegemony over the industry.
Commodity Producers - Farmers, ranchers or growers who produce livestock, raw

milk, crops, fruits or vegetables.

Compelled Commercial Speech - Generic advertising of commodities resulting from
mandatory assessments on commodity producers.
Concentration - Decreasing the number of business units or enterprises in a business

field while increasing the size of each.

Contract Producers - Farmers, ranchers or growers who produces a commodity under a

production contract.

Counter-hegemony - Efforts by subordinate groups to effect change in the dominant
hegemony controlling the social-political formation of society or controlling other
domains, such as commodity production. The challengers engage in a hegemonic
struggle with the power bloc exercising hegemony by using moral and philosophical
arguments, economic strategies, state apparatus, the courts and other means to break the
hegemony. In Gramsic's writings, the counter-hegemony was directed against a
political-economic hegemony exercised by a "historic bloc."
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Countervailing Power - A regulatory mechanism that occurs when strong buyers assert

themselves against the market power of suppliers or producers of consumer goods. The
condition of countervailing power can also occur when the buyer is a manager and the
seller is a seller of labor. The group seeking countervailing power is usually a larger
disadvantaged group that is facing a small, more advantaged group.

Factory Farm - Production of animals or plants for use in the food chain using business

practices of assembly line uniformity, large volumes, structured business practices and
homogenous outputs. Livestock grown under this model are kept in large confinement
facilities to create consistency in the processed food and take advantage ·of economies of
scale.
Family Farm - The USDA defines a family farm as:

An agricultural business which 1) produces agricultural commodities for sale in
such quantities so as to be recognized as a farm rather than a rural residence; 2)
produces enough income (including off farm employment) to pay family and farm
·operating expenses, to pay debts, and to maintain the property; 3) is managed by
the operator; 4) has a substantial amount of labor provided by the operator and
family; and 5) may use seasonal labor during peak periods and a reasonable
amount of full-time hired labor. See United States Department of Agriculture,
Agriculture Fact Book 2000 (Wa. D.C.: GPO, November 2000).

Fraction - A group within a dominant hegemony that Gramsci calls a hegemonic class.
Globalization - The process of making something worldwide in application. In

agriculture, this refers to a worldwide system of sourcing raw materials, producing,
processing, selling and transporting food products and related chemicals, equipment and
biotechnological in the global borderless marketplace.
Government Speech - Communication resulting from the government's affirmative
decision to express itself. Examples: Recruiting posters saying "Join the Army";
advertisements to "Buy U.S. Savings Bonds," USDA nutrition guidelines, instructions
regarding taxes or Medicare, etc. The USDA has argued that generic commodities
advertising is government speech while the challengers assert that such advertising is
collective private speech.
"Gramscian/Galbraith Legal Context Analysis" - A structured research method for

gathering and analyzing evidence to facilitate a broader understanding of what is at stake
for parties in lawsuits engaged in intense hegemonic struggles over constitutional issues.
Hegemony - A concept developed by the Italian theorist, Antonio Gramsdas, as an
expansion of Marxist theory. Hegemony exists when a provisional alliance of social and
political groups is formed and gains legitimacy and dominance through political,
intellectual and moral leadership. People are united through a shared world view that is
reinforced by consensus between state and private institutions.
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Historic Bloc - Term used by Antonio Gramsci to refer to the social formation of a civil
and political group around a hegemonic project.
Industrial Agriculture Bloc - A power bloc of individuals in agriculture, business,
academia, biotechnology research, chemical and pesticide development and government
that are centrally organized around the hegemonic project of industrial agriculture. The
central organizers are concentrated and vertically integrated commodity producers .
Industrial Agriculture Model - A business and technological approach to agriculture
that includes elements such as: economic growth, profit, industrial process, and
conversion of natural foods into commercial products by using methods and systems that
are governed by productivity and efficiency objectives . Crops grown using the industrial
agriculture model are often characterized by monoculture (growing one crop on vast
amounts of farmland). The industrial agriculture approach also promotes the use of
pesticides and biotechnology to seek more homogeneity.
Investigative Frame - Term used by author of this dissertation to identify a structured
approach used to organize facts and study the relationship between First Amendment
compelled speech cases and a hegemonic conflict within the agriculture industry.
Land Grant Universities - Universities and colleges that received federal funding under
the Morrill Acts of 1862 and 1 890 for developing programs in the areas of agriculture
homemaking and mechanical arts. States and territories also received land from the
federal government for this purpose.
Legal Investigative Frame - Term used by author of this dissertation to identify a
structured approach used to study a line of cases, the historical facts, the interests at stake
for the judiciary and other key elements.
Livestock Packers and Processors - The business entities in the beef and pork food
production chain that slaughter, process and package cattle and hogs.
Marketing Orders - Regulatory schemes designed to achieve orderly marketing goals
through government regulation of agricultural commodities including: 1 ) regulation of
supply and quality, and 2) consolidation of commodity payments for promotion and
research. They arise when an industry actively initiates the through an industry initiative,
approval by the Secretary
Retailers - Business organizations that sell commodities to ultimate consumers.
Sustainable Agriculture - An approach to farming and production of food that stresses
the long-term habitability of the world and promotes environmentally sound farming
practices that conserve and renew the earth 's resources.
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"State" - A set of organizations invested with the authority to make binding decisions
for people and organizations located within a particular territory and to implement these
decisions using force, if necessary.
Transnational Corporation - A corporation that competes on a global scale with few
or no national alliances. The business organization is accountable solely to deliver profits
to shareholders and directors residing in different countries. The emergence of trans
national corporations with extensive abilities to influence trade and economic policies has
created a new global power base that has arguably supplanted nation states. The
transnational corporation is the entity around which other groups ally themselves in the
"industrial agriculture bloc."
Vertical Integration - A business model that occurs when one entity controls one or
more steps in production from the raw materials to the consumer. This reduces the
number of business transactions and their associated costs and creates a shortened supply
chain.
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APPENDIX B
ANNOTATED LIST OF COMPELLED
COMMERCIAL SPEECH CASES
United States v. Rock Royal CO-OP, Inc., 307 U.S . 533 (1939). The government sought
to collect mandatory fees from several milk processors in accordance with a milk order
and the 1937 Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act. The milk processors agued that"
1) their due process rights were violated under the 5th Amendment, 2) the Tenth
Amendment prohibited the federal government from fixing the price of milk prior to the
commencement of interstate commerce, and 3) that the authority accorded the Secretary
of Agriculture violated their property rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. This
authority included the right of the Secretary to delineate marketing areas, to implement
marketing orders based solely on the consent of the producers and not the processors, and
to authorize bloc voting by farming cooperatives on behalf of their members. The
District Court held for the challengers, but the Supreme Court overruled in favor of the
government.
United States v. Frame, 885 F.2d 1 1 19 (3rd Cir. 1989) The Third Circuit applied the
Central Hudson test and found the Beef Promotion and Research Act was constitutional.
However, the court was unwilling to accept the government' s argument that the
promotional expression of the Cattleman' s Board constituted "government speech."
Cal-Almond v. United States, 14 F.3d 429 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 5 19 U.S. 963
(1996). Under the Central Hudson test, the Ninth Circuit held that the First Amendment
rights to freedom of expression and association of two groups of almond handlers were
violated by the California Almond Marketing Order. The court found that the evidence
on record indicated that the regulations in reality hindered the efforts of the handlers to
increase sales and returns to growers.
Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc. v. Espy, 58 F.3d 1 367 (9th Cr. 1995), rev 'd sub nom.
Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, 521 U.S . 457 (1997). In keeping with its decision
in the Cal-Almond case, the Ninth Circuit held that federal marketing order for California
tree fruit was unconstitutional due to its failure to meet the second and third prongs of the
Central Hudson test.
Glickman v. Wileman Brothers & Elliott, Inc., 521 U.S. 457 (1997). This case gave the
Supreme Court a chance to resolve the conflict between the Third and Ninth Circuits. In
a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court held that the mandatory assessments on fruit growers
did not raise First Amendment issues, and analyzed the case under a freedom of
association theory. It noted that the assessments did not impose a restraint on the
plaintiffs' freedom to communicate, did not compel them to engage in actual or symbolic
speech and did not compel them to endorse or finance political or ideological views that
were not germane to the purposes for which the compelled association was justified. The
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court also emphasized that this marketing order involved a complex regulatory scheme,
of which the generic commodity advertising was only one part.
Goetz v. Glickman, 149 F.3d 1131 (10th Cir. 1998). Kansas cattle farmer claimed his
First Amendment rights were violated by beef checkoffs. District Court ruled in favor of
USDA. Tenth Circuit upheld ruling of District Court, but relied on Glickman v.
Wileman, to conclude that the lower court incorrectly applied Central Hudson test.
Gallo Cattle Co. v. Ca. Milk Advisory Bd., 185 F.3d 969 (9th Cr. 1999). The Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals held that the marketing order in question requiring mandatory
assessments for generic advertising did not violate the First Amendment rights of the
milk producer. The Court applied the three-part test from Glickman v. Wileman, but did
not address whether a complex regulatory scheme (such as the marketing scheme in
Wileman) was prerequisite for applying Wileman.
Cal-Almond Inc. v. United States, 192 F.3d 1272 (9th Cr. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S.Ct.
2215 (2000). Ninth Circuit held that an almond marketing order does not violate the First
Amendment by imposing mandatory assessments on individual almond handlers to fund
collective generic almond promotion.
Gerawan Farming v. Lyons, 42 Ca. 4th 468 (2000). The California Supreme Court held
that the mandatory assessments against plum growers under the California Plum
Marketing Program (of which 55% of the revenue was used for generic advertising) did
not raise First Amendment free speech issues under the U.S. Constitution as interpreted
by the U.S. Supreme Court in the Glickman v. Wileman case. However, the California
Supreme Court strongly criticized the Wileman ruling and reached the conclusion that the
mandatory assessments implicated Gerawan' s free speech rights under the California
Constitution.
Gerawan Farming, Inc. v. Lyons, Super. Ct. No. F031142 (5 th Appellate Dist., State of
Cal. 2001). Upon remand from the California Supreme Court, the state appellate court
adopted an intermediate scrutiny balancing test for evaluating the constitutionality of the
plum marketing order under the free speech clause of the California State Constitution.
It held that checkoff program was unconstitutional.
United States v. United Foods, 533 U.S. 405 (2001). The U.S. Supreme Court held that
the mandatory assessments against mushroom growers imposed by the Mushroom
Promotion, Research, and Consumer Information Act of 1990 for purposes of generic
advertising were unconstitutional. It distinguished this case from Glickman v. Wileman
on the grounds that the primary purpose of the assessments against the mushroom
growers was to solicit funds for generic advertising rather than to support a complex
regulatory scheme like the one regulating the fruit growing industry. The Supreme Court
declined to hear the government's argument on "government speech" on the grounds that
it was raised for the first time after the court granted certiorari. It affirmed the 6th Circuit
decision overturning the district court's finding of summary judgment in favor of the
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government and sent the case back to the district court. The government has sought to
continue the case and introduce a government speech defense on the grounds that the
Supreme Court decision only denied summary judgment for the defendant and was not
dispositive of the case. Two actions pending in the Western District Court of Tennessee
are dormant while awaiting the decision of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in
Michigan Pork Producers v. Campaign for Family Farms.
Livestock Marketing Association v. United States, Livestock Marketing Association v.
USDA, Nos. 02-2 769 and 02-2832, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 13630 (8th Cir. 2003).
District court decision rejecting the government speech argument and holding beef ·
checkoffs unconstitutional was upheld by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals on July 8,
2003.
Jean Charter and Steve Charter v. United States, 230 F. Supp. 2d 1121 (D. Montana
2002). District Court decision on November 1, 2002, recognizing government speech and
holding beef checkoffs unconstitutional is currently being appealed in the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals. Briefing concluded in July 2003 and oral arguments are expected to be
scheduled for fall 2003.
Michigan Pork Producers v. Campaign /or Family Farms, 229 F. Supp. 2d 772 (W.D.
Mich. 2002), as corrected October 31, 2002. Decision holding pork checkoffs
unconstitutional is being evaluated by the USDA and the federal Justice Department with
regard to whether the government will file an appeal. An appeal in the Michigan case
was argued before the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals on March 14, 2003. This is the
court that held the mushroom checkoffs unconstitutional in the recent United Foods case.
Joseph P. Cochran, et al. v. Ann Veneman, et al. and Fred Lovell, 2003 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 4361 (Middle Dist. Penn. 2003). Joseph and Brenda Cochran and the Center for
Individual Freedom brought suit in the U.S. District Court in Scranton, Pennsylvania.
The plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment and the defendents then filed a
motion to dismiss or in the alternative, for summary judgment. As dairy producers
required to pay checkoffs under the Dairy Promotion Stabilization Act of 1983, plaintiffs
claimed the commodity checkoffs violated their First Amendment rights. The District
Court granted the defendants' motions for summary judgment and upheld the diary
checkoffs on the grounds that the regulatory environment for the dairy industry (which
consists of eleven federal marketing orders) more closely resembles the facts in Glickman
v. Wileman that the facts in United States v. United Foods. Joseph and Brenda Cochran
filed an appeal with the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
Delano Farms Company, et al. v. California Table Grape Commission, No. 00-16778
(9th Cir. January 27, 2003). The challengers, Delano Farms, Susan Neill Company and
Lucas Brothers, sells table grapes under brand names. The Ninth Circuit appellate court
held that the facts of this case were more similar to United Foods than Wileman,
because: "the scheme does not collectivize the industry, about 90% of the assessment
money is spent on generic promotional activities, and there is no antitrust exemption."
Delano Farms at 9. The court referred to its earlier 1999 decisions in Gallo Cattle
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Company v. California Milk Advisory Board and Cal-Almond Inc. v. U.S. Department of
Agriculture and stated that it did not need to reexamine its analyses in those cases in light
of the United Foods case, because they are distinguishable from United Foods based on
the fact that both involve marketing orders under the same 1937 statute that was
controlling in Wileman. The Ninth Circuit reversed the lower court ruling granting the
Grape Commission a dismissal, so the case has returned to the district court for trial.
In Re Washington Apple Advertising Commission, No. CS-01 -0278-EFS (E.D. Wa.
March 14, 2003). The Washington Apple Advertising Commission contacted parties and
initiated this lawsuit to determine the constitutionality of its checkoff program. The
federal district court granted a preliminary injunction to apple producers who challenged
the Washington state apple checkoff program. The court found that the apple checkoff
activities did not constitute government speech, that the Apple Commission was not a
governmental entity, and that the Apple Commission was not disseminating the
government's message because it did not meet the prerequisite of government control of
the entity. The Commission has shut down its offices.
State of Fla., Dept. of Citrus v. Graves Brothers Company, Tampa Juice Services, et
al. , No. 2DO03-2276, 2d Dist. Court of App., Florida.
The circuit court determined that the State of Florida's activities in collecting a "box tax"
from citrus fruit growers and generating generic advertising to promote Florida citrus
fruit was not government speech because if was not funded by the general revenue funds
of the state. The court then subjected the case to a First Amendment review and found
that the box tax was unconstitutional under United Foods and Glickman. It granted the
plaintiff fruit growers' motion for partial summary judgment. The State of Florida has
appealed.
Pelts & Skins, L.L.C. v. James Jenkins, Jr., Secretary of the Louisiana Department of
Wildlife and Fisheries, No. 02-384-A, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7014 (Middle Dist.
Louisiana 2003). The district court granted summary judgment to the plaintiff, an
alligator farmer who objected to paying mandatory fees to the state of Louisiana for
generic marketing of alligator products without differentiation as to type, quality or
brand. The court rejected the government speech defense on the grounds that there is a
"close nexus between the alligator producers and the message funded." Pelts & Skins at
2 1 . It found that the alligator industry resembled the facts in the United Foods case than
the Glickman case. The Department of Wildlife and Fisheries has filed an appeal with the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.
Cases Addressing Freedom of Association and Compelled Funding:

Abood v. Detroit Board of Education 43 1 U.S. 209 (1977) Union-management agency
shop agreements, which require that every employee pay the union a service charge equal
to the amount of union dues, impinge on employees' right to be free from compelled
affirmation of belief and compelled association for expressive purposes.
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Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977). State law requiring citizens to bear state
slogan, "Live or Die," on automobile license plates implicates First Amendment rights
because law requires individuals to participate in the dissemination of an ideological
message.
Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 ( 1984). Court upheld an order of the
Minnesota Department of Human Rights compelling the Jaycees to admit women in local
chapters. Although the Court found that the constitutional rights of the Jaycees were not
sufficiently violated, Justice Brennan' s opinion contained the following points that
provided guidance for future compelled association cases: 1) freedom of association is
constitutionally protected, 2) freedom of association presupposes a freedom not to
associate, and 3) the appropriate standard for analyzing an infringement on the right of
association is whether it serves a compelling state interest.
Keller v. State Bar of Cal. 496 U.S. 1 (1990). Court unanimously rejected the California
State Bar Association' s efforts to utilize compulsory dues to finance political and
ideological activities favored by less than the majority of its members.
Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Association, 500 U.S. 507 ( 1991). Court relied on Abood and
Chicago Teachers Union v.Hudson, 475 U.S. 292 (1986) in holding that fees used for
lobbying activities are not sufficiently connected to collective bargaining to compel
employees to comply.
Smith v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 4 Cal 4th 843 (1993). Judgment of the Court of
Appeal affirmed with respect to its ruling on collecting mandatory student activities fee.
The Regents of the University of California may impose the fee
Board of Regents of the Unviersity of Wisconsin System v. Southworth, 529 U.S . 217
(2000). The Supreme Court held that the First Amendment was not violated when a
public university charged students mandatory fees to fund extracurricular speech,
provided that the university exercised viewpoint neutrality in allocating the funding to the
student organizations engaging in such speech. Government speech is mentioned in this
case in the following dicta:
Our decision ought not to be taken to imply that in other instances the University,
its agents or employees, or--of particular importance-its faculty, are subject to
the First Amendment analysis which controls in this case. Where the Unviersity
speaks, either in its own name through its regents or officers, or in myriad other
ways through its diverse faculties, the analysis likely would be altogether
different. . . (citations omitted). The Court has not held, or suggested, that when
the government speaks the rules we have discussed come into play. Southworth at
234-235.
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APPENDIX C
CRITERIA FOR ANALYZING COMPELLED
COMMERCIAL SPEECH CASES
1) Does the court recognize that the compelled commercial speech case involves a
First Amendment issue?
2) If so, what standard of First Amendment protection does the court apply in its
decision-making? Does the court apply the Central Hudson test for commercial
speech and analyze the case using the established intermediate scrutiny standard
for First Amendment protection of commercial speech? Or does the court apply
the Abood analysis for analyzing freedom from compelled speech and compelled
association by using the strict scrutiny standard as outlined in the Roberts case?
3) What justification does it the court offer for selecting its First Amendment
standard for analysis?
4) Does the court state a rationale for treating commercial speech differently than
private speech?
5) Are the cases that the court relies upon as precedent sufficiently similar to be
controlling?
6) Is this decision consistent with earlier decisions on compelled commercial
speech? If not, how is this case distinguished?
7) How does this case fit within the current trend in First Amendment doctrine
toward affording broader protection for commercial speech?
8) How does this case fit within the current trend in First Amendment doctrine
toward expanding the Abood concept to new fact situations?
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9) Does the Court identify any underlying public policy, economic or political issues
as factors for consideration in reaching its decision?
10) Does the Court acknowledge any of the agricultural industry interests at stake?
1 1) Does this case contribute to the predictive value of the current line of compelled
commercial speech cases?
12) Does the Court recognize the USDA' s argument for government speech as a
legitimate defense to the First Amendment claims? Does the Court apply the
defense in reaching its decision?
13) Does this case serve as a "catalyst" or a "brake" in the process of generating
change in a) the agricultural hegemony, or b) First Amendment commerci al
speech doctrine?
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APPENDIX D
SAMPLE INTERVIEW QUESTIONS
1) Are you familiar with commodity checkoff programs? How would you describe
them?
2) Do you feel that commodity checkoffs have a positive impact on the industries they
support? If so, what are the benefits? If not, why do you think they fail to add value?
3) How do commodity checkoffs impact various agricultural producers? (large
producers, corporate producers, independent ranchers, farmers and dairy farmers)
4) Do you agree with the way in which the revenues from commodity checkoffs are
being spent by respective industries? Why or why not?
5) Do you agree with the messages and focus of today' s generic commodities
advertising? If not, what alternative message would you like to see advertised?
6) What specific groups do you feel represent the various interests in the agricultural
industry with respect to commodity checkoffs? (Government, industry trade groups,
grassroots groups, parties to lawsuits, etc.)
a) What goals are openly expressed by each group?
b) Are there any unstated objectives that you can also identify?
7) What interests do you think are at stake for each of these groups in the current
conflict over commodity checkoffs?
a) What does each group stand to lose?
b) Which groups have shared interests?
8) Which groups do you think have the most power? The least power? Why?

45 1

9) Do you think this will change in any way if commodity checkoffs are held
unconstitutional? Why or why not?
10) What factions within the agricultural industry are openly in conflict over checkoffs?
1 1) Do you see this as a recent development or are the differences longstanding?
12) With which groups are you most closely aligned? Why?
13) Should the groups representing the various industries do anything to accommodate
the unhappy minorities? If so, what would be appropriate?
14) What alternatives to the current commodity checkoff programs do you feel might be
worth pursuing?
15) When did you first become aware that the First Amendment free speech argument
was a viable position in the conflict over commodity checkoffs?
a) What was your reaction to the use of a First Amendment argument by
challengers?
b) Do you feel that requiring mandatory payments for generic advertising is a
violation of First Amendment rights?
16) Do you think that commercial speech or advertising should receive the same level of
protection as political or private speech? Should advertisers have the same freedom
to publicly share messages as individual speakers?
17) How much protection do you feel should be afforded compelled commercial speech?
Should the courts recognize the right of a commodity producer not to engage in the
advertising of messages such producer does not support?
18) Should commodity producers be entitled to opt out of commodity checkoff
programs? What effect will this have on the overall results of the programs?
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19) What kinds of changes are occurring in the agricultural industry? (Please elaborate
based on your background and expertise.) What do you think is driving these
changes?
20) Which changes are positive and which are negative for . . .
a) the future of agriculture in the U.S.?
b) the future of the independent farmer or rancher?
c) the future potential to sustain a desirable quality of life for commodity producers?
d) the future of the U.S . as a global agricultural competitor?
e) the future ability to maintain a healthy ecosystem for commodity production?
21) Is generic advertising useful in responding to these changes? In what ways?
22) Do you feel the current laws adequately address the issues raised by these
agricultural changes? What further legislation would you like to see enacted? Is such
further legislation moderately needed or urgently needed?
23) Do you agree with the way in which the past and present Secretaries of Agriculture
(Daniel Glickman and Anne Veneman, respectively) have handled the referendum
challenges to commodity checkoffs? Why or why not?
24) Do you agree with the USDA' s aggressive efforts to fight the challenges to
commodity checkoffs in the courts? Why do you think the USDA is fighting so hard?
25) Are you familiar with the "government speech defense" that is being used by the
USDA?
26) What is your opinion of this defense? Do you agree with the argument that generic
advertising created by commodity producers is "government speech"? Why or why
not?
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27) If the courts accept the government speech argument, what will be the
consequences?
a) Do you foresee any changes in the decision-making and power exercised by the
groups involved in the commodity checkoff programs?
b) If so, do you think these would be positive changes?
28) What is your opinion about the recent Supreme Court case (United States v. United
Foods) holding that the mushroom checkoffs assessed against the mushroom growers

in Tennessee are unconstitutional?
29) Do you believe that mandatory commodity checkoffs are compelled speech?
30) What is your opinion on other pending cases filed by parties using First Amendment
arguments to challenge checkoffs in the dairy, pork and beef industries? (Interviewer
will mention recent status and developments in pending cases.)
3 1) What consequences do you think will occur if the Supreme Court ultimately holds
that mandatory assessments are unconstitutional?
32) If you are familiar with the Central Hudson intermediate standard for protection· of
commercial speech? What consequences do you think will arise if the Supreme Court
switches to a stricter standard for protecting commercial speech?
33) Who else would you suggest I contact in exploring this research subject?
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